RH v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

The Appellant, a citizen of Albania, appeals under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision dated 27 January 2025 to refuse the protection claim he made on 3 October 2022. As such, sections 30-39 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“the 2022 Act”) apply.

I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.

The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained on myHMCTS.

The Appellant claims asylum on grounds he is a victim of trafficking at risk of persecution on return to Albania, and claims humanitarian protection on grounds he is at risk of being killed or violently attacked on return to Albania, by unlicenced money lenders from whom he borrowed a significant sum of money.

The hearing was recorded and that recording shall stand as the record of proceedings.

The Appellant applied on 22 July 2025 to make a correction to his evidence, having previously stated that people “were later arrested in Albania” but had wanted to say that they were “previously arrested in Albania in 2019.” I accepted this correction. There was no objection from Mr Bray.

The Appellant’s initial asylum claim did not include any reference to trafficking. This was raised later, after he was found by police in a “cannabis grow house.” The Respondent consents to the Tribunal’s consideration of this new matter.

I asked the Appellant if he knew the outcome of the 10 August 2023 referral to the National Referral Mechanism (“the NRM”) to consider his claim to be a victim of trafficking. He said they had refused his claim because of a lack of evidence. Mr Bray confirmed this was a “reasonable grounds” decision. Neither the date nor the text of the decision is before me.

In the hearing requirements form, the Appellant stated the following: “I suffer from severe mental health conditions including extreme anxiety, depression and trauma related to my experiences. When under stress, such as during a hearing, I experience panic attacks, dissociation, difficulty concentrating and memory problems. This would significantly affect my ability to understand questions, give clear answers and properly participate in the hearing. I may become overwhelmed or distressed and require breaks or additional support. I have experienced serious trauma in the past. Discussing these events causes severe psychological distress and may significantly affect my ability to participate fully in the hearing.” I treated this as an application for him to be treated as a vulnerable witness within the meaning of the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance (“the 2010 Guidance Note.”) Mr Bray confirmed the Respondent did not oppose the application.

Part way through the Appellant’s evidence, he was asked why he had not provided any evidence of news coverage he claims exists, about the arrest of two of the people he claims to fear. He said that he had uploaded it to the MyHMCTS portal in the same way as he had other documents. There was nothing fitting that description uploaded to MyHMCTS that Mr Bray or I could identify, and we both had access to the portal during the hearing. The Appellant said he could provide a link to the article during the hearing. I treated this as an application to admit late evidence. Mr Bray had no objection, but noted the Appellant had been able to use the portal successfully on other occasions. A link to the news article was provided to us both via email to the Tribunal clerk, and Mr Bray confirmed he had sufficient time to read it. I granted the application on grounds the news article may be of assistance to the Tribunal in determining the issues in dispute.

The Appellant was briefly represented by solicitors and counsel, though was unrepresented by the date of the hearing. A written submission prepared by counsel included an acceptance that a person at risk from unlicenced money lenders does not form part of a particular social group, and so the Appellant’s protection claim on that basis could succeed only under the humanitarian protection heading.

Mr Bray agreed with me the following complete list of issues in dispute:

I heard evidence from the Appellant given with the assistance of an Albanian language interpreter who confirmed they could understand one another.

I heard submissions from Mr Bray, which were interpreted for the Appellant, and I heard the Appellant’s arguments in response.

To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:

If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:

To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.

The Respondent argues there are section 8 behaviours present in the Appellant’s case, because he came to the UK via other safe countries but did not claim asylum until he arrived here. I have taken this into account as undermining his credibility, however this is to a limited extent given he was a child at the time of the journey.

The Appellant’s evidence was that he was from a small town in northern Albania. He wanted to pursue a career in the arts and was studying at the Tirana School of Arts. The cost of tuition and living expenses was high, and his family could not afford it. At a young age, out of desperation to pay his school fees, he borrowed a considerable sum of money (the equivalent of £3500) from some people he learned later were involved in serious criminal activities, including drugs, weapons and many other types of crime. Over time, they began to demand the money back much earlier than originally agreed, and when he was unable to pay it, they began to threaten him with violence. He believed his life was in danger and he fled Albania. He fears on return that they would kill him or force him into criminal activities such as drug dealing to pay off his debt.

On arrival to the UK he was in contact with his parents in Albania every day, however in November 2024 they told him they did not want any more contact with him and that he was on his own, because the money lenders were threatening them about his unpaid debt.

The Respondent’s position is that the Appellant’s account about the money lenders was not credible because of inconsistencies, implausibilities and a lack of detail.

The Respondent argues that the claim the Appellant needed money to fund the completion of his education is inconsistent with background information that pre-university education is free in Albania. The Appellant’s response was that he wanted to study a painting and sculpting course, and that in Albania if you don’t pay to buy things for school, you cannot attend.

I note the evidence in the Country policy and information note: unaccompanied children, Albania, July 2025 that “children in Albania have a legal right to free and compulsory education until the age of 16.” The Appellant was 17 at the time he claims to have taken out the loan, for a course due to start one month before he turned 18.

In those circumstances it is plausible that the course the Appellant claimed he hoped to take had to be funded privately. I note also that this course was at the Tirana School of Arts, and that Tirana is a considerable distance from the Appellant’s family home in the north of Albania, and this may have involved additional expenses such as for travel and/or accommodation.

