SD v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

This is the reconsideration of the appeal of the Appellant, a national of Lebanon born on 17 October 1964. She arrived in the United Kingdom on 9 May 2004 and was granted entry on a six-month visit visa until 20 October 2004. She claimed asylum on 1 September 2004 with her child as her dependant. On 16 March 2005, the Respondent made a decision to refuse to vary the Appellant’s leave to enter the United Kingdom and to refuse to grant asylum. The Appellant appealed against this decision. Her appeal was heard on 20 June 2005 before Immigration Judge Cohen, who dismissed her appeal in a determination promulgated on 5 July 2005. On the application of the Appellant, the Tribunal ordered reconsideration on 19 July 2005. The first-stage of the reconsideration took place on 22 December 2005. The Tribunal decided that there was a material error of law in the determination of Immigration Judge Cohen, but stated that it was unable to complete the reconsideration on 22 December 2005, because further oral evidence would be necessary.

The second stage of the reconsideration of the Appellant's hearing took place on 11 July 2006 before Immigration Judge Bartlett and Immigration Judge Markham David. In a determination promulgated on 27 July 2006, the Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal.

On 5 December 2006 and by a Order of the Court of Appeal, the Appellant's appeal was allowed and remitted to the Tribunal, for the reasons given in the Statement of Reasons, which reads:

“1.

The Appellant is a citizen of Lebanon, a Christian and a single parent of a child born out of wedlock.

2.

The Appellant entered the United Kingdom on a visitor's Visa in May 2004 and claimed asylum on 1 September 2004 before expiry of her leave to enter. She appealed against the Respondent’s decision of 16 March 2005 to refuse to vary leave to enter which was accompanied by a reasons for refusal letter of the asylum claim of the same date.

3.

At the subsequent appeal, the AIT found at paragraph 32 that:

“The objective material overall is indicative of a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant would be at risk of substantial harm or of being the victim of honour killing if she returned to live with her family and brothers in the small village at which she resided ….”

4.

The AIT, however, dismissed the appeal stating that:

“On the basis of the evidence as we assessed it, it would not be unsafe, unreasonable or unduly harsh for the Appellant to enter and relocate to a part of Lebanon other than the village where her family resides…..”

5.

The AIT therefore found that the Claimant could internally relocate within Lebanon so that she would not be found by her family.

6.

In dismissing the claim, it is accepted that the AIT erred in law for the following reasons:

i.

The AIT did not take into account the events surrounding the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the period between 12 and 19 July, during which time the determination remained pending. These events were relevant to the issue of internal relocation for the Appellant and her child with regards to whether internal relocation was a reasonable and safe expectation in light of the ongoing conflict and the consequences for the welfare of the Appellant and her child.

ii.

The AIT did not fully engage with the expert report of Dr. Alan George dated 18 May 2005 which stated that internal relocation would not guarantee the safety and the anonymity of the Appellant as a single parent.

7.

Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the Respondent concedes that this amounts to an error of law ……………..”

The appeal was then listed for hearing before the Tribunal on dates including 26 April 2007 and 1 October 2007. On 1 October 2007, it was listed before Senior Immigration Judge Jarvis who adjourned the case and directed that it be re-listed for hearing. Senior Immigration Judge Jarvis made the following observations and directions:

“UPONhearing Ms E Storey of the Refugee Legal Centre for the Appellant, who requested an adjournment by reason of the fact that Mr Bandegani, Legal Representative who has conduct of the matter for the Appellant, has been taken ill and is unable to leave his home, and that he has with him the Appellant’s file, (a letter to that effect arriving with us after we had concluded the hearing), and there being no objection from Ms J Isherwood Presenting Officer, we adjourned the hearing to a date to be fixed with the following observations and directions.

ISSUES FOR RECONSIDERATION:

1.

On 5 December 2006, an order was made, by consent, in the Court of Appeal, allowing the Appellant’s appeal and quashing the determination of the Tribunal dated 11 July 2006 and issued on 27 July 2006. The matter was remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration.

2.

At the hearing on 26 April 2007 before the Tribunal it was agreed that the order of the Court of Appeal was to be interpreted as holding that there had been a material error of law on the part of the previous of the Tribunal so that the Tribunal would next move to the second stage of the further reconsideration. It was further agreed that the primary findings of fact and credibility in relation to the Appellant’s account, as found by the panel of the Tribunal that decided the appeal in the determination issued on 27 July 2006 are to stand. On 26 April 2007, the Tribunal noted the agreed material facts to be:

•

The Appellant is not married

•

The Appellant is a national of Lebanon

•

The Appellant has a son who was born out of wedlock in 2004

•

The Appellant is of the Christian faith

•

The Appellant is in contact with her former partner who is said to be in the Lebanon

•

The Appellant is at real risk in her home area where she is in fear of being a victim of an honour killing at the hands of her family members by reason of her having given birth to a child outside wedlock, such a fear being well-founded.

3.

In addition to the above and to the fear of being a victim of an honour killing, it is accepted by the parties that it is the Appellant’s case that she also holds a genuine subjective fear that her former partner will take her child away from her and that he will be permitted to do so by the law in the Lebanon.

4.

The further substantive hearing is by way of full further second stage reconsideration in order that all the relevant material facts may be found in relation to all matters and issues, both subjective and objective, going to internal relocation within the Lebanon and more particularly to Beirut, and to include receiving written expert evidence and perhaps also oral expert evidence from Dr George and from Mr Abed Awad, the latter to provide evidence on relevant aspects of Lebanese family law. It is likely that there will also need to be up to date oral evidence given by the Appellant.

5.

In the light of the findings as to relevant fact, the Tribunal will then consider and decide the issue of risk on return, including whether the Appellant would be at real risk on return to the Lebanon if required to relocate to Beirut from her home area, for all or any of the feared reasons or any other relevant reasons.

6.

On 28 June 2007 Directions were given for the filing and service of expert evidence by the Appellant which have not been complied with.”

On 9 May 2008, this case was listed for hearing before Senior Immigration Judge Gill. Unfortunately, inadequate arrangements were made for the hearing, in consequence of which the hearing had to be adjourned. At this hearing, the Appellant was represented by Ms. G. Loughran, of the RLC, and the Respondent was represented by Ms. Isherwood, who sought to withdraw the Respondent's acceptance of the finding that the Appellant is at real risk of being a victim of honour killing at the hands of members of her family in her home area. Senior Immigration Judge Gill ruled against Ms. Isherwood. Senior Immigration Judge Gill observed that the Tribunal (in the determination promulgated on 27 July 2006) had found that the Appellant was at real risk of being a victim of honour killing if she returned to live with her family and brothers in the small village at which she had resided an hour’s drive from Beirut (see paragraph 32 of the determination), that the Tribunal had dismissed the appeal only because it found that the Appellant would be able to relocate in Lebanon, that the case was remitted by the Court of Appeal on the basis of the Statement of Reasons and that it was clear from the Statement of Reasons that the Respondent did not take issue with the finding that the Appellant was at real risk in her home area. In these circumstances, Senior Immigration Judge Gill concluded that it was too late for the Respondent to take issue with the Tribunal's finding that the Appellant was at real risk of being a victim of honour killing in her home area. It would be unfair to allow the Respondent to do so.

