Hossein Kesejini v Immigration Services Commissioner

Unlike many areas of law, immigration law is the subject of strict rules as to who may provide advice and services. Section 84 of the 1999 Act sets out a list of those who may provide such advice or services and in what circumstances, and section 91(1) provides that someone who does so in contravention of section 84 commits a criminal offence. Those who are not already regulated lawyers, such as practising solicitors, barristers, legal executives and advocates, must be registered with the Commissioner. Section 83(5) mandates his objectives as follows:

Schedule 5 contains more detailed provisions on how the Commissioner can exercise his functions, including at paragraph 1 the power to make rules:

At the time of the hearing before us, the relevant rules were contained in the 2016 Code of Standards (Footnote: ¹). Subsequent references to Code numbers are to that document.

Under paragraph 4A(e) of Schedule 6:

Cancellation of registration is therefore not a discretion. Once a person is adjudged as incompetent or unfit then their registration must be cancelled.

Section 87 gives a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against a number of decisions by the Commissioner, including a decision to cancel registration under paragraph 4A(e) of Schedule 6.

The Tribunal’s function on appeal was described by the Court of Appeal in Visa Joy Ltd v Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner [2017] EWCA Civ 1473:

We therefore make any necessary findings of fact to the standard of the balance of probabilities. Bearing in mind our statutory function as described in Visa Joy, we consider the Commissioner to bear the burden of proving the facts upon which he relies in claiming that SIS is unfit or otherwise incompetent. SIS nonetheless bears the burden of proving any facts upon which it relies to show the contrary. Of course, we shall only resort to the burden of proof where absolutely necessary in order to resolve a controversial issue: Verlander v Devon Waste Mgt [2007] EWCA Civ 835 at [18]-[19].

The powers of the Tribunal if it upholds the appeal are given by section 88(2):

Cancellation of registration followed the determination of complaints made by Dr Ali Maham on 31 January 2022 and Ms Elham Kimiyaee on 5 February 2022. The two complainants had instructed SIS to make an immigration application that included them both, so the complaints were likewise dealt with together. The complaint determination (“the Determination”) summarised the complaint as follows:

The Determination then set out in detail what provisions of the Code were raised, SIS’s explanation, and the further investigation conducted. It then set out the Commissioner’s final conclusions, which upheld the complaint summarised above together with findings that SIS had breached other parts of the Code.

The action decided upon by the Commissioner was to:

SIS exercised its right of appeal.

We should record two preliminary issues. First, prior to the hearing the Commissioner applied for permission to call one or both of the two complainants to give oral evidence by video from Iran. Applying the principles set out in Agbabiaka (evidence from abroad; Nare guidance) [2021] UKUT 286 (IAC) and after the Commissioner had followed the procedure set out in Presidential Guidance from the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber): note on taking evidence from abroad – Number 1 of 2022, Judge Neville refused permission in the interests of justice, as no agreement could realistically be procured from the Iranian authorities. Directions were made for written interrogatories concerning the complainants’ witness statements, to which the complainants responded.

Second, SIS complained at the hearing that not all the information available to the Commissioner had been obtained. In particular, Complainant A had only been asked to provide a sample of his communications with SIS due to OISC wishing to take a proportionate approach to the gathering of evidence (including the need to obtain translations).

Assessing the consequences of the above for the way in which the appeal was presented, by reference to all the evidence and argument, we are satisfied that the parties had a fair opportunity to put their respective cases. We give our reasons, where appropriate, together with those for our conclusions on the substantive issues.

Two days were allocated for the hearing of the appeal. This proved insufficient, and we are grateful for the parties’ efforts in concluding the evidence within two days and their agreement to provide subsequent written submissions. A number of the factual allegations in the Determination engage more than one provision of the Code. Ms McKeon helpfully provided a Scott Schedule organised by each provision in issue, which then cross-referenced the relevant paragraphs of the determination. After the hearing this was updated with SIS’s response.

We are mindful that our function is not simply to adjudicate upon whether the complainants’ complaint is well-founded but, as held in Visa Joy, to decide upon continued registration. This requires consideration of all the evidence placed before us. It is useful to first set out some general matters concerning the witnesses from whom we heard.

