Case Reference: FT/D/2025/0494/FPP
Transport
Heard by Cloud Video Platform
Before
TRIBUNAL JUDGE T BARRETT
TRIBUNAL MEMBER FRY
TRIBUNAL MEMBER ROANTREE
Between
RAHINAZ MOGHAL
Appellant
and
The REGISTRAR OF APPROVED DRIVING INSTRUCTORS
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: In person, supported by her husband.
For the Respondent: Mr Russell
Decision: The appeal is Dismissed.
REASONS
This appeal concerns a decision of the Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors (“the Registrar”) made on 25 March 2025 to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register of Approved Driving Instructors (the “Register”) on the grounds that the Appellant was not a fit and proper person to be an Approved Driving Instructor (“ADI”).
The Registrar reached this decision because the Appellant had accepted a fixed penalty notice for breach of requirements as to control of the vehicle (including mobile phone offences) incurring 6 penalty points on the 30 December 2024.
The proceedings were held by video (CVP). All parties joined remotely. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this way.
The Appeal
The Appellant’s Notice of Appeal dated 18 April 2025 included a lengthy attachment which in summary sets out:
The Appellant asks the Tribunal to consider this appeal with compassion, proportionality, and fairness based on the Appellant’s good character, unblemished professional record and the exceptional and isolated nature of the incident in question and the severe personal impact removal will cause.
The Appellant fully acknowledges the seriousness of the fixed penalty notice.
The Appellant states that the fixed penalty notice arose during a moment of crisis, because her mother-in-law was critically ill and suffered a stroke and was rushed to hospital in Pakistan on that day 30 December 2024. The Appellant was her primary carer. The Appellant further states that they glanced at their phone whilst the vehicle was stationary to check a message about the condition of their mother-in-law. That this was a one-off circumstantial incident with no intent to breach the law. The Appellant states that the motivation was one based on care for the Mother-in-law not recklessness.
The Appellant denies this was a case of distracted driving as she asserts the car was stationary and the Appellant asserts that they were not on the phone, nor using the phone for communication, texting or any interactive function. The Appellant states they momentarily touched the phone to check the message.
The Appellant deeply regrets the circumstances that led to this situation and takes full responsibility for their actions, they had no intent to act in a way that could jeopardise their position as an ADI or reflect negatively on their professionalism and integrity.
In the Appellant’s opinion, by informing the DVSA on the 25 February 2025 whilst the Appellant was in Pakistan this demonstrates transparency and by complying and responding around the funeral of her mother-in-law should demonstrate the Appellant’s honesty, integrity and good character.
The Appellant has been an ADI for over a decade and losing ADI status would have a profound effect on the Appellant both professionally and personally.
The Appellant asserts that s.19 of the Equality Act 2010 concerning indirect discrimination state that decisions must not disproportionately disadvantage an individual unless there is a strong justification, and the Appellant believes similar cases have resulted in the ADI remaining on the Register.
The mother-in-law had various health issues that worsened in late December 2024 but nonetheless had travelled to Pakistan prior to suffering a stroke on 30 December 2024. The Appellant monitored the mother-in-law's condition from afar suffering considerable stress as her health deteriorated till unfortunately the mother-in-law passed away on 14 February 2025 causing considerable grief to the whole family. The Appellant’s mental health has been significantly impacted and they have sought help accordingly.
The Appellant asserts that they have been fully transparent in engaging with the DVSA and fulfilling their duty to disclose relevant circumstances to them.
That prior to this incident the Appellant had no penalty points on their licence, and they had previously maintained an exemplary driving and professional record.
The Appellant asserts that under “Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 decisions affecting personal and family life must be proportionate and justifiable”. The Appellant further asserts that the case of AA vs UK 2011 “establishes that decisions impacting a person ability to sustain themselves must balance public safety and individual rights”.
That the number of character references provided demonstrate the Appellant has the professionalism and personal responsibility of an ADI and the incident in question was out of character.
That the Appellant has taken preventative measures to prevent such an issue arising again such as by placing the phone in a glove box and setting it to do not disturb. Additionally, the Appellant has used the experience as a learning point and has developed training specifically on this point for their students.
That the principle of proportionality must be considered as regards in particular the cases of R (P) v SoS Justice 2019 UKSC 3 and R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKSC 3.
The Registrar’s Statement of Case dated 19 August 2025 resists the appeal. The Registrar in summary says:
The Appellant’s representations were carefully reviewed and whilst there is considerable empathy with the personal circumstances of the Appellant it remains the case that the Appellant admits to using her phone to view a message. As an ADI well aware of the rules on mobile phone use this is not acceptable behaviour.
The Appellant’s driving licence is currently endorsed with 6 penalty points having been accepted a fixed penalty notice and this cannot be ignored.
The Appellant failed to notify the Registrar within 7 days as required, only responding following a notification from the Registrar on the 24 February 2025.
The conditions for entry onto the register extend beyond instructional ability and require that the applicant is a fit and proper person. Anyone who is an ADI is expected to have standards of driving and behaviour above that of the ordinary motorist. Teaching (generally) young people to drive as a profession is a responsible and demanding task which should only be entrusted to those with high standards and a keen regard for road safety. The Appellant is not believed to have displayed the required level of responsibility or commitment to improving road safety that is expected from an ADI.