The Respondent argues it is implausible that someone the Appellant did not know would lend a schoolboy the equivalent of £3500 knowing he could not pay it back because he was only working part-time as a waiter earning £15 a day. I am not persuaded it is implausible that an unlicenced money lender involved in organised crime would lend a large sum of money to a naïve teenager from the north of Albania, if he knew the Appellant’s family could pay back the money, and/or he would put the Appellant to work in a drug dealing operation, if he could not pay.

The Respondent argues that it is reasonable to expect the Appellant to provide a clear and consistent account of when he borrowed money and when he was threatened. The Appellant’s account changed throughout his interview, stating he borrowed the equivalent of £3500 in September 2022 and had to pay the money back within two weeks, was then accosted by persons with knives asking about the money not being paid back within the two weeks; borrowed the money in May 2022 and was accosted on 10 June 2022; asked for the money in May 2022 and received it in September 2022; received half the money in June and half in September; paid some money back before receiving more; did not pay back any; and had not explained what he did with the money. The Respondent also considers it inconsistent that the money lenders accosted the Appellant in June 2022, refused his plea for more time to pay, but then left him alone until he left Albania in September, even though they knew where he lived.

These are clearly a number of inconsistent answers, and I have considered the extent to which the Appellant’s claimed vulnerability may have adversely affected his ability to give a consistent and chronologically coherent account.

The Respondent’s position is that little weight should be placed on the Appellant’s claimed vulnerability as a reason for evidential deficiencies, because of the lack of medical evidence.

The Appellant’s first interview with the Home Office took place on the day he arrived to the UK. It is not in dispute that the Appellant was a child on his own on the journey he had undertaken, culminating in a small boat crossing from France to the UK. I take judicial notice that the role of criminal people smugglers on that route into the UK is well-established. The Appellant’s evidence was that he was traumatised by what happened on that journey, but he cannot remember anything about it beyond that it was very long, dark, very cold, terrifying, and no child should have to experience a journey like it.

The second interview took place approximately two years after the first. The Appellant told the second interviewer that he was experiencing breathing problems because of the stress, thought he had depression because he was stressed all the time, and was not registered with a GP. At that stage he was 19 years old.

The Appellant’s evidence was that he was initially permitted to study at school here, but the Respondent then imposed bail conditions on him prohibiting him from either studying or working. It is unclear from the evidence before me how he filled his time once he was prohibited from accessing any education.

His oral evidence was that he had some sessions of therapy in the UK but he could not remember whether he had been diagnosed with anything. There is no evidence before me from that therapy provider, or about how the Appellant came to receive therapy, nor that he is or was on prescribed medication.

The Appellant now lives in an asylum hotel, on a low income, with no family in the UK aside from a cousin who visited him once when he was in an asylum hotel outside of London. There is no evidence before me that the Appellant is currently receiving any medical care. He repeatedly raised during the hearing that he was suffering with memory loss, and was frightened. This is consistent with his written request for his vulnerabilities including dissociation, difficulty concentrating, and memory problems, to be taken into account in the hearing, and is consistent also with his interview answers.

The 2010 Guidance Note sets out that children often do not provide as much detail as adults in recalling experiences and may often manifest their fears differently from adults; the order and manner in which evidence is given may be affected by mental, psychological or emotional trauma or disability; and comprehension of questioning may be impaired.

The Equal Treatment Bench Books sets out that a witness with a mental disability may have difficulty reconstructing events in chronological order, and that difficulty in remembering things is also associated with depression. It sets out also that dissociation can be experienced in many different ways, including that a person may be unable to remember information about themselves, there may be gaps where they cannot remember what happened, dissociation can be experienced as a result of trauma, and many people with dissociative disorders have other mental health problems including periods of memory loss.

I have carefully considered how to approach the Appellant’s evidence as to his symptoms, in the absence of any corroborating medical evidence, or indeed any medical evidence at all. The Appellant was briefly represented by solicitors and counsel, but he has been unrepresented at least since 2 July 2025. There is before me no Appellant’s skeleton argument, no Appellant’s bundle, and no Appellant’s witness statement, in addition to the lack of medical records. I am satisfied that in his circumstances, as an unaccompanied child, and then a young relatively socially isolated adult without legal representation, he may not have known about the role and importance of medical evidence in this appeal. For at least some of his time in the UK he has not had a GP, and so it may be there are no GP notes about him to obtain, even if he had known of the importance and/or those representing him had taken steps to obtain them.

In all the circumstances, including that the Appellant’s account of his symptoms is plausible, detailed, and consistent now across a period of years, and multiple accounts, I am satisfied he is credible on this issue. I accept in particular that he has suffered, and continues to suffer, with memory loss, and that this has had a significant impact on his ability to give a consistent and chronologically coherent account.

I am satisfied that the core of his account – that he borrowed money from criminal money lenders and fled Albania having been threatened by them for not repaying the money on time – is plausible. He has been consistent as to that core across his multiple accounts, and I am satisfied to the standard of the balance of probabilities that he fears serious harm on return to Albania at the hands of those money lenders.

LR (Male VOTs) Albania CG [2026] UKUT 315 (IAC) makes clear that people who are owed money by young people in Albania will make threats to their family members, as is the Appellant’s account here. The family is from a small town in the north of Albania, and the Appellant’s evidence was that the money-lenders knew where he lived. The Appellant has not sought to embellish or exaggerate his evidence on contact with his family, maintaining initially that they were still in contact regularly, but then updating his evidence on that point when his parents changed their approach having been threatened by the money lenders. His evidence is consistent with the objective evidence, as well as plausible and reasonably detailed. I am therefore satisfied his family received threats from the money lenders, and have responded by rejecting the Appellant and stopping all contact with him.