IN THE FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL CASE NUMBER: IMS/2012/5/RTR
IMMIGRATION SERVICES
GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER
Between
DR PAULO HENRIQUE FERREIRA T/A THE ONE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION LIMITED
(Appellant)
and
IMMIGRATION SERVICES COMMISSIONER
(Respondent)
Before:
David Hunter QC (Chair)
Ms Shindo Maguire
Mr Paul Barnett
Sitting at:
Victory House
30-34 Kingsway
London WC2 6EX
Hearing Date: 19th February 2012
Sent to Parties: 10th April 2013
Appearances:
For the Appellant: No appearance
DECISION AND REASONS
(Rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-Tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 (“The Rules”)
THE APPEAL
This is an Appeal by The One International Corporation Ltd, in the person of Dr Paulo Ferreira (“the Appellant”), against a Decision of the Immigration Services Commissioner (“the Respondent”), dated 4th October 2012, refusing the Appellant’s application to the Respondent, dated 20th March 2012, for registration as an immigration adviser at level 1 under Schedule 6 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (“the Act”).
The Appellant duly appealed against this Decision by Notice of Appeal dated 16th October 2012.
The Respondent lodged a Response to the Notice of Appeal on 19th November 2012.
THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING THE APPELLANT’S APPLICATION
Section 84 (1) of the Act provides that no person may provide immigration advice or immigration services unless he is a qualified person.
Section 84 (2) (a) of the Act provides that a person is a qualified person if he is a registered person.
Schedule 6 of the Act requires persons seeking to become a qualified person by registration to make an application for registration to the Immigration Services Commissioner.
Schedule 6 (1) (b) provides that an application for registration must be accompanied by such information and supporting evidence as the Commissioner may from time to time determine.
Schedule 6 (2) provides that, when considering an application for registration, the Commissioner may require the applicant to provide her with such further information or supporting evidence as the Commissioner may reasonably require.
THE HEARING
The Tribunal sat to hear the Appeal on 19th February 2012.
Prior to the hearing, the Tribunal had received a Hearing Bundle, containing the Decision Letter, the Notice of Appeal (containing the Grounds of Appeal), the Respondent’s Response to the Appeal, and all documentation considered by the Respondent to be relevant to the Appeal, including witness statement of Paul Johnson and Jeremy Dunn, employees of the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner (“OISC”).
On the morning of the hearing, Counsel for the Respondent appeared, together with representatives of the Respondent and the witnesses for the Respondent.
There was no appearance by, or on behalf of, the Appellant.
Notice of the hearing of the Appeal (the date and venue thereof) had been duly given to the Appellant on 14th January 2013.
On the day prior to the hearing, 18th February 2013, an enquiry had been made, by e-mail by the Office of the Tribunal, of the Appellant seeking confirmation that he would be attending the hearing on the following day. Previous unsuccessful attempts had been made to contact the Appellant by telephone. The reason for this enquiry was, that there had been no response by the Appellant to the Notice of hearing, nor had there been any communication by him with either the Respondent or the Tribunal, nor had there been any submission by him to the Tribunal of any documents or witness statements upon which he proposed to rely at the hearing.
In answer to this enquiry by e-mail, the Appellant sent to the Office of the Tribunal, at 17.10 on the afternoon of 18th February 2012, an e-mail which stated: “I can’t attend the hearing ! Can’t travel to London due to business commitments !”
No application had been made by the Appellant for an adjournment of the hearing, nor was any such application made in this answering e-mail, or by any subsequent communication.
On the morning of the hearing, Counsel for the Respondent submitted to the Tribunal that the hearing should proceed in the absence of the Appellant.
The Tribunal was satisfied that the Appellant had been notified of the hearing, and, in all the circumstances, considered that it was in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 36 of the Rules, the Tribunal proceeded with the hearing in the absence of the Appellant.
The Tribunal took note of the Grounds of the Appellant’s Appeal, which were, as set out in his Notice of Appeal: “Several misleading statements; Deliberately providing wrong information to forbid someone to knowing the truth; Defamatory statements suggesting lack of integrity, honesty, incompetence and other reprehensible personal characteristics.”
On behalf of the Respondent, Paul Johnson and Jeremy Dunn gave sworn evidence, and spoke to their written witness statements, which were received, as their evidence, by the Tribunal.
That evidence of those witnesses, together with the documentation furnished by the Respondent, formed the Respondent’s case.
The hearing concluded on 19th February 2012.
During and after the hearing, and prior to its determination of this Appeal, the Tribunal has considered fully the Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal, the evidence given on behalf of the Respondent, and all of the documentation furnished to the Tribunal.
