James Marr Goldie v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors

The proceedings were listed for oral hearing, remotely, by CVP and proceeded in that mode.

The Appellant failed the Standards Check test, required by the Respondent to be undertaken by the Appellant, on four consecutive occasions, namely, 1 November 2022, 7 February 2023, 31 July 2023 and 10 April 2025 pursuant to the provisions of the Motor Cars (Driving Instruction) Regulations 2005. The Respondent made a decision dated 9 July 2025 to remove the Appellant’s name, in consequence, from the Approved Driving Instructors Register (‘the Register’), pursuant to section 128(2)(d) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, as amended (‘the Act’), taking into account representations made by the Appellant.

The Appellant’s overall performance was found to bebelow the required standard in all four Standards Check tests. The Respondent would have been perfectly entitled in law to make a decision to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register upon him failing even the first Standards Check test. However, the practice of the Respondent is to permit an ADI up to three attempts to pass a Standards Check test (although, due to administrative error by the Respondent, the Appellant was afforded an advantage of undertaking a fourth attempt to pass his Standards Check test).

The Respondent took account of representations made by the Appellant in emails dated 27 April 2025 and 23 April 2025, that alleged a ‘personal vendetta’ against him by the manager of the ‘Aberdeen North Team’, before they made their decision – the decision under appeal. However, in his oral evidence, and that of his daughter, he did not pursue that assertion and, instead, asserted that he had not been ‘signposted’ after receiving feedback following his failed tests. The representative of the Respondent submitted that no concerns had been raised, at the time, by the Appellant concerning the quality of the feedback received by the Appellant after each test. The Appellant stated that, if anything, he was ‘overteaching’ and that his ‘markdown’ on risk management was unfair.

In the decision under appeal, the Respondent had pointed out to the Appellant that the Tribunal, in determining an appeal, could not alter the result of a Standards Check test, nor order a re-test, a challenge that could only be taken, in this case, to the Sheriffs’ Court. The Appellant did not make any such application to the Sheriffs’ Court in respect of the outcome of any of his four failed Standards Check tests.

The Appellant submitted a Notice of Appeal dated 19 July 2020. He referred to his being an Approved Driving Instructor (‘ADI’) for some 15 years but had not been trained in the ‘new style of training’. However, he went on to advise that he had paid for private training to ensure he would pass his upcoming Standards Check tests; that he continued to have a high pupil pass rate; that the examiners were not familiar with the roads where the tests were conducted and that he would be happy to go back onto a trainee licence. The Appellant had stated in his Notice of Appeal that he was taking legal advice on the matter. It emerged at the hearing that this involved his daughter taking advice from CAB who advised the Appellant to pursue this appeal to the Tribunal rather than incur the expense of an application to the Sheriffs’ Court to challenge the outcome of any of the four Standards Check tests.

In their Response, dated 25 November 2025, the Respondent confirmed that, in fact, the re-entry of the Appellant’s name onto the Register in August 2014 would have expired, in the normal course of events, on 31 August 2026, if the decision had not been made on 9 July 2025 to remove his name from the Register; that the first and second Standards Check tests were conducted by one examiner, while the third and fourth tests were conducted by a different examiner. The Respondent submitted that that, despite being given an adequate opportunity to reach the required continuing standard to have his name remain on the Register, the Appellant had failed a Standards Check test on four consecutive occasions. The Respondent further submitted that they, felt obliged, therefore, to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register in the interests of road safety and consumer protection. These submissions were, essentially, repeated orally in the hearing by the representative for the Respondent, but with the question of public confidence in the Register being undermined if the Appellant’s name was allowed to remain on the Register in the circumstances also being mentioned in submission.

The decision by the Respondent to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register pursuant to s.128(2)(d) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (‘the Act’) in that he had failed the continued ability and fitness test (known as a ‘Standards Check test’) on
four separate occasions, was, undoubtedly, correct as a factual proposition. The Tribunal agreed with the Respondent’s rationale, as set out in the preceding paragraph, in arriving at that conclusion.

Section 125(5) of the Act requires that a person whose name is held in the Register
must undergo a test of continued ability and fitness to give instruction in the driving
of motor cars. Although the Act permits removal of a name after a single failure of a
check test, it is usual for an instructor to be allowed three attempts before removal is
ordered. By reason of the word “may” in s.128(1) of the Act, removal from the Register is discretionary.

Significantly, pursuant to s.133(1) of the Act, an appeal against the conduct of a Standards Check test lies to, in the case of Scotland, as here, to a Sheriffs’ Court – not to the Tribunal.The Appellant accepted that he did not make application to the Sheriffs’ Court to challenge the outcome, or conduct, of any of his four attempts at the Standards Check test.

The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to decide whether the Respondent’s decision to exercise their discretion to remove the Appellant’s name from the ADI Register was correct. The principal way that issue is addressed is by requiring that those who give paid instruction havetheir name on the Register undergo Standards Check tests Parliament has put other provisions in place so the public can have confidence in the Register. For example, there is a pre-condition to registration that anapplicant has passed all three parts of the qualifying examination and there is arequirement that the applicant is and remains a ‘fit and proper person’ to have hisname on the Register (which goes beyond ability as an instructor) and s.125(5)provides that the entry of a person’s name onto the Register shall be subject to thecondition that, so long as his name is on the Register, he will, if at any timerequired to do so by the Registrar, submit himself for such test of continuedability and fitness to give instruction in the driving of motor cars as may be
prescribed. The importance of this provision is that it ensures, by periodictesting, that driving instructors remain sufficiently competent to charge fordrivinginstruction. It is therefore an important component in maintaining publicconfidence in the Register. It is important to note that the imposition of thecondition is mandatory and that the terms of the condition are that the Approved Driving Instructor (‘ADI’) will,at any time required to do so by the Respondent, submit himself for a Standards Check test. Once the Respondent has required an ADI to submithimself for a check test.

The Tribunal was satisfied that the Respondent was correct to find that the Appellant had been givenadequate opportunity to pass the Standards Check test but had failed to do so – on four occasions The Respondent was correct to remove the name of the Appellant from the Register due to his inability tosatisfy the Registrar that his ability to provide driving instruction was to the requiredstandard.

The Appellant was provided withguidance andadvice, following his failed Standards Check examinations, on how he might improve his standards before undergoing afurther test. Despite this, the Appellant failed to achievethe required standard on four consecutive occasions.

Most of the submissions made in the Appellant’s written representations to the
Registrar, replicated in his Notice of Appeal, concerned him criticising the conduct and outcome of the Standards Check tests. However, as was noted previously in this Decision, pursuant to s.133(1) of the Act, an appeal against the conduct or outcome of a check test lies to, in this case, a Sheriffs’ Court and, pursuant to s.133(3), no such appeal may be made to the Tribunal under s.131 of the Act.Accordingly, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider such submissions.

The Tribunal is a judicial authority entirely independent of both the Appellant and the Respondent. When an appeal comes before a Tribunal, the Tribunal considers the matter the subject of the appeal entirely afresh while having regard to the views expressed by the Respondent as the body entrusted by Parliament in respect of these matters.

The appealis dismissed with immediate effect.