Mr Kesejini’s evidence was difficult to follow, even making due allowances for it being given through a Farsi interpreter. A recurrent theme in this case is the disorganisation of his case files and, we find, his reliance on an employee named Amir Afjari for running much of his practice. No financial ledger was kept for individual files, at least none that we have seen, nor was much of the correspondence routinely stored on a central file. The most likely conclusion considering the overall evidence is that both transactions and correspondence were collated from the relevant sources (bank statements, email accounts, WhatsApp on a mobile device, etc) in response to OISC’s investigation rather than being contemporaneously recorded on a file. That disorganisation was reflected in Mr Kesejini’s answers. He showed little understanding of criticisms put to him on file and practice organisation, or why matters that OISC expects to be in correspondence, for example assessments of prospects of success, should be there. The following are only examples of this confusion:

Overall, Mr Kesejini’s evidence betrayed a haphazard approach to organising his practice, in relation to what was written down and filed and also in relation to his own working knowledge. Someone who writes little down but can demonstrate a razor-sharp memory of client interactions might still prevail in a factual dispute. Mr Kesijini is far from being such a witness, and we exercise great caution before accepting anything he says that is not supported by reliable contemporaneous documentation.

Ms Larissa Imperico is the OISC officer who was assigned to the two complaints. She gave oral evidence and was comprehensively cross-examined by Mr Parkin, whose written closing submissions criticised her evidence in a number of respects. We disagree that she was deliberately evasive, although she did exhibit some frustration at what she saw as the irrelevance or impossibility of answering some of Mr Parkin’s questions. This led her to see cross-examination as being akin to an argument, which reduced the quality of her answers to subsequent questions. As Mr Parkin accepts, however, her knowledge and subjective views are not directly relevant. The Tribunal considers the evidence and reaches its own conclusions. We take Ms Imperico’s evidence into account where we consider it to be material.

Attacks have been made on the credibility of Complainant A’s written evidence. We shall deal with these where they arise, but again we have considered the evidence as a whole. This is particularly important with Complainant A’s evidence, as he alleges that he has been the victim of a fraud by Mr Kesejini who, in turn, says that the allegation itself is fraudulent. The inability of SIS to have Complainant A made available for cross-examination, and to challenge his version of events, through no fault of either party, is a matter we must bear in mind when making our findings of fact.

We next address the allegations contained in the Scott Schedule, the rival contentions listed being for ease of reference; they should not be taken as comprising the parties’ entire cases, all of which we have taken into account. Breach of the code is not a binary outcome, so where appropriate we also set out our views on seriousness. We have stripped out matters relating to the £100,000 and consider that last.

Respondent’s contention:

“The Appellant’s emails to Dr Maham were frequently signed off by an employee, expressly stated to be “Under supervision of Hossein Ghaffari Kesejini”, where that employee was not registered to provide immigration advice and/or services, and in the absence of evidence of any supervision plan: Determination, [63].”

Appellant’s response:

“An authorised person has no authority to exceed and so this allegation is misplaced: Grounds of Appeal, [4].”

This allegation relates to the fact that all emails sent to the Complainants were signed by an individual called Amir Afjari (although his surname does not appear to be routinely disclosed in correspondence to clients). He is not registered with OISC and cannot provide immigration advice or services. We agree with SIS that Code 3 is not engaged. It concerns registered organisations and advisers who act outside their authorisation, not the behaviour of those advisers who are not authorised at all. That is dealt with under Code 8 below.

Respondent’s contention:

“The Appellant informed Dr Maham that his chances of obtaining an innovator visa were “100%” and that the application would be completed within three months. Doing so, in particular prior to Dr Maham taking and passing the required English language test suggests unfitness: Determination, [36].”

Appellant’s response:

“At the time of the original advice (before Ms Kimiyaee became involved), a three-month timeframe was feasible while, on the Respondent’s own view, Dr Maham is “fluent in English” and accordingly could have been expected to obtain the necessary test results. Accordingly, the advice was not incompetent: Grounds of Appeal, [23].

The “100%” representation was never made: Grounds of Appeal, [24]-[27].”

Inevitably this part of the Code is somewhat of a ‘catch-all’ for matters that fall below the fitness and competence expected of organisations and advisers in general. It poses the same issue as the ultimate question in the appeal, but for the moment we simply deal with this specific allegation.

In his evidence, Mr Kesejini said that Complainant A was lying when he said that he had been advised that the prospects of his immigration application succeeding were “100%”, and that he would never say such a thing to a client. Mr Parkin observes the lack of any positive evidence that this was ever said, and that the client care letter sent to Complainant A includes the following: (emphasis added)

We accept the Commissioner’s submission that this is no substitute for a discrete written indication of prospects, and find that it would be insufficient to displace any understanding by a client from an initial meeting (whether mistaken or not) that an application would be bound to succeed. It is bound up within the text describing the chargeable fee.

On timing, the client care letter says the following:

As was asked of Mr Kesejini in cross-examination: up to three months from when? Would it take SIS up to three months to submit the documents to the Home Office, or up to three months for the Home Office to process them once received? Or will the total process take up to three months from the date of the letter? Alarmingly, Mr Kesejini was unable to answer this question, let alone describe what a client might reasonably think. We consider it entirely plausible that a client could understand the client care letter to mean that the visa would be obtained within three months of the date of the letter and find it to be misleading in that regard.