It is plain from what we have said above that the findings made in the determination of the Tribunal promulgated on 27 July 2006 stand, except for the findings with regard to internal flight. Accordingly, we adopt paragraphs 1 to 32 of that determination, and this determination should be read as if paragraphs 1 to 32 of the determination promulgated on 27 July 2006 had been set out herein.

At the hearing on 9 May 2008, the Tribunal was informed that it was the Appellant's intention to give oral evidence on her own behalf and also to call two expert witnesses, namely, Dr. Alan George and Dr. Sabah Al-Mukhtar, who had both provided written reports.

The appeal was then listed before us for hearing on 17 July 2008. Unfortunately, an interpreter had not been requested. We immediately instructed the administrative staff to arrange for an interpreter to attend. At about 11.30 a.m., Mr. Ahmed Blaha, an interpreter in the Arabic language, arrived.

Mr. Wilford made a request for an adjournment. This was because Dr. Al-Mukhtar was not present. Mr. Wilford informed us that he and Ms. Isherwood were agreed that the presence of Dr. Al-Mukhtar was necessary. Mr. Wilford informed us that Dr. Al-Mukhtar was contacted on 9 June, when he confirmed that he would be able to attend the hearing on 17 July. However, Dr. Al-Mukhtar subsequently said that he was not aware that he should attend on 17 July, which Mr. Wilford accepted was contradictory. Mr. Wilford could not explain what had gone wrong.

We were concerned about the possibility of similar problems arising in the future. We were also mindful of the fact that the case had had a long history. In our view, the Appellant had had sufficient opportunity to secure the attendance of any expert witnesses. We also took into account the fact that we had a written report from Dr. Al-Mukhtar. Although there were matters arising from his report which we would have liked to put to Dr. Al-Mukhtar if he had attended the hearing, we were not given any assurance that, if the matter was adjourned, he would attend on a future occasion. In all of the circumstances, and for all of these reasons, we were not satisfied that rule 21(2) of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 2005, as amended, was satisfied. Accordingly, we refused the adjournment request.

Mr. Wilford then contacted the RLC and asked them to make contact with Dr. Al-Mukhtar with a view to arranging (or attempting to arrange) his attendance before us on the same day. At the conclusion of the oral evidence of the Appellant and Dr. George, when we were ready to hear oral evidence from Dr. Al-Mukhtar, Mr. Wilford informed us that his instructing solicitors had informed him that Dr. Al-Mukhtar had travelled to the hearing centre but that he did not wait to be called to give oral evidence. It seems he arrived whilst we were hearing oral evidence from Dr. George and that he then left to attend a meeting elsewhere. Mr. Wilford reiterated his view that it was important for the Appellant to call oral evidence from Dr. Al-Mukhtar. We again refused the request. Our reasons are the same as stated above.

The parties agreed that it was for the Tribunal to decide whether the Appellant had a genuine fear of losing her child to his father. In this regard, we made the observation that the previous Tribunal did not accept the Appellant’s evidence that she is estranged from the father of her child or that her relationship with him has ended.

We also raised the question as to whether the Appellant was attempting in her recent witness statement dated February 2008 (pages B1 to B4 of the Appellant's bundle B) to re-argue factual issues which have been settled by the previous Tribunal. In this regard, Mr. Wilford acknowledged that the guidance in DK (Serbia) and others v. SSHD[2006] EWCA Civ 1747 was against the Appellant. In addition, he acknowledged that the adverse credibility assessment of the previous panel in the determination promulgated on 27 July 2006 had not been challenged by the Appellant. However, he submitted that the recent witness statement of the Appellant was evidence before the Tribunal.

We asked the parties whether we have to reach a finding as to whether the Appellant is at real risk of being persecuted by members of her family if she were to relocate, or whether the finding of the Tribunal in the determination promulgated on 27 July 2006 that the Appellant is not at such real risk stands. Mr. Wilford referred us to paragraph 5 of the document issued by Senior Immigration Judge Jarvis. Ms. Isherwood initially said that she relied on her skeleton argument but, when pressed to clarify her position, asked us to reach our own finding. As we indicated at the hearing, we take into account the fact that the parties have, to date, assumed that we would have to reach our own finding on this factual issue and that paragraph 5 of the note of Senior Immigration Judge Jarvis conveys the impression that it was understood that the Tribunal would have to reach a fresh finding on this issue.

Accordingly, we have decided that the finding of the previous panel that the Appellant is not at real risk of persecution from members of her family if she were to relocate will not stand, and that we will reach our own finding on that matter on the whole of the evidence. Of course, this includes the evidence that was before the previous panel and as has been assessed by it to the extent not affected by the Consent Order and the Statement of Reasons. Ms. Isherwood accepted that, in the event that we were to find that the Appellant is at real risk of being persecuted if she were to relocate and that she would have insufficient protection, then there is an applicable Geneva Convention reason.

We raised several matters in connection with the psychiatric report of Dr. James Barrett. On page B11, he states that, at the time the Appellant gave her previous accounts (which, we noted, were given two years or so previously), she was suffering from the same psychological problems she was suffering from at the time of his examination of her. We questioned what this opinion was based on, since we could not see that Dr Barrett had had the benefit of the Appellant's medical records. On page B12, Dr. Barrett made recommendations for the treatment of the Appellant, i.e. that her GP should institute treatment for a depressive disorder. We questioned whether these recommendations had been progressed by the Appellant or her GP. We asked Mr. Wilford whether the Appellant was currently on any treatment and if, so, what. He informed us that he was unable to assist, because the interpreter from the RLC had not arrived.

The parties agreed that, in addition to internal flight with regard to the asylum claim, we also had to decide whether the Appellant is at real risk of serious harm, pursuant to the President's Practice Direction of 9 October 2006, to treat the grounds of appeal as including, and having always included, a humanitarian protection ground.

With regard to the human rights claim, Mr. Wilford informed us that he relied on Articles 3 and 8. He informed us that there are two strands to the Article 3 claim – one which is based on the same factual matrix as the asylum claim, and the second which is based on the risk of suicide. Similarly, Mr. Wilford informed us that there are two strands to the Article 8 claim, the first being based on the deterioration in the Appellant's health together with the associated risk of suicide, and the second being based on the Appellant’s right to family life with her child which (it is contended on the Appellant's behalf) would be lost if the Appellant were to lose her child to the child’s father.

We heard oral evidence from the Appellant, through an interpreter in the Arabic language. In examination-in-chief, she confirmed that her recent statement dated 18 February 2008 had been read back to her and that its contents were true and correct.

There were no questions in cross-examination.

We then explained to the Appellant that we had noted that she had given explanations for the difficulties the previous panel had found with her evidence. We asked her why we should believe her evidence that she fears that the father of her child would take her child away from her, if she were to return to Lebanon. In response, the Appellant said that she has been in the United Kingdom for four years and has not had any contact with the father of her child. During the four years, he has not made any attempt to contact her, although he knows that she is living with her sister Leila and he knows her sister’s address. She does not know why he has not made any contact with her during the past four years.

