Case Reference: FT/EA/2024/0458
Information Rights
Before
JUDGE SCHERBEL-BALL
TRIBUNAL MEMBER DR MANN
TRIBUNAL MEMBER WOLF
Between
MARCEL PETER BARD
Appellant
and
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
Respondent
Decision:
The Appeal is refused.
REASONS
A.Introduction
This is an appeal against a Decision Notice (the “Decision Notice”) of the Information Commissioner (the “Commissioner”) dated 21 November 2024 (Reference IC-317819-Z0F4) (the “Decision Notice”). The appeal is brought under s.57(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”).
This appeal concerns whether the Commissioner was correct to determine in the Decision Notice that the Appellant’s eight requests made of the Ministry of Justice (the “MOJ”) under FOIA between 4 April 2024 and 21 May 2024 were vexatious within the meaning of s.14 FOIA.
The appeal was considered at an oral hearing which took place by video link (CVP). The hearing on 2 July 2026 was a second attempt to hold the hearing of this appeal. The first hearing had taken place on 7 May 2026. The Appellant sought to conduct the hearing from a stairwell of a large building. For the reasons set out in the Tribunal’s directions dated 7 May 2026, it was not ultimately possible to continue to conduct the hearing in that way. Following further directions which I gave on 19 May 2026, the hearing was relisted before the same Panel for 2 July 2026. The Appellant attended in person on 2 July 2026 from a suitably private venue. The Commissioner did not attend, having notified the Tribunal of this in advance. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and appropriate to conduct the hearing in this manner and that the Appellant was able to take a full part in proceedings.
Following the hearing, we have decided to refuse the appeal. These are our reasons for doing so.
B.Procedural Background
This appeal concerns eight requests which the Appellant made of the MOJ between 4 April 2024 and 21 May 2024 (the “Requests”). The Requests were as follows:
4 April 2024 (“Request 1”)
“1. Has the County Court at Newcastle Upon Tyne made an Order for Possession in accordance with rule 40.2 Civil Procedure Rules (in particular in accordance with rule 40.2(1)(a) and rule 40.2(1)(b)) on the 3rd day of March 2022?
2. Has the County Court at Newcastle Upon Tyne issued an Order for Possession in accordance with rule 40.2 Civil Procedure Rules (in particular in accordance with rule 40.2(1)(a) and rule 40.2(1)(b)) on the 3rd day of March 2022?
3. Regarding which land has such Order for Possession been made and issued?
4. Which Judge or judge or other officer of the court has made and issued such Order for Possession on the 3rd day of March 2022?
5. Has such Order for Possession in accordance with part 40 Civil Procedure Rules been validly served?
6. Has no forgery falling under section 9 Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 been involved in the making and/or issuing of Order for Possession on the 3rd day of March 2022?
7. Who is the Claimant and which representative with rights of audience has represented the Claimant applying for such Order for Possession?
8. I hereby request a copy of such Order for Possession, and/or the number/reference of such Order for Possession made and issued in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules.”
9 May 2024 (“Request 2”)
“Please provide and advance the full names of Judges confirmed and signed in Gateshead standing under their Oath of Allegiance as set out in the Promissory Oaths Act 1868, section 4; In particular full names of Judges confirmed and signed in Gateshead: County Court at Gateshead”
9 May 2024 (“Request 3”)
Please clarify whether the official name is “County Court at Newcastle Upon Tyne”, or rather “County Court, Newcastle upon Tyne”, or even different from both of these.
Please clarify which jurisdiction the County Court at Newcastle Upon Tyne has and/or is exercising.
Please clarify which jurisdiction the County Court, Newcastle upon Tyne has and/or is exercising.
Is it not correct that since 1984 there is only one County Court, and the official name in any particular venue is supposed to be “County Court at…”?
Please clarify which is the official name of the County Court at a particular place/venue/county/borough/etc. which has its jurisdiction in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e. in accordance with the Bill of rights 1688/1689.”
9 May 2024 (“Request 4”)
Please provide and advance the full names of fee-paid members of the judiciary who in the course of their duties occasionally sit at the County Court at Gateshead.
And please clarify which of these fee-paid members of the judiciary sitting at the County Court at Gateshead are confirmed and signed standing under their Oath of Allegiance as set out in the Promissory Oaths Act 1868, section 4.
And please clarify whether only those standing under their Oath of Allegiance can lawfully preside in/over procedures at the County Court at Gateshead.”