In the interrogatory questions posed to Complainant A, he was asked for the source of the ‘100% chance of success advice’, and said that it had been put to him several times verbally including in one voice recording, and was witnessed by the agent from Avazeh Seir Travel and Complainant B. Mr Parkin observes that nowhere is this supported by the transcripts of voice recordings nor in the evidence from Complainant B, and therefore that Complainant A is not credible in his assertion, has withheld voice recordings, or that they were some of the voice recordings provided to the Commissioner that were never translated. In any event, he argued, the evidential case for the ‘100% advice’ fell apart. We reject these submissions. As observed above, the ‘voice recordings’ appear from the evidence to be audio messages sent by Mr Kesejini to Complainant A using WhatsApp. As set out above, the Tribunal approaches fact-finding by considering all the evidence. This includes recognising where evidence has not been provided as affecting both the evidential sufficiency of a party’s case and the fairness of the proceedings. There is no formal requirement for direct evidence of a particular fact; the Tribunal can draw such inferences as appropriate from the wider evidence and context. A relevant consideration in that exercise is the failure of SIS to provide a complete record of what advice was given. In a professional regulatory context, the Tribunal is entitled in principle to accept an assertion from a complainant that is consistent with the wider circumstances and is gainsaid by nothing other than a contrary assertion by an appellant.

Furthermore, SIS knew prior to the hearing that (a) this allegation was made and (b) that there were voice recordings that had not yet been translated. We cannot see that any request for the recordings (to which Mr Kesejini could quickly and readily listen) to be disclosed was ever made. Nor was there any application for the Tribunal to make an order that they be disclosed. Mr Parkin’s submissions on the subject were akin to those that might be made at a criminal trial, where a hole in the prosecution case might mean that a charge is dismissed even where it could be easily remedied by a defendant. As made clear in Visa Joy at [40], that is not how this appeal is decided:

“40.

In that context reference to case law relating to 'charges' in disciplinary proceedings or the law relating to unfair dismissal has little or no direct relevance. In fairness, when presenting the oral appeal, Mrs Alexander on behalf the Appellant, did not advance her case by reference to those aspects of her predecessor's skeleton argument; in my view, she was right not to do so. The process of evaluation by the Commissioner, and if necessary on appeal by the tribunal, is one of assessing fitness and competence. It is not narrowly confined solely to determining whether one or other specific 'charges' are established.”

It ill-behoves SIS to take forensic points on an absence of evidence for which it bears significant responsibility.

We further take into account Mr Kesejini’s evidence on the substantive requirements of the Innovator Route that Complainant A needed to meet, which was vague and difficult to follow. In his witness statement he claims that he advised that Complainant A would be “eligible for [an] innovator visa subject to the terms mentioned on the client care letter”. While some of those terms in the client care letter are relatively clear (for example, having “at least £1,270 in your bank account for 28 consecutive days before applying for Innovator visa”), others are not, and in particular the following: (preserving the original typing)

The first of those could be read as stating that Mr Kesejini had advised that the two bulleted requirements were, or would be, met. The second says nothing about whether those funds must simply be held by Complainant A or whether they needed to be sent to SIS, the Home Office or a third party.

Taking into account all the evidence, including that discussed later and put forward in the parties’ submissions, we find that Mr Kesejini did not deliberately mislead Complainant A into thinking that his application was sure of success. There is a degree of contingency built into the client care letter, for example, the need to pass an English language qualification. We nonetheless find that Mr Kesejini failed to explain what the prospects of success actually were. He has adduced no evidence that he did, such as an attendance note, nor is he correct to state that is it apparent from the client care letter, nor was he able to give a clear account in his written or oral evidence as to what that advice would have been. His vagueness and lack of clear advice were capable of leading Complainant A to understand that his prospects of success were ‘100%’ and that the matter would be resolved in the next three months, and we uphold a breach of Code 4 to that extent.

This breach has serious implications for the appellant’s fitness and competence to provide immigration advice and services in the future, as failure to clearly communicate advice on prospects was raised in an audit on 20 March 2020 by reference to Code 26 and Code 53, with the action needed being specified as:

“…Clients need to receive written advice on their individual likelihood of success once you have assessed how well they meet immigration requirements and assessed whether there are any weaknesses in credibility which is your client’s best interest for them to be advised of…”

The repetition of that conduct reduces the likelihood that the appellant will comply in the future.

