Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v NC

I am satisfied on the arguments before me that that the First-Tier Tribunal (“FTT”) erred in law in the decision to which it came on 28 July 2025 and that its decision should be set aside as a result.

The claimant was entitled to Universal Credit (UC) from 18 January 2019. On 29 October 2024 the claimant’s appointee informed the DWP in advance that the claimant would be out of Great Britain from 13 November 2024 to 17 December 2024. It is not disputed that the claimant did not meet any of the temporary absence provisions (which allow entitlement to UC to continue whilst abroad) found in regulation 11 of the Universal Credit Regulations 2013 (“the UC Regs”) for this period when she was abroad.

On 1 November 2024 a decision maker on behalf of the Secretary of State decided that the claimant ceased to be entitled to UC from 18 October 2024 as she no longer met the entitlement condition of being present in Great Britain from the assessment period beginning on 18 October 2024. The supersession was carried out on the ground that "it is expected that a relevant change of circumstances will occur" under regulation 23(1)(b) of the Universal Credit etc (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 2013.

The appeal against this decision was held on 28 July 2025. The FTT agreed that the claimant was not entitled to UC in the assessment period 18 October 2024 to 17 November 2024 because she did not meet the basic conditions of entitlement of being in Great Britian found in section 4(1)(c) of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 or any of the exceptions to that condition found in regulation 11 of the UC Regs. There is no appeal against that part of the FTT’s decision.

However, the FTT decided that as the claimant returned to GB during the next assessment period, her entitlement to UC could restart with effect from 18 November 2024 by way of a closed-period supersession. In my judgement the FTT erred in law in so concluding.

Such a conclusion runs contrary to the Upper Tribunal’s decision in SSWP v SC (UC) and MJ v (1) LB Bromley and (2) SSWP (HB) [2025] UKUT 299 (AAC). The important and relevant legal effect of that decision is that the Secretary of State’s decision maker on 1 November 2024 could not in law have decided that the claimant became re-entitled to universal credit with effect from 18 November 2024 having already decided, on 1 November 2024, that she was not entitled to universal credit from 18 October 2024. This is because having (rightly) decided that the claimant had ceased to be entitled to universal credit from 18 October 2024, the claimant could then only become (re-)entitled to UC from 18 November 2024 if she had made a fresh claim for UC, which she did not do.

In refusing permission to appeal its decision, the FTT sought to distinguish its decision in this appeal from the above decision in SCand MJ on the basis that when the Secretary of State’s decision was made on 1 November 2024 in this appeal, the claimant was in Great Britain and her date of return was known. This is not a valid distinction as a matter of law. This issue was addressed and rejected in SC and MJ, at paragraphs 194, 209-215 and 219-221.

For the reasons set out above, the Secretary of State’s appeal succeeds and the FTT’s decision must be set aside.

I remake the decision the FTT ought to have given. That decision is in the terms set out above as that is the only decision that can be made on the facts of this case.

Whether the claimant’s appointee was wrongly advised by DWP staff that the claimant’s UC would not be affected by her going abroad for the above period (if she was so advised) is not matter for me.