Niall Wermter v The Information Commissioner & Anor

This is an appeal against the Commissioner’s decision notice IC-339810-G3Z0 of 5 June 2025 which held that the London Borough of Camden (‘the Council’) were entitled to rely on regulation 12(4)(b) (manifestly unreasonable request) of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR). The Commissioner did not require the public authority to take any steps.

The appellant produced a number of additional documents on the morning of the hearing. The second respondent took a pragmatic approach and agreed to those documents being relied on. We took those documents into account where relevant.

Under rule 14 the redacted sections of those documents will not be disclosed to anyone other than the parties.

The appellant made an application for disclosure of an email. The tribunal refused that application for the reasons given orally in the hearing.

There are two background issues in this appeal. The first relates to the legality of water charges made by Councils and related caselaw. The second relates to a dispute that the appellant had with the Council’s social services department and the course of dealings that arose out of that dispute.

Jones v Southwark London Borough Council [2016] EWHC 457 (Ch) and Kingston-Upon-Thames v Moss [2020] EWCA Civ 1381 concerned agreements between the local authorities and water undertakers (the water companies), under which the local authorities collected charges for water and sewerage from tenants. In those cases the courts held that the local authorities were ‘resellers’ within the Water Resale Orders, rather than the agents of the water companies. This meant that there was a statutory cap on the amount the local authorities could charge. Although tenants were paying the same amount that they would have paid if they had been billed by the water company directly, the statutory cap is calculated by reference to the amount payable by the local authority to the water company under the agreement. As a result, the local authorities in question were required, in effect, to pass on to their tenants the benefit of any reductions or allowances agreed with the water company. As the local authorities had not passed on those reductions or allowances, the charges made to the tenants exceeded the maximum charge.

Following the decisions in Jonesand Moss a number of local authorities have set up schemes to repay tenants the overcharged amounts.

The Council’s position is that it had a different arrangement with Thames Water, however it has established a provision in its accounts of £3.7m to meet the estimated costs of reclaims against historical Thames Water utility charges.

A ‘provision’ can only be established in a public authority’s accounts if it meets the following criteria as listed in the Code of Practice on Local Authority Accounting in the United Kingdom, which is based on International Financial Reporting Standards and statutory guidance:

In August and September 2023 the appellant became involved in a dispute with the Council’s social services department. The dispute concerned the appellant’s involvement in the care and welfare of a third party. The appellant was very dissatisfied with decisions limiting his involvement and contact with the third party and the way the situation was handled by the social services department. He says that the social services department then stopped communicating with him altogether, which created an impasse. The appellant describes the situation as follows:

“Through my interaction with Camden's social services directive throughout 2023, it became clear that arbitrary and capricious decisions were being routinely made that were both immoral and unlawful. Far from safeguarding and promoting the well-being of the vulnerable, as the Care Act 2014 requires, social services' actions and omissions were doing the opposite. When challenged, two senior officers on two separate occasions became verbally venomous. I recorded these unpleasant outbursts and then told the officers concerned that I had done so. Thereafter Camden's social services went silent. I advised the senior officers through unanswered emails that their bilious tirades compounding their failure to work within the parameters of law together with their refusal to engage in necessary dialogue thereafter constituted common law criminal offences of misconduct in public office.”

It is not the tribunal’s role to make a judgement on whether the social services department were justified in acting as they did, but we recognise that the situation was extremely upsetting for the appellant and has clearly affected him deeply.

Mr. Wermter made the request that is the subject of this appeal on 6 June 2024:

“I would now request that Camden send me copies of all agreements between itself and Thames Water Utilities from 1989 until March 2019, together with any deeds of variation, clarification and the like.

Any clause in these documents purporting to prevent disclosure by reason of commercial sensitivity should be disregarded - these agreements and any variations to them have been terminated or have expired, as have all other such agreements between TWU and other local authorities.

These copy documents should be posted to my home address.”

The Council wrote to the appellant on 27 June 2024 extending the deadline for a response under EIR until 2 August 2024. The Council responded substantively on 2 August 2024. The Council refused to provide the information, relying on regulation 12(4)(b) EIR on the basis that the request was manifestly unreasonable. It upheld its position on internal review on 3 October 2024.

The Commissioner had not seen the requested information but decided that the requested information was environmental because information relating to the Council’s contract with Thames Water was likely to be information on measures and plans which will affect the elements of the environment outlined in Regulation 2(1)(a) of the EIR.

The Commissioner found that the impact of dealing with this level of correspondence and unreasonable behaviour represented a disproportionate or unjustified level of disruption. He accepted that in isolation the request appeared to have a serious purpose, however he was satisfied that the motivation for the request was to cause disruption and it has no serious purpose. He said that he did not accept that corresponding using inappropriate and/or abusive language should be tolerated by public authorities. The Commissioner noted that the appellant’s behaviour escalated following the request, but was satisfied that had the Council continued to engage with the complainant there would continue to be disproportionate or unjustified levels of disruption. This was supported by evidence that the appellant was responsible for a second request for the same information. On that basis the Commissioner was satisfied that the exception was engaged.

In relation to the public interest, the Commissioner accepted that disclosing the information would increase transparency and allow the public a greater ability to understand the contract between Thames Water and the Council. Taking into account the significant burden that responding to the request would place on the Council, balanced against the information which is already published in relation to its connection with Thames Water, the Commissioner decided that the public interest in the exception being maintained outweighed the public interest in disclosure.

The appellant has not explicitly set out his grounds of appeal, but it is apparent that the grounds of appeal are as follows:

The Commissioner relied on the Decision Notice. He submitted that in all the circumstances the request was manifestly unreasonable. He noted that in Craven v Information Commissioner and DECC [2015] EWCA Civ 454 the Upper Tribunal held that for all intents and purposes the term ‘manifestly unreasonable’ under regulation 12(4)(b) has the same meaning as ‘vexatious’ under section 14(1) FOIA.

His view was that the balance of the public interest favoured the maintenance of the exception, rather than being equally balanced. This meant that the Commissioner’s decision, whilst informed by the presumption provided for in regulation 12(2), was that the exception provided by regulation 12(4)(b) was applied correctly.

