Case Reference: FT/EA/2025/0290
Information Rights
Decided without a hearing
Before
JUDGE SOPHIE BUCKLEY
MEMBER DAVE SIVERS
MEMBER ANNE CHAFER
Between
ANTONY WILLIAMS
Appellant
and
(1) THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
(2) BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION
Respondents
Decision: The appeal is dismissed.
REASONS – AMENDED UNDER RULE 40
Introduction
1. This is an appeal against the Commissioner’s decision notice IC-358656-N6J0 of 24 July 2025 which held that the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was entitled to rely on section 38(1)(b) (health and safety) and 40 (personal information) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) to withhold the requested information.
Factual background to the appeal
2. Broadcasting House is the BBC’s headquarters, located in central London. As a site of national importance, it frequently faces security challenges, which have been increasing in the past decade. Approximately 6000 staff members work within Broadcasting House.
3. Within Broadcasting House, there is a café called the “Media Café”. The Media Café was originally intended to be accessible to the public. However, the Media Café is now accessible only to BBC staff. The BBC says that access restrictions on the Café were first imposed in 2017, following a security incident in which a group of intruders managed to gain access to Broadcasting House by appearing to be visiting the Café. At that time, the BBC says that it sought Westminster City Council’s permission to close access to the Media Café by one particular entrance (in circumstances where the BBC previously had a legal arrangement with Westminster City Council which provided for a public right of way into the Café). Following continued increases in the security risk to Broadcasting House, the BBC says that it later applied to close public access to the Café entirely. WCC granted that request in November 2024.
4. Mr. Williams says that the BBC has made false statements to Westminster City Council in relation to its intentions regarding public access to a café within Broadcasting House. He says that the BBC’s stated position in 2017, i.e. that it did not intend to close all public access to the Media Café was false. He says that the BBC always intended to close public access entirely.
5. This appeal concerns information in documents covering security features and procedures to protect BBC New Broadcasting House from physical and cyber security threats. Those documents are:
a. A Security Risk Assessment of New Broadcasting House dated 07/08 March 2017.
b. Recommendations from a Security Risk Assessment Group on 13 March 2017.
c. Advice to the Executive Board on the background to the Security incident and proposed mitigations to avoid similar risks in future dated 22 March 2017.
d. Minutes of the BBC Audit and Risk Committee dated 22 June 2017.
e. BBC Board Report dated September 2017.
f. Security Breach Action Plans.
g. Security Breach Timetables.
6. The withheld information in those documents broadly relates to the following:
a. The location of specific BBC services within Broadcasting House.
b. Current security measures and protocols in place at Broadcasting House.
c. Security recommendations and implementation decisions, including security recommendations following the 2017 incident, and the BBC’s decisions on whether or not to implement those recommendations.
d. Information about staff training and protocols.
Request and response
7. Mr. Williams made the following request for information on 29 August 2024:
“Please provide all recorded information held that was generated by the Director General’s Office in relation to the 2017 security incident that led to the removal of public access the Media Cafe, or in relation to any decisions during 2017 to remove public access to that area.
Again, I believe there is plausible possibility of wrongdoing in relation to this, with regards to the false statements made in the December 2017 deed with Westminster City Council committing to continued public access to this area, and request that public interest tests take this into account, per the code of practice?”
8. The BBC asked for clarification, and Mr. Williams clarified on 6 September 2024 that he sought:
“All internal records within the BBC, excluding correspondence (emails or paper correspondence), used to support the BBC’s decision to temporarily close the media café at Broadcasting House in March 2017 and September 2017.
Given the explicit reference to the 2017 security incident, and the involvement of the Director General's Office as a factor that led to that decision, I interpret this to include any information generated by the Director General's Office in relation to the security incident.”
9. The BBC substantively responded to the request on 6 December 2024 providing some information and refusing to provide some redacted information relying on sections 38(1) and 40(2). The BBC upheld its position on internal appeal.
10. In the course of the Commissioner’s investigation the BBC disclosed some further information to Mr. Wiliams.
Decision notice
In a decision notice dated 24 July 2025. the Commissioner concluded that the BBC was entitled to rely on sections 38(1)(b) and 40(2) or 42 to withhold information. The Commissioner held that the BBC had breached section 17(3) FOIA. No steps were required.
Section 38 – health and safety
The Commissioner found that there was a causal link between the disclosure of the information and the likelihood of endangerment to the safety of individuals, because the withheld information relates to physical security and building integrity and is a current and ongoing concern.
The Commissioner was satisfied that the risk of endangerment to health and safety was not based on mere assumption or belief and that the risk was logical and substantially more than remote. He accepted that endangerment was placed in the ‘would be likely to occur’ category.
Whilst the information is from 2017, the Commissioner said that its contents and breadth of coverage were still relevant and the Commissioner was persuaded that there was a real possibility of the harm envisaged occurring.
In particular, the Commissioner was satisfied that disclosure could increase the risk to, and vulnerability of, the site, thereby endangering the safety of employees and the public.