Mobile phone use offences are serious road safety offences and give rise to significant numbers of casualties and accidents.
Registration represents official approval, it would be inappropriate to condone motoring offences of this nature as it would effectively sanction such behaviour if transgressors are allowed entry on to the register to teach others.
It would be offensive to other ADIs and persons trying to qualify as such, who have scrupulously observed the law for this recent relevant conviction to be ignored.
The Law
Conditions for entry and retention on the Register require the applicant to be and continue to be a “fit and proper person” to have his name on the Register – see sections 125(3) and 127(3)(e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (the “Act”).
In Harris v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors[2010] EWCA Civ 808, the Court of Appeal described the “fit and proper person” condition as follows: “..the condition is not simply that the applicant is a fit and proper person to be a driving instructor, it is that he is a fit and proper person to have his name entered in the register. Registration carries with it an official seal of approval…It seems to me that the maintenance of public confidence in the register is important. For that purpose, the Registrar must be in a position to carry out his function of scrutiny effectively, including consideration of the implications of any convictions of an applicant or a registered ADI. This is why there are stringent disclosure requirements.” (paragraph 30).
The Registrar can remove a person’s name from the Register if they have ceased to be a fit and proper person to have their name on the Register (section 125(2)(e) of the Act). The Registrar may take the view that a person no longer meets this requirement where there has been a change in circumstances. The Registrar has the burden of showing that a person does not meet the statutory requirement to be a fit and proper person, and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.
The powers of the Tribunal in determining this appeal are set out in section 131 of the Act. The Tribunal may make such order as it thinks fit (section 131(3)). The Tribunal stands in the shoes of the Registrar and takes a fresh decision on the evidence available to it, giving appropriate weight to the Registrar’s decision as the person tasked by Parliament with making such decisions (in accordance with R. (Hope and Glory Public House Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates Court & Ors[2011] EWCA Civ 31).
The Evidence
We have considered a bundle of evidence containing 38 numbered pages. This includes evidence of the original submissions provided to the Registrar by the Appellant as well as all the material submitted by the Appellant in support of the appeal (including various character references and an itemised mobile phone bill). We heard evidence and submissions from the Appellant, and submissions from the Registrar.
The Relevant Facts
The Appellant accepted (on or before the 17 February 2024) a fixed penalty notice incurring 6 penalty points for breach of requirements as to control of a vehicle .
The Appellant admits that on the 30 December 2024 they touched their mobile phone whilst stationary in order to read a text message.
The Appellant was under a duty to notify the DVSA within 7 days of the acceptance of the FPN and failed to do so, only contacting them on the 25 February 2025 in reply to a message they sent to the Appellant on the 24 February.2025.
Submissions
In submissions, the Appellant told the Tribunal in summary:
Prior to the incident in the Appellant’s many years of being an ADI she had never made such an error or had points on her licence before and it was terrible mistake and lapse of judgment on her part.
On the days prior to the incident the Appellant’s mother-in-law had been unwell with her health deteriorating.
The Appellant on the day “could not think straight” with worry for her mother-in-law to whom she was very close after the death of her own mother 15 years ago. That day the Appellant was distressed and juggling calls from abroad, she told us that she felt emotionally overwhelmed.
As she came to a temporary stop in a line of traffic in the middle of the road (not near any junction) she received a text message. Her car is not equipped with bluetooth functionality and so the notification came from the phone itself that was sat loose on the passenger seat. The Appellant glanced at and then picked up the phone to swipe at it and read the message as she didn’t have her glasses on. Thinking it might relate to her mother-in-law.
Approximately 10 days later she received a letter concerning the offence with photographs and she accepted liability for it immediately. The Appellant knew what she did was wrong and accepted that she was guilty of this offence.
The Appellant feels that she has let herself, her family, her pupils and everyone down. To seek to ensure this doesn't happen again she has taken measures to prevent it such as by insisting phones are kept in the boot of the car now with scheduled breaks to check for messages. She has also developed special phone related training for her students in light of this event.
The Appellant recognises she made a terrible mistake on that day and that there is no excuse for it. The consequences will be very significant for her, her family and the wider community if she cannot continue to be an ADI. The implications terrify her, and she asks for mercy and compassion.
The Appellant said it was an oversight that she did not inform the DVSA of accepting the points on 17 February as she was required to. Unfortunately, her mother-in-law had passed away and she had to travel to Pakistan at that time. When the DVSA contacted her on 24 February she ensured she responded within hours.
When questioned about the various cases and legislation cited in the Appellant’s written submissions the Appellant was unable to provide any comment beyond stating that she thought the outcome should be proportionate and losing her ADI status would not be in this case. Beyond this the Appellant was unable to give any explanation as to what the Appellant sought to rely on these citations for, nor was she able to give any indication as to why and how the Appellant wanted the particular legislation and precedent case law cited to be applied in the specific context of this case.