To the extent that the tribunal considers it necessary to determine if the EIR was engaged, the Council submitted that the contract with Thames Water, as an agreement relating to the supply of water, is information on a measure which will affect the elements of the environment. The Council submitted that the Commissioner was correct to conclude that the EIR applied and, in any event, that the tests under FOIA and EIR are, in essence, identical.

The Council submitted that it is clear from the evidence submitted to the Commissioner that the appellant has pursued a relentless and often vitriolic campaign against the Council and certain members of staff in relation to the requested information. The Council submitted that the pattern of abusive, intemperate and occasionally aggressive behaviour has persisted for an extensive period of time including verbal (voicemail) and written (email) acts of harassment, which on occasions occurred several times during the course of the same day. The Council submitted that evidence of ulterior motive indicated that the allegations would be withdrawn if the social services dispute was concluded to the appellant’s satisfaction, and that it is self-evident that such conduct is inherently inappropriate.

In all the circumstances of the case, the Council submitted that it reasonably determined that the public interest in maintaining the exception clearly outweighed the public interest in disclosing the information.

The appellant submitted that the request is a FOIA request because the request is not for ‘environmental information’. He submitted that the Council deliberately applied EIR in order to benefit from the regulation 7 extension of time, albeit that the appellant submitted that regulation 7 did not apply in any event, because the request was not complex or the requested information voluminous.

The appellant submitted that the tribunal should determine if the request was vexatious under section 14 FOIA, but accepted that ‘vexatious’ and ‘manifestly unreasonable’ under FOIA EIR are for all intents and purposes synonymous and that the same underlying guidelines and holistic test from Dransfield apply.

The appellant submitted that the behaviour of the public authority is relevant. He submitted that his insistent, persistent and assertive tone was contextually justified and that his admittedly at times heated manner was an understandable human and inevitable reaction to ever more dismissive, evasive, provocative and, indeed, vexatious behaviour on the part of Camden's staff, together with the underlying very serious purpose of the request - to expose fraud perpetrated by senior council officers and seek redress of those affected by that fraud.

The Appellant submitted that senior Camden officers particularly harmed relations by making scurrilous and false accusations of sexually offensive language and homophobic and transphobic slurs which contributed to the deterioration of relations and have been improperly relied upon to justify a finding of vexatiousness against the Appellant.

He submitted that the distress caused to senior officers by the custodial consequences of disclosure cannot turn an otherwise proper request into a vexatious one.

The appellant submitted that the request had a very serious purpose and an exceptionally strong public interest. He submitted that there was substantial and compelling evidence of wrongdoing. He submitted that the requested documents are directly relevant to further evidencing a significant fraud upon its own tenants and leaseholders by senior Camden officers. He said that a request aimed at exposing serious wrongdoing should not be refused as vexatious.

In relation to motive the appellant submitted that his letter of 15 November 2023 to the borough solicitor Andrew Maughan, presented him with two clear options. He said that through inaction and abuse, Maughan and other senior officers chose the path the appellant consequently took and ‘on their heads be it’.

He submitted that, in any event, a request aimed at exposing serious wrongdoing should not be refused as vexatious, whatever the imputed motive. He quoted paragraph 68 of Dransfield in the Court of Appeal: :"If a requester pursues his rights against authority out of vengeance for some other decision of its, it may be said that his actions were improperly motivated but it may also be that his request was without any reasonable foundation. But this could not be said, however vengeful the requester, if the request was aimed at the disclosure of important information which ought to be made publicly available…”

The appellant submitted that the request by Mr Foot, the deputy editor of a local newspaper, made the request of his own volition and the appellant was not responsible for that request. He submitted that if a local newspaper considers information newsworthy that reinforces the serious purpose in the request and the clear public interest in the information.

In conclusion the appellant submitted that the request has a clear serious purpose and substantial public interest value far outweighing any distress of the Council's staff. He said that the Council’s own conduct first created and then exacerbated the acrimonious relationship. He submitted that the Commissioner's caseworker failed entirely to conduct the proper holistic assessment under s.14(1).

Council Directive 2003/4/EC on Public Access to Environmental Information (‘the Directive’) sets out a regime for public access to environmental information held by Public authorities in the Member States. It implements the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s (UN/ECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 1998 (‘Aarhus’).

The importance of the obligation to provide access to environmental information is seen from the recitals to the Directive and the Aarhus Convention. The first recital to the Directive states that:

“…increased public access to environmental information and the dissemination of such information contribute to a greater awareness of environmental matters, a free exchange of views, more effective participation by the public in environmental decision-making and, eventually, to a better environment.”

The recitals to the Aarhus Convention include:

“…citizens must have access to information, be entitled to participate in decision-making and have access to justice in environmental matters

…

improved access to information and public participation in decision-making enhance the quality and the implementation of decisions, contribute to public awareness of environmental issues, give the public the opportunity to express its concerns and enable public authorities to take due account of such concerns.”

Regulation 12 EIR provides, insofar as relevant:

“(1)

Subject to paragraphs (2), (3) and (9), a public authority may refuse to disclose environmental information requested if–

(a)

an exception to disclosure applies under paragraphs (4) or (5); and

(b)

in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.

(2)

A public authority shall apply a presumption in favour of disclosure.

…

(4)

For the purposes of paragraph 1(a), a public authority may refuse to disclose information to the extent that-

…

(b)

the request is manifestly unreasonable.”

The following analysis is adopted, with only minor changes to the wording, from the Upper Tribunal decision in Vesco v (1) Information Commissioner and (2) Government Legal Department [2019] UKUT 247 (TCC)).

As the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has said:

“The right to information means that the disclosure of information should be the general rule and that public authorities should be permitted to refuse a request for environmental information only in a few specific and clearly defined cases. The grounds for refusal should therefore be interpreted restrictively, in such a way that the public interest served by disclosure is weighed against the interest served by the refusal”. (Office for Communications v Information Commissioner Case C-71/10 at paragraph 22).

This is why the EIR is deliberately different from the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”) in that all exceptions are subject to a public interest test and there is a presumption in favour of disclosure.

