Colin Bidewell v The Information Commissioner & Anor

This is an appeal against Decision Notice reference IC-312325-C3D6 dated 8 October 2024.

By the Decision Notice, the First Respondent (“the Commissioner”) decided that a request for information made by the Appellant of the Second Respondent (“the CO”) on 12 March 2024 (“the Request”) was vexatious, and that the CO was entitled to rely on s14(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”) to refuse the Request.

The Tribunal’s decision is unanimous.

We understand that the Appellant is the inventor of, or may have a commercial interest in the invention of, a device called the “Lounger Logger”. The device indicates whether a sun lounger is occupied or available for use. The Appellant explains that the device would enable disabled persons to access sun loungers on a footing equal to that of those without disabilities, and that it could also reduce the risk of exposure to ultraviolet radiation.

Over several years, the Appellant has sought to engage with a number of organisations, including public authorities of which the CO is one, to identify what steps they have taken to monitor or collect data relating to sun lounger occupancy and, when awarding contracts, to check whether service providers, such as hotels, ensure equal access to sun loungers.

The Request is this:

“FOI request: CIPS: GCF agreement

Dear FOI team,

In respect of the above long term support agreement between GCF and CIPS please supply all pertinent emails and associated communications between the following parties and internally within the GCF dating from 2017 onwards in respect of GCF public sector travel and accommodation agreements including but not limited to RM6217, specifically as it relates to:

1.

Realtime accessibility of hotel real estate (lounger terraces, spa areas etc.) subject to the Equality Act 2010.

2.

The raising of a suspicion of procurement fraud and CIPS membership and counterparty exposure by accessory to the size and scale of ~25m GBP over the 7 year term of the CIPS:GCF agreement in respect of the blank FOIs for realtime accessibility of hotel lounger realestate returned in the face of EWHC1842 on material data, triggering the suspicion of such fraud by reason of faulty process and false representation, aided and abetted by bidders and suppliers in full knowledge of the suspicion of such suspected offenses

Parties and communication in scope of the FOI request:

1.

CIPS:GCF

2.

Suppliers and bidders (ie successful and not successful): GCF

3.

Internal GCF

For a situation self-assessed by CIPS as “serious” therefore subject to SI FOI from the Charity Commission (requested), we would expect to see some content.

For the avoidance of doubt, any allegation (including those already levied) of vexatiousness are rejected – this is a matter of compliance to longstanding equality legislation and attempts to block public access to the information request MAY be subject to a claim at court for obstruction and perverting the court of natural justice. Every guest is legally entitled to realtime, on-demand by-definition *identical* access across a hotel lounger estate and Cabinet Office is reminded that this whole case (along with its associated cases still open with both CAA and MCGA on both accessibility and UV product safety as the NHS overspends on skincancer treatment) remains eligible for escalation to EWHC on suspicion of offenses not limited to fraud and suspected conduct in the face of EWHC1841 on material data.”

The CO understands that:

The CO says that the Government Commercial Function is a cross-government network procuring or supporting the procurement of goods and services for the government, and the Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply is a membership for those working in roles involving procurement and supply.

On 12 April 2024, the CO refused the Request pursuant to s14(1) FOIA (vexatiousness). The CO said this:

“We refer to your request in which you asked for a number of queries ultimately relating to real time accessibility of hotel real estate.

Section 14(1) of the Freedom of Information Act (the Act) says that a public authority is not obliged to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious. After careful consideration we have concluded that your request is vexatious and we are therefore refusing it under section 14(1) of the Act.

In reaching this decision we have worked through the Information Commissioner’s guidance on vexatious requests which is available at: https://ico.org.uk/media/1198/dealing-with-vexatious-requests.pdf

We are content that your request is vexatious based on the history of your requests on this topic, we are content that we have provided all information available to us on this topic and any further correspondence will continue to be treated as vexatious.”

The CO recited what it said was a non-exhaustive list of the Appellant’s previous correspondence and requests on the same topic.

On 12 April 2024, the Appellant took issue with the CO’s refusal of the Request. He said this:

“Thank you for your response to this FOI, which is rejected:

1.

Requests in the pursuit of legal compliance of government contracts in equality law cannot by-definition be determined as vexatious – the two concepts are mutually incompatible. This mere conclusion confirms a fundamental ignorance of the intention of the request in recovering compliance in equality law in the public sector travel and accommodation supply chains and what equality law requires in realtime equal access for all

2.