13 May 2024 (“Request 5”)
Please provide and advance the following information:
Has the Crown Court at Newcastle Upon Tyne made a Restraining Order in accordance with rule 40.2 Civil Procedure Rules (in particular in accordance with rule 40.2(2)(b) and rule 40.2(1)(a)) on the 7th day of December 2023?
Has the Crown Court at Newcastle Upon Tyne issued a Restraining Order in accordance with rule 40.2 Civil Procedure Rules (in particular in accordance with rule 40.2(1)(a) and rule 40.2(2)(b) on the 7th day of December 2023?
Regarding which land has such Restraining Order been made and issued?
Which judge or other officer of the court has made and issued such Order for Possession on the 7th day of December 2023?
Has such Restraining Order, made and issued in accordance with part 40 Civil Procedure Rules, been validly served?
Has no forgery falling under section 9 Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 been involved in the making and/or issuing of Restraining Order on the 7th day of December 2023?
Under which jurisdiction has such Order been made and issued on the 7th day of December 2023?
What is the official name of the court in which such Restraining Order has been made?
Who is the Applicant and which representative with rights of audience has represented the Applicant applying for such Restraining Order?
For which land, and in which court, and with which evidence has the Applicant made any application for a restraining order on or before the 7th day of December 2023?
Has no forgery falling under section 9 Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 been involved in the making of such application?
Please clarify the difference between a Courtroom decision/Room-decision and valid order.
I hereby request a copy of such Restraining Order, and/or the number/reference of such Restraining Order made and issued in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules, and in accordance with the supremacy of the law of the land.”
13 May 2024 (“Request 6”)
Please provide and advance the full names of District Judges Sitting in Retirement confirmed and signed in Newcastle Upon Tyne standing under their Oath of Allegiance as set out in the Promissory Oaths Act 1868, section 4;
In particular full names of Judges Sitting in Retirement confirmed and signed in Newcastle Upon Tyne, and in Gateshead: County Court at Newcastle Upon Tyne, and County Court at Gateshead;
Please provide and advance the full names of District Judges Sitting in Retirement confirmed and signed in Newcastle Upon Tyne and in Gateshead, standing under any oath at the County Court at Newcastle Upon Tyne, and at the County Court at Gateshead.
Please provide and advance the full names of District Judges Sitting in Retirement in the course of their duties sitting at the County Court at Newcastle Upon Tyne, and sitting at the County Court at Gateshead.
Please clarify which oath District Judges Sitting in Retirement are required to take in order to be able to lawfully administer justice and preside in/over procedures in or at the County Court.
Please clarify whether District Judges Sitting in Retirement are still bound by the Oath of Allegiance which they had to take to become District Judges, i.e. before the time they started to sit in retirement.
Please clarify in how far any administration of justice or presiding or sitting by a District Judge Sitting in Retirement can be considered lawful administration of justice as guaranteed by law and constitution (e.g. Lord Denning, 1974, Att.-Gen. v. Timesnewspaper).
Please clarify which jurisdiction District Judges Sitting in Retirement are exercising.
Please clarify whether District Judges can exercise the territorial jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or of England.
Please clarify whether District Judges can exercise any other jurisdiction than the so called ‘voluntary jurisdiction’?”
14 May 2024 (“Request 7”)
“Please provide and advance the following information:
1. Has the County Court at Newcastle Upon Tyne made an Injunction Order in accordance with rule 40.2 Civil Procedure Rules (in particular in accordance with rule 40.2(2)(b) and rule 40.2(1)(a)) on the 27th day of July 2023?
2. Has the County Court at Newcastle Upon Tyne made an Injunction Order in accordance with rule 40.2 Civil Procedure Rules (in particular in accordance with rule 40.2(2)(b) and rule 40.2(1)(a)) on the 27th day of July 2023?
3. Has District Judge J Gribble made and issued an Injunction Order in accordance with rule 40.2 Civil Procedure Rules (in particular in accordance with rule 40.2(2)(b) and rule 40.2(1)(a)) on the 27th day of July 2023?
4. Which District Judge confirmed and signed in Newcastle Upon Tyne and standing under their Oath of Allegiance as set out in the Promissory Oaths Act 1868, section 4, has made and issued such Injunction Order in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules?
5. Has such Injunction Order, made and issued in accordance with Part 40 Civil Procedure Rules, been validly served?
6. Has no forgery falling under section 9 of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 been involved in the making and/or issuing of Injunction Order on the 27th day of July 2023?
7. Under which jurisdiction has such Order been made and issued on the 27th day of July 2023?
8. I hereby request a copy of such Injunction Order made and issued in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules, and in accordance with constitutional principle of the rule of law.”