The EIR does not contain an express obligation to interpret grounds for refusal in a restrictive way, but, given the obligation to interpret the EIR purposively in accordance with the Directive the overall result in practice ought to be the same: the grounds for refusal under the EIRs should be interpreted in a restrictive way (Vesco v (1) Information Commissioner and (2) Government Legal Department [2019] UKUT 247 (TCC))

A three-stage test applies, on the wording of Regulation 12:

Under the first stage we must decide if the request is manifestly unreasonable. Authorities on “vexatiousness” under Section 14 of FOIA are of assistance at this stage. The parties agree that the tests for vexatiousness and manifest unreasonableness are, for the purposes of this appeal, materially the same (Craven v Information Commissioner and Department for Energy and Climate Change [2012] UKUT 442, and Craven/Dransfield v Information Commissioner [2015] 1 WLR 5316 at paragraph 78).

The starting point is whether the request has no reasonable foundation, that is, no reasonable foundation for thinking that the information sought would be of value to the requester, or to the public or any section of the public, judged objectively (Dransfield v Information Commissioner [2015] 1 WLR 5316 at paragraph 68, Beggs v Information Commissioner 2019 SLT 173 paragraphs 26-29). The hurdle of satisfying the test is a high one.

The lack of a reasonable foundation to a request is only the starting point to an analysis which must consider all the relevant circumstances. It is clear from the Court of Appeal’s decision that the public interest in the information which is the subject of the request cannot act as a ‘trump card’ so as to tip the balance against a finding of vexatiousness (see CP v Information Commissioner [2016] UKUT 427 (AAC) and Cabinet Office v Information Commissioner and Ashton [2018] UKUT 208 (AAC).

In considering manifest unreasonableness, it may be helpful to consider factors set out by the Upper Tribunal in Dransfield v Information Commissioner and Devon County Council [2012] UKUT 440 at paragraph 28. These are:

This is not an exhaustive checklist, and other factors that may be relevant are previous requests (including number, subject matter, breadth and pattern), whether they were to the same or a different body, the time lapse since the previous requests, and whether matters may have changed during that time. If, after applying the first stage of the test, the conclusion is that the request is not manifestly unreasonable, then the information requested should be disclosed (assuming no other exemptions apply).

If it has been established that a request falling under the EIRs is manifestly unreasonable within Regulation 12(4)(b), that of itself is not a basis for refusing the request. We must then go on to the second stage and apply the public interest test in Regulation 12(1)(b). Application of this test may result in an obligation to disclose, even if a request is manifestly unreasonable.

There is a presumption in favour of disclosure under Regulation 12(2) of the EIRs. It was “common ground” in the case of Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth[2008] Env LR 40 at paragraph 24 that the presumption serves two purposes: (1) to provide the default position in the event that the interests are equally balanced and (2) to inform any decision that may be taken under the regulations.

The tribunal’s remit is governed by s.58 FOIA. This requires the tribunal to consider whether the decision made by the Commissioner is in accordance with the law or, where the Commissioner’s decision involved exercising discretion, whether he should have exercised it differently. The tribunal may receive evidence that was not before the Commissioner and may make different findings of fact from the Commissioner.

We have read and taken account of an open and a closed bundle of documents as well as the additional documents submitted by Mr. Wermter on the first day of the hearing. We heard oral evidence from Mr. Wermter and, for the second respondent, from Andrew Maughan and Sarah Laws. We read a statement from Philip Lewis, to which we attached reduced weight because he was not subject to cross-examination.

One of the issues raised by the appellant is whether the Council was correct to deal with the request under the EIR.

Although the appellant’s position was that the request was for environmental information, he makes this point because he says that the Council deliberately and wrongly dealt with the request under EIR in order to vex him by obtaining an extension of time that would not have been available under FOIA. He does not maintain that on the facts of this case, the application of section 14 FOIA would lead to a different answer to the test in regulation 12 EIR. Given that both parties agreed that the choice of regime would not affect the outcome, and given that we did not have access to the requested information, the tribunal took the view that it was appropriate to address the request on an “either/or” basis, as suggested by Upper Tribunal Judge Wikeley in paragraph 23 of Craven v Information Commissioner[2012] UKUT 442 (AAC). The tribunal did not therefore have to determine if the requested information was environmental.

The tribunal canvassed this with the parties at the start of the hearing, and there was no objection to the approach, subject to the appellant remaining able to make his points about whether or not the Council had deliberately chosen to use EIR to vex him by obtaining an extension of time.

The issues for the Tribunal to determine are:

Some of the evidence was in the form of automatic transcriptions of voicemails from the appellant, which contain errors. The tribunal was satisfied that the transcriptions were accurate enough to form the basis of findings of fact. No specific content of the transcriptions was disputed by the appellant.

On 11 September 2023 the appellant sent an email to the director of social services which included the following:

“You love this term, “next of kin”, don't you? It was your every second utterance in our phone conversation last Friday (recorded and, no, I don't need your permission).

Define “next of kin” in English law. Google “next of kin”. Did you find any legal authority for the term? Maybe in other common law jurisdictions, but not here.

You'll find the following article excellent in dispelling misconceptions you have labouring under for decades no doubt. Read it no, I insist read it.

https://www.hilldickinson.com/insights/articles/myth-busting-next-kin

“Next of kin” has no legal meaning in English law. None whatsoever. Zilch. Nichts.

Read that again. And again. Got it? Now never use that term again and cascade that instruction to all CSS workers immediately (I use the word “workers” very, very loosely indeed) As I submitted to you on Friday, if the relatives are Harold Shipman and Myra Hinckley, and the carer is Mother Theresa, whom do you liaise with? You wouldn't answer then. Answer now. Without a LPA, relatives have no right to exclude any other person from [redacted]’s life. To the extent that you have allowed them to do so hitherto, this was wholly unlawful and will desist this instant. Full unrestricted access to [redacted now]. You can phone me to apologise profusely and confirm that all and any advice to exclude has been nullified. Any time before 5pm is fine. Your tone on Friday was condescending, by the way. It irritates. You don't like me and so feelings have to be mutual. Nonetheless, as a local government civil servant you are obliged to act without personal prejudice and there are civil and criminal sanctions should you fail to do so. Don't go there. Grit your teeth and overcompensate.

Much, much more to follow. You have a great day."

He emailed them again on 13 September 2023 and hand delivered a letter to on 27 September 2023.