The fact that Cabinet Office have stated that they have already provided all the information they have effectively: a. Confirms admission to a procurement fraud in presenting framework contracts as legally compliant without actually conducting statutory due diligence as it relates realtime accessibility of hotel real-estate – a clear fraud by false representation

3.

It is simply inconceivable that CIPS’s trustees exposed by their counterparty via the long term support agreement in GCF returning blank FOIs in the face of EWHC1841 (effectively for the last 7 years) would NOT make representations to GCF in order to present mitigation to HC if/when this case got there. This FOI is seeking that correspondence. Else are we saying that a whole quorum of senior procurement folk serving as CIPS trustees are completely ignoring this matter whilst continuing to expose their 57k funding membership and other contract counterparties to the tune of 30m GBP in accessory to a suspected procurement fraud. Really ??

The rejection is therefore rejected, with the request refreshed and reinforced.

I attach civil procedure served this afternoon – HC ruled in EWHC1841, the FOIs in accessibility were returned blank. This thread with the Cabinet Office fundamentally affirms our claim of fraud in presenting framework travel and accommodation contracts as legally compliant in equality when we’ve not even looked, as being valid for presentation to HC.

Please respond to the internal review and confirm understanding that the view of vexatiousness is automatically void – this is in pursuit of legal compliance. Civil Service and Ministerial Codes refer and override.”

On 10 June 2024, the CO maintained its position on internal review. It said that the review, preceding FOIA requests and all the Appellant’s previous case history on the topic of the Request only served to strengthen the CO’s position on the vexatious pattern, number, motive and burden of the Appellant’s queries.

The Appellant complained to the Commissioner.

The Commissioner investigated. During the Commissioner’s investigation, the CO provided a detailed account to the Commissioner of the history of the Appellant’s requests and complaints to the CO and other organisations on the topic of sun lounger access and related issues. We address that history of matters in our Analysis below.

By the Decision Notice, the Commissioner decided that the Request was vexatious. In reaching his decision, the Commissioner considered the following matters:

By Notice of Appeal dated 9 October 2024, the Appellant submits, in full:

““Decision is fundamentally incompatible with the following statutes and cases:

EWHC1841 on material data for statutory duty discharge

EWCA Civ 715 on due diligence for avoidance of abuses of human rights – of which realtime accessibility is on, contrary to Equality Act 2010

Fraud Act 2006 – fraud by false representation (in presenting a contract eg RM6217 @ 11bn GBP as compliant with Equality Act 2010, when, in the face of Upper Court judgments as above, we refuse to look even when warned (aggravating factor, per Sentencing Council)

Civil Service Code to act in the public interest

Efforts in pursuit of upholding case and statute law (including cases precedent) cannot and must not be found to be vexatious – the two concepts are mutually exclusive and the court’s judgments must be upheld and protected

ICO’s position currently represents conduct in the face of these cases (complicity) therefore must be automatically withdrawn ruled null and void and to no effect as if it hadn’t been made. It’s been issued outside the scope of the rules binding the Commissioner’s conduct.

Volume of correspondence is a measure of difficulty encountered in educating Government on the requirements of long-standing human rights legislation descended from Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 in the midst of a crop of public enquiries into systemic governance failure and problem denial and global street protests for equality during a highly virulent pandemic and as societal inequality literally runs riot here in the UK

Gov is bound by s149 Equality Act 2010 in what it (ATOL) licenses and procures in travel and accommodation at significant scale, yet still in the face of our courts, it’s still not looking and refuses to do so

The decision breaches the Civil Service Code to act in the public interest to help all those discriminated against despite their protected characteristics to not be, including in places of public accommodation covered by equality legislation”

The Appellant submits that the outcome he seeks by the appeal is this:

“Official nullification of the Decision and revision plus apology to the courts Education across the public sector of the critical importance of upholding the judgments of our Upper Courts not limited to EWHC1841 (Footnote: ¹) and EWCA Civ 715 (Footnote: ²). Potential disciplinary proceedings given persisting suspicion of offenses not limited to fraud by false representation of RM6217 The recognition of the dimension of time when auditing accessibility of hotel real estate and other places covered by equality legislation – how do operators, suppliers and bidders to government contracts and (ATOL) licenses necessarily prove that all guests can necessarily access a sun lounger in exactly the same amount of time as anyone else in line with their fundamental huma rights, if not in the agile, on-demand digital environment (and product is “UV safe” as global healthcare services overspend on skincancer treatment)? Where are the actual artifacts of compliance from eg EHRC/NHSE. They are not here., EWHC1841 applies Why exactly is the Commissioner struggling to appreciate the argument of the criticality of being able to demonstrate identicality of access to shared furniture by inclusive experiental design given the agreements committed to by public sector employees to uphold public sector equality duty?”