Respondent’s contention:

“The Appellant’s emails to Dr Maham were frequently signed off by an employee, expressly stated to be “Under supervision of Hossein Ghaffari Kesejini”, where that employee was not registered to provide immigration advice and/or services, and in the absence of evidence of any supervision plan: Determination, [63].”

Appellant’s response:

“The evidence relied upon to show that the Appellant permitted an unauthorised person to provide immigration advice or services does not, in fact, establish this: Grounds of Appeal, [6]-[9].”

We express our conclusions on this allegation relatively briefly, without meaning any disservice to its exhaustive exploration in evidence and submissions.

We agree with Mr Parkin that OISC’s arguments went too far in some respects, for example when it was put that simply sending a receipt for received funds or an invoice must be done directly by an authorised person. There is nothing in the regulatory code that prevents the use of accounts departments, secretaries, receptionists and so on to correspond with clients – provided that they do not provide immigration advice or immigration services.

Nonetheless, Mr Kesejini’s evidence as to how his advice turned into the emails from Mr Afjari was wholly unsatisfactory. He failed to explain why he could not simply write emails to clients himself or, if he were checking every single email himself as claimed at one stage, why they had gone out in Mr Afjari’s name. We reject the claim that Mr Afjari was akin to a secretary taking audio dictation or that the wording of his emails was written by Mr Kesejini. At best, Mr Afjari would ask about a query that had been received, Mr Kesejini would give him the answer, and Mr Afjari would compose an email to communicate his understanding of the answer. This is supported by Mr Kesejini’s poor English, as well as how central Mr Afjari appears to have been to the overall running of the business. An illustrative example is the following email, which we find was sent to Complainant A:

A client reading this email would, as a matter of obviousness, think that the advice was being delivered by Mr Afjari under the latter’s supervision, like a trainee solicitor. At best they might have thought that the advice was being delivered by both of them jointly. This is reinforced by the use of the plural first-person pronoun and in practical terms by the number of emails from the complainants in the file where they write directly to “Mr Amir” requesting information and advice. We find that such a client would be entirely right to think that Mr Afjari was providing the advice, and that this is the most likely state of affairs that arises from the contemporaneous documentation (notwithstanding the word ‘Administrations’ at the end of the email). There was, indeed, no reliable evidence capable of leading us to the opposite conclusion. Mr Kesejini’s evidence on the way in which he and Mr Afjari worked bordered on incoherence, and became even more so when further details were sought. Mr Afjari has never provided any explanation of his own during OISC’s investigation and was not called to give evidence. OISC did not ask us to draw any formal adverse inference from his absence, so we do not, but SIS remains fixed with a lack of evidence to counter the situation that plainly arises from the documents: SIS’s business did involve Mr Afjari providing immigration advice and services contrary to the Code and the 1999 Act. This is a serious breach. We have unallayed serious concerns with Mr Afjari’s presence in SIS and his influence over it.

Respondent’s contention:

Appellant’s response:

We find no breach of Code 10. We were referred to no OISC definition of vulnerability that would include the two complainants. They are educated and sophisticated businesspeople. While an inability to understand English can often come within the definitions of vulnerability used in courts and tribunals, there is no basis upon which to read that across to the Code. However, we do accept that recipients of immigration advice and services are a vulnerable group overall, and apply that when approaching the overall issue of fitness and competence.

Respondent’s contention:

Appellant’s response:

The first issue has already been discussed at Allegation #2. We consider that the three-month statement was misleading, but not deliberately so. We were referred to no authority on whether this amounts to a breach of the Code, but cannot see why negligent or incompetent advice cannot also be misleading within the ordinary meaning of the word. We therefore do find a formal breach, but remind ourselves of the importance of not being overly distracted by that formality; as held in Visa Joy it is the ultimate question of fitness and competence that matters.

That latter consideration applies to point (b) of this allegation. Mr Parkin’s submissions that it does not properly fall under this part of the Code have some merit. OISC’s case could only really be understood as suggesting that requiring payment before issuing an invoice is prima facie misleading or dishonest. We reject this. Nonetheless, and as shall be discussed later, the evidence heard on this subject provided further ample illustration of the chaos that reigns in SIS’s accounting and filing. It should not take a three-person panel, Mr Kesejini and two barristers significant time poring through dozens of documents to work out what should have been immediately clear from a client ledger. This is not a case of non-compliance with specific accounts rules, to which unfortunately we were never taken, but a failure to meet the fundamental requirements of competently running a professional business. This permeated the entire appeal and will be taken into account in our eventual conclusion.

These all concern the missing £100,000 described in our introduction. We shall deal with this matter later in this decision after concluding the other specific allegations under the Code.