21 May 2024 (“Request 8”)
“Please provide and advance the full names of Judges confirmed and signed in Sunderland standing under their Oath of Allegiance as set out in the Promissory Oaths Act 1868, section 4; In particular full names of Judges confirmed and signed in Sunderland: County Court at Sunderland.”
The MOJ responded to Requests 2 to 7 on 22 May 2024 in a combined response. The MOJ stated that it considered these requests to be vexatious under s.14(1) FOIA and therefore refused to provide any further response.
The Appellant subsequently requested an internal review of each of these requests. The MOJ responded to these requests for an internal review on 20 June 2024. In the internal review responses, the MOJ apologised for not having responded to Request 1. It upheld the MOJ’s reliance on s.14(1) FOIA for Requests 2 to 7 and stated that Request 1 was also vexatious within the meaning of s.14(1) FOIA.
Also on 17 June 2024, the MOJ responded to Request 8. It refused that request, relying on s.14 FOIA, and stated that in accordance with s.17(6) FOIA it would not send out further refusal notices in respect of requests on the same topic. This was subsequently upheld following an internal review on 19 July 2024.
The Appellant complained to the Commissioner about the handling of the Requests in July 2024.
In the Decision Notice, the Commissioner upheld the MOJ’s reliance on s.14 FOIA in relation to the Requests. The Commissioner’s conclusions are set out at paragraphs 37 to 43 of the Decision Notice. In summary, the Commissioner reached this conclusion because:
The key question is whether the request itself is vexatious rather than the person making it.
In reaching a decision, the Commissioner considered the information provided to him in order to balance the purpose and value of the request against the detrimental effect on the MOJ.
The Commissioner considers that the requests are an attempt to challenge the authenticity or lawfulness of particular court orders and/or those responsible for issuing such orders. There are proper avenues for pursuing such challenges through the courts, and the Commissioner was satisfied that seeking to raise those challenges through requests under FOIA was a “clear and obvious improper use of the legislation.”
While complying with the requests would not necessarily impose a burden on a public authority the size of the MOJ, the Commissioner considered the requests were vexatious when considered in the context of the aggregated burden of dealing with the pattern and frequency of related requests submitted by the complainant.
The Commissioner concluded that any response provided to the requests would not satisfy the interests of the Appellant and lead them to an outcome which they were seeking. Rather, responses would in turn be likely to generate further correspondence and requests, continuing the pattern already demonstrated.
Having regard to the underlying commitment to transparency and openness which underpins FOIA, the Commissioner was satisfied that there is no wider public interest in the information sought in the Requests. In this regard, the Commissioner was satisfied that some of the requests “clearly do not constitute valid requests for recorded information under FOIA” and would “only serve the private interests of the complainant rather than holding any value to the wider public.”
C.The Grounds of Appeal and the Commissioner’s Response.
The Appellant appealed to this Tribunal on 21 November 2024. His grounds of appeal are as follows:
“1. In his decision notice IC-317819-Z0F4 (DN), the Information Commissioner (IC) has impliedly adopted the unacceptable approach from the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), to group together (”bulk disposal”) of 8 separate information requests which are of different nature and contents;
2. The blind-adoption of the undue “grouping-together”/”bulk-disposal” is evidence, of bias by the IC in favour of the MoJ.