By his Response to the appeal dated 21 November 2024, the Commissioner submits, in summary, that:

By its Response to the appeal dated 31 January 2025, the CO submits, in summary, that the Request is vexatious for the following reasons:

We had before us a bundle of 2,169 pages, a bundle of authorities, and two skeleton arguments. The first skeleton argument was that filed by the CO. The second skeleton argument was the CO’s skeleton argument annotated by the Appellant to take issue with certain of the CO’s arguments and to advance his own. As annotated, that document became, in effect, the Appellant’s skeleton argument.

We also had a witness statement made by Ms Walsh Atkins, deputy director for Freedom of Information in the CO, which set out the background to the Appellant’s interactions with the CO, and explained why the CO considered the Request to be vexatious. Ms Walsh Atkins was present at the hearing. The Appellant declined the opportunity to cross-examine Ms Walsh Atkins.

We heard opening submissions from the Appellant, responsive submissions from the CO, and, after a break in the hearing offered to the Appellant so that he might compose his thoughts, closing submissions from the Appellant.

After the hearing, despite the Tribunal’s indication that it would not thereafter entertain further material from any party, the Appellant has filed further material with the Tribunal. We address that in our Analysis below. We have not considered it necessary to invite either the Commissioner or the CO to respond to that material.

Section 1 FOIA provides a right of access to recorded information held by public authorities. It provides:

That right is subject to several exemptions, of which s14 is one, which provides relevantly as follows:

S58 FOIA provides as follows:

If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers—

At the outset, we observe that it is no part of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine any of the issues which underpin the Request, that is to say, any of the issues identified by the Appellant’s concerning public sector fraud or inequality, whether those he lays at the door of the CO or otherwise.

Nor is it within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to direct the issue of any apology from any party to the Courts, to educate the public sector, or to direct disciplinary proceedings, those all being matters the Appellant seeks to achieve by this appeal.

Our role is simply to determine whether the Request is vexatious, and consequently, whether the CO was entitled to refuse the Request in reliance on s14(1) FOIA.

In Information Commissioner v Devon CC and Dransfield [2012] UKUT 440 (AAC) (“Dransfield”), the Upper Tribunal acknowledged the need to protect public authorities' resources from unreasonable requests:

“Section 14…is concerned with the nature of the request and has the effect of disapplying the citizen's right under Section 1(1)… The purpose of Section 14… must be to protect the resources (in the broadest sense of that word) of the public authority from being squandered on disproportionate use of FOIA…”[10]

S14 FOIA does not define vexatiousness. In Dransfield the Upper Tribunal held that it takes its meaning and flavour from its context [24], and that it connotes a “manifestly unjustified, inappropriate, or improper use of a formal procedure.” [27].

The Upper Tribunal suggested four broad issues or themes to consider as evidencing such misuse of the FOIA procedure namely: the burden on the public authority and its staff; the motive of the requester; the value or serious purpose of the request in terms of objective public interest in the requested information; and any harassment of or distress to the public authority’s staff. The Upper Tribunal stressed the importance, nonetheless, of taking a holistic and broad approach to assessing whether a request is vexatious.

While the Upper Tribunal noted that although FOIA is both “motive blind” and “applicant blind”, the application of s14(1) FOIA cannot disregard the question of the underlying rationale or justification for the request, or the wider context of the course of dealings between the individual and the public authority. The Upper Tribunal observed in relation to the issue of burden that the “present burden may be inextricably linked with the previous course of dealings” [29]. It is, therefore, appropriate for us to consider the context and history of the request, including the number, breadth, pattern and duration of previous requests.

The Upper Tribunal observed:

“There is… no magic formula – all the circumstances need to be considered in reaching what is ultimately a value judgement as to whether the request in issue is vexatious in the sense of being a disproportionate, manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA.”

