Jose Marques v The Information Commissioner

The appeal is struck out.

Under rule 32(3) the Tribunal may dispose of proceedings without a hearing under rule 8 (striking out a party’s case). I have given the appellant the opportunity to provide written representations. Taking into account the fact that the appellant has provided detailed written representations and bearing in mind the overriding objective, I am satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to determine the matter without a hearing.

The original notice of appeal relates purely to an appeal against a decision of the Communications Ombudsman in relation to which the tribunal has no jurisdiction.

The appellant stated, by way of submissions dated 23 July 2025, that he wished to appeal against the Information Commissioner’s ‘outcome decision’ dated 2 April 2025 in relation to a complaint to the Commissioner about the Riverside Housing Association’s unauthorised sharing of his personal data.

The outcome letter issued by the Information Commissioner in relation to his complaint about Riverside Housing Association is dated 31 January 2025 and is the subject of a separate appeal/application by the appellant with the case number FT/EA/2025/0157. The complaints that the appellant has in relation to the handling of his data protection complaint already form part of FT/EA/2025/0157.

The letter dated 2 April 2025 is the outcome of the appellant’s request to review the handling of that data protection complaint. The tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with an appeal against the Commissioner’s review of its own handling of a data protection complaint. This appeal accordingly adds nothing of substance to the existing appeal/application in FT/EA/2025/0157.

The appellant was given notice that the tribunal was considering striking out the appeal on the basis that the tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with it and made submissions in an email dated 17 September 2025.

The appellant asserted that:

“I respectfully submit that there has been a misunderstanding as to the nature and purpose of my appeal. I did not intend to challenge the ICO's internal administrative handling of my complaint, but rather the substantive decision reached in its letter dated 2 April 2025 (Reference: IC-332100-Z6F9).

My grounds for appeal, as detailed in my original GRC1 form, are a direct challenge to the ICO's final decision to take "no further action" in relation to my complaint against Riverside Housing Association. I disagreed with the ICO's conclusion that Riverside Housing Association "complied with its data protection obligations," and I believe this conclusion is legally and factually incorrect.

Specifically, my appeal is based on the following:

• Failure to apply the law: The ICO's decision failed to consider and apply the High Court ruling in R (Roberts) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2025] EWHC 51 (Admin), which found that the process of requesting direct benefit deductions without a claimant's consent is unlawful.

•  Failure to investigate to an appropriate extent: I contend that by ignoring this relevant judicial precedent, the ICO failed in its statutory duty under Section 165(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018 to investigate my complaint to an "appropriate extent".

The letter dated 2 April 2025, which the tribunal references, was the ICO's final ruling after my request for a review of its initial decision. It concluded that the ICO would not pursue my complaint further. My appeal is against this final outcome, not a procedural aspect of the ICO's internal processes. The FTT has jurisdiction to hear appeals against certain decisions made under the Data Protection Act 2018. This is such a case.

The existing appeal with case number FT/EA/2025/0157, which the tribunal has noted, is a related but separate legal action concerning the ICO’s initial decision. My appeal here (FT/EA/2025/0096/GDPR) is a valid challenge to the ICO's final ruling on my complaint and should be heard on its merits.”

I have considered the appellant’s submissions carefully. Having considered those submissions and having looked again at the contents of the letters from the Commissioner of 2 April 2025 and 31 January 2025 I remain of the view set out above. The appellant has a live appeal against the Commissioner’s substantive decision in relation to this data protection complaint. The tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider a separate and additional appeal against the Commissioner’s refusal to review that complaint.

It is not appropriate to exercise the tribunal’s power under rule 5(3)(k)(i) (transfer to another court or tribunal) in relation to the proceedings.

On that basis the appeal is struck out under rule 8(2)(a).