The Appellant said that the reason why she believes that the father of her son will take her son away from her, is because her brother-in-law met her son's father whilst he was in Lebanon. Her son's father told her brother-in-law that he does not want her (the Appellant), but he wants the child. Her brother-in-law has explained this in his witness statement which was submitted to the previous panel.

The Appellant told us that, when she was in Lebanon, she went to a boarding school in Al-Ashrfieh in Beirut for ten years, and that she left school at the age of 17 years. After leaving school, she worked in shops in different areas, in the centre of Beirut and also in the surrounding areas of Beirut. She lived with her mother in an area called Baabda, which was about half an hours’ drive from Beirut.

The Appellant said that she is currently living with her sister, Leila, in the United Kingdom. She does not receive any news from Leila about her family in Beirut. She has had an argument with her sister. They are not on good terms. Her sister has allowed her to live in her house for the sake of her son.

Neither Mr. Wilford nor Ms. Isherwood had any questions arising from our questions.

Dr. George confirmed that he stood by what he has said in his first report dated 18 May 2005 and his three supplementary reports (dated 8 March 2006, 3 December 2007 and 27 February 2008), having made a correction of “a small editing error” in one of the supplementary reports. The last version of his curriculum vitae is set out in the third report dated December 2007. Since then, Dr. George has completed a trip to Iraqi Kurdistan in late April this year, after which he briefed the Foreign Office research department, “Research Analysts”, on the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan. In May, he gave a lecture in Istanbul at a university conference on Turkish / Syrian relations. In late June, he was invited by the Foreign Office, Research Analysts, to give a seminar on how to conduct research on the middle east. Also in late June, he gave a lecture, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London on the future of Lebanese-Syrian relations. This was a conference involving Israeli and European academics. The most recent broadcast he did was about a month ago for the BBC World Service, on the Lebanese political crisis.

Since the fourth and last report was written, the political crisis in Lebanon has not only persisted, it has evolved into armed confrontation in various parts of the Lebanon, most notably in late spring and early summer this year, when there were a series of armed events. For example, Hizbollah, a Shia militant group, occupied west Beirut for several days. Normally, it is not present in west Beirut. In the northern city of Tripoli, there have been successive gun battles between pro- and anti-Hizbollah groups who fought in the streets in Tripoli. In the Shouf mountains, south east of Beirut, there was fighting between the Druse and Hizbollah. In May, there was a political solution of sorts, mediated by Qatar, the Gulf state, as a result of which Hizbollah withdrew from west Beirut. However, sporadic fighting has persisted, particularly in Tripoli. The political crisis in Lebanon, and the accompanying violence, arises essentially from the very nature of Lebanon, its society and the rivalries between significant components of the Lebanese population. These various groups have outside sponsors, in particular, Syria and Iran, who support Hizbollah, and on the other side, United States and France, who support the groups who oppose Hizbollah. The situation now, while mainly calm, remains tense. None of the underlying issues have been resolved.

Paragraph 45 of Dr. George’s third report (page B34 of the Appellant's bundle B) states that “…it is neither the general practice nor is it easy for individuals to relocate to parts of Lebanon remote from members of their community.” Dr. George told us that outbreaks of communal violence reinforce an awareness of the significance of the communal structure and the fact that security can be found in one’s own community, although this does not mean that people from one community never move to some other part of Lebanon. Paragraph 45 of the same report also states that families and extended families form the basis of society in Lebanon and that they provide the social, economic and political support. Dr. George told us that, if a person is literally totally destitute and has no contacts, they would have to survive by begging or obtaining charity if they could not obtain a job, which would depend on their skills. It is not the case that, in every single instance, the only way one can survive is through the support of one's family or clan. Dr. George said that he would not exclude the possibility of a Lebanese, without a particularly strong family clan or backing, succeeding spectacularly in terms of business etc. However, the general position is that people rely on their families for support and as a social network. This is what people depend on when they do not have a job or when they are in trouble. The Lebanese state does not provide a generous welfare state.

Paragraph 46 of the same report states that “the extended families and clans, as well as functioning as vital economic and other support mechanisms for individuals constitute highly effective channels for the flow of information. Through family and clan networks, a fugitive's antagonists would have relatively little difficulty establishing their quarry's whereabouts. This is especially so as Lebanon is such a small country.” Asked to explain how a person would go about finding someone through that person's extended families, Dr. George said that one would work one’s way from one end of one clan system into the next. If each clan or extended family is seen as being akin to a village where everyone knows the presence of each individual, it is relatively easy to track members of a clan. At the points where clans and extended families overlap, as they do “at the edges”, then one can gain insight into who is in the adjacent clan or family.

Dr. George said that he has had personal experience of this in Lebanon in the context of his commercial consulting work. In 1996, he was asked to go to Lebanon to establish the background or bona fides of a gentleman who wanted to be the local representative of a multi-national company. His task was to establish whether the gentleman in question, who was a Maronite Christian, had a clean background in terms of gun running or drugs. Within four or five days, Dr. George had learnt a surprising amount about the gentleman, simply by moving through the family system until he got near enough to the gentleman's extended family so that he was talking to the gentleman's distant family who knew all about him.

In cross-examination, Dr. George informed us that he was last in Lebanon in April 2007. Paragraph 15 of the third report dated 3 December 2007 mentions a trip in March / April 2007 to Lebanon. Dr. George told us that he obtains his information about what is happening in these countries in many ways. One reads the media, including internet websites. One stays abreast of the latest publications, academic books and reports of numerous bodies, such as Amnesty International Report. One attends conferences. Dr. George maintains contact with foreign office officials who are dealing with the countries in question. In the case of Lebanon, Dr. George also receives by e-mail each morning the main Lebanese newspaper, the Daily Star, which is a respected English language Lebanese daily newspaper.

The publication entitled: “Honour: Crimes, Paradigms and Violence against Women”, edited by Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, dated November 2005, which is attached to Dr. George's second report dated 8 March 2006, states, at page A37 of the Appellant’s bundle A, that, in its constitution, Lebanon has committed itself to the principle of justice and equality for all Lebanese before the law and that “Lebanonhas voluntarily become a party to a number of international conventions and charters that involve the principle of equality and require the abolition of all forms of discrimination between one person and another on grounds beyond their choice and will”. In response, Dr. George said that he had not written this chapter himself and that there may be some confusion over the use of the word “committed” in the publication. Dr. George took it to mean that, by signing the conventions, Lebanon had committed itself. However, this was different, in Dr. George's view, from saying that the Lebanese government is “committed” in the sense that it is pressing forward on all fronts in all parts of society, including Hizbollah, to eliminate discrimination against women.

The reason why Dr. George did not refer to the “third periodic report of the State’s parties” to the United Nations' Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, in his reports, until this was mentioned by the Respondent in the skeleton argument, is because, as stated at paragraph 35 of his fourth report dated 27 February 2008, he did not consider that it added anything substantive to the existing information on matters relevant to the instant appeal.

There were no questions by way of re-examination.

We then asked Dr. George some questions. Referring to paragraph 14 of his report on page A58 of the Appellant's bundle A, where Dr. George had said, in commenting on customs, particularly in Jordan, that “nothing in Islam provides for such brutality”, Dr. George informed us that he does not have any formal in-depth knowledge about Islam or in Islamic law or jurisprudence and the Islamic legal system. He has general knowledge about Islamic law.