In Dransfield v Information Commissioner & Another and Craven v Information Commissioner & Another [2015] EWCA Civ 454 (CA) the Court of Appeal emphasised the need for a decision maker to consider all the relevant circumstances. Arden LJ observed that “vexatiousness primarily involves making a request which has no reasonable foundation, that is, no reasonable foundation for thinking that the information sought would be of value to the requester, or to the public or any section of the public. Parliament has chosen a strong word which therefore means that the hurdle of satisfying it is a high one and that is consistent with the constitutional nature of the right.” [68].

A request stimulated by a genuine public interest concern may become vexatious by drift where that proper purpose is overshadowed and extinguished by the improper pursuit of a longstanding grievance against the public authority (Oxford Phoenix v Information Commissioner [2018] UKUT 192 (AAC)).

Before we turn to the Request itself and the application of the themes identified by Dransfield, we address Ms Walsh Atkins’ evidence of the CO’s wider dealings with the Appellant.

By her evidence, Ms Walsh Atkins explains that the Appellant has issued at least seven FOIA requests to the CO between November 2021 and March 2024, and four requests for internal reviews between December 2021 and April 2024, where his FOIA requests have been refused. Ms Walsh Atkins describes them as “ambiguous and broad FOIRs pertaining either to the use and availability of sun loungers, or to issues which he considers to be related to that issue (i.e., government procurement or policy matters in the tourism industry).”

Ms Walsh Atkins explains that on 30 April 2023, the Appellant informed the CO that he was proposing to issue contempt proceedings against the Minister for the Cabinet Office, apparently on the grounds that government had failed to comply with the Equality Act 2010 in not providing the Appellant with the information he sought by his FOIA requests. The CO considers this an example of the Appellant’s vexatious behaviour in his dealings with the CO.

Ms Walsh Atkins explains that in response to one of the Appellant’s FOIA requests, a request made on 15 July 2023, the CO provided to him a copy of an agreement between CIPS and GCF. Provision of this document to the Appellant appears to have stimulated the Request which is the subject of this appeal. The CO’s view that the Appellant’s “piggybacking” off receipt of this single document demonstrates a vexatious mindset, and that there is nothing in the agreement which justifies the vast amount of information sought by the Request.

Ms Walsh Atkins explains that this instance of behaviour is consistent with the Appellant’s behaviour generally as regards other organisations and public authorities, whereby the Appellant consistently attempts to escalate and expand his engagements. In this context, Ms Walsh Atkins summarises the origin and history of the Appellant’s engagement with the CO thus: initial engagement with HSBC in promoting the Lounger Logger, followed by complaints to the FCA, then the Complaints Commissioner, then HM Treasury, and involving Public Health England, the Committee on Standards in Public Life and Priti Patel, Member of Parliament for Witham.

Ms Walsh Atkins explains that the CO Digital Knowledge and Information Management Team have identified 125 emails from the Appellant’s two known email addresses, containing at least 21 additional attachments, including:

We start with the issue of burden. We consider that it would be intensely burdensome for the CO to respond substantively to the Request.

First, the Request is unclear in several important particulars, including what is meant by (1) “realtime accessibility of hotel real estate (lounger terraces, spa areas, etc) subject to the Equality Act 2010”, and (2) the “raising of a suspicion of procurement fraud”. That lack of clarity imposes a real, practical burden on the CO in attempting to construe the true meaning of the Request.

Second, the scope of information sought, both the chronological scope extending back to 2017, and the scope of unidentified parties (“Suppliers and bidders (i.e. successful and not successful) ....”) whose communications are sought, is potentially enormous, and, in our view, unworkably so. Quite apart from anything else, it is, in our view, highly unlikely that the CO would hold such material, but it would still be necessary for the CO to undertake a very substantial exercise to establish and confirm even that much.

Third, we consider the course of previous dealings between the Appellant and the CO, attested to by Ms Walsh Atkins. She says that the Appellant’s FOIA requests have been, overwhelmingly, repetitive, vast in scope, difficult to understand, and issued in respect of information which the CO either does not hold, is unlikely to hold, or cannot provide. Based on our review of the material before us, we consider that to be a wholly fair description of matters.

In this regard, we have noted the course of the Appellant’s requests to the CO and CCS for information from 2021, which we summarise as follows:

We consider that the CO will already have been put to considerable time and expense in dealing with the Appellant’s previous FOIA requests and associated correspondence.