Following the appellant’s dispute with social services, in about October 2023, he attempted to discuss the issue with the Council’s solicitor, Andrew Maughan. He made an appointment with Mr Maughan via his PA, but this was postponed by a letter from the PA on 10 October 2023.

Following that, the appellant left a number of voicemails, which were unanswered. He sent an email to Andrew Maughan’s PA on 25 October 2023 in which he said that officers in the social services had committed and continue to commit criminal offences of misconduct in public office and said, inter alia, that it was imperative that the culpable officers were removed. He received no response.

The appellant states that he had been aware for some time that the Council was ‘highly likely’ to have overcharged its tenants and leaseholders for unmetered water rates over a considerable number of years. He therefore wrote a letter to Andrew Maughan dated 15 November 2023 which, in the appellant’s words, ‘threatened to expose this scandal should Maughan continue to stonewall’.

In the letter of 15 November 2023 issues he had raised in 2012/2013 with Westminster Council and his views on the legality of water charges and raised the Jones/Moss litigation. Then he said:

“Now, Mr Maughan, what’s sauce for the goose…Camden has exactly the same catastrophic criminal and financial Damoclean sword handing over it. Would you like me to now sever the thread? Or do we expeditiously resolve the evil mess that your social services directorate has created? All done and dusted within a week?

Good. Clear your diary. Telephone me immediately on [redacted]”

On 22 November 2023 he left the following voice note for Andrew Maughan/his PA (the tribunal’s corrections are in square brackets):

“This is [Wermter]. You haven't responded to my letter of the 15th. I will now be getting in contact with members of Camden Council rather than officers. You've got until 5:00 until close of Business Today. You get in contact with me? Do you know my number? [redacted] you said, can all be resolved very expeditiously. All it needs is will on your part, otherwise you'll have the members coming down on you like a ton of bricks. close of business. 5:00 before then.”

On 4 December 2023 the appellant called Andrew Maughan’s PA. Her note of the call records that ‘He makes all these threats… that “you will not have a job”. He will go nuclear whatever that may means (sic). Demands I call you out of the meeting to speak with him.”

On 5 December 2023 the appellant called asking to speak to the Director of HR. The note of the member of staff who took the call reads as follows:

“just took a call that came through for Jo (Director of HR) from an anonymous caller. His name is Niall Wermter from Lab London. His telephone number is [redacted]. He said he is an investigative lawyer. He was very well spoken and was claiming that the supporting people directors were defrauding camden council tenants, by overcharging water rates (mentioned Thames Water) and by not advising Council Tenants of discounts available. He said he'd spoken to the Borough solicitor but got nowhere and said he had his finger on the nuclear button and could cause the council damage by millions/billions of pounds. He mentioned the words nuclear button/action several times (which was a bit disturbing). I took the above details from him and explained that all I could do was get someone to call him or email him back. He said it was no use taking his email as no one would respond, but he did give me his telephone number. He then predicted that I may give his number to someone in social services, said this wouldn't be a good thing to do as they would cover up. He expected a call from Jenny (chief executive), I said this was likely not going to happen, which he started to challenge me back on. He then gave the expectation that I would pass on the message to someone much lower down that couldn't do anything. He mentioned Daniels name, Jenny and "Borough solicitor", he didn't mention your name Andrew.

The conversation went on and he kept reiterating the issue and the nuclear power button he had and was surprised that camden wasn't interested in what he wanted to say. I had to firmly put a stop to what he was saying. I had to forcefully ask him to provide his telephone number for someone to call him back and explained to him that he could go on telling me all this if he wanted to but as a PA I couldn't do much with the information and that all I could do was pass on his details. He then continued going on so I told him I was going to stop the call now that I had his details and he put the phone down.”

On 6 December 2023 the appellant spoke to the Director of Corporate Service. She reported the phone call as follows:

“I have spoken to him this morning he called again. I've been clear to him that him calling is not the solution and that he needs to put his concerns in writing and go through his established social care route or lodge a complaint. I've also said that if he is alleging any "financial corruption", we have a whistleblowing process etc but again, this wont be solved through an adhoc phone call.”

Andrew Maughan wrote to the appellant on 6 December 2023. He said:

The appellant’s reply on 13 December 2023 included the following:

Andrew Maughan replied stating that he was not going to meet the appellant and said that if he had matters to raise he should please choose one of the routes he had previously identified.

The appellant emailed Andrew Maughan again on 14 December 2023, including the following “A gentle reminder of the pressing engagement you have at The Cock at 10am tomorrow. I've advised Jon Rowney by voicemail to cancel his Christmas should you play truant as he would then be dealing with a £50m black hole.”

The appellant left a voicemail for Andrew Maughan to a similar effect on 18 December 2023.

On 18 January 2024 the appellant emailed Jon Rowney, the executive director of corporate services at the Council, copying in Andrew Maughan, his PA and the Chief Executive of Camden Council. That email included the following:

“Due to the indolence, incompetence and defamatory insolence to boot of Andrew Maughan, the easier path of dealing with certain unlawful activities of your social services directorate is hereby closed. Camden is now looking at an extrapolated black hole of in excess of £50m, the incarceration of officers past and present for misconduct in public office and offences under Section 3 Fraud Act in respect of water rates unlawfully and knowingly overcharged, not to speak of much dire adverse media attention and public opprobrium.

…

We, you and I, Mr Rowney will meet. Tuesday, 23 January, back room of the Cock Tavern, Chalton Street, NW1 at 10am. An acceptable excuse for nonattendance? Death, your own."

On 30 January 2024 Jon Rowney emailed the appellant as follows:

“I refer to your recent communications via email and the large number of phone calls and messages.

You originally approached us with regard to your desire to see your friend [redacted] again. I understand that this was originally dealt with by colleagues in Adult Social Care, but you were unhappy with that outcome, which led you to approach our borough solicitor, Mr Maughan. He explained that [redacted] was now under the care of another local authority in [redacted] and that while we were still funding her support, we had no influence over issues regarding access to her. These remain matters for both her family and [redacted]. Should you wish to discuss access to [redacted] I suggest that you discuss with [redacted] City Council. I now consider this matter closed.