We then referred Dr. George to paragraph 23 of his first report at page A60 of the Appellants bundle A, where he had made reference to various communities within Lebanon. Asked to describe in greater detail what communities exist and where they are found in Lebanon, Dr. George said that the biggest Christian community is the Maronite community, thought to be a majority in the 1930s/1940s. Maronite Christians are to be found in the “swathe” or area stretching continuously from east Beirut running northwards along the coast to a point roughly midway between the coastal towns of Jounieh and Tripoli. At that point, the area shifts from being Maronite Christian to Sunni Muslim. This Maronite “swathe” extends inland to embrace the first of Lebanon's two parallel mountain angles. It functioned as a mini Christian state during the civil war. Other Christian groups and also some Muslims do live in this Maronite Christian “swathe”, which can also be described as a territory which runs from the eastern half of Beirut, which is Christian, northwards along the coastal plane and to the adjacent mountain range. There are geographically recognisable towns in this region. East Beirut is one. Joune is another. Those are the two main urban centres. There are numerous villages and smaller towns in this area. Asked to describe the size of Joune and the other towns and villages, Dr. George said that statistics in Lebanon are extremely unreliable, because of the sensitivity of the issue as to the relative sizes of the various communities and the sizes of the control they should have over the state.

Apart from this “swathe”, Maronite Christians will not be found in any significant numbers in other parts of Lebanon, although there are other Maronite Christians in other major towns such as Sidon and Tyre, both of which are majority Sunni with “very very small” Christian communities. In addition, in the south of Lebanon along the border with Israel, there is a Maronite presence, which is not dominant, in a mainly Shia area. The other remaining major part of the country is almost exclusively Shia and Sunni. At the edges of the Maronite heartland, the situation can be quite variable over short distances, as the religious structure merges into the adjacent area.

Dr. George told us that Tripoli, which is Lebanon's second biggest city, is a Sunni majority city. There are Christian communities in Tripoli. There is a small Armenian Greek Orthodox or Greek Catholic community in Tripoli. There may also be some Syrian Catholics; Dr. George was not sure without conducting further research. These Christians are also found in Beirut.

With reference to paragraph 46 of his third report on page B34 of the Appellant's bundle B, which states, inter alia, that newcomers to a locality attract attention, Dr. George said that he could cite numerous examples of newcomers going to a new locality. These were examples from his work as an expert witness, involving Lebanese cases when the applicants were deemed incredible by the courts. These individuals have given detailed accounts of how difficult or impossible it was to live anonymously. Dr. George stressed that this is not a particularly Lebanese phenomenon but a middle eastern phenomenon.

In the event that we were to find that, although unmarried, the Appellant is not estranged from the father of her son and that her relationship with him had not in fact ended, then, in Dr. George's opinion, the issue as to whether the Appellant would be able to relocate in Lebanon would depend very much on the attitudes of his family and her family. Dr. George said: “If they were at one end of the spectrum of social or religious opinion, at the extreme end, the fundamentalist end, it would be very serious if they continued to have a relationship out of wedlock. If, on the other hand, they were at the other end of the spectrum, there would not be a problem. In relation to Maronite society, wealthy educated Maronites are often very liberal in such matters. At the other end of the Maronite spectrum, in a mountain village for example, attitudes can be just about as hard-line as in the case of fundamentalist Muslims. Somewhere in the middle of the Maronite spectrum, one might put the poorer working or middle class residents of East Beirut who, while tending to be somewhat conservative, would not necessarily take violent action to express their opposition to the relationship. It really is very difficult to generalise.” Dr. George accepted that, in his reports, the assumption made that the Appellant's family would wish to track her down and carry out an honour crime, was based on an acceptance of her evidence. He said he was aware of the difference between plausibility and credibility and where his function ceases.

At paragraph 9 of his second report on page A18 of the Appellant’s bundle A, Dr. George had explained that the reason why he did not refer to the report of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (CIRB) dated 25 February 2004 at paragraph 17 of his first report, is because his first report largely overlapped with the CIRB report. However, we had noted that, in fact the statistics in the CIRB report which he went on to describe at paragraph 9 of the second report contradict the statistics previously given at paragraph 17 of his first report. When this was put to Dr. George, he said that he was not surprised that the statistics cited by the Daily Star and the CIRB conflict, due to definitional problems as to what constitutes an honour crime and because of the underreporting of honour crimes.

At paragraphs 16 to 18 of his third report on page B28 of the Appellant's bundle B, Dr. George had provided some information about the assessment by the judiciary of his expert reports in other cases. At paragraph 18 of the report, Dr. George had said that the courts had invariably found him qualified to act as an expert witness, that he was very rarely criticised and that any criticism was either minor or proved to lack substance by subsequent judicial scrutiny. Asked whether this was his own opinion, or whether it was held by the courts upon further judicial scrutiny of any judgments which were critical of his reports, that the criticisms were minor or without substance, Dr. George said that the short answer, which he would like to elaborate upon slightly, is that, in some cases, the criticisms have been overturned by the Court of Appeal and that, in other cases, the criticisms have not been examined by higher judicial authority.

We asked whether there was any particular reason why he had not quoted the criticisms in the same way as he had quoted from judgments which made positive remarks about him, so as to enable the Tribunal to decide the matter for itself. Dr. George said that there were a number of reasons. It would simply be unwieldy to have done so; the most standard critique of those criticisms would run to several pages. When the question was repeated, Dr. George said that he had tried to include matters which are of substance and of relevance to assisting the court. He did not consider that “criticisms which are minor or which evaporate on examination to be any way helpful”. However, he said that he “was ready to go through that process without going into any sort of detail”. He asked if it would help to give us one example of what he meant, or if it would help if he were to submit his critique of criticisms that had been made of his reports. We were worried about embarking about an examination of satellite issues and we did not consider that any further delays in our consideration of this case were justified. We observed that it would perhaps have been more helpful if Dr. George had simply set out the critical cases as well as the complimentary ones, so that we can decide the matter for ourselves.

At paragraph 20 of his first report on page A60 of the Appellant's Bundle A, Dr. George had attributed the following quote to the U.S. State Department Report on Lebanon for 2003:

“Women who report instances of violence against them often receive dismissive or insufficient protection from the police, as it is seen that family matters should be handled within the family, even with reference to such severe matters as “honor killings”.

At paragraph 42 of his third report (page B34 of the Appellant's bundle B), Dr. George said that this quotation should not have been included in his first report because it does not appear in the said USSD Report, referring to it as “an editing error”. Asked to explain how the “editing error” had occurred, Dr. George that he could not really do so at this point. He said: “It would have been some item in my computer which would probably have been in the memory that one uses when drafting an article which I inserted intending to take out again but failed to do so”. He agreed that, if something is quoted wrongly, this may give rise to misgivings with regard to the report generally. Dr. George said that the quote in question “has the ring of an earlier report, possibly an earlier USSD report. It is not something I wrote” and that the curious thing was that the quote in the last sentence of paragraph 20 of the first report is an accurate quote from the same USSD report.

We have narrated almost the whole of Dr. George's oral evidence.

We then heard submission from the parties, which we have considered.