The Commissioner recognised that there was a public interest in understanding the circumstances and reasons for changes to public access. He declined to determine whether or not the BBC was guilty of wrongdoing.
The Commissioner recognised the public interest in transparency and accountability, and noted that the BBC had some provided information in scope of the request along with further disclosure during the Commissioners investigation.
The Commissioner noted the BBC’s arguments that Broadcasting House is a high profile location, regularly hosting prominent staff and visitors. It is the focus of demonstrations and public attention. In this context, the safety and security of individuals remain paramount. The BBC plays a critical role in the government’s response during crisis situation, with a responsibility to continue broadcasting throughout national emergencies. This heightens the imperative to maintain the confidentiality of security arrangements.
In the circumstances, the Commissioner concluded that there was a strong public interest in protecting those at risk of harm and ensuring the responsible use of information. He concluded that the public interest balance favoured maintaining the exemption.
Grounds of Appeal
The Grounds of Appeal are that the Commissioner got the public interest balance wrong, in essence because the established facts give rise to a plausible suspicion of wrongdoing, which the Commissioner refused to engage with.
The Commissioner’s response
The Commissioner submitted that regardless of whether or not the withheld information probably shows wrongdoing has occurred in respect of a deed between Westminster Council and the BBC, which the BBC allegedly breached, this is not enough to outweigh the very weighty public interest in maintaining the safety of BBC staff and on set audiences from the risk of harm that disclosure would be likely to cause.
The Commissioner noted the importance of maintaining the exemption is strong, and submitted that the suspicion of wrongdoing is not a very weighty countervailing consideration to outweigh the risk to the safety of BBC staff, visitors and on set audiences.
Response from the BBC
The BBC noted that the grounds of appeal do not challenge the engagement of section 38 and submitted in any event that section 38 is engaged.
The BBC submitted that the information could be used as follows:
Threats have previously been directed towards staff members in specific departments; and if the physical locations of those departments were made known, there would be a significant and real chance of that information being used in a targeted attack.
Detailed information about the security measures and protocols in place at Broadcasting House would assist threat actors in identifying vulnerabilities and circumventing those measures.
Threat actors would benefit from knowledge of specific recommendations which were and were not implemented by the BBC, as these identify known vulnerabilities in security.
Information about staff training and protocols would enable a threat actor to anticipate staff responses and thereby circumvent security measures.
The BBC submitted that use of the information for the purposes of a targeted attack is a real and serious likelihood because there have been a high number of security incidents in recent years. It submitted that infiltration of Broadcasting House by malefactors would endanger the public more generally for reasons given in the closed bundle.
In relation to the public interest the BBC submitted that there is a clear and strong public interest in maintaining the exemption and very weighty countervailing considerations would be required to outweigh the likely endangerment that would arise from disclosure. The BBC submitted that the public interest in disclosure in this case was particularly strong because there is both likely endangerment to staff and to the public at large.
The BBC acknowledged the important general public interest in accountability and transparency and the general public interest in understanding the extent of and rationale for restrictions to public access to Broadcasting House. The BBC submitted that that public interest is largely served by the information already disclosed.
In relation to the suspicion of wrongdoing, the BBC does not accept that there is any prima facie evidence of wrongdoing. It submitted that the statements made by the BBC to Westminster City Council in 2017 to the effect that public access would ultimately be resumed were entirely in line with the BBC’s intentions at the time, as evidenced by contemporaneous documents. Further, the BBC submitted that, in any event, a suspicion of wrongdoing could not outweigh the heavy public interest in non-disclosure. A great deal of transparency has already been achieved and the redacted information has no relevance to the suspicions.
Mr Williams’ reply
Mr. Williams submitted that it seems unlikely that every redaction is of equal safety concern, and that so many minor pieces of information, from 2017 could still, if disclosed, lead to a very significant and or weighty change of a situation that is dangerous. Mr. Williams submitted that known vulnerabilities presumably would have been addressed.
Mr. Williams submitted that the BBC’s approach is not in line with their willingness to otherwise disclose information in these topics, for example making public the location of specific BBC services within Broadcasting House, briefing the media on specific security measures and including concern about fire exits in their section 106 application to Westminster City Council. Mr. William submitted that the BBC take an absolutist approach on section 38 that it is engaged with anything tangentially touching on security.
He submitted that there is only a minor and theoretical possibility of endangerment and challenges the submission that there are no borderline cases where the additional public interest in disclosure would affect the balance.
Mr. Williams highlighted that the BBC applied to Westminster Council after Mr. Williams raised his concerns about wrongdoing and after the Council had told the BBC that they would commence legal enforcement action against the BBC. He submitted that the BBC could have but did not make an application to the Council in 2017 and instead removed public access while telling the Council that they had merely changed the entrance. He submitted that they knowingly made a misleading statement in a planning application which is fraud.
Mr Williams submitted that BBC have offered no explanation for the inconsistency between their March 2017 decision to permanently close the Media Café to the public and their September 2017 planning application to Westminster City Council (WCC), which affirmed continued public access. The author notes that the processes were six months apart, both involved senior management, and both engaged the BBC at the highest level.
