Gary Symonds v Information Commissioner

The proceedings were held by video (CVP). All parties joined remotely. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this way.

This appeal is against a decision of the Information Commissioner (the “Commissioner”) dated 28 November 2024 (IC-320615-V5Q0, the “Decision Notice”). The appeal relates to the application of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”). It concerns a request for information from Ormiston Academies Trust (the “Trust”). The request relates to a named governor of the Trust, and asks for information about the name of another organisation that he is a trustee of.

On 10 June 2024, the Appellant wrote to the Trust and requested the following information (the “Request”):

“I would like to make a Freedom of Interest Request (FOIR) to obtain clarification of the declarations of interest for [redacted], a governor of Cowes Enterprise College.

The Trust responded on 14 June 2024 and refused the Request on the basis it is vexatious, under section 14(1) FOIA. The Trust maintained its position on internal review.

The Appellant complained to the Commissioner on 17 July 2024. The Commissioner decided that the Trust was entitled to rely on section 14(1) FOIA to refuse the Request because it was vexatious. This was based on the history between the Appellant and the Trust, the number of previous FOIA requests and other items of correspondence from the Appellant, the burden of the requests and effect on staff, and the fact the Appellant was using FOIA requests as a vehicle for raising wider concerns about conduct at the Trust. The Commissioner concluded that the Appellant had a serious purpose and motive for making this particular request to the Trust, but the requests and correspondence with the Trust over time appear to have become vexatious.

The Appellant appealed on 24 December 2024. His grounds of appeal are based on the argument that the information requested is information about governance that the Trust are required to publish by the Department for Education. He makes a number of points in response to the Decision Notice which can be summarised as follows:

The Commissioner’s brief response maintains that the Decision Notice was correct. It does not address the specific arguments made by the Appellant. The Trust has also completed a form confirming that they oppose the case, saying “We believe that the refusal of information under section 14 of the FOIA was applied appropriately”.

The Appellant submitted a reply to the Trust’s brief response. This provides considerable detail about his contact with the Trust, issues involving safeguarding relating to his child, and alleged false statements and alteration of evidence. It also expands on the responses to the Decision Notice set out in the appeal, and provides a timeline of events. The Appellant also submitted a reply to the Commissioner’s response, which provides further background detail to this request and the other request under appeal.

The Appellant applied for permission to use evidence contained in appeal reference FT/EA/2024/0407 in this appeal. This application was refused by Registrar Bamawo on 10 June 2025.

The relevant provisions of FOIA are as follows.

Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled—

if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.

Vexatious or repeated requests.

Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious.

that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or

There is no further guidance on the meaning of “vexatious” in the legislation. The leading guidance is contained in the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) decision in Information Commissioner v Dransfield [2012] UKUT 440 (AAC), as upheld and clarified in the Court of Appeal (“CA”) in Dransfield v Information Commissioner and another & Craven v Information Commissioner and another [2015] EWCA Civ 454 (CA).

As noted by Arden LJ in her judgment in the CA in Dransfield, the hurdle of showing a request is vexatious is a high one: “…the starting point is that vexatiousness primarily involves making a request which has no reasonable foundation, that is, no reasonable foundation for thinking that the information sought would be of value to the requester, or to the public or any section of the public. Parliament has chosen a strong word which therefore means that the hurdle of satisfying it is a high one, and that is consistent with the constitutional nature of the right. The decision maker should consider all the relevant circumstances in order to reach a balanced conclusion as to whether a request is vexatious.” (para 68).

Judge Wikeley’s decision in the UT Dransfield sets out more detailed guidance that was not challenged in the CA. The ultimate question is, “is the request vexatious in the sense of being a manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA?” (para 43). It is important to adopt a “holistic and broad” approach, emphasising “manifest unreasonableness, irresponsibility and, especially where there is a previous course of dealings, the lack of proportionality that typically characterise vexatious requests.” (para 45). Arden LJ in the CA also emphasised that a “rounded approach” is required (para 69), and all evidence which may shed light on whether a request is vexatious should be considered.

The UT set out four non-exhaustive broad issues which can be helpful in assessing whether a request is vexatious:

Overall, the purpose of section 14 is to “protect the resources (in the broadest sense of that word) of the public authority from being squandered on disproportionate use of FOIA” (UT para 10), subject always to the high standard of vexatiousness being met.

The issue in this appeal is whether the Trust was entitled to rely on section 14(1) FOIA to refuse to respond to the Request.

By way of evidence and submissions we had the following, all of which we have taken into account in making our decision:

An agreed bundle of open documents.

Written submissions from the Appellant.

Oral submissions from the Appellant at the hearing.

In accordance with section 58 of FOIA, our role is to consider whether the Commissioner’s Decision Notice was in accordance with the law. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited to issues that are actually dealt with in the Decision Notice. As set out in section 58(2), we may review any finding of fact on which the Decision Notice was based. This means that we can review all of the evidence provided to us and make our own decision.