3. The appellant’s 8 Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOI) requests erroneously “bulked”/”grouped” together: to refer to each of the (a) 240509031, 240509029, 240521056 – asking for names and oaths of numbered paragraphs in the decision or notice and give Judges; (b) 240513021, 240509030 – asking about info. re. due process/administration of justice; (c) 240514008, 240405043, 240513020 – asking for the existence of valid orders;
4. It goes against logic to undertake to group/bulk them: it was undertaken by the MoJ in order to avoid the discharge of their duties under the FOIA 2000, and that approach was wrongly overtaken by the IC;
5. It is also evidence of arbitrariness: had the 8 complaints not been made by the appellant within a period of several weeks, but rather stretched them over a period of several months/years, the MoJ would not have been able to adopt their vexatious “grouping”/”bulking” together separate complaints;
6. In his decision notice IC-317819-Z0F4, the IC has adopted an approach hostile to openness and transparency, hostile to information access, and thus harmful to the open justice principle, and harmful to the trust in the judiciary branch;
7. In his DN, the IC has fallen way behind the handling of Freedom of Information requests in the United States of America (USA): whereas in the USA it is the most normal thing to not only make a FOIA-request (1) for the full name of any judge, (2) for the full oath that any Judge has taken (and to request written confirmation), (3) for the insurance-bond that any particular judge has as required by law, but the oath and bond can even be requested and verified in the Judge’s office itself in many places;
8. It should not be a big issue at all for members of the public to be able to enquire who is sitting in judgement, which oath they have sworn when, whether they are duly insured – these are the minimum requirements for the rule of law, which each and everyone must be able quickly and efficiently verify regarding any given case, as a precondition to participate in proceedings in full trust;
9. The IC with its approach hostile to transparency, rule of law, individual and public rights, is showing a worrying tendency to create a gap/divide between the jurisdictions and civil socities e.g. of the UKon the one hand, and the USA, Australia, etc.– not only on the background that there is only one universal Common Law, this approach by the IC is erroneous - IC risks that the UK “decouples” and falls behind (vis-à-vis its peer-group);
10. IC's hostility to the open justice principle, contrary to UKSC case law;”
The Appellant further stated that the outcome which he sought through the Appeal was:
“1. The 8 individual complaints to the IC, must be separated, and looked at and decided separately by the IC: some of them have nothing to do with others, and are of an entirely different nature and character and contents than others; 2. The 8 individual complaints (once separated again by this Tribunal) should be referred back to the IC, to be decided one-by-one under separate case-numbers/separate decision notices; 3. It should be generally established by the Tribunal that in future the request for names of Judges, their oaths and their bonds, should be a “no brainer”, should be an information request which the MoJ in the interest of rule of law, open justice, should answer swiftly, completely and without months of delay, nor without possibility for the MoJ to "hope" for the IC to assist relation to the request for information them with any hostility to transparency and information freedom in an open society and regarding open justice; The same should be done regarding the request to the existence of valid orders; And with regards to requests concerning info. re. due process, etc.; 4. This Tribunal may want to encourage the IC to generally adopt an information-access-friendly approach (intransparency, concealment, bias, procedural-manipulations (and/or the impression thereof) is not helpful, nor acceptable.”
The Commissioner’s Response dated 9 January 2025 seeks to uphold the Decision Notice. The Commissioner relies on his Decision Notice. He also emphasises that he considers that much of the grounds of appeal concern the way in which the Commissioner conducted the investigation which he contends is not within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, relying on the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal in Carins v Information Commissioner and DVLA (EA/2009/0102 & 0119) at [38].
D. The relevant legal principles
The Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider this appeal is set out in s.58 FOIA. If the Tribunal considers that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law or, if it involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner. In any other case, the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal.
The Tribunal must consider whether the provisions of FOIA have been correctly applied and is not bound by the Commissioner’s views or findings but must arrive at its own view, giving such weight to the Commissioner’s views and findings as it deems fit in the particular circumstances - Guardian Newspapers & Brooke v Information Commissioner and BBC(EA/2006/0011 & 0013) at [14(3)].
When determining the application of s.14 FOIA, the following general propositions can be derived from the case law:
First, one of the main purposes of FOIA is to provide citizens with a qualified right to access to information and therefore a means of holding public authorities to account – Dransfield at [25].
Second, vexatiousness is not defined in s.14 FOIA, but the question is whether the request is vexatious, not the person making the request – see Boyce v Information Commissioner [2025] UKFTT 7 (GRC).
Third, the focus and rationale for s.14 FOIA is on protecting public authorities’ resources from being squandered in the disproportionate use of FOIA – Dransfield at [10]. Proportionality therefore lies at the heart of any assessment of whether a request is vexatious under s.14 FOIA.
Fourth, the use of s.14 FOIA is a high threshold which must be judged to an objective standard – Dransfield v Information Commissioner [2015] EWCA Civ 454; [2015] 1 W.L.R. 5316 (“Dransfield CA”) [68] and [72], Parker v Information Commissioner [2016] UKUT 0427 (AAC) (“Parker”) at [45] and [50].
Fifth, whether a request is vexatious requires an assessment of all the circumstances surrounding the request to reach a value judgment as to whether the request in issue is vexatious. This is necessarily a holistic assessment – Dransfield at [45] and [82], Parker at [27].
Sixth, while the starting point is to consider the value or public interest in the request (Dransfield CA at [68]), the public interest or value (even of a private interest) in the requested information is not a trump card, but must be considered as part of a balancing exercise with the burden placed on a public authority – Cabinet Office v Information Commissioner and Ashton [2018] UKUT 208 (AAC) at [27], Parker at [45].
