Jason Eastwood v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors

This appeal was re-listed for remote oral hearing on 24 March 2025 by CVP, having been adjourned on 9 December 2024 as the Appellant was due for trial on 5 March 2025 on criminal offences in connection with the decision under appeal.

Case Management Directions had been issued by the GRC Registrar on 13 December 2024 directing the Appellant to notify both the Tribunal and the Respondent by no later than 12 March 2025 of the outcome of his trial on 5 March 2025, failing which his appeal may be struck out.

The Appellant did not comply but, on the afternoon of 24 March 2025, advised GRC that he would not be attending this appeal hearing but was content that the Tribunal proceed in his absence.

The Tribunal ascertained from information that was in the public domain that the Appellant had been convicted of the criminal charges faced by him and the case adjourned for sentencing on 30 April 2025.

The Tribunal declined to strike out this appeal despite the Appellant not having complied with the said Directions issued to him and proceeded to determine this appeal in the Appellant’s absence.

Oral submissions were made by the Respondent’s representative.

The Appellant appealed against a decision of the Respondent dated 19 February 2024 to remove his name from the Register (‘the Register’) of Approved Driving Instructors (‘ADIs’), pursuant to section 128(2)(e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (‘the Act’) on the basis that he was no longer a fit and proper person to have his name remain on the Register due to him having been charged on 2 September 2023 with sexual assault offences (by touching) on two separate females, both of whom were pupils of his, aged under18, while receiving driving instruction from him at the time of the alleged offences and, from information in the public domain, had been convicted of those offences in court on 5 March 2025.

The Respondent, in the decision under appeal, submitted that it took account of written representations made by solicitors on behalf of the Appellant on 29 January 2024 before making the said decision. Those detailed representations, in summary, were as follows

The Appellant submitted an appeal dated 28 February 2024 against the Respondent’s said decision, that, essentially, reiterated the said representations made to the Respondent but seeming to submit that the Decision should not have been made until the outcome of his criminal prosecution was known.

The Respondent’s case was set out in the Response. It accepted that the Appellant had not been convicted at the date of its decision but he had been charged with two offences of a sexual nature against two females who were under 18 years; that conditions to have his name remain on the Register extended beyond instructional ability alone and required the Appellant to be a ‘fit and proper person’; that driving instruction was a responsible and demanding task that should only be entrusted to those with the highest standards; that the Respondent would be failing in its public duty if it allowed an ADI charged [and now convicted] with offences of this nature to have his name remain on the Register; that registration represented official approval, requiring account to be taken of an ADI’s character, behaviour and standard of conduct; that the reputation of the Respondent an and public confidence in it would be undermined if it became known that the Appellant’s name was permitted to remain on the Register and that it would be offensive to other ADIs, or aspiring ADIs, who had been scrupulous in observing professional behaviour to ignore the current charges faced by the Appellant that impacted on his professional conduct.

In his oral submissions, the Respondent’s representative relied on the Response submitted.

The basis of the Respondent’s decision was that the Appellant did not fulfil thecriteria to be a ‘fit and proper person’, as required by s.128(2)(e) of the Act, namely,

“that he ceased …. to be a fit and proper person to have his name included in the register”.

Conditions require that an ADI (the Appellant in this case) be a ‘fit and proper person’. This requires account to be taken of anADI’scharacter, behaviour and standards of conduct. This involves consideration of allmaterial matters, including convictions, and other relevant behaviour, placing all matters incontext, and balancing positive and negative features as appropriate. The Respondent may take theview that a person no longer meets this requirement where there has been a change incircumstances.

An appeal to this Tribunal against the Respondent’s decision proceeds as an appeal by way ofre-hearing, that is, the Tribunal makes a fresh decision on the evidence before it. The Tribunal must givesuch weight as it considers appropriate to the Respondent’s reasons for its decision as the Respondent is the regulatory authority tasked by Parliament with making such decisions. The Tribunal does not conduct a proceduralreview of the Respondent’s decision-making process.

As a matter of law, the standing of the Respondent could be substantially diminished, and the public’s confidenceundermined, if it were known that a person whose name was included on the Register when they had demonstrated behaviours or been convicted in relation to an offence (the latter not being the case here), substantially material to the question of fitness. This can be in respect of behaviourpertaining to motoring matters and other matters of responsibility, trustworthiness and prudence;indeed, it would, indeed, be unfair to others who have been scrupulous in their behaviour, and in observingprofessional behaviourthe law, if such matters were ignored or overlooked.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Harris v. Registrar of Approved Driving
Instructors [2010] EWCA Civ 808 confirmed that -

“..... the condition is not simply that the applicant is a fit and proper person to be a driving instructor;it is that he is a fit and proper person to have his name entered in the Register. Registration carrieswith it an official seal of approval ..... the maintenance of public confidence in the Register is important. For that purpose, the Registrar must be in a position to carry out his function of scrutinyeffectively, including consideration of the implications of any convictions of an applicant or aRegistered Approved Driving Instructor”.

The thrust of the Appellant’s case was that he was innocent of the criminal charges brought against him unless and untilhe was proven guilty of any criminal offence. This, of course is a correct proposition in criminal law. However, at the date of the hearing of this appeal, the Appellant had been convicted of the offences with which he had been charged. An entirely different legal test applies in these appeal proceedings than that in the criminal courts. In these Tribunal proceedings, the burden of proof does lie on the Appellant, namely, to prove to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that, on the balance of probabilities, he remained a fit and proper person to have his name remain on the Register despite having been charged with what can only be described as serious criminal offences of a sexual nature, by touching, involving two separate females, at different times, who were under 18 years of age, while providingdriving tuition to each of them.

The very highest standards, not only of driving instructional ability, but of character, behaviour and standards of conduct were expected of an ADI.

On the balance of probabilities, the Tribunal decided that if the Appellant’s name were not to be removed from the Register at this stage, too great a potential of risk to the public would exist or be perceived to exist.

In reaching its Decision, the Tribunal considered all the evidence and submissions before it and took into account all of the circumstances relevant to this appeal.

The Tribunal must bear in mind the significant importance which attaches to the integrity ofthe Register. For the public to have trust inthe integrity of the Register, the Respondent must act in a way that encourages belief that those whose names were entered onto it, had high standards. Allowing those who do not meet those standards would undermine the trust placed in it with serious consequences for those who do maintain the necessary high standards.These are matters of wider, and public interest, which attract significant weight even where, as in this case, having his name removed from the Register may, potentially, have significant consequences, financial or otherwise, for the Appellant.

Taking all of these factors into account and, noting that the Tribunal needs to maintain publictrust in the Register and to prioritise consumer protection over the interests of the Appellant as an individual ADI, the Tribunal concluded that the Appellant, at the time of the decision under appeal, was not a fit and proper person tohave his name remain on the ADI Register.

Accordingly, the appeal isdismissed.