At the hearing, we asked the Appellant to explain his written submissions in more detail, and asked him questions about various matters. We have considered his points of appeal in light of what he said at the hearing, as follows.

This appeal is closely related to another ongoing appeal (FT/EA/0407/2024), and the statements made by the Trust to the Commissioner as recorded in the Decision Notice very closely resemble those in the other appeal. We are aware that there is another appeal about a different request that is currently being considered by the Tribunal, which was also refused on grounds of vexatiousness. The appeals had not been joined and we did not consider the full bundle from the other appeal. However, we allowed the Appellant to explain points that were relevant from the other appeal.

He is not pursuing a personal vendetta against the named individual – instead the Trust is refusing to comply with its obligations, and he has identified that the named individual had failed to declare a number of potential conflicts of interest. The Appellant explained that his request is not a vendetta, he believes he is asking for information in the public interest. His concerns stem from an incident when he says that he discovered this individual was using a Trust phone number to advertise his bed and breakfast business. He says that he then became concerned that this individual was not declaring his interests properly, and the Trust was not publishing declarations of interest accurately. He says this led him to uncover that the individual had made different declarations for different roles.

He does not agree with the numbers of previous requests and amount of correspondence reported by the Trust, and says his previous FOIA requests have uncovered important evidence about various matters. The Trust had provided the Commissioner with a table setting out a history of FOIA requests, subject access requests, complaints and correspondence from the Appellant. The table provided by the Trust was relied on in the Commissioner’s decision, which says the Trust had reported a total of 77 FOIA requests, 21 internal review requests, 15 subject access requests and 14 service complaints relating to 11 members of staff.

We asked the Appellant to provide a copy of his written comments on this table, which he had provided to the Commissioner in the other appeal. The Appellant sent this comments document to us after the hearing. This document provides explanations for some of the FOIA requests, and says he had no record of others, and suggests that the Trust had logged some requests for an internal review as separate FOIA requests. The Appellant’s own version of the table with his comments indicates that he accepts he has made some 26 separate FOIA requests to the Trust between 2018 and 2024. For a number of other FOIA records he says, “I can find no evidence of correspondence based on the above information, hence I believe if the GBOAT wish to rely on the above as evidence they should provide further detail or evidence to the ICO/tribunal”. It appears from the table that some of these are internal reviews rather than fresh FOIA requests. However, others are listed as FOIA requests about new, specific matters. The table gives the day and subject matter of each request, and we find it implausible that the Trust would have invented a set of requests on different matters. We therefore find that a number of these additional requests were made by the Appellant, even if he is not now able to identify correspondence relating to each of them.

He does not agree that his requests and communications have been adversarial, he says that the Trust have not provided evidence of this, and he stands by his belief that the actions and behaviours of staff should be investigated by the regulatory authorities. We have not seen all of the previous FOIA requests from the Appellant. The Request we are considering is not obviously adversarial. It is clear that there has been a breakdown in the relationship between the Appellant and the Trust. The Trust’s representations to the Information Commissioner refer to threats by the Appellant to make reports to the police. The Appellant says that the Trust has made defamatory and prejudicial remarks about him, and threatened to report him to the police. We asked the Appellant at the hearing why he has made so many FOIA requests. He explained that quite a lot are reactionary requests, in response to actions by the Trust. He said that the Trust would refuse to deal with his concerns either informally or through a complaints process, and so he used FOIA to “force” a reply because the Trust is legally required to respond. He sees FOIA as a way to get or force a response, and that is why he used it so much.

We have considered the broad tests from the caselaw in turn.

The burden imposed on the public authority by the request. As set out above, the Appellant accepts having made around 26 separate FOIA requests to the Trust. We also find that a number of the other FOIA requests listed by the Trust in their table were made by the Appellant. Although the total appears to be less than the 77 stated by the Commissioner, this is still a large number of requests from one individual to the same public authority. The Appellant has persistently used FOIA requests to obtain answers from the Trust, because this is a way to force a reply. The individual Request here is not a particularly burdensome one to answer. It simply requires clarification of the name of an academy trust. As noted by the Commissioner, however, a simple request can be burdensome when considered in the context of other requests and correspondence. There is a pattern here, where answers to FOIA requests or other questions are followed by further FOIA requests on related topics.

The Trust’s representations to the Commissioner say, “The communications have placed a significant burden on the trust. Between August 2022 and the current date the trust has exchanged approximately 120 emails with Mr Symonds. Even just allowing for 20 minutes per email this would be in excess of 36 hours, however this is a very conservative estimate given the complexity of the way the requests are structured, which often require considerable time to decipher what the requested information is. This has been exacerbated in recent months as Mr Symonds has taken to sending requests directed to more than one body at once in the same email.” The Trust goes on to say this is diverting resources and attention away from their stated aim of providing children with a great education. Looked at overall, we accept that the large number of FOIA requests and related correspondence will have placed a considerable burden on a relatively small public authority.