Respondent’s contentions:

Appellant’s contentions:

It is convenient to take these two allegations together. The immigration route chosen by Complainant A required a business plan to be submitted. Sports Travel Services Limited (“STS”), a separate company to SIS but still owned and controlled by Mr Kesejini, then commissioned another third party, TopWriters, to prepare the business plan. The common control of both companies was never communicated to Complainant A in writing, nor was he given time to consider it. He never agreed in writing to the fees and costs of such service, never received any written explanation of the benefit the third party would bring and never gave written consent to its involvement. He had, we find, been given that information orally, and confirms as much in his witness statement. By the time Complainant A paid the invoice for the business plan, he had never been given TopWriters’ name, whether in writing or otherwise.

Mr Parkin first argues that no conflict arose because STS did not profit directly from the commissioning of the business plan, “but simply acted as an agent for the appellant” in doing so. This effectively places a burden on OISC in an individual case to show a material conflict or benefit to the adviser before the rule is engaged, and so neglects the word “potential”. The meaning of this provision of the Code, in the present context of regulatory supervision and consumer protection, clearly requires that where a regulated adviser provides services by using a connected company in circumstances such as these, a “potential conflict” arises: the client is entitled to be informed in writing and have time to think about it.

There is no evidence on why STS should be instructed as agent to commission the business plan rather than SIS do it directly, other than that it was also controlled by Mr Kesejini, and we find that use of STS was an integral part of SIS’s conduct of Complainant A’s case. This fell within the scope of Code 20 and Complainant A was not given that information in writing or time to consider it, and nor did he give prior consent in writing. So, while this had no identifiable adverse consequences for Complainant A, it is still a breach of the Code.

In Mr Parkin’s closing submissions, he draws attention to Complainant A having confirmed in his witness statement that he did know SIS and STS were both owned by Mr Kesejini, but acknowledges that Code 20 requires the information to be given in writing. SIS therefore accepts that there was “perhaps an extremely technical breach of the code here, but not one of substance which would suggest a lack of fitness or competence in any meaningful way.” We disagree. It contributes yet further significant evidence of the lack of transparency and communication in SIS’s communications with the complainants. Important information required by the Code was left to be communicated orally with no note being retained. We can reasonably infer from the way in which this allegation was defended that this was the practice taken with other clients.

On Code 36, SIS accepts that this information was never given in writing and makes the same point that the breach was technical rather than substantive. We reject that argument for the same reasons as under Code 20.

Respondent’s contention:

“The Appellant did not provide Ms Kimiyaee with a client care letter: Determination, [46].”

Appellant’s contention:

“Ms Kimiyaee was not a prospective client at the time that a client care letter would otherwise have been sent. Given her brief and mediated interaction with the Appellant, any breach would have been subsequently mitigated in any event: Grounds of Appeal, [36].”

There is no dispute that Complainant B never received a client care letter. OISC perhaps went a little far in their arguments as to when a client became a ‘prospective’ client; we accept that there might be circumstances in which mere exploratory contact, such as an enquiry about prices or capacity, might not trigger the obligation. On 2 September 2021, correspondence was sent to Complainant B (again signed off by ‘Amir’), including:

It went on to request completion of a form. Complainant B part-paid the invoice, which included SIS’s professional fees for the application on 4 September 2021 and returned the completed form on 13 January 2022. Beyond argument, the requirement for a client care letter to be sent was triggered on 2 September 2021 at the latest. In evidence, Mr Kesejini stated that he did not consider someone a client until he had “checked their documents”. This did not survive into the closing submissions made on his behalf, and given that payment had to be made by that point we reject it.

We disagree that the breach is mitigated by Complainant B’s instruction being brief and mediated. The purpose of a client care letter is to establish the nature of the instruction at its inception, not at some later date. The inclusion of client care information in a planned ‘advice’, as it is suggested (with little basis) would have happened later had Complainant B not withdrawn her instructions, does nothing but lead to paid work being completed before information fundamental to its instruction has been given. As to the mediated introduction, this increased rather than decreased the importance of directly communicating the basis of the relationship to the client. An advisor should not assume that a third party has done so accurately, or indeed at all.

The seriousness of this breach is significantly aggravated by a failure to send client care letters having been raised in two previous audits of SIS.

Respondent’s contention:

“The Appellant failed to include information as to its complaints procedure in the client care letter which was sent to Dr Maham: Determination [47].”

Appellant’s contention:

“The client care letter does not contain a section headed ‘Complaints Procedure’, but it does contain the sort of material one would expect in a complaints procedure. It gives contact details [197] and details of the role of the Appellant’s PII insurers and the role of the OISC [198].”

