Sarah Walker v The Information Commissioner

On 08 November 2024, Ms Walker complained to the Information Commissioner’s Office (“ICO”) about how Kirklees Council had deal with her personal data. The ICO took this as being a complaint under Section 165 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA”).

In an initial response dated 18 January 2025, the ICO said they would keep the information on file.

Ms Walker lodged with this Tribunal a GRC1 dated 14 February 2025 which is well within the 6-month plus 28-day period in which a person may apply to the Tribunal for an Order to Progress. (see Rule 22(6)(f) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009).

In a further response dated 21 February 2025, the ICO said that they had contacted Kirklees Council and informed them that the ICO was of the view that they had not complied with their obligations under the DPA.

By email sent on 23 April 2025 at 1:59 p.m., the Tribunal Office sent to the parties Case Management Directions which included provision by the ICO of the Commissioner’s Response and the date for any application to be made and provision for Ms Walker to respond to any application, which I consider meets the requirement of the Tribunal to give any appellant the opportunity to make representations about any strike out application as is required under Rule 8(4) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009.

By correspondence dated 25 April 2025, the ICO informed Ms Walker, one of their Lead Case Officers that stated they:

The ICO response dated 16 May 2025 sets out the law at paragraphs 11 to 20. I adopt that analysis in full and do not repeat it here, seeking to focus this decision on the application of that law to Ms Walker’s application.

Ms Walker, responding on 29 May 2025 to the ICO’s application to strike out, draws attention to differences in her case and the factual matrix which existed for those cases. However, the underlying legal principles are the same, irrespective of the specific factual differences: the Tribunal only has power to order the ICO to progress a complaint and it is the ICO who decides how much investigation is required.

In her reply to the Information Commissioner’s Response, Ms Walker states:

She continues by explaining why she says the original decision was procedurally flawed.

The key issue here is that, however it happened, Ms Walker on her own admission, accepts that she now has the ICO outcome which is all the Tribunal could order the ICO to provide. Therefore, this Tribunal does not have any need for the Tribunal to make an order that the ICO provides an outcome as she has the outcome. Therefore, there is no reasonable prospect of the appeal succeeding.

For the above reasons, and pursuant to rule 8(3)(c) of the GRC Rules, the application is struck out.