Seventh, a request can have value or serious purpose even if it only serves a private interest rather than a public one. A request should therefore not be dismissed as vexatious purely for the absence of public interest, without considering the other factors - Soh v Information Commissioner and Imperial College London [2016] UKUT 0249 (AAC) at [80] – [81] (“Soh”)
Eighth, the fact that there was once a genuine dispute or public interest, does not mean that this public interest cannot be diminished or extinguished through multiple requests – this can be “vexatiousness by drift”– Oxford Phoenix Innovation Limited v Information Commissioner and MHPRA [2018] UKUT 192 (AAC)(“Oxford Phoenix”) at [87].
Ninth, when considering all the circumstances, important but non-exhaustive criteria to focus on may include (i) the burden imposed by the request on the public authority, (ii) the motive of the requester, (iii) the value of serious purpose of the request and (iv) harassment or distress to staff – Dransfield at [28]. However, these are themes, not a checklist. The role of the Tribunal is to arrive at a “value judgment as to whether the request is vexatious in the sense of being a disproportionate, manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA” – Dransfield at [82] (emphasis added). These are therefore disjunctive, not conjunctive requirements.
Tenth, a request can be vexatious within the scope of s.14 FOIA because of, in whole or in part, the costs of complying with a request – Dransfield CA at [86]. The costs of redacting information for relevant exemptions can be taken into account when assessing this under s.14 FOIA, in contrast to s.12 FOIA – Innes v Information Commission and Buckinghamshire County Council [2016] UKUT 520 (AAC) at [54].
Eleventh, it is permissible when considering the burden on a public authority to assess the context and history of the particular request, having regard to the previous course of dealings between the individual requester and the public authority. The breadth, pattern and duration of previous requests may be a telling factor – Dransfield at [29]. A single well-focussed request is less likely to run the risk of being found to be vexatious – Parker at [25].
Twelfth, the period at which vexatiousness should be judged is the time when a response is due to the request under FOIA – Soh at [101]. However, that does not necessarily preclude subsequent events from being taken into account either (i) to the extent that they shine a light on the state of affairs at the time the response was due – Lee v Information Commissioner and King’s College Cambridge (EA/2012/0015) at [80] or (ii) when considering, what steps, if any, need to be taken by a public authority under s.50(4) FOIA if the appeal is allowed – Stürmer v Information Commissioner and North East Derbyshire District Council [2015] UKUT 0568 (AAC) at [91] – [95].
These general propositions must be applied to the specific facts before a Tribunal considering the application of s.14 FOIA; not all will be applicable in each case.
E.Evidence and Submissions at the Hearing
We considered an open bundle comprising 89 pages. Three minutes before the hearing was due to take place at 09:57, the Appellant sent the Tribunal an email comprising six further PDFs which he described as the “Appellant’s exhibits”.
The Tribunal did not consider that the Appellant provided an adequate explanation for why this additional material was provided only a few minutes before the hearing. While the Appellant asserted that some of it had only recently been obtained, that was not the case for all of this material. The Appellant also stated that he was waiting to see if the hearing was going ahead; however he had been told the date and time of the hearing in a notice of hearing dated 21 May 2026 which formed part of the same email chain used by the Appellant to submit his evidence. The Appellant therefore had had ample time to submit any evidence in good time before he did.
In addition, the Appellant’s email submitted the material does not appear to have been copied to the Respondent as should have been the case. The Appellant should provide a copy of his evidence to the Respondent. However, for the reasons set out below, the Tribunal did not consider that unfairness resulted to the Commissioner from the submission of this late material. Having considered the material, we do not consider it changes the outcome of the case, and that in accordance with case management principles and the overriding objective, it was appropriate for the hearing to continue. We have considered all the evidence submitted by the Appellant prior to issuing this judgment.
During the hearing, including in response to questions from the Tribunal, the Appellant gave evidence as part of the hearing as to the background to the Requests. The Appellant was not formally sworn as (a) his position merged fluidly between evidence and submissions, and (b) the Tribunal is entitled to adopt more informal procedures as may be appropriate on occasion.
In this judgment it is not necessary to capture the full extent of the detail and nature of the evidence and allegations made by the Appellant during the course of his evidence and submissions. The essential facts or allegations which the Appellant advanced were that:
He had been the subject of an extensive fraud which had involved the theft or wrongful removal/transfer of his land.
He had been the subject of multiple court hearings in the Newcastle area which involved “forged” or “fraudulent” court orders or documents by a number of court staff and/or judges.
He alleged that the civil court service in Newcastle was “operating as an organised crime group”.