The client care letter sent to Complainant A, dated 23 June 2021, has been provided to us. The suggestion that it complies with the Code is unreal. First, Mr Parkin’s reference to “contact details” must be to this paragraph:

We have not applied any redaction to the first sentence; for the telephone number and email the reader must resort to the letterhead which just provides the generic contact details for SIS. Second, being insured is an entirely different matter to having a complaints procedure – not all complaints are resolved by there being a financial indemnity for negligence. No reference to the possibility of making a complaint can be found anywhere in the letter.

Ms Imperico stated in her evidence that there were guidelines on the contents of a complaints procedure. Mr Parkin argues as follows:

“[…] However, these guidelines had not been included and were not, in any case, available to the public.

There is simply too little here for the court to reach any conclusion. The respondent may have requirements which are adequately made available to advisors, but if so, the court has not been provided with this material. It may or may not be a windfall for the appellant, but in the circumstances, no breach can be established.[…]

The client care letter contains nothing that a competent advisor could even mistake for giving details of a complaints procedure. There is no evidence that there was any complaints procedure. The specific requirements of a client care letter had been specifically communicated to SIS just two months earlier in its 2021 audit. It was the responsibility of SIS to ensure that it complied with the Code and to proactively seek further advice when unsure.

This is a significant breach.

Respondent’s contention:

Appellant’s contention:

This relates to the instruction of TopWriters to actually write the business plan (as distinct from the involvement of STS in commissioning it). We accept SIS’s case that Complainant A gave consent to the instruction of a third party to write the business plan and that he was very satisfied with the result. He can also be taken to have known the fee, as he paid it in advance when giving that consent.

OISC argues that Code 34 was breached simply because the identity of TopWriters was never disclosed. We disagree. There is no such requirement in Code 34, and we accept Mr Parkin’s argument that providing a name might sometimes prove difficult. The identity of the third party may be relevant if any potential conflict arises, such as it did with STL as set out above.

No breach under Code 34 is established.

Respondent’s contention:

Appellant’s contention:

This heading also covers allegations concerning financial records, which we postpone until later. On the narrow point of translation, we agree with SIS. We were not referred to any part of the Code or any guidance requiring that all communications with a client be translated to English when placed on file. In a field where many clients have selected an adviser due to a shared language other than English, it would be onerous to fully translate every single communication. We cannot simply infer such a requirement. We suspect that this part of the Code does nonetheless require that the gist of any communications, such as important instructions, points of advice, dates or required actions, are placed in English on a file note, but we did not hear argument on the point.

There would, therefore, be nothing objectionable about an adequate record where not everything had been translated from Farsi. As already noted, however, the difficulty with SIS’s files is that they contained very little at all, and had to be reconstructed from various WhatsApp chats and recollections of advice given over the telephone.

This relates to the missing £100,000 and is considered later.

Respondent’s contention:

Appellant’s contention:

SIS provided bank statements as follows:

It is common ground that both SIS and Complainant A agreed professional fees of £3,000, half payable up front and the other half payable at a later stage. An invoice on 21 June 2021 accordingly lists £1,500 for SIS’s fees, as well as two disbursements: a Home Office visa fee of £1,021 and an Immigration Health Surcharge of £2,010. A receipt for the total of £4,531 was issued on 28 June 2021.

Confusingly, another invoice is provided (apparently on the same day) under the same reference, listing the full £3,000 fee. Mr Kesejini attempted to account for this as explaining to Complainant A that £3,000 would be due eventually and only £1,500 was due then, but we cannot see how it does anything of the sort.

In any event, as the two disbursements were to be paid to the Home Office by SIS on a later date, Code 64 plainly required them to be held in a designated client account until that time. The same applied to the £1,500 paid on account of work to be undertaken. We take notice in accordance with our professional experience that it would be common practice in such circumstances for the entire £4,531 to be paid into the client account, and the £1,500 only transferred to the business (or ‘office’) account according to work that had actually been undertaken and billed. This enables anyone looking at the client account statements to see that all money has been placed in the client account save for billed costs. The credit received in SIS’s Barclays bank account with an account number ending 1885 was £3,047. Try as everyone might, no coherent explanation of that sum could be obtained from Mr Kesejini, and he ultimately deferred to Mr Afjari. It was suggested to Mr Kesejini that one of the transfers of £3,000 soon afterwards, from 1885 to 5436, related to Complainant A’s case, but again he was unsure. Based on a natural reading of the bank statement we find that it was.

Amidst that confusion, two matters can be stated with confidence. First, the 1885 account was not a distinct client account. The grounds of appeal, and Mr Parkin in his submissions, make a legal argument that the black letter of Code 64 is the end of the requirement, but the term ‘distinct client account’ has an obvious meaning. Indeed, at the time of the transactions above there was a Practice Note available on the OISC website (Footnote: ²) setting out numerous requirements. SIS cannot complain that OISC did not present this Practice Note as part of its evidence; a competent adviser would have known about it.