The motive of the requester. The Appellant says that his motivation in uncovering a lack of transparency from the named individual, and this is in the public interest. On the evidence we have seen and heard, we accept that the Appellant does not have an impermissible motive in making the Request.

The value or serious purpose. Again, the Appellant says that his motivation is uncovering a lack of transparency by the named individual, and this is in the public interest. He refers to the legal requirement to publish registers of interests online. He says that interests have not been declared accurately and the individual has used Trust resources for personal business.

The Appellant also says that his previous FOIA requests were all in the public interest, as they largely related to concerns around safeguarding and the Trust’s processes. The Appellant provided us with considerable background information on these previous requests. He says that the information he has uncovered will be provided to a current child abuse inquiry, and to MPs in relation to a new Bill about children’s wellbeing and schools. We do not need to make a finding on these earlier requests in order to make a decision about the current Request. The earlier requests may have had a genuine purpose, but nevertheless cumulatively lead to a disproportionate and inappropriate use of FOIA.

We have looked at the facts surrounding the Request itself. The declaration of interests the Appellant is asking about is at page B334 in the bundle. It has columns for each individual which show the name of the organisation declared, the type of interest, and space for notes. For the relevant individual, this gives “AMAT” as the organisation, and “Trustee of a small MAT in Leeds” in the notes box. The declaration therefore does give the name of the organisation, as the acronym “AMAT”. The Appellant said at the hearing that there was some confusion over whether this was an acronym, or the statement “a MAT” which did not specify the organisation. He said this was ambiguous. He now accepts that “AMAT” was named. The Trust also provided evidence to the Commissioner that the full name “Abbey Multi Academy Trust Leeds” was given separately on the Trust’s register of pecuniary interests as published on its website in October 2023.

We therefore find that the value or serious purpose of this Request was very limited. The Trust had already named the relevant organisation – as an acronym in one document, and in full in another document, both of which were publicly accessible. At best the Request was asking for clarification of an acronym, when the full name was already available elsewhere.

The Appellant made various other allegations at the hearing about the Trust having updated its declarations of interest at the time he made his Request and afterwards. He says that this is new information about the Trust deliberately concealing or deleting information that he has only discovered after receiving the bundle of documents for this hearing. We do not entirely follow this argument, as he said these updates were for individuals other than the individual he is concerned about. In any case, we do not make any finding on this point as it is not relevant to the specific Request – this simply asked for the name of a declared organisation.

The Appellant also says that the Request cannot be refused as vexatious because it is a legal/contractual requirement with the Secretary of State for Education that the information he has requested is published online for everyone to view without it having to be requested under FOIA. We do not agree. The issue of whether a Request is vexatious is separate from any legal obligations to publish certain information. In any case, as explained above, the information was published online – both as an acronym and with the full name of the organisation.

Any harassment of, or distress caused to, the public authority’s staff. The Trust’s representations to the Commissioner say, “The requests have caused distress and worry for staff, particularly when complaints are submitted or threatened to be submitted to external regulatory bodies such as the TRA – one member of staff has been reported to them and the threat of another two is pending. Another member of staff was reported to the Nursing Council. There is anecdotal evidence that two members of staff, one based at the school Mr Symonds’ child attended and one at Head Office left their roles not least in part due to the actions of him”. It is unclear how much of this reported stress and worry has been caused by FOIA requests, and how much by other complaints or correspondence from the Appellant. Nevertheless, we accept that the large volume of FOIA requests will have caused some distress to the staff involved, particularly where they were personally targeted by the requests.

Conclusions. Having considered the factors set out above and all the surrounding circumstances, we find that the Trust was entitled to rely on section 14(1) FOIA to refuse to respond to the Request.

We have considered the starting point that the Request should have “no reasonable foundation”. Although the Appellant says he was concerned about compliance with the obligation to declare interests accurately, the Request itself asks for information that was already available. Answering the Request would not shed any light on the accuracy of declarations of interest. We have balanced this against the large volume of requests and consequent burden on a relatively small public authority. Responding to FOIA requests takes up the time and resources of public authorities. Often this is for good reason. However, a disproportionate use of FOIA by one individual can cause further requests to be vexatious. We find that this point was reached in this case. We were concerned by the Appellant’s approach of using FOIA as a weapon to “force” the Trust to engage with his concerns. We find that, in all the circumstances, the Request was an inappropriate or improper use of FOIA. We understand that the Appellant feels he is raising matters of public interest, but there is a lack of proportionality here in the way FOIA has been used over a considerable period of time. We therefore find that the Request was vexatious.

We dismiss the appeal for the reasons explained above.