He had been the subject of various orders which were unlawful or defective for various reasons. This meant he did not accept that orders had in fact been made against him.
He had been stymied in his attempts in 2026 to get hold of the court record (which he distinguished from the court “file”) by the courts in Newcastle.
There was therefore an essential public interest in the matters which he raised through the Requests to expose the serious misconduct to which he had been subjected.
Far from his requests being vexatious, it was the Commissioner’s response which was vexatious, and he was seeking to prevent access to information of real public importance and therefore the Commissioner should be closed down. The Commissioner had engaged in a deliberate policy of obstruction in relation to another request he had made concerning land registry records (by not issuing a decision notice) and a separate data protection matter.
The evidential basis for the allegations which the Appellant made in respect of the judicial system in Newcastle were set out largely in a 15-page PDF entitled “Exhibit 10” supplied minutes before the hearing and which was the subject of a detailed discussion at the hearing. The Appellant advanced the allegations of fraud or forgery (or similar) because of various inconsistencies or deficiencies which he said he had identified in court documentation in cases to which he was a party. (Footnote: 1) These included: (a) differences in names between the parties and details of representation in a transcript of a hearing and a court order resulting from the same hearing on 3 March 2022; (b) references to the hearing taking place at “Newcastle CF&T Centre” which the Appellant said did not exist, (c) an unsigned certificate of the appointment of a bailiff, (d) a party to one of the proceedings which the Appellant said did not exist, (e) an unsealed injunction order, and (f) a signature on a court employee’s email which referenced “Newcastle Upon Tyne County”, when the Appellant said there was no such county. In relation to the email signature, the Appellant placed particular reliance on the fact that he contended that there should not have properly been any capitalisation in the word “Upon” (emphasis added) as featured in this email signature.
The Tribunal did not form a positive assessment of the candour or reliability of the Appellant’s evidence. Indeed, we considered it generally highly unsatisfactory. We reached this conclusion because the Appellant was exceptionally evasive in the answers he gave, frequently being unable to give a straight answer to a simple factual question asked by the Tribunal. Instead, he frequently resorted to lengthy argument and allegations about the conduct of others. In addition, the Appellant had a very selective recall of events, being for example, unable to recall whether he was given advance notice of any of the hearings which resulted in what he described as “fraudulent” or “forged” orders. At the same time he was able to recall with almost immediate precision the dates of the hearings. In addition (a) the Appellant described one question posed by the Tribunal as irrelevant, and (b) declined to answer a question relating to what he had been charged with at a particular Crown Court hearing (a hearing which was apparently the subject of one of the Requests). The Appellant took this approach despite being more than willing to make wide-ranging allegations of bias, bad faith and/or extremely serious criminality against a range of public officials and employees at many points in his oral or written submissions.
The details of the allegations made by the Appellant were largely contained in Exhibit 10. This was a selection of highly edited and incomplete material. The apparent rationale for selection or editing was that the Appellant did not wish to overburden the Tribunal. He stated that more evidence could be provided if the Tribunal so wished. However, we consider that taking the evidence at its highest, there was very limited weight which we could put on this documentation and that it was not sufficient to support the allegations advanced by the Appellant. In this regard, it is well-established that allegations of bad faith or criminality have to be more consistent with their existence than their absence; allegations which are equivocal or equally consistent with honesty or mistake will not suffice – Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [2004] UKHL 48. None of the points raised by the Appellant would have met this high threshold for advancing a credible case of wrongdoing. Rather, it was clear to the Tribunal, and we concluded, that the Appellant was willing to jump on every discrepancy or possible error in the documentation in front of him to draw the wildest allegations of forgery, fraud or other seriously disreputable conduct, when other far more innocent explanations were equally, if not more probable.
The Appellant then used these allegations of forgery, fraud and so on to dispute the validity of various orders or findings which had been made against him in various judicial proceedings. When asked whether various orders or injunctions had been made against him, he did not provide a straightforward answer, but suggested that everything that was done was fraudulent or forged and therefore he could not provide a simple answer to the questions raised. This approach did not assist the Tribunal.
Taken as a whole, we therefore do not accept the Appellant’s evidence as advanced orally or in documentary form before the Tribunal, save to the extent stated below. We have made the following findings on the evidence before us, on the balance of probabilities:
The background to the Requests concerns a series of court proceedings which involved the Appellant. The starting point appears to have been a hearing at the County Court at Newcastle-upon-Tyne on 3rd March 2022 in which a possession order was likely made against the Appellant by a District Judge in respect of a property which the Appellant owned. The Appellant says he did not attend the hearing and that is consistent with the evidence before us.