Mr Parkin argued that no evidence had been provided that the 1885 account was not a client account, but in circumstances where the bank account had clearly been de-designated as a client account by Barclays no such burden falls on OISC. It is SIS that is in the best position to prove it was operating in a way that was compliant with the Code, and we cannot see that any satisfactory explanation has been provided for the way in which both accounts were operated.

OISC’s Practice Note set out the relevant requirements, including that the account must have “client account” in its title. This account had been renamed prior to an invoice being issued to Complainant A, and it is inconceivable that Barclays would not have communicated the reasons for this to SIS. It was then incumbent on SIS to make alternative arrangements rather than simply ignore the problem.

Second, SIS was required to keep disbursements and payments on account for work yet to be undertaken in a distinct client account. Instead it was paid into the 1885 bank account and, shortly afterwards and before the work represented by the initial £1,500 could have been completed, paid over to the 5436 account.

A serious breach of the Code is established.

We reach the above conclusion without regard to the fact that by the time Complainant B was sent an invoice on 2 September 2021, payment of sums in advance was requested to the 5436 account that had never, on anyone’s case, been a client account.

Appellant’s contention:

Respondent’s contention:

We again postpone matters relating to the missing £100,000, instead approaching this allegation by reference to other payments cited by OISC.

This allegation is indefensible for the reasons given above. Even in proceedings where the accuracy and honesty of SIS’s financial records were in issue, it has been unable to present a coherent picture. There are duplicate invoices of the same date which defy logical explanation. It is impossible to reliably trace how Complainant A’s payments were dealt with. While we have not yet dealt with it, there is a similar mystery over what happened to £260 paid by Complainant B, that appears nowhere in the bank statements. SIS claims this was paid in cash by a third party at the UK office, which we accept, but the failure to then pay that into the bank (or even mark the receipt as paid by cash) means that accurate financial records are not available.

This is a serious breach of the Code, even without regard to the issue we shall now go on to consider.

The nature of this allegation is well known to the parties and we do not lengthen these reasons further with a detailed explanation. The following is a short summary.

The Innovator route required evidence that Complainant A could prove he had £50,000 available to invest in his business.

As set out by Complainant A in emails to OISC, on various dates in July, September and October, requests were sent, ostensibly in the name of Mr Kesejini, for several payments totalling £100,000. This represented £50,000 for each complainant’s application. The payments were sent and now cannot be traced. The initial messages sent to Complainant 1 appear to have come from a WhatsApp account ending with the number 575, which bears the name ‘Hossein Ghafari’ (Mr Kesejini). We have no evidence as to whether this is the name chosen by the account holder or entered as a contact by Complainant A, but Complainant A does show a screenshot of the account profile showing a photograph of Mr Kesejini. Subsequent messages come from a number ending 752, with the name ‘Sport Immigration Services’.

No direct bank payments can be made between Iran and United Kingdom due to sanctions placed on the former, so it is commonplace for Iranian citizens to send money using private money exchangers. These can be named individuals nominated by either party. Names were given for the payments comprising the £100,000 that were different to those given for payment of SIS’s fees already discussed. Complainant A describes how on 29 November 2021 he sent SIS an email asking for a client account statement and confirmation receipts but received no response, but instead a WhatsApp voice message. On 5 January 2022 Complainant A sent an email demanding the return of his money. The reply, he states, just advised him to re-attempt the English test he had recently failed.

Complainant B also claims to have been defrauded, sending a total of £12,062 in September 2021. She did not receive the payment requests directly, they were sent via Complainant A. Half of the £100,000 he paid was also on her behalf, as she did not then have the funds available.

Further detail was sought in the interrogatories as to which number was used on which dates. Complainant A replied that 575 was used from 25 June 2021 to 30 August 2021, when a message was sent by 752 to say to use that number from then on, and that this is what happened. Mr Kesejini accepts that the number ending 752 was one used by SIS, it appears in the signature of an email from SIS sent in July 2021.

A major difficulty in the way in which the evidence has been gathered and presented is that Complainant A has been responsible for gathering and collating the relevant evidence, but has not provided all of it to OISC, and it is difficult to cross-reference translations to the dates of messages. Only a selection of evidence was provided, as previously described. A further difficulty is the lack of any organisation in the way SIS kept its records.

What emerges is the assertion by Complainant A that someone has contacted him using SIS and Mr Kesejini’s identity, and perhaps his known number, and defrauded him of money. Mr Kesejini asserts that he is the victim of fraud, Complainant A (or perhaps someone else) impersonating him to make a false claim and recover money. A further possibility put forward by Mr Kesejini is that Complainant A intended to defraud Complainant B out of her money, with Mr Kesejini as the scapegoat.