The Tribunal has reminded itself that the statutory principle governing the material decision of the Respondent, and the determination of this Appeal, is set out in Section 83 of the Act, which provides, at sub-section (5), that: “The Commissioner must exercise her functions so as to secure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that those who provide immigration advice or immigration services - (a) are fit and competent to do so; (b) act in the best interests ofFirstly their clients; (c) do not knowingly mislead any court, adjudicator or tribunal in the United Kingdom; (d) do not seek to abuse any procedure operating in the United Kingdom in connection with immigration or asylum; (e) do not advise any person to do anything which would amount to such an abuse.”
The Tribunal has reminded itself also that the burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, the facts on which he relies rests on the Appellant.
THOSE MATTERS ASSERTED BY THE RESPONDENT AS REASONS FOR THE DECISION
There were essentially four matters asserted by the Respondent as reasons for the refusal of the Appellant’s material application for registration.
Firstly, the history of the Appellant’s activities in connection with a firm known as UKHelp4U Ltd.
Secondly, his advertisement of immigration services.
Thirdly, a number of declarations as to his nationality.
Fourthly, a declaration in respect of his training in immigration law.
Further, the Respondent had concerns emanating from the process of this application, and as to the competence of the Appellant.
THE FACTS FOUND BY THE TRIBUNAL IN RESPECT OF THESE ASSERTIONS
The Tribunal finds that the following facts are established by the evidence.
The Appellant was registered by the Respondent as an immigration adviser for the firm of UKHelp4U Ltd (also registered), from March 2006 to March 2009. He was the sole director of that firm from January 2007. In October 2008 that firm was the subject of a winding-up order under the Insolvency Act 1986, following a number of unsatisfied Count Court judgments against it. The winding-up order was made on the petition of HMRC, which claimed substantial unpaid taxes, and there was no appearance on behalf of the firm at the relevant hearing. Subsequently, enquiries from the Respondent about this matter, of which the Respondent had become aware, were unanswered, and the firm’s registration was cancelled by the Respondent in March 2009.
The Appellant then applied to the Respondent for the registration of UKHelp4U Immigration Services Ltd, in June 2009. In the context of this application, the Appellant did not inform the Respondent of the aforesaid winding-up order (the Respondent’s knowledge of that matter was gained by other means), nor did he inform the Respondent of his arrest by police on suspicion of money-laundering in October 2009. Further, there were a number of failures by the Appellant to provide documentation in support of the application of June 2009, and failures to respond to requests for information. On the ground of those failures, that application was refused in March 2010.
While the Appellant’s application which is the subject of this Appeal - the application made in March 2012 - was pending, the Respondent discovered advertisements, on web-sites, for The One International Corporation Ltd, in April, July and August 2012. The Tribunal finds that these advertisements were placed by the Appellant, and that the advertisements offered immigration advice and services.
It is a criminal offence, under Section 92B of the Act, to offer to provide immigration advice or services by way of advertisement, when not authorised to provide immigration advice or services. The Appellant was not so authorised at the times of the appearances, on web-sites, of these advertisements.
Further, those advertisements made highly misleading and exaggerated claims in respect of the immigration advice and services which The One International Corporation Ltd purported to provide.
On eight occasions, in applications made to Companies House in respect of UKHelp4U, UKHelp4U Immigrations Services Ltd and UKHelp4U Financial Services Ltd, the Appellant, whose admitted nationality is Portuguese, made declarations, under another name used by him - “Tyler Davis” - that his nationality was British. Those declarations of nationality were false.
In the context of his application for registration in March 2012, the Appellant stated that he studied Immigration Law with the Institute of Legal Executives tutorial college (“ILEX”). ILEX has confirmed that the Appellant did not study immigration law with it, nor did he purchase any immigration course material from that organisation.
Further, in the context of this application, there were a number of failures by the Appellant to provide information validly requested by the Respondent.
And finally, the Respondent had valid concerns about the competence of the Appellant to provide immigration advice and services, because he had not provided any (authorised) immigration advice or services since March 2009, following which time there have been significant changes in immigration law, and because the only training adverted to by the Appellant, in the context of this application, was the aforesaid alleged study with ILEX, and because of concerns arising out of the quality of a number of client care letters provided by the Appellant.
THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL
Because of the failure of the Appellant to prosecute his Appeal, and his wholly unacceptable failure to attend the hearing, the only material available to the Tribunal to set against those facts, found by the Tribunal and set out above, are the Appellant’s aforesaid Grounds of Appeal.
Insofar as those Grounds do make a case on behalf of the Appellant, the Tribunal concludes that the assertions contained in and inferred by those Grounds are wholly unsubstantiated by the evidence in this Appeal.
The Tribunal concludes that, cumulatively, the facts found above establish overwhelmingly that the Respondent could not be satisfied that the Appellant, in the context of his application for registration of March 2012, is fit or competent to provide immigration advice or immigration services, and that those facts support fully the valid reasons for the Respondent’s decision to refuse the application.
DECISION
Having regard to the aforesaid conclusions, the Decision of the Tribunal is to dismiss this Appeal.
David Hunter QC