The making of this possession order then led to a series of further legal proceedings or hearings. These appear to have included:
a hearing for an injunction which was sought and obtained by Connells Limited (“Connells”) against the Appellant and which took place at some point in 2023. Connells appear to have been involved in the proposed marketing and/or sale of the Appellant’s property which had been the subject of the possession order. It is not clear to us whether this was a hearing in July 2023 as referred to in Request 7, or a separate hearing before a different District Judge in September 2023 to which the Appellant referred to in Exhibit 10; and
criminal proceedings in December 2023 against the Appellant for “attacking” (Footnote: 2) a bailiff who had entered the Appellant’s property (the Appellant disputed that the individual was properly appointed as a bailiff). These proceedings were heard before HHJ Rippon at Newcastle Crown Court. The Appellant says he was acquitted of all the charges, but also made reference to a restraining order being sought. In light of the nature of Request 5, we consider that a restraining order was likely to have been made against the Appellant at this hearing, even if the Appellant may dispute its validity.
The Appellant has not made any attempt through the civil court (or criminal system) to challenge (by way of applications for permission to appeal or an application to set aside) any of the orders made against him at various points. The Appellant accepted this in his evidence.
The Appellant is using the Requests as a way of trying to circumvent or challenge the lawfulness of various orders made against him including the possession order from March 2022. This follows, in the context of the Appellant’s evidence and submissions in respect of the purported public interest on which he relies in respect of the Requests.
While we are conscious that every system of justice is imperfect, that miscarriages of justice can occur within our justice system, and that the legal system can be difficult and challenging territory for those without legal representation, we consider that the evidence relied upon by the Appellant falls a very long way short of the evidence required to support any of the allegations of bias, bad faith or criminal behaviour made against any of the individuals or public authorities, including those involved in the justice system in or around Newcastle or the Commissioner.
F.Discussion and Conclusions
In light of our findings on the evidence, and taking into account all of the circumstances of the case, as applied to the legal principles summarised above, we have concluded that the Decision Notice was correct in finding that s.14(1) FOIA was engaged in respect of each and all of the Requests.
There are a number of points which taken collectively support our conclusion. Many of which mirror substantially the Commissioner’s findings in the Decision Notice as summarised at paragraph 10 above. Specifically:
First, we address the Appellant’s complaint in his Grounds of Appeal (albeit not one he developed in any detail at the hearing), that the Commissioner was wrong to address all of the Requests together and he should have done so separately, without taking into account the others, or in the language of the Appellant “bulking them together”. We consider this complaint to be without merit for three reasons:
To the extent that this is a complaint about the conduct and manner of the Commissioner’s investigation, we agree with the Commissioner that this falls outside of the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction under s.58 FOIA concerns the lawfulness of the Decision Notice. The Tribunal has no power to direct that the Commissioner conduct a different investigation or the same investigation in a different manner. Indeed the Tribunal has no power (as the Appellant requests) to remit matters to the Commissioner at all – Information Commissioner v Malnick[2018] UKUT 72 (AAC); [2018] AACR 29.
As a matter of law, the Commissioner was perfectly entitled, and indeed correct, to take account of the breadth, pattern and duration of previous and indeed subsequent requests within the relevant period – see Dransfield at [29]. While the test must still be whether each individual request is vexatious under s.14 FOIA, the law permits the broader contextual pattern to be taken account. This is what the Commissioner did in the Decision Notice and this approach was correct as a matter of law. Assessing the Requests together is not therefore “evidence of arbitrariness” as the Appellant alleges.If the requests had been stretched out over many years, this may have led to a different conclusion, but that is not what happened on the facts of this case. On the contrary, the Appellant made eight requests, which in total comprised more than 40 sub-questions, over a matter of weeks. We consider that pattern and number of requests to be consistent with, and indicative of, the Requests being vexatious under s.14 FOIA, although we stress, it is not determinative of the issue. Everything must be judged together, and in context.
Second, objectively judged, there is no substantive evidence of bias or improper conduct on the part of the Commissioner. We reject the Appellant’s contention that the position in separate proceedings under s.166 of the Data Protection Act 2018 and/or a separate FOIA request, or anything in the factual background of this case, supports such a conclusion.