The representative of the Registrar set out that:
The Registrar stands by the points made in the statement of case.
The Appellant having accepted 6 penalty points for a mobile phone driving offence is no longer able to satisfy the fit and proper person criteria.
The representations of the Appellant were considered but the holding and looking at a phone whilst driving is a significant distraction posing considerable danger to herself and others. As an ADI she should know this and the law. To have acted contrary nonetheless shows insufficient regard to the motoring laws and road safety.
In all the circumstances the decision of the Registrar was correct.
Conclusions
The Tribunal considered carefully all the evidence and papers before it. In particular the considerable information put forward as regards the personal effects removal from the Register would have for the Appellant and her family.
As is regularly made clear by the DVSA and this Tribunal, ADIs are rightly held to a higher standard than ordinary motorists. The public has the right to expect that those who are registered as ADIs will act professionally, reliably, and with integrity. ADIs must adhere to the highest standards of motoring, which they themselves should be teaching to their pupils.
The Registrar has a duty to ensure that only those of appropriate standing are allowed to remain on the Register, and that those who are on it understand their responsibilities to not only know the rules but to scrupulously follow them as well. The standing of the Register, and the public’s confidence in it, critically depends upon a firm approach being adopted as regards ensuring that ADIs who have demonstrated behaviours substantially material to the question of unfitness, do not appear on the Register. These are matters of wider public importance which attract significant weight even where removal from the Register may have serious consequences for an individual.
Use of a mobile phone while driving is a very serious driving offence, such activity can and frequently does cause serious accidents as acknowledged by the Appellant herself during the hearing. It endangers the lives of other road users, pedestrians and the driver themselves, or risks causing serious injury. The level of sentence applicable to this offence reflects the severity of the risk such behaviour poses, and the mandatory imposition of 6 penalty points will often result in an ADI being justifiably removed from the Register.
While the Appellant has offered explanations and expressed regret, we do not find that there are any exceptional circumstances in what was presented. Whilst the Tribunal has considerable sympathy in relation to the unfortunate position the Appellant found herself in on the day of the incident and in the months that followed. The fact is that there were many different opportunities and approaches that reasonably could have been taken that would have entirely avoided the ultimate outcome here. Indeed, had the Appellant adopted the approach she told us she does now (i.e. locking her phone in the boot whenever she is driving) this incident would never have happened. The Appellant’s deliberate choice of actions that day to pick up the phone and interact with it were indeed as the Appellant told the Tribunal “Terrible mistakes” that there is “no excuse for”.
In all the circumstances of this case we are satisfied that removal of the Appellant’s name from the Register is fair, proportionate and justifiable even taking into account the personal circumstances and individual rights of the Appellant.
We therefore find that the Appellant does not currently meet the statutory requirement to be a fit and proper person. We conclude that the Registrar’s decision to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register as she was not a fit and proper person was correct. We unanimously dismiss this appeal.
Finally, the Tribunal notes that this was one of a number of recent appeals of this kind where the written submissions of the Appellant contained a number of sections that were drafted in a manner that bears an exceptional level of similarity to sections of the written submissions of other entirely unconnected appeals. The relevant sections generally focus on legal principles and caselaw that is not immediately connected with Fit and Proper Person cases (in terms of either the factual circumstances or the Road Traffic Act legal framework applicable). So, it is generally not obvious from the written submissions alone as to the point the Appellant is trying to make in the relevant sections and how it applies to the facts of the Appellant’s specific case.
In such circumstances the Tribunal will try to assist by making particular enquiries of the Appellant during the hearing, in line with its duty to support litigants in person to ensure they stand on an equal footing with other parties and can participate fully in the proceedings. This to ensure that cases are dealt with justly in accordance with the overriding objective.
However, in this case (and as is usual in these circumstances) when the Tribunal asked the Appellant to expand upon and explain the aim of the relevant sections of the written submissions, the Appellant effectively declined to do so leaving the Tribunal and Respondent uncertain as to the relevance and purpose of those sections of the Appellant’s written submissions.
Where a point has a purpose and relevance to the proceedings the Tribunal will always consider it carefully, and the Tribunal will (if necessary) support litigants in person in this regard to ensure they are able to stand on an equal footing.
However, the inclusion of make-weight, irrelevant, overly generic or otherwise inappropriate points in submissions actively undermines the overriding objective in that it prevents the case being dealt with expeditiously. It also necessarily means that the case takes more than appropriate amount of tribunal resources, thereby denying other cases that additional resource. Furthermore, even from the perspective of an Appellant it is unhelpful in that the inclusion of such material tends to negatively affect both the clarity and impact of their case.
The overriding objective is multi-faceted, and it is equally important that cases are dealt with expeditiously and fairly, including by ensuring that any case is allotted an appropriate share of the tribunal’s resources. Appellants (and those who assist them) must bear this in mind when preparing their submissions so as to ensure points made have both a relevance and a purpose in the context of the facts of the particular appeal. It is also critical that the points are such that they can be explained in plain English by the Appellant so the Tribunal can (if need be) assist the Appellant.
Signed Judge T Barrett Date: 11/10/25