In our view, answering the Request would be an unreasonable burden viewed against the appreciable wider landscape of previous FOIA requests and associated correspondence from the Appellant which is laid out over hundreds of pages of such material before us, and which we have summarised above: seven FOIA requests and four requests for internal review in approximately three and a half years on a subject matter which, to the extent it can be identified given the frequently ambiguous or impenetrable nature of its presentation, is itself of potentially vast scope.

We do not doubt the sincerity of the Appellant’s belief in the importance of the issues he is seeking to address by the Request. That sincerity is evident from the meticulous care he applies to his written submissions, correspondence, applications and evidence, and was equally evident in his oral submissions at the hearing.

However, viewing matters in the round, we are not persuaded that the Appellant’s motive for the Request is such as to lend any proper justification to it. What may have been a reasonable or benign motive behind initial enquiries of the CO with a genuine focus on the subject matter of those enquiries, appears now to have been overtaken by the Appellant’s determination that he, personally, should hold “government” to account by means of FOIA, government being a broad concept but, for current purposes, apparently personified by the CO either as the repository of potentially responsive information or as the agent of others. By this exercise, the Appellant seeks to embark upon broad and speculative lines of enquiry.

The CO submitted that the Appellant appears to have a commercial interest in a business venture offering a product designed to reduce the harms he identifies but that the CO does not place undue reliance on that in the context of assessing the Appellant’s motive for the request. The extent of that interest is not evident to us from the material we have seen, and we are unable to conclude that such interest forms any significant part of the Appellant’s motive.

We are unable to find that the Request has value or any serious purpose.

We accept that there is, in principle, value and serious purpose in the pursuit of information from public authorities whose disclosure may shed light on issues of equality, health and safety, and good governance in public affairs. However, in this case, what may have started out as a line of enquiry stimulated by a genuine concern as to some or all those matters, has, in our view, now metamorphosed into a pursuit so unreasonable and so disproportionate as to have lost any of its initial value or serious purpose. The Request seems to us to constitute a paradigm of vexatiousness by drift. Any possible vestige of value in the Request has now, in our view, been very significantly diminished by the Appellant’s approach to matters, if not wholly lost.

The CO submits that aspects of the Request may cause harassment or distress. The CO refers in this context to the Appellant’s threat to issue contempt proceedings against the Minister for the CO, and the Appellant’s suggestions in many of his communications with the CO that CO staff, or civil servants more widely, are complicit in large scale procurement-based fraud.

The Request is inoffensively framed. Viewed in its isolated parts, we consider that the Request is unlikely to cause distress. It is not aimed at any identified member of staff in the CO. We do not consider that the threat of contempt proceedings against the Minister for the CO is likely to have caused that person distress. There is no evidence that that is the case. The CO has said, instead, that the threat was excessive and manifestly unjustified in the circumstances. That may be right. It is not the same thing as distress or harassment.

However, the fact that the Request comes at the end of a long line of previous requests which, cumulatively, are likely to have imposed real pressure on the staff responsible for responding, tends, in our view, to suggest that the Request would have the capacity to harass those tasked with responding, if only to a low degree.

We have structured our analysis of vexatiousness around the four themes identified in Dransfield, but we have also taken a holistic view of the Request.

In viewing the Request that way, we conclude that it is manifestly unreasonable and unjustified. So far as it can be understood, the Request is predicated on the CO (1) having participated in or effectively condoned fraud and having failed to have regard to equality legislation, and/or (2) being responsible for bringing to account other government departments or public authorities liable for the same matters. There is no glimmer of evidence before us of (1) and no basis for suggesting (2). The Request has no value or serious purpose.

It is evident from the material before us that the CO has, to date, responded diligently to the Appellant's FOIA requests and requests for internal reviews on the subject matter of the Request. The Request cannot justify the resource and operational burden it would impose on the CO substantively to respond to it, whether viewed in isolation or against the Appellant’s previous course of dealings with the CO in relation to the subject matter of the Request.

It is evident that the Appellant is committed to expanding and escalating his enquiries relating to the subject matter of the Request. In our view, any substantive answer the CO might provide to the Request would make no difference to the Appellant's intent in that regard.