We reserved our decision.

It is for the Appellant to establish that she is at real risk of treatment amounting to persecution for a Geneva Convention reason or serious harm or (in relation to the Article 3 claim) that there are substantial grounds for believing that she would be subjected to treatment amounting to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR.

We stress that we have considered all the documents before us very carefully (whether or not they have been specifically referred in our determination) before reaching our conclusions on this appeal. It is impossible, without producing a determination of inordinate length, to refer to each and every document or mention each and every point or argument mentioned in each document.

As stated above, the factual findings of the previous Tribunal, as set out at paragraph 2 of the document quoted at our paragraph 4 above, stand. It is also clear, from this document, that it is necessary for us to reach a finding as to whether the Appellant has a genuine fear that her son’s father will take her son away from her. The previous Tribunal made an adverse assessment of the credibility of the Appellant’s evidence, including her evidence as to her alleged contact (or absence of contact) with her son’s father in the United Kingdom. As we observed at the hearing, it is plain, from the reasoning of the previous Tribunal, that the previous Tribunal did not believe the Appellant's evidence that she was estranged from her son's father, or that her relationship with him has ended. This case was remitted by the Court of Appeal to the Tribunal only for the Tribunal to reconsider internal flight. The only error of law agreed between the parties in the Statement of Reasons concerned the previous Tribunal's consideration of the availability of internal flight on account of the risk of being a victim of an honour crime at the hands of her family. At the hearing before us, Mr. Wilford acknowledged that the guidance of the Court of Appeal in DK (Serbia) was against the Appellant. We agree. The findings of the previous Tribunal, in relation to the Appellant's evidence about the alleged lack of contact with her son's father, are not affected by the error of law, and they should stand.

In any event, we did not find the Appellant's further evidence credible. In her statement of February 2008, the Appellant acknowledged that she had been untruthful previously. She sad that she had lied when she said she had met a friend of her son's father on a bus. She said she lied, because she thought that she would not be believed if she had said that she had not had a relationship with her son's father for some time and that she was afraid that she would be removed to Lebanon if she was not believed. We did not find her explanation at all credible, not least because, on this evidence, she is still saying that she was not in contact with her son's father at the relevant time, which the previous Tribunal found contradicted the evidence of her brother-in-law, that she and her son's father lived with him and his wife for a substantial period, only leaving at the end of August 2004 to go into NASS accommodation together (see paragraph 27 of the previous determination). Accordingly, having taken an opportunity to correct the previous adverse credibility assessment by making her statement of February 2008, the Appellant has still given evidence which is not credible and which is still contradicted by the evidence of her brother-in-law.

In all of the circumstances, and for these reasons, we did not find that there were any good reasons for departing from the findings of the previous Tribunal in connection with the Appellant's evidence about her contact (or lack of contact) with her son’s father.

The Appellant said that the only reason why her sister and her brother-in-law allow her to live in their home, is for the sake of the child and that she and her sister do not talk. In her recent statement, she described her circumstances in her sister’s home. In his report, Dr. Barrett describes the Appellant's circumstances in her sister's home, stating that she and her son are confined to their room as much as possible (see page B8 of the Appellant's bundle B). He describes the atmosphere as being ”exceedingly tense” (page B8 of the Appellant's bundle B) and her circumstances as being “desperately miserable domestic circumstances” (page B11 of the Appellant's bundle B). Of course, in making these observations, Dr. Barrett relies on the Appellant’s account to him of her domestic circumstances. The overall impression given, of a difficult and unsupportive environment, is not supported by the fact that the Appellant's brother-in-law attended the previous hearing and gave evidence in support of her appeal. Bearing in mind the previous Tribunal's assessment of the Appellant’s credibility and the fact that the previous Tribunal also had difficulty with some aspects of the evidence of the Appellant's brother-in-law and having regard, further, to the fact that we too have difficulty with the Appellant's evidence, we did not find the Appellant's evidence that she and her sister do not talk and do not get along credible. We only have the Appellant's evidence in her recent statement that her brother has told her sister and brother-in-law that, if she were to return to Lebanon, he (the Appellant's brother) would kill her. This Appellant’s credibility is so low that we do not accept that anything she says which is not supported by other evidence is reasonably likely to be true.

The previous Tribunal made a finding that the Appellant is at real risk of substantial harm or of being the victim of an honour killing, if she returned to live with her family and brothers in the small village at which she would have lived an hour’s drive from Beirut (paragraph 32 of the determination of the previous Tribunal). In our view, it is clear that the Tribunal based this finding on the objective evidence as to the availability, or otherwise, of state protection to potential female victims of honour killing. Having noted earlier in the same paragraph the Respondent's submissions, the information contained in the CIRB report of 25 April 2006 and a letter from a lawyer stating that Lebanese Christians have an open mentality that permits common law relationship and that the age and financial status of the women would be relevant in deciding whether an individual is at real risk, the Tribunal did not assess the Appellant's circumstances or her evidence, in order to reach its finding that the Appellant would be at real risk of an honour killing at the hands of her family.

We therefore have difficulty with the finding of the previous Tribunal, that the Appellant is at real risk of persecution or substantial harm from her family in her home area because, as we have said, that finding appears to be based entirely on the objective evidence as to sufficiency of protection. This may be the reason why Ms. Isherwood sought to re-open the issue as to whether the Appellant is at real risk of persecution in her home area. Our decision in this regard was that it was too late for the Respondent to seek to re-open this factual issue and that it would be unfair to allow her to do so. It is right that we stand by that decision. Accordingly, notwithstanding the fact that we did not believe the Appellant's evidence, we determine this appeal on the basis that the previous Tribunal's finding that the Appellant is at real risk of persecution or substantial harm at the hands of her family in her home area, stands. That finding is determinative of the outcome of this appeal (for reasons given below). This is the reason why we have described our difficulty with the previous Tribunal's finding that the Appellant is at real risk in her home area, and the reasons for our difficulty. If we had not explained our reasons, we would have left unexplained the potential conflict between the adverse assessment of the Appellant's credibility (including her evidence that her brother has threatened to kill her) and our decision to allow this appeal.

We had several difficulties with the evidence of Dr. George.

The first difficulty we have relates to the error which Dr. George described as an “editing error” in relation to paragraph 20 of his first report (on page A60 of the Appellant's bundle A), which contains the quote we have set out at our paragraph 44 above. At paragraph 42 of his third report (page B34 of the Appellant's bundle B), Dr. George states that this quotation should not have been included because it does not appear in the said USSD report. He referred to it as an “editing error”. We have set out above Dr. George's explanation in oral evidence as to how this editing error occurred. The fact that an expert has included a quote attributing it to a report which does not in fact include that quote, raises questions about the accuracy of the expert's reports in other respects. However, experts, like all human beings, can make mistakes. On the other hand, we cannot dismiss this error out of hand as a trifling matter either, given that the Tribunal is entitled to expect that material quoted in an expert's report is accurately taken from the document indicated to be the source of the quote and that sources for any quotations are accurately indicated. If this “editing error” was the only issue we had with Dr. George's evidence, it may be that we might have concluded that it was not worthy of any special mention. However, given that we have other concerns, we feel bound to mention it.