In your e-mails and phone calls, you have also alleged wrong doing in relation to water charges in the light of the Kingston case (Royal Borough of Kingston Upon Thames v Moss [2020]) which concerned Kingston’s agreement with Thames Water regarding the supply of water to tenants. There is limited value in going through how the detail of the Kingston case (which is well documented publicly) might apply to other boroughs. However, I’d like to be very clear that Camden does not have any general duty to make payments to our tenants and it is misleading and totally incorrect to allege Camden’s position in the light of the Kingston case amounts to any form of wrongdoing fraud or criminal action.

I would also like to point out that your communications have consistently been abusive, unpleasant and in some regards threatening. We cannot tolerate this behaviour and my instructions to officers are now to not communicate with you.

As Andrew Maughan confirmed in his last email to you, there are a number of formal procedures you can take if you wish to submit a complaint.”

On 26 February 2024 the appellant emailed Osian Jones, who uses they/them pronouns, starting the email with “Dear preferred pronoun”.

On 9 March 2024 the appellant emailed Jon Rowney as follows:

“I'm getting mightily peeved by officers diverting my mail to Complaints. Now you're at it. Don't let it happen again. Below is the text of such a diverted email sent earlier:

I would like to thank you for your last email, but given its unnecessarily obstructive and defamatory content, I'm afraid I cannot.

I can agree that correspondence with you seems pointless at the moment, given your present unfortunate attitude.

Kindly arrange for the hand-delivery of a letter by myself to Ms Gould in person and through no intermediary on Tuesday/Wednesday 12/13 March. This hand-delivery may be at absolutely any time and at whatever place suits Ms Gould. Notify me accordingly by phone, if you would.

I would reiterate for the umpteenth time that how I choose to resolve matters is exactly that - my choice. As you know very well, none of the options you purport to oh-so helpfully provide are either in the least bit effective or expeditious - expedition that the extremely time-sensitive nature of [redacted]'s condition demands.

The solution to the either/or dilemma ominously looming over Camden outlined in my email to Maughan of 15 November 2023 (of which you have a copy) is within Ms Gould's remit - not yours, nor indeed any other officer.

That this dilemma has arisen is no fault of mine or Ms Gould, but rather occasioned by the unlawful conduct of your fellow officers. Rather than desperately defending the indefensible, you would be wise, Mr Rowney, to rapidly distance yourself from your nefarious mates. You are paid by and charged to serve us, not them.

I sincerely hope you will readopt the cooperative manner which characterised our initial dealings.”

On 12 March 2024 the appellant emailed Jon Rowney as follows: “I've left a message on your voicemail. Kindly now advise me of when and where the letter will be hand-delivered. There can be no reason for you not arranging this, literally, one-second operation other than bloodymindedness - an attitude that may attract a criminal sanction.”

Mr Rowney replied as follows: “You’re welcome to hand deliver private and confidential correspondence to the Leader, Cllr Gould, at the reception desk at 5 Pancras Square and that will go directly to her. We’re unable to arrange an appointment for you to personally hand your correspondence to her.”

The appellant then contacted the Council’s external auditor, Suresh Patel, and made allegations of fraud perpetrated by officers within the housing directorate. The auditor asked him to share the evidence of fraud.

On 5 April 2024 the appellant emailed Jon Rowney, including the following:

“I have received an email from Camden's external auditor at Mazars, Suresh Patel, the salient passage of which is… “…[Y]ou claim to have uncovered fraud perpetrated by officers within the housing directorate and that you have repeatedly attempted to resolve the matter through communication with Camden's Section 151 officer and the Council's Monitoring Officer. Before we arrange to speak, can you please share with me the evidence you have of the fraud and details of what you have asked Council officers.” Would you like me to now share that evidence with Mr Patel? Do I share with him, inter alia, my missive to Maughan of 15 November 2023? Or do you, Maughan and I deal with the criminal conduct of officers in your social services directorate and expedite the lifting of restrictions unlawfully imposed and maliciously retained?.... Deadline: Close of business, Wednesday, 10 April 2024. Otherwise, it's Enola Gay.”

On 11 April 2024 the appellant emailed Jess McGregor, in social services, as follows:

“Camden is about to face a £50m+ black hole and the incarceration of officers past and present in its housing department – a potential calamity which you have caused.

What’s that got to do with you, eh?

Well, Camden’s external auditor has asked me to detail an historic and chronic fraud which I discovered your housing pals have perpetrated.

I have advised Mr Maughan and Mr Rowney that I will not pursue the fraud issue, contingent upon a thorough investigation of and action against you, Solvey, Bennett and Sharples for misconduct in public office in respect of [redacted]’s case.

What you and your maters have done and continually to do is sheer inhumane evil – criminally so.

You will phone me by close of business today. You will adopt an appositely anilingual attitude.”

On 19 April 2024 the appellant emailed Susan Bennett, Service Manager in social services, as follows:

“There was a needs assessment conducted in April last year which by law I should have been but was not involved in … At that meeting, Sharples contrived to exclude me from [redacted]’s life permanently… you stated that the exclusion was correct as I had no “close relationship” with [redacted]. How so, Ms Bennett? You really should do some research before taking such drastic action. Do you want to change your mind on that one? Time for a proper needs assessment, wouldn’t you say? Good.

Georgina Gould (Leader), Jon Rowney (Finance Director), Andrew Maughan (Borough Solicitor) and many others are very much aware of an anxious about the £50m+ catastrophe that would befall Camden should I choose to pursue the housing department fraud. They know that I will not drop the bomb, as it were, if you and your pals in the social services directorate hold your hands up, take your punishment and, most importantly for [redacted]’s wellbeing, immediately remove all restrictions.

Don't kid yourself. Faced with financial disaster, the big wigs at Camden would feed you to the lions. You're a pawn… Yes, the sky IS falling in on you. Actions, particularly malicious ones, have consequences.

You will attend a meeting at 9am, Tuesday 23 April at 5 Pancras Square. Bring Sharples along. You’ll be there all day.”

On 23 April 2024 the appellant emailed Susan Bennett, copying in Courtney Sharples as follows:

“You and Sharples failed to make an appearance this morning.

Let’s try again, shall we? Tomorrow, 9am, 5 Pancras Square. The game’s up. You confess to misconduct in public office, you accept due punishment, and you instantaneously clear up the maliciously motivated evil you have created.”