Third, this Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to “encourage” the Commissioner or establish “general principles” regarding the availability of court materials under FOIA. The Upper Tribunal has often commented on the fact that the decisions of the FTT do not set any judicial precedent. This Tribunal is no different. Moreover, there is an absolute exemption under FOIA for information held in court records or created by a court or a member of court staff – see s.32 FOIA. This reflects the principle set out in Cape Intermediate Holdings v Dring [2019] UKSC 38 (“Dring”), that the common law and associated court rules govern rights of access to court documents and provide the framework for access to such materials, not FOIA. If the Appellant wishes access to court documents for the purpose of challenging the validity of court orders and proceedings, the appropriate mechanism is through the courts, not FOIA.
Fourth, the Appellant places significant reliance in his arguments on the “open justice” principle, including by reference to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dring.The open justice principle is indeed a cornerstone of English law, but this argument only advances the Appellant’s case so far. He does not adequately explain how many of the requests relate and support the open justice principle. Indeed, the Appellant knows the names of the judges whose decisions he says are unlawful, as they appear in his evidence or the Requests themselves. Moreover, it is a matter of judicial notice that the names of District Judges are published online by the Judiciary, grouped according to circuit, not specific court location. (Footnote: 3) We therefore do not consider that the open justice principle is materially advanced by identification by reference to the information which the Appellant seeks through the requests.
Fifth, as set out at paragraph 27.4 above, we have found that the evidence is that the Appellant is seeking to use FOIA as an improper mechanism to challenge the validity of court orders made against him. It is striking that the Appellant emphasised the lengths he had gone to establish whether Newcastle-upon-Tyne is properly to be regarded as a county, when he accepted he had not sought to challenge the underlying orders against him through the appropriate court mechanisms. The Tribunal considered this contrast was stark. The court system has mechanisms for challenging orders which are said to be unlawful. This is through an appeal or an application to set aside as appropriate. This particularly applies, if, as the Appellant says, he was not present when orders against him were made. The Tribunal considered the Appellant’s focus on “office copies” of documents and detailed submissions on the distinction between the court “record” and the court file to miss the point. The proper mechanism to challenge court orders is through the courts, not through ancillary FOIA requests. We consider this a weighty but not determinative factor in our assessment of whether s.14 FOIA is engaged.
Sixth, relatedly, the evidence is consistent with the Appellant pursuing a private agenda of primary interest to him and without any genuine broader public interest. It is true, that the Appellant says he has been a victim of serious crime, but as we have explained we do not find there is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion. There is very limited broader public interest in the information sought. We consider that this is a paradigmatic example of a private interest being dressed up in an argument about broader public interest. The limited public interest is also reinforced by the fact that (a) the requests often concern hearings involving the Appellant himself, (b) the nature of the requests themselves which include matters which are entirely arcane, such as the difference between the County Court at Newcastle and the Newcastle County Court, and (c) the fact that many of the requests are not requests for recorded information but requests in substance for legal advice or attempts in the way they are framed to challenge the validity of court orders.
Seventh, we also considered it was a striking feature of the Appellant’s submissions at the hearing that he never sought to explain why the specific Requests advanced the particular interests he was maintaining. We consider that the nature and specificity of the requests themselves reinforces the private interests of the Appellant rather than any broader public interest. We have concluded that there is no material link between the overarching public interest arguments which the Appellant advanced and the more than forty sub-requests he advanced during this confined period in 2024.
Eighth, while this case is not one in which it is said that burden plays a particular role, we consider that the Commissioner was correct to recognise that the pattern and nature of the Requests was such that, in context, any responses would not satisfy the Appellant and be an end to the matter. On the contrary, the persistence and focus of the Appellant were hallmarks of his oral evidence and submissions, and we have no reason to doubt that this differed at the time of the Requests in 2024.
Ninth, the Appellant himself is still able to advance his allegations of misconduct and improper behaviour and challenge the validity of the orders in question if he so wishes. Indeed he has exhibited extracts of purported correspondence with the Metropolitan Police which he says show they are investigating his allegations. That correspondence shows that the police have been able to obtain documents from HM Land Registry and Santander Limited (who apparently were involved in the possession hearing in March 2022). It is apparent, therefore, that the police will be able to obtain such documents as they need for any investigation independently of FOIA. The public interest which the Appellant relies on is therefore appropriately addressed through any police investigation and any challenge which the Appellant is able to bring through the mechanisms available to him through the court process, and which he has not availed himself of to date.
Accordingly, and stepping back, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that the Decision Notice was correct and in accordance with the law. S.14(1) FOIA is properly engaged in respect of each of the Requests. We therefore dismiss this appeal.
These conclusions were reached unanimously by the Tribunal Panel.
Signed: Judge Scherbel-Ball Dated 6 July 2026