The second difficulty relates to paragraph 17 of Dr. George's first report (page A59 of the Appellant's bundle A) and paragraph 9 of his second report (page A18 of the Appellant's bundle A). At paragraph 17 of his first report Dr. George quoted the following passage from a CIRB report dated 25 February 2004:

“Most deaths linked to honour crimes are not reported to the police and are covered up by the family as suicides or accidents ….. Of the 36 [reported] honour crimes committed between 1995 and 1998, 22 were committed by brothers, 7 by husbands, 6 by fathers, and 1 by a son”.

At paragraph 9 of his second report, Dr. George referred to the publication of a report on 9 September 2004 of the Beirut-based Daily Star entitled: “Laws in Arab World Remain Lenient on Honour Crimes”. He explained that he had not referred to this article at paragraph 17 of his first report, because it largely overlapped with the CIRB report and that he was mentioning it in his second report for completeness. Dr. George then went on to quote the following from the report in the Dairy Star:

“In Lebanon, the most recent study on honor crimes goes back to 1998 and shows sentences issued between 1994 and 1998 in 16 cases of murder included one acquittal, four one-year prison sentences, four sentences of less than five years in prison, three jail sentences of less than 10 years and four life sentences………… According to Internal Security Forces Statistics, there were 22 cases of so-called “honor crimes” committed between 1995 and 1997. More recent figures are not available”.

Dr. George then said in his second report:

“I note that the statistics on honour crimes cited by the Daily Star and by the CIRB conflict. This does not surprise me bearing in mind definitional problems…..”

It seemed to us odd that, notwithstanding the contradictory statistics (a fact acknowledged by Dr. George), he should seek to explain away the absence of any mention in his first report of the statistics which were reported in the Daily Star report, on the basis that the Daily Star report largely overlapped with the CIRB report. When we put this to Dr. George at the hearing, he said he was not surprised that the statistics cited by the Daily Star and the CIRB conflict “due to definitional problems as to what constitutes an honour crime and because of the underreporting of honour crimes”. We did not consider that this explanation addressed the point that was put to him, that is, how it could be said that the report in the Daily Star overlapped with the CIRB report, when he acknowledged that the statistics as to the number of reported honour crimes committed in the two reports conflict. The figure of 36 reported honour crimes committed according to the CIRB report and which he quoted in his first report, was a figure that was 63 % higher than the figure of 22 honour crimes committed according to the Daily Star report, which he omitted to quote (leaving aside the fact that the periods for which the figures relate do not correspond exactly, a fact which Dr. George did not rely on to explain the difference in the statistics). The issues we take here are: (a) if Dr. George was aware of the report in the Daily Star at the time of his first report, then he should have mentioned both sets of statistics, with his explanation as to possible reasons for the conflicting statistics; (b) the failure to mention in the first report the lower numbers in the Dally Star cannot be explained away on the basis that they “largely overlap” with the CIRB report; and (c) if he was not aware of the report in the Daily Star at the time of his first report, this itself raises questions as to how well-informed he is.

The third, and more important, difficulty concerns paragraphs 16 to 18 of Dr. George’s third report (pages B28 to B29 of the Appellant's bundle B), where he quoted from or referred to various decisions or judgments of the courts in which comments were made about his expertise or his opinions, as follows:

“16.

In the past nine years I have prepared numerous Expert Reports on Middle Eastern cases for submission to the IAT, IAA and AIT. I cannot be precise about how many but my best estimate would be about 700. Adjudicators and Judges have repeatedly acknowledged by credentials and accepted my expertise. By way of example, I would cite the case of Jasim [2006] EWCA Civ 342. In the Judgment in that case Lord Justice Sedley stated: 'No doubt was cast before or by the adjudicator upon Dr George's expertise or credentials, and there was no evidence in direct opposition to his. He is an experienced writer and consultant upon and analyst of Middle Eastern political and economic affairs, a Senior Associate Member of St Anthony's College, Oxford (whose Middle East Centre is an acknowledged centre of excellence), and since 1989 a specialist commentator upon Iraq'. Lord Justice Pill stated: 'That Dr Alan George was qualified to provide the report on Iraq he did is not in doubt and the report was a helpful contribution to the in-country information available to the immigration judge'. I would note that in his Determination, promulgated on 4 August 2006), of the case of a Palestinian from Iraq Appeal Number AA/07439/2006, Immigration Judge Hart stated: 'Dr George's credentials as an expert are impeccable … I have been much assisted by Dr George's report'. I also refer to the judgment in the case of H v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 803, in which it was noted that I had given '' a detailed history of involvement with and knowledge of affairs in the Middle East, and more particularly in Syria' and that it had not been suggested in that case that I was 'not a person with specialist knowledge of Syria and able to report on it.' The Determination of the Country Guidance case of AR (Kurd: not risk per se) Syria CG [2006] UKAIT 0048, promulgated on 7 June 2006, for which I gave written and oral evidence, states: 'Dr George is clearly a knowledgeable witness. He has a lengthy history of commentating on Middle Eastern matters'.

17.

In a letter dated 16 March 2007 relating to an entirely separate case (also involving a Palestinian from Lebanon), the Home Office, while expressing an intention to question certain aspects of my testimony in that case, wrote: 'That Dr George has enormous experience and knowledge of Middle Easter affairs is not disputed'.

18.

While the Courts have invariably found me qualified to act as an Expert Witness and have repeatedly explicitly acknowledged my credentials and accepted my expertise, very rarely they have criticised aspects of my testimony (including in a Country Guidance case involving Palestinians in Lebanon). I would respectfully observe, however, that these criticism have been either minor or, on examination, have proved to lack substance. On request, I would be pleased to provide a detailed critique of these criticisms.”

Paragraph 18 of the third report makes reference to a country guidance case involving Palestinians in Lebanon, but fails to make any reference to another country guidance case involving Palestinians in the West Bank, that is, MA (Palestinian Arabs – Occupied Territories – Risk) Palestinian Territories CG [2007] UKAIT 00017. In that case, the Tribunal had before it reports from Dr. George. The Tribunal noted that, whilst Dr. George had quoted from the judgments of Sedley LJ and Pill LJ in Jasim (incidentally, the passages of the judgments relied upon before the Tribunal in MA (Palestinian Territories) were the same as the passages quoted at paragraph 16 of the third report which is before us), he had omitted to mention that Gibson J. and Pill LJ, who gave the majority judgments in Jasim, held that the Immigration Judge in Jasim was entitled not to accept the opinion of Dr. George as to the risk on relocation.

The Tribunal in MA (Palestinian Territories) went on to list the previous Tribunal determinations in which Dr. George’s reports had been dealt with and consider what had been said about Dr. George’s reports in the previous determinations, as follows (paragraphs 68 to 70 of the determination in MA (Palestinian Territories)):

“68.

Dr. George’s reports have been considered by the Tribunal in the following reported cases:

KK IH HE (Palestinians – Lebanon – camps) Palestine CG [2004] UKIAT 00293;

AR (Kurd: not risk per se) Syria CG [2006] UKAIT 00048; and

LM (Educated women – Chaldo- Assyrians - risk) Iraq CG [2006] UKAIT 00060.