Mr. Williams submitted that the evidence suggests the BBC made a single, settled decision in March 2017 to remove public access on a long-term basis and that the BBC entered into the December 2017 agreement and did not comply with its terms. He says that the BBC provided misleading explanations to subsequent enforcement enquiries and that they moved to legal compliance when the Council rejected their temporary closure explanations. The author rejects the BBC’s assertion that no circumstances point to wrongdoing and maintains that there is a public interest in understanding the BBC’s conduct in a formal regulatory process.
Legal framework
Section 38 – health and safety
Section 38(1) FOIA provides that information is exempt information if its disclosure would or would be likely to:
Endanger the physical or mental health of any individual, or
Endanger the safety of any individual.
Section 38 is a qualified exemption and so the tribunal must go on to consider if the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure.
The Task of the Tribunal
The tribunal’s remit is governed by s 58 FOIA. This requires the tribunal to consider whether the decision made by the Commissioner is in accordance with the law or, where the Commissioner’s decision involved exercising discretion, whether he should have exercised it differently. The tribunal may receive evidence that was not before the Commissioner and may make different findings of fact from the Commissioner.
Issues
The issues we have to determine are:
Section 38 – health and safety
Whether disclosure would be likely to endanger the physical or mental health of any individual. This entails:
Identifying the applicable interest within the exemption.
Considering the nature of the danger (identifying a causal relationship and that it passes a de minimis threshold)
Determining the likelihood of danger (more probable than not or a real and significant risk of endangerment)
In all the circumstances of the case, whether the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information. This includes:
Identifying what actual harm or prejudice the proposed disclosure would or would be likely to cause, focussing on the public interests expressed in the particular exemption in issue.
Identifying what actual benefits the proposed disclosure would or would be likely to cause.
Evidence
We read an open and a closed bundle of documents. It was necessary to withhold the closed bundles from Mr. Williams, otherwise the purpose of the appeal would be defeated. The open and closed bundles include a witness statement from Mark Fewster, Safety, Security & Resilience Specialist at the BBC dated 23 September 2025.
Discussion and conclusions
Is the exemption engaged?
The tribunal considers that the applicable interest in the exemption is the protection of physical or mental health.
The endangerment or harm relied on by the BBC is a danger to the physical health of BBC staff or others in or around Broadcasting House.
We have reviewed the withheld information in detail and taken account of the evidence of Mark Fewster, who has significant experience security both at the BBC and working for the BBC while employed by Mitie.
The information contains:
Exact locations of particular BBC services in relation to which threats have been made.
Details of security measures and protocols at Broadcasting House that remain in place.
Details of security recommendations that have not been implemented by the BBC.
Details of staff training and protocols.
Mr. Fewster has provided detailed and convincing explanations of how this information could be used by individuals with criminal intent. Taking account of the evidence of the general level of threat of attack and the specific examples of incidents and threats, we accept that the BBC has shown a causative link between disclosure of this information and a real and significant risk of endangerment.
Having looked at the withheld material, we do not accept that the BBC has taken an ‘absolutist’ or blanket approach. We accept that the BBC have identified and disclosed any material that does not carry the identified risk of misuse. We do not accept that the fact that the BBC has, on other occasions, seen fit to disclose more limited information about security undermines our conclusion on the risks of disclosing this information.
We accept that the locations of certain departments within the BBC might be ascertainable from other information in the public domain. In our view an official confirmation direct from the BBC, combined with the other security information contained in the withheld information, would be likely to be of use to a malefactor.
On this basis we find that the exemption is engaged.
The public interest in withholding the information
Although the likelihood of the release of this information leading to an incident where individuals are harmed is not high, if such an incident occurred the consequences are very serious. Further, the BBC has emergency broadcasting obligations which is a critical public service. A risk to its security carries a risk to its ability to maintain broadcast operations and is a risk to public safety more generally. Again, whilst the risk of this is not high, the consequences would be extremely serious. Taking all that into account, in our view there is a very strong public interest in maintaining the exemption.
The public interest in disclosure
We have reviewed the withheld information carefully. There is nothing in the information which sheds light on any of the wrongdoing alleged by Mr. Williams whether by confirming it or refuting it. Any parts of the document that relate to the issues raised by Mr. Williams have been disclosed to him. On that basis, the alleged wrongdoing adds nothing to the general public interest in transparency.
On that basis we do not need to decide if there is a plausible suspicion of wrongdoing. We do, in any event, disagree with Mr. Williams that the documents in the bundle show that the BBC had made a decision to remove public access permanently in March 2017. Having reviewed the documents in the open bundle and having taken account of the evidence provided by Mr. Fewster, we do not accept that there is a plausible suspicion that the BBC made false statements to Westminster Council in 2017.
We accept that there is a general public interest in disclosure to ensure transparency and accountability in relation the security measures taken by the BBC.
Conclusions on the public interest balance
Having considered all the factors set out above, the public interest in disclosure is outweighed by the very strong public interest in maintaining the exemption. The appeal is dismissed.
Signed: Date:
Judge Buckley 26 February 2026
Amended on 24 March 2026