Susan Bennett replied that that no staff would be meeting with him at 5 Pancras Square and that she had informed security of this. She said that the appellant’s emails and voicemails were threatening and that they will not be responding to his demands.

On 24 April 2024 the appellant sent two further emails to Susan Bennett including the following:

“The only threats made have been by yourselves upon yourselves. There's an old adage: "If you can't do the time, don't do the crime" Advising you as I have that your acts and omissions constitute misconduct in public office and of the custodial consequences of those acts and omissions does indeed threaten your liberty.

I’ll have a copy right now of that email sent by [redacted] on 25 July 2023 (or thereabouts). I’m led to believe it contains defamatory untruths about me. I can see no reason for that copy email not to be sent to me. So see to it. Right now.

To iterate, given the dread of a £50m+ black hole, incarceration of housing officers, much adverse national media attention and general chaos at Camden, you and your chums are on your own. Camden will desert you… and rightly so.

Confess, take your punishment, but first undo immediately the mess that Sharples, Solvey and you have created. Do that now, do that rapidly. I'm sure the judge will consider your albeit very belated cooperation in mitigation when determining the length of sentences. The longer you take to act now, the longer you and your pals rot behind bars.

Why Sharples was ever left on the case after the meeting last April is a mystery, having displayed such wholly unjustified, visceral and demented contempt towards me, a snarling contempt which occasioned her necessary removal from the meeting - snarling as she went! Her initial malice has lingered like an unpleasant odour in the lives of [redacted] and me. It's time Sharples smelt the inside of a holding cell prior to interrogation.”

The appellant shared the letter of 15 November 2023 with Suresh Patel. The auditor replied on 21 May 2024 and asked the appellant again to clarify the fraud he claims the Council has carried out. In that letter he stated:

“You refer to the issue of Westminster Council and water charges which they, like many councils including Camden, were collecting from council tenants on behalf of Thames Water. My understanding is that while some councils have accepted that the tenants had been overcharged because the councils had not passed on the discounts they had arranged with Thames Water, Camden asserts that tenants did not pay any more under the arrangement with Thames Water than they would have done if they were being billed by Thames Water directly.

The Council has informed me that should any tenant make a claim for overpayment then the Council will react to them as and when they are made.

Nonetheless, the Council has considered it financially prudent to make provision for repayment which is currently £3.7m.”

Although the appellant considers the ‘disclosure’ of this provision significant, any provision will have been published every year in the Council’s accounts.

In his reply to the auditor dated 27 May 2024, copying in Andrew Maughan and the Chief Finance Officer, the appellant summarised the basis for his allegation of fraud, as set out in his letter of 15 November 2023 as follows, ‘Through knowledge of discounts available, a fiduciary duty, and a failure to advise tenants of these discounts, officers committed offences under sections 3 and/or 4 Fraud Act 2006.’ He explains why he says that the Council is ‘more than likely liable to make the necessary repayments to its unmetered tenants as Southwark and Kingston have been obliged to do’. He concludes with the following:

“Without delay, I would now request that Camden send me copies of all agreements between itself and TWU from 1989 until March 2019, together with any deeds of variation, clarification and the like. Any clause in these documents purporting to prevent disclosure by reason of commercial sensitivity should be disregarded – these agreements and any variations to them have been terminated or have expired, as have all other such agreements between TWU and other local authorities.”

The appellant followed this with the request for information on 6 June 2024.

Sarah Laws, the FOI lead at the Council, took the view that the request should be dealt with under EIR because of the nature of the contract. We accept that Sarah Laws honestly formed this opinion on the basis of the knowledge of the requested information. She was aware that a previous request for the same contract in around 2018 which had led to a complaint to the Commissioner. Because of this she took the view that they should extend the time for consideration under regulation 7 EIR. We do not accept, as the appellant asserts, that this decision was taken in order to vex the appellant, because at this stage Sarah Laws had no knowledge of the appellant or any of his previous dealings with the Council. We do not accept that the decision to handle the matter under EIR was a deliberate ploy to gain the benefit of the regulation 7 extension of time.

On 27 June 2024 the Council wrote to the appellant to inform him that the Council were extending the deadline under regulation 7(1) EIR.

The appellant took the view that this was clearly not a request for environmental information. He made two assumptions. First that the Council knew that FOIA was the appropriate regime and were deliberately using EIR to get the benefit of the regulation 7 extension and second that they did this deliberately in order to vex him. He says that as a result of the ‘bogus EIR extension’ he responded with a ‘barrage of voicemails and emails to various Camden officers’. When asked about this in evidence he said that they ‘deserved it’. He accepted that many of the voicemails were offensive.

The appellant sent at least twelve emails to Philip Lewis and Peter Williams between 2 and 5 July. These included the following:

“I will have the information supplied to me by close of business tomorrow or heads roll. Understood? You have failed to phone me despite repeated requests to do so. I will pursue disciplinary action against you I hear they're hiring at Burger King. Finger out, do some work. Go! No, no cup of tea first. Get the papers, stick them in a large manilla folder and despatch to me pronto. I will call you on the phone in thirty minutes. It will come up “Private”. You and I will be in constant contact this afternoon while you chase around for the documents. Abandon all other business.”

“I will arrange for you to face disciplinaries and inevitable sackings should you fail to phone me by 1 pm. To earn a salary you actually have to do some work now again shocking, isn't it? Phone now.”