(a)

In the LM case, Dr. George is referred to at paragraphs 9, 53 and 54 of the Determination. We cannot see any in-depth analysis in that case of the general expertise of Dr. George.

(b)

In the KK IH HE case, the Tribunal heard oral evidence from Dr. George, whose written and oral evidence is summarised at paragraphs 18 to 43 of the Determination in that case. The Tribunal assessed the evidence of Dr. Joffe (from whom it also heard evidence and Dr. George at paragraph 85 onwards. At paragraph 86, the Tribunal expressed concern about the fact that Dr. George had only visited Lebanon once in 1996. The Tribunal found surprising Dr. George's statement that he can better monitor the Middle East from London than on the ground as people speak more freely in London. The Tribunal considered that a person would be far more likely to be able to get a realistic feel for the conditions in the camps if (in the case of Dr. George) he had visited the camps more recently than in 1996. The Tribunal found itself in agreement with the Respondent's representative concerning the occasional sweeping generalisation to be found in the evidence of Dr. George. The Tribunal did not consider that it can properly be said, as contended by Dr. George, that conditions in the camps are life threatening generally. Otherwise and, in general, the Tribunal found the evidence of Dr. George was essentially consonant with the various country reports of specialist bodies.

(c)

We note that the AR case concerned Syrian Kurds. In the AR case, the Tribunal also heard oral evidence from Dr. George, whose written and oral evidence is summarised at paragraphs 27 to 59 of the Determination in that case. At paragraph 77 onwards, the Tribunal commented on Dr. George’s evidence referring to him as “clearly a knowledgeable witness….. [with] a lengthy history of commentating on Middle Eastern matters” (paragraph 77). However, at paragraph 78, the Tribunal expressed concern with the efforts Dr. George made as to the truth or lack of it concerning the suggestions that significant numbers of Syrian Kurds were to be granted citizenship. The Tribunal considered that Dr. George seemed to have gone to a source from which the answer given could be expected and that the Tribunal would have expected Dr. George to have carried out more extensive research than he did. At paragraph 79, the Tribunal stated that, with that caveat in mind, the Tribunal considered that Dr. George’s evidence is in general consistent with the background evidence and deserving of weight being attached to it as a consequence.

69.

Dr. George’s report, which is dated 15 May 2006, pre-dates the date of promulgation of the AR case and the date on which it was added to the publicly–available country guidance list on 8 June 2006. We can therefore understand why he made no mention of the AR case. However, it is unfortunate that, whilst he referred to the Jasim case as an example, he overlooked mentioning the KK IH HE case in which he gave oral evidence to the Tribunal and in which the Tribunal commented in more specific terms on his evidence than the generalised comments in the Jasim case. Whilst we note that Dr. George makes clear that he was referring to the Jasim case only by way of example, we do not consider that he was entitled to state that his “expertise has been accepted by the Courts” without also drawing the attention of the reader to the reservations expressed on his evidence in the KK IH HE case.

70.

The KK IH HE case is included in the Appellant's bundle B (pages 160 to 177 of bundle B). We consider that we are also entitled to have regard to the AR case; it is a reported case and deals with Dr. George’s evidence on part of the Middle East. We consider that we are entitled to have regard not only to the general observations about Dr. George in the Jasim case but also to the Tribunal's more specific observations in the KK IH HE and AR cases. We are not aware that the observations of the Tribunal in those cases to which we have referred have been disapproved of by the Court of Appeal. It may be argued that, for example, the fact that the Tribunal in the KK IH HE case considered that Dr. George made occasional sweeping comments does not mean that Dr. George has done so in the report before us. That is of course entirely correct. Similarly, it would be entirely correct to say that the KK IH HE and the AR cases concern different countries and that accordingly they have no bearing on the question as to whether Dr. George's opinion in the report which is before us should be accepted or rejected. An individual's expertise concerning the situation in different countries may not be the same and it may be argued that he has greater expertise to opine on the situation for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories than in Syria or the camps in Lebanon. We bear that in mind. However, just as it would be appropriate to bear in mind the complimentary observations about Dr. George in the Jasim case, so too is it relevant to bear in mind the reservations of the Tribunal in the KK IH HE and in AR cases. However, we should make clear that, even if we had not been aware of the Tribunal's reservations, we would nevertheless have reached the conclusions we have reached in the instant appeal (see below).”

In summary, therefore, the Tribunal took issue with the fact that, whilst Dr. George had quoted from decisions or judgments in which he or his expertise had been praised, he failed to mention other less complimentary observations or remarks which appeared elsewhere – for example, in the KK, IH, HE case, where the Tribunal found his evidence to contain “the occasional sweeping generalisation”; and, in the AR case, the Tribunal had expressed concern that Dr. George seemed to have gone to a source from which the answer given could be expected, in his efforts to ascertain the truth or lack of it, concerning the suggestions that significant numbers of Syrian Kurds were to be granted citizenship.

We are now confronted with the same difficulty in the instant case. Whilst Dr. George has (again) quoted from the complimentary passages in the judgments of Sedley LJ and Pill LJ at paragraph 16 of his third report, he has omitted to mention the fact that Gibson J and Pill LJ, who gave the majority judgements in Jasim, held that the Immigration Judge was entitled not to accept the opinion of Dr. George as to the risk on relocation. Whilst he quoted from a complimentary passage in the Tribunal's determination in the AR case, he omitted to mention that the same Tribunal expressed concern that he went to a source from which the answer could be expected in attempting to establish a matter in issue. Whilst he has referred to “a Country Guidance case involving Palestinians in Lebanon” (presumably, this is a reference to the KK, IH, HE case) as an example of a rare occasion on which he was criticised, he omitted to mention the more recent MA (Palestinian Territories), which is also a country guidance case.

Importantly, MA (Palestinian Territories) was appealed to the Court of Appeal. Whilst the Court of Appeal granted permission to appeal on other issues, permission was refused to challenge the Tribunal's decision that “there were …… features of Dr. George’s report which led [the Tribunal] to attach less weight to it than [the Tribunal] would otherwise have…” (paragraphs 35 to 39 of the judgment). These features included the fact that the Tribunal in MA (Palestinian Territories) considered that Dr. George's use of the term “colonisation” was tendentious. At the hearing, the Court of Appeal refused a renewed application to challenge the Tribunal's decision to attach less weight to the reports of Dr. George. Whilst the Court of Appeal did not express a view as to whether the Tribunal was justified in drawing the inference it drew from Dr. George's use of the term “colonisation”, the Court held that the Tribunal had expressed a preference for other evidence and had given other proper reasons for doing so. In other words, the Tribunal did not err in law in making its other observations. It is inconceivable that Dr. George is not aware of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in MA (Palestinian Territories), especially given that the RLC were representing the appellant in that case, as they are in the instant case.

With this background in mind, Dr. George's evidence that criticisms of his testimony “have been either minor or, on examination, have proved to lack substance” (paragraph 18 of the third report on page B29 of the Appellant's bundle B) does not stand up to examination. It can hardly be said that the criticisms in the Tribunal's determination in MA (Palestinian Territories)were minor or that they proved to lack substance on examination.