In the weeks leading up to the hearing, the Appellant issued several applications, all of which were refused, seeking, inter alia:

After the hearing, the Appellant has continued to correspond with the Tribunal and the parties. That correspondence has become increasingly prolix and incomprehensible. We address some of it below.

On 2 July 2025, the Appellant made an application to the Tribunal seeking the Tribunal’s commitment to appreciating “the sheer scale of apparent misconduct discovered by the Appellant” and claiming “multiple UT escalation grounds if needed”, which we take to be a reference to the Upper Tribunal.

The Appellant’s application attached a substantial spreadsheet called “Artifacts of evidence inventory.” This document, or a version of it, was, in fact, filed by the Appellant prior to the hearing, and we invited his comment on it at the hearing. We understood the Appellant to explain that the spreadsheet is a taxonomy of materials which illustrate (1) the scale of the issues which concern the Appellant, and (2) what other enquiries he has on foot, and that it is intended, as he put it to us, to provide commentary and colour to help the Tribunal achieve its objectives in a fair and balanced way. By his application made after the hearing, the Appellant presents the inventory to illustrate what he describes as “the wider and complex context that this Tribunal is bound by Parliament to incorporate into its Decision, as are public sector employees and those acting for the State when they act for the State.” The inventory, which we understand to be a work in progress, lists items of legislation, case authorities, codes of conduct, and other material, described as drawn from global sources.

On 4 July 2025, the Appellant contacted the Tribunal as follows:

“Tribunal will be aware that the Respondent’s Skeleton Argument for the above Appeal indeed clearly shows Government’s clear and unambiguous understanding of the Lounger Logger ™ invention as it relates accessibility and the dimension of time and its relevance to the Equality Act 2010; and Duty of Care as it relates skincancer preventative measures at point of risk as our NHS overspends on skincancer treatment

Tribunal will also be aware that the Appellant has multiple open cases with the police on suspicion of the serious offenses of:

1.

Fraud by false representation (in presenting ATOL licences and contracts as compliant when we’ve not even looked, with our senior courts ruling on matters such as the legality of material data and due diligence

a.

Key dimensions: 23bn GBP public sector travel and accommodation contracts, 175m trips of ATOL licenses over the 7 years to date..and still counting today

2.

Misconduct in public office and perverting the course of natural justice in the frustrated process execution of the 2022 accessibility complaint of cruise ships in UK waters by Maritime and Coastguard Agency crucial to this case, still today without Independent Assessment, as provided, but denied, impacting the rights of so many when they sail and stay

The Respondent’s Skeleton Argument provides vital new case evidence for these open claims with the police to assist with their enquiries into the serious offenses suspected to include conduct contrary to the Civil Service Code to act in the public interest, relating to the conduct of entities including the SRA refusing to discount bad legal advice in the market and the ICAEW in terms of the CIPS CFO’s conduct with suspicious transactions

My understanding is that Skeleton Arguments are (or will be) public information

Therefore please can you confirm that I as the Appellant to this Appeal have Tribunal’s permission and/or authority to share the Respondent’s Skeleton Argument with the police, pending this case’s anticipated referral to the other courts as provided for by its Case Management Powers and as requested in the relevant Requests filed by the Appellant during the course of these proceedings.”

On 6 July 2025, the Appellant filed a revised skeleton argument with the Tribunal, which he describes as being intended to help the Tribunal navigate the pertinent issues of this case, namely legal advice which CIPS informed the Appellant it had obtained in August 2023.

On 6 July 2025, the Appellant made a FOIA request to the CO asking for the following information:

“With respect to the above Appeal at FTT GRC, please confirm

1)

Which legal firms were approached to represent the Respondent(s) for this Appeal

2)

Which firms declined to represent and their reasons for so declining

3)

Which firms expressed interest to represent and the rationale for selecting 1COR

4)

The rationale for choosing to take the position of vexatiousness at this time compared to any other

5)

Why no engagement was attempted with the Appellant to negotiate scope of request currently in Appeal given the suspicion of serious offenses committed including fraud by false representation given blank FoIs for accessibility in the public sector travel and accommodation supply chain in full face of senior court cases precedent including those from our High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court as cited in proceedings evidence”.

On 7 July 2025, the Appellant issued what he described as a “follow-on” FOIA request to the CO, copied to the Tribunal, asking why a government legal adviser had been “replaced” for the appeal, and saying “In respect of public sector employees in Cabinet Office and Departments allied to this case including DfT self-reporting either themselves and/or their concerns relating to this case and the offenses suspected given case evidence to the authorities including Police and other authorities, this is covered off by the associated call into case evidence of which Tribunal is well aware (evidence inventory), so we’ll deal with (self-)reporting of concerns and the Civil Service Code during Tribunal proceedings themselves.”

On 11 July 2025, the Appellant filed with the Tribunal an updated Artifacts of evidence inventory.

On 16 September 2025, the Appellant wrote to the Tribunal to say that he is keen to see in evidence the following items “still apparently missing at time of hearing in order to ensure procedural propriety and decision confidence (in absence of evidence to the opposite effect of their presence in the bundle)”:

“1.

the Independent Assessment into the December 2022 accessibility complaint of cruise ships in UK waters due from Maritime and Coast Guard Agency that they still refuse to procure and produce despite provisions and requirements for exactly that Independent Assessment

2.

the legal advice that CIPS told us in August 2023 they procured in respect of this case that they still refuse to evidence despite us extensively asking for it and s3 Royal Charter binding the charity to collaborate without limitation for the advancement of the profession

3.

the Crime Reference Number due from police to CIPS on proxied member’s suspicion of a significant fraud offense by false representation of such incredible magnitude involving public finances

4.

the notification of Serious Incident due from CIPS to Charity Commission given the suspicion of a fraud offense in presenting as a 30m GBP/year Royal Charter-bearing charity compliant with its articles when there’s no such evidence including items 2-3 above in addition to the notification of Serious Incident referred herein

5.

the prosecution, conviction and sentencing data in respect of the serious offenses suspected connected with points 1-4 above

6.

How many FCIPS, MCIPS, trustees and others have called in their suspicions of an offense to law enforcement and the regulator given case evidence including the CIPS Code of Conduct”

Also on 16 September 2025, the Appellant wrote to the Tribunal saying this:

“Apologies, one significant artefact also apparently missing ….is the proof that 23bn GBP public spending on travel and accommodation contracts (plus 175m trips of ATOL licences) actually complies with the requirements of Equality Act 2010 SDG10 by required design and default as it relates the subject matter in this Appeal ie dimension of time

Plus UV warning:risk proximity to help our NHS and global partners as we all overspend on skincancer treatment SDG3

These basic aspects in human rights and tort law in negligence appear to be *entirely* missing from the industry’s and statutory duty-bound regulators’ consciousness with corresponding false positives returned in our audit and assurance activities throughout the built environment community across territorial and marine markets. We MUST deal with this *incredible* Post Office Horizon-esque insistence to ignore what’s so obviously wrong hiding out in plain sight right in front of us – and we will deal with it

Folks have fundamental rights and need to be protected from harm – we’re just not even looking and refuse to heed associated warnings TO look. It is the very worst form of abject neglect and is NOT what the UK is about

Invention cannot be “un-invented” – this is the whole concept of discovery. This case should be looked upon as the opportunity it is for UK on the global stage in the sustainable development conversation we’re all very evidently very painfully still struggling with bringing into tangible intervention to back up all the rhetoric on how important is D&I, duty of care and preventative measures

It should never have had to be taken to a judicial process - we will continue to leverage our judicial system in order to see that the right thing is done, recognising our membership of the EU Convention (Article 14)

My MP wrote to the House in 2021 – 4 YEARS ago next month !!!”

This appeal is not a platform for a roving and open-ended inquiry by the Appellant across the issues he identifies, into which he can slot evidence relating to those issues as and when he identifies it.

None of the material which the Appellant has filed with the Tribunal subsequent to the hearing is relevant to the issue which we must determine, that is whether the Commissioner’s Decision Notice to the effect that the Request is vexatious and that the CO is consequently entitled to rely on s14(1) FOIA to refuse the Request, is in accordance with the law. That is the limit of the appeal. It is the limit of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

FOIA is intended to provide citizens with a qualified right of access to information held by public authorities. It is a means by which a citizen might hold a public authority to account. It is important that the standard for identifying the exercise of that right as vexatious is set high. We consider that the Request, viewed in the round, is an improper use of FOIA and meets the high bar of vexatious.

The Commissioner was correct to find that the Request was vexatious. The Decision Notice is in accordance with the law.

The appeal must be Dismissed.