The appellant left a voicemail for Peter Williams (lasting 5 minutes) on 2 July 2024. It included the following:

The appellant left another voicemail for Peter Williams (lasting over 4 minutes) on 2 July 2024 at 09:51. It included the following:

“I will be holding Camden to ransom. That information means that Campbell Fight will have a black hole of in excess of £50 million, I repeat 5050 million. That's why the Bone solicitor is, well, I think the borough solicitor is hoping that I fall under a bus. Now I've told you, I'm not asking you, I'm telling you all staff are diverted to obtaining that information that I require and it's done. Now all stop. None of them. None of them sleep. They don't eat, they don't treat drink, they don't defecate, they don't urinate. They are all on that task. And I'll have that information today. As I say, I have Camden with that information. I have Camden, Camden Council by the short and curlies and I will be demanding sackings. So Williams, make sure you're not on that list of names and you can ensure that by getting all of that information to me… All of that information to me today I'll have hourly report. So on the hour, every hour you will be phoning me. So at 10:00 you will be phoning me. This is what we're doing. 11:00. This is what we're doing 12 talk, this is what we're doing and by 5:00 doing it by close of Business Today you will be saying the information has been has been sent by a motorcycle Courier to you. Do you understand or you don't have a job? You might have intimated that I'm extremely annoyed you prompt you passed me around for a month, 20 working days and then say now you say it's too complex and voluminous. Absolute bullshit. So, Mr. Williams, I'll have the information now. All staff diverted to Cam 7864 hourly reports 10. O'CLOCK 11121234 and by 5. I have that I have a I have the information that I've that I've requested involves a demanded under the Freedom of Information Act of 2000. All of it. 10:00 I have a report 11121234 and by 5 that's delivered by motorcycle Courier to me.”

On 3 July 2024 at 10.54 the appellant left another voicemail for Peter Williams, lasting nearly 4 minutes, which included the following:

“…it was clearly an FOI request. Now you're not setting it back to grade one. I've just had a last Thursday I had a missive through an email through from your Mr. Phillip Lewis saying due to the complexity of the luminous, this bullshit is essentially there's nothing complex or voluminous about it. I think Mr. Lewis needs to work a little harder. Of the 20 day limit is up tomorrow. You'll be back tomorrow. Make sure that is with me, that all of the information is with me by close of business tomorrow. All hell will break loose. The next request I will be making. If you fail to get that information to me by close of business tomorrow, send it by motion. Local Courier might just make sure it's here by close of business. If not, then my next Freedom of Information request. We will demand that you tell me what percentage of your FOIA requests are being dealt with within the 20 within the 2020 working days. And if, as I suspect, very few of your FBI's are being dealt with in within 20 days. When I go straight to the Information Commissioner and heads will roll. Have I made myself clear? You're so phone me. You're back tomorrow. You're phone me the moment you get in, the moment you hear this message, you phone me on 07984779919 and I don't want any attitude from your soul other than an apology Apologetic 1 Make sure that information is with me. There's, as I say, there's nothing complex or voluminous about that, about the information requested. Nothing. It should be easy to identify the documents, I retrieve them and dispatch them. There's nothing to it, absolutely nothing to it. It's bullshit. It's total bullshit. Complex and voluminous, son. Straight through to me. You're back tomorrow before 11:00 tomorrow you phone me. Are they all hands on deck? That information is given to me by close of business tomorrow. I'm getting sick of Cabinet Council. Absolutely sick of you. Not so. Yeah. By the way, I'm a lawyer, so the letters after my name, LB London. So yes, heads will roll. If that doesn't, if that information isn't with me by close of business tomorrow, heads will roll. There will be people losing their jobs. Mr. Williams, have I made myself clear? Right, get to it.”

The appellant left another voicemail for Peter Williams at 09.51 on 4 July 2024, including the following:

“Every single member, member, staff that you have there is now on this. You don't stop for lunch, don't have a cup of tea, you don't defecate, you don't urinate, You don't eat, you don't drink”

On 4 July 2024 the appellant emailed Philip Lewis, copying in Peter Williams including the following “You are to phone me immediately on [redacted] and then every hour on the hour.”

On 4 July 2024 at 10.30 the appellant left another voicemail for Peter Williams which included the following:

“Every member of staff, every member of staff is now engaged in grabbing those documents, carefully photocopying them and having them dispatched to me. No tea breaks, no lunch breaks. You work. You work harder than you have ever have done before. You run. You don’t walk and you phone me back immediately.”

On 4 July 2024 at 12.35 the appellant left the following voicemail for Philip Lewis:

“At 1:00, I’ll be arranging for a disciplinary hearing, which I will attend your disciplinary hearing. At 1:00, I will arrange that disciplinary meeting. I’ll also demand an input into any reference that you receive on your departure. So understood. You get those papers through to me now, Papers to be in a filing cabinet that all be all be in the same place. You pull it out, you copy the papers, you put them in the middle of envelope. You have some dispatch by the motorcycle Courier and you do that. Now. You get on the phone. You stay with me all afternoon. You stay on the phone as you get the folder, photocopy the content of the folder and send and then put it in an envelope and hand and hand the envelope. So the most cycle Courier, you stay on the phone from phone with me as I say at 1:00. So I have a response on the phone at 1:00. Your goose is cooked. You have to do some work. You can’t just pump out a sit on their hands for a month. They’d send out a bullshit standard form letter. It’s copious, copious, voluminous, that’s you just pump those out because you’re too lazy. It’s so obvious you’re supposed to deal with a FOIA promptly. You’re not supposed to miss that. You’re not supposed to turn them into EIR’s, which they’re not, so that youcan get an extension of a further 20 working days. You’ve cooked up until the 20 working days is up today, as I say, at 1:00 you’re looking at you’re looking at working at saying second shelves at Sainsbury’s or flipping burgers. It’s entirely up to you need to do some work occasionally. You said you have a job tonight with the council. You’ll find out. You’ll find out. As I say, 1:00 absolutely bone idle and useless right before 1:00 and you stay on the phone. You phone me and you stay on the phone.”

The appellant left another voicemail for Peter Williams at 14.59 and one for Philip Lewis at 15.21. He left another for Philip Lewis at 16.41 which included the following:

“Not a wise move, Mr. Lewis. So you won’t have a job and you’re going to prison unless in the next 21 minutes I have those papers through.”

On 5 July 2024 the appellant emailed the FOI department three times as follows:

“The s.10 FOIA time-limit expired yesterday and no lawful ground for time-extension pertains. Your junior officers erroneously and negligently determined my request to be under EIR 2004 and then applied a time-limit extension permissible under the EIR but not the FOIA.

Kindly see to it that the demanded information is despatched to me by close of business today. Telephone me on [redacted] upon receipt of this email.

Your junior officers are refusing to communicate with me. In respect of the behaviour of those junior officers, kindly arrange disciplinary meetings for them next week. Advise me of the the [sic] time and place of these meetings in order that I might attend and present information.”

“I have not received the phone call required by my previous email marked for your immediate attention and action. Still less have I received the documents demanded in my FOI, the receipt of which is now overdue without lawful cause.

Kindly now telephone me on 07984779919 immediately in order to secure an extremely expeditious conclusion to this matter.”

“Documents delivered, now.

If Mr Williams is the most senior officer in the FOI department, then I’ll have his line-manager on the phone now – [redacted] – immediately.

NOW, NOW, NOW. HAVE YOU GOT IT?!”

On 5 July 2024 the appellant left another voicemail for Philip Lewis at 15.54 which included the following:

“Where are they? You seem to be a little slow. It was never is not and never will be. And EIR, what you did because I’m being impression you’re not too bright…This will all come up in your disciplinary next week. In the meantime, I suggest you get those papers to the right now. I don’t care if you have to work until midnight, you get those papers to me now... Do you understand those papers to read now? Stop what you’re doing. Don’t eat, don’t drink, don’t defecate, don’t urinate. You have permission to breathe and get those papers together and dispatched to me. You have my address, you have my phone number. Do it now.”

On 8 July 2024 the appellant emailed the FOI department as follows:

“I can only assume that your radio silence is motivated by malice. I would advise you that this constitutes misconduct in public office, a common law offence which upon conviction always carries a custodial sentence.

You will phone immediately on [redacted]. If the line is busy, you will keep calling until it is free. This email has been copied Camden’s chief executive.”

On 8 July 2024 at 09.19 the appellant left Peter Williams a voicemail including the following:

“…You know who I am. I've just sent you an e-mail. It looks like you are going to court. It's a criminal offence what you're doing. You might be having a giggle about this, but you won't be giggling when they when you're sent down. Understand you are in big sheets now go and get those papers. There's a good boy run along… If you act maliciously, as you appear to be doing now, you go to prison. Understand that now, whatever you're doing, stop it….”

He sent another voicemail to Peter Williams on 8 July 2024 at 11.31:

“The chief executive is aware of what's going on now. I suggest you get the finger out right now. Papers to me right now them. So C AN7864 is a reference as you know damn well. Get on the phone to me right now. Right now, your bloody mindedness is doing you no favors at all. Type this to me right now. You phone me right now. As I say, Chief executive is well aware of what's happening now. She's the head honcho. So big trouble.”

On 8 July 2024 at 13.08 the appellant left Peter Williams the following voicemail:

“Do you have a look at the e-mail that I've just sent you? You're doing an FOIA request and review all on the same day. I have been advised they're not very happy with you. Mr. Williams, you committed offences. You and Mr. What's his name now Lewis have committed a criminal offence to criminal criminal offences of misconduct in public office. It always track it carries invariably carries a custodial sentence. So you're looking at prison time unless you get your asses into gear. Now all of those papers completes very carefully. Get those papers together and get them to me now. So understood. The CEO, the head honcho of Camden Council is on your case. The IC O is on your case. I'm on your case. The police will be on your case. You will have your door kicked in at 4:00 in the morning because you acted maliciously. Now, the way that you save your bacon is you get those papers together right now. Right now, and dispatch to me.”

On 8 July 2024 the appellant emailed the FOI inbox, copying in the Council’s CEO, as follows:

“You have unlawfully and deliberately miscategorised my FOI request as an EIR request in order to abuse the extension provision in the EIR to my detriment. This is an intentional and malicious act of delay.

Scores of emails and voicemails to you have met with absolutely no response.

Common law criminal offences of misconduct in public office have occurred. These offences invariably - id est, always - carry custodial sentences. I will pursue this path of action should I fail to receive the requested documents today. If you, Williams and Lewis, do not care about imprisonment for your malice, then you should in any event treat this email as a “review” request to be actioned and completed today, not a further 20 working days, as it is not strictly speaking a “review” at all as you haven't made a lawful decision yet! The FOIA time-limit expired four days ago. In short, papers now or go to prison. You will conduct any review today and despatch the papers to me today. Understood? Mindful of the characteristic petty vindictiveness of bone-idle council officers, you will ensure that the demanded papers are completely and carefully copied. Or else… Move!”

The appellant also sent similarly worded emails during this period to Mr Maughan and his deputy.

On 9 July 2024 Jon Rowney emailed the appellant including the following:

On 9 July 2024 the appellant replied to Jon Rowney, including the following:

“Let’s get some matters straight, shall we?

First, the request was and is a FOIA 2000 request. Read that again, and again, and again. And again. FOIA 2000, not EIR 2004. Sunk in? Good.

Second, your FOI people have deliberately miscategorised the request as an EIR 2004 request. My communication with the ICO yesterday reveals that this intentional misclassification is a common ploy by local authority FOI people, a cynical device used to artificially and unlawfully extend the time-limit of an information request. The time-limit extensions permitted under the EIR stretch out to near-infinite, while the Section 10 FOIA requirement is a strict 20 working-day turnaround.

…

None of these Reg 2 EIR definitions describe in any sense or under any sane construction my request for documents - as your FOI people know damn well. Had they not known this - an extremely unlikely possibility - numerous emails and voicemails to them over the last week in this regard would surely have alerted them to their supposed ignorance. Throwing melodramatic histrionic fits to obfuscate malfeasance is par for the course with Camden officers. Stop it.

…

Kindly now have a word with your FOI layabouts and have them despatch the documents this afternoon. Better still, do it yourself after all, you have had since May to supply information that both I and the external auditor are very anxious to view.

Given your previous exemplary civility toward me, I'm bound to say that I'm disappointed by your earlier email. Perhaps had you first phoned me to establish the facts, you would have then breathed fire upon your FOI clowns rather than further distressing me.

By the way, [the third party] is still dying and missing me as I do her - unless you'd forgotten what this is all about. And if you are looking for (extremely) "unreasonable behaviour", perhaps you should try your social services directorate.”

These matters are only relevant to the extent that they shed light on the position at the time of the refusal.

The appellant continued to email and leave voicemails for individuals at the Council in similar terms, despite having been asked not to on a number of occasions.

The appellant asked Mr Foot, deputy editor of the Camden New Journal to request the same information. He did so on 9 January 2025 and the appellant followed this request with multiple emails to the Council, in a similar tone to his previous correspondence.