OISC’s overall submission is that the 752 account requested the transfers and was undoubtedly being used by Mr Kesejini. One photograph on 2 October 2021 shows a picture of his boarding pass, bearing his name. Yet this assumes that the screenshots are correctly and genuinely composed. We also note that Complainant A does not appear to have pursued his initial intention to follow up with the UK police and to pursue civil litigation. There are no receipts from Complainant A proving payment to exchangers, which would be particularly useful evidence given that he says one of them was used for both the accepted business plan payment and some of the fraudulent transactions; there is only pasted text purporting to show payment to that account.

Mr Parkin asserts failures in investigation by OISC in this respect, and he is right to say that OISC do not appear to have ever considered the possibility that Complainant A’s case should not be taken at face value. Ms Imperico confirmed this in evidence and, as argued by Mr Parkin, was unaware of the potential for impersonation risk in transactional legal work. Complainant B has provided a greater level of documentary evidence. Again however, there is very little analysis or ability to verify the requests for money. Many of the payment requests are audio files. They were sent to OISC but no consideration has been given to whether they match Mr Kesejini’s voice, for example by obtaining a forensic voice comparison report.

The actors’ respective motivations for lying provide little assistance without undue speculation. It is difficult to see how Mr Kesejini could have perpetrated the fraud without a very good expectation of being caught. This could conceivably have included criminal prosecution, even though that has not yet transpired. Likewise, if Complainant A is the fraudster then the whole exercise seems unnecessarily elaborate. Both parties have been hampered by the inability to test the complainants’ evidence in cross-examination.

Mr Parkin’s reference to impersonation fraud gives rise to another possibility. Mr Kesejini’s practice of doing business on WhatsApp, and the obvious lack of organisation in his practice, leaves room for a third party to impersonate him and contact a client. While Mr Parkin highlighted OISC’s lack of knowledge of such risks, Mr Kesejini employed no protective methods at all. A written note of his advice on how Complainant A could evidence holding £50,000 in investment funds, or confirmation of it in writing, would have made it less likely that Complainant A would have agreed to send funds without further checks.

We have not found this an easy matter to decide. We remind ourselves of the principles set out in Verlander at [18]. This is an exceptional situation that justifies resort to the burden of proof. Context is important. These are disciplinary proceedings brought by a regulator. It is an extremely serious allegation; there is only one civil standard of proof and someone has committed fraud: see Re B. (Children) [2008] UKHL 35 at [73]. Yet a finding of such moment in the professional disciplinary context requires evidential rigour by the regulator. Here, for understandable reasons of resourcing, OISC’s evidential case is incomplete for the reasons already stated and put forward by Mr Parkin. Looking at the whole of the evidence, without rehearsing it all, we conclude that OISC has not met its burden of proof in showing that Mr Kesejini was responsible for the requests for payment and responsible for the complainants’ missing money. On the evidence available to us, that conclusion is not more likely than not. These allegations are dismissed.

We apply the above findings to determine whether SIS is competent and fit to provide immigration advice and services. There is inevitably a crossover between the competence and fitness. The guidance on competence (Footnote: ³) includes:

The guidance on fitness (Footnote: ⁴) includes the likelihood of future compliance with OISC’s Regulatory Scheme and a history of legal compliance.

Previous audits conducted on SIS are relevant, as set out below. We have underlined those failings that, on the present facts, have been repeated.

An audit conducted in 2020 found that:

In April 2021 that:

A further audit was conducted in August 2022. We recognise that this post-dates the relevant interactions with the complainants, but it provides further evidence on the general running of SIS and the extent to which concerns raised by previous audits were addressed. The concerns raised were:

Applying our findings and consideration, without repeating it all, we find without hesitation that SIS is not competent and is not fit to provide immigration advice or immigration services. The matters found above that we consider to be particularly salient can be summarised as follows:

All these are such as to put clients of SIS at risk, are inconsistent with competent provision of immigration advice and services, and demonstrate that SIS is unfit to provide them. Cancellation of registration is therefore required under para 4A of Schedule 6 to the Act.

Our final observation is that our concerns principally relate to Mr Kesejini’s inability to run a professional practice, as opposed to his abilities in immigration law. The statutory regime permits of only one outcome once a lack of competence or fitness is established. Had other options been available to us, we would have explored with the parties whether restrictions on practice would be appropriate, for example a limitation on Mr Kesejini providing immigration services and advice other than in the direct employment of, and under the supervision of, another authorised person. This is a matter that the Commissioner may wish to consider in future.