At the hearing, we initially asked Dr. George whether it was his own opinion that criticisms were minor or proved to lack substance on examination, or whether it was held by the courts upon further judicial scrutiny of any judgments which were critical of his reports that the criticisms were minor or without substance. Dr. George said that the short answer, which he would like to elaborate upon slightly, is that, in some cases, the criticisms have been overturned by the Court of Appeal and that, in other cases, the criticisms have not been examined by higher judicial authority. He did not mention the fact that some criticisms had been upheld, including a criticism that he had failed to mention decisions in which some criticisms had been made of his reports. There is no question of the Court of Appeal overturning the criticisms of the Tribunal in MA (Palestinian Territories) or of the Court of Appeal not examining the criticisms. We therefore express our concern about the fact that Dr. George omitted making any mention of the fact that there was at least one occasion when the Tribunal's criticisms of his report were examined and were not overturned.

We then asked Dr. George whether there was any particular reason why he had not quoted criticisms of his reports, in the same way as he had quoted from judgments which made positive remarks about him, so as to enable the Tribunal to decide the matter for itself. He said that there were a number of reasons, as follows: “that it would be unwieldy to have done so; the most standard critique of those criticisms would run to several pages”. When the question was repeated, Dr. George said that he had “tried to include matters which are of substance and of relevance to assisting the court” and that he “did not consider thatcriticisms which are minor or which evaporate on examination to be any way helpful”. However, he said that he “was ready to go through that process without going into any sort of detail”. He asked if it would help to give us one example of what he meant, or if it would help if he were to submit his critique of criticisms that had been made of his reports. We have already explained above that the Tribunal's observations in MA (Palestinian Territories) cannot be described as minor; still less do we consider that they can be described as criticisms which “evaporated on examination”.

As we said at the hearing, we did not receive evidence of Dr. George’s critique of any criticisms, because we were concerned about embarking about an examination of satellite issues. The point is not whether any criticisms were valid or not, but whether there were any good reasons for Dr. George’s decisions: (a) to place before the Tribunal only quotations from decisions or judgments which were complimentary (and omitting to quote from decisions or judgments which were not complimentary); and (b) to describe criticisms of his reports as “minor” or which “on examination, proved to lack substance”. It seems to us that Dr. George was simply not prepared to have the Tribunal assess for itself any criticisms of his reports without placing before the Tribunal his own critique thereof. He withheld from the Tribunal any mention of any criticisms which, on further judicial scrutiny, did not evaporate. When this is considered together with the concern expressed in KK, IH, HE and what we have said in paragraphs 60 to 62 above, we have concerns as to whether Dr. George is objective and unbiased in giving his opinions about matters extending to the subject matter of his reports. We acknowledge that he is knowledgeable but depth of knowledge is not all that is expected. An ability and willingness to present information is an objective way where there is conflicting evidence which goes both ways, is also expected. In all of the circumstances, and for the reasons we have given, we decided to treat Dr. George’s evidence with caution in this case.

In general terms, we would say that, where an expert refers the Tribunal to cases in which his expertise has been accepted or acknowledged or in which he has received praise, he must, at the same time, refer to the Tribunal to any cases which he is aware of and which may detract from what is said about him in the cases he has referred to. In other words, failure to place before the Tribunal such material in an even-handed way may reflect on the weight to be given to the evidence which the subject matter of the expert's report(s).

In the instant case, there is no evidence before us which counters Dr. George's evidence as to the likelihood of the Appellant being a victim of an honour killing or an honour crime at the hands of her family. Accordingly, for that reason, we accept his evidence in that regard. We have set out Dr. George's oral evidence in full at paragraph 40 above. The combination of this evidence and the finding of the previous Tribunal that the Appellant is at real risk of being subjected to substantial harm or persecution in her home area at the hands of her family, means that we must determine this appeal on the basis that her brothers are to be likened to the extreme end of the social and religious spectrum. On the basis of this and Dr. George's evidence (which we accept because it was not countered by any other evidence) as to the ease with which individuals can be traced in Lebanon (see our summary of his evidence in this regard at paragraphs 29 and 30 above), we are driven to conclude that, if the Appellant were to attempt to relocate to another community in Lebanon, whether Maronite Christian or otherwise, there is a reasonable likelihood that she would be found quickly by her family.

In addition, we are driven to conclude that, once she is found by her family, the Appellant would receive inadequate protection from the state against the actions of her family, who we have to regard as being at the extreme end of the social or religious spectrum, for the reasons we have given. We have considered the evidence relied upon on the Respondent’s behalf as to the incidence of honour killings in Lebanon. For example in Taha v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1675, the Federal Court of Canada considered that the evidence shows that honour killings are rare in Lebanon, that Lebanon is the most Western country in the middle east and that honour killings are confined to a small segment of the rural population. We have considered the article in the International Herald Tribune issue of 2 August 2007 on which Ms. Isherwood relied. Notwithstanding this evidence, the finding that the Appellant is at real risk from her family in her home area and the fact that we must liken the Appellant's family to the extreme end of the social and religious spectrum, we are driven to conclude that, in the unique circumstances and on the basis of the accepted findings in this particular case, it is not reasonably likely that the Appellant would receive sufficient protection from the Lebanese authorities against the actions of her extremist family.

Ms. Isherwood accepted that, if we were to conclude that the Appellant would be at real risk on relocation from her family of being a victim of an honour killing and that there would be insufficient protection, there is an applicable Geneva Convention reason.

Accordingly, and for the reasons given above, the Appellant has established her asylum claim and her related Article 3 claim. Since her asylum claim has succeeded, her claim for humanitarian protection cannot succeed (see paragraph 339C(ii) of the Immigration Rules).

Accordingly, our finding (and the finding of the previous Tribunal) that the Appellant’s evidence about the lack of contact with the father of her son is not credible, is not material to the outcome. The previous Tribunal concluded that the Appellant had not established that she and the father of her son are not in continuing contact. We find that the Appellant has not shown that the relationship she enjoyed with the father of her son has ended, notwithstanding the fact that he may have returned to Lebanon. For the same reasons, we do not accept her evidence that, if returned to Lebanon, she would be living as a single female. We did not accept that she has any genuine fear of losing her child to the father of her son. Accordingly, it is not necessary for us to deal with Ms. Isherwood's submissions relating to EM (Lebanon) v. SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1531. But for the finding of the previous Tribunal that the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution in her home area at the hands of her family, the Appellant would not have succeeded in her asylum claim or her related Article 3 claim.

It is therefore not necessary for us to deal with the report of Dr. Al-Mukhtar. Suffice it so say that we had several difficulties with his report, including the fact that his report was not sourced; he states that he is an Iraqi lawyer but he failed to explain how he obtained his knowledge of Lebanese law and whether he has ever lived in Lebanon; he did not explain whether there are any instances of Christian illegitimate children living in Lebanon; and, he did not explain whether the fact that the Appellant's son's birth certificate gives the name of his father makes a material difference to his opinion of the potential difficulties the Appellant and her son would face.

For the same reasons, it is not necessary for us to consider the Appellant's Article 3 claim to the extent that it is based on her medical condition and the risk of suicide, or her Article 8 claim. Accordingly, we do not need to deal with the report of Dr. Barrett in any greater detail than we have.

Decision: