MR SEEMAN AND MRS ROSA RAMIAH Appellants
and
HAMPSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL Respondents
Decision of the Tribunal sitting at The Castle, Winchester, Hampshire, on Wednesday 14th, and Thursday 15th June, and on Monday l9th June 1989 at Hannibal House, Elephant and Castle, London.
Before: Margaret Rutherford (Chairman)
John Stephens Esq
Kay Wells
Appeal against the decision of Hampshire County Council to cancel the registration of the Appellants in respect of the residential care home known as White Eagles Rest Home, 61 Westwood Road, Portswood, Southampton.
Representation
For the Appellants: D N L Bloom-Davies Esq, of Counsel, instructed by S Jamieson Esq of Lake Parry and Treadwell, Solicitors
For the Respondents: Gary Grant Esq, of Counsel, instructed by Andrew Ogden Esq, Assistant Solicitor, Hampshire County Council
DECISION
It is the unanimous decision of the Tribunal that the Appellants' appeal be dismissed, and that the decision of the Respondents to cancel the registration of the Appellants in respect of Whiteagles Rest Home be confirmed.
WITNESSES
For the Appellants: Mrs Muriel Miller
Mrs Rosa Ramiah
Seeman Ramiah Esq
For the Respondents: Graham Dyer
Walter Bamber Esq
Keith Nickson Esq
BRIEF BACKGROUND TO THE CASE
The Appellants bought White Eagles Rest Home in August 1986. The conveyance was bought in the name of Mrs Ramiah. A joint application for registration (change of owner, since the Home was previously registered in the names of Mr and Mrs Smith), was made by the Appellants, Mrs Ramiah signing on 24th March and Mr Ramiah signing on 16th July 1987. The application stated that both were owners of the home. The Appellants were registered on 8th August 1987. Mrs Ramiah, a registered general nurse, was responsible for day to day management of the Home.
During the period prior to registration and for the remainder of 1987, visits were made to the home by the Respondents' officers and correspondence was exchanged about, inter alia, references, requirements of the Chief Fire Officer, the possible increase in the number of residents from thirteen to twenty three, and the matter of a boundary wall. Also discussed was the need to complete the form relating to the disclosure of criminal convictions. From 1987 until late 1988 nothing untoward concerning the home occurred.
In November 1988 the Respondents learned that Mr Ramiah had been convicted on indictment, and sentenced to nine months imprisonment suspended for two years, on 5th May 1987. The conviction was in relation to a fraudulent insurance claim for a sum in excess of £4000.00 and Mr Ramiah had pleaded guilty.
In January 1989 the County Council served notice on the Appellants of a proposal to cancel their registration on the ground that by reason of Mr Ramiah's conviction they were not fit persons to be concerned in the carrying on of a residential care home. The matter was considered by a Sub-Committee on l0th March 1989. This Committee decided that they were not prepared to allow the registration to continue in the sole name of Mrs Ramiah. The County Council adopted the proposal that the joint registration be cancelled. Their formal reasons for cancellation were that Mr Ramiah by reason of his conviction was not a fit person and that Mrs Ramiah had associated herself with the accounts given by Mr Ramiah concerning his conviction, which accounts the Committee believed to be false. Also, their assessment of Mrs Ramiah was that she would not in reality run the home entirely independently of her husband, uninfluenced by him, and that she should not therefore be permitted to continue to hold a registration in her own name.
The Appellants appealed on the grounds that the Committee was wrong in finding Mr Ramiah's conviction effective rendered Mrs Ramiah an unfit person. It was also wrong in deciding that Mrs Ramiah could not in reality run a home entirely independently of him and uninfluenced by him.
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE RESPONDENTS' CASE
On two submissions of law the Appellants' appeal should be dismissed.
That evidence was adduced by Mrs Ramiah that White Eagles was sold, in that completion of the purchase was due to take place on Thursday 15th June 1989. Since neither of the Appellants are now owners of the home, accordingly the appeal should be dismissed on the ground that there is no need to interfere with the decision of the registration authority to cancel the registration in respect of a property to which neither Appellant is connected. Section 1 of the Act states, inter alia, that registration is required "in respect of any establishment which provides or is intended to provide… residential accommodation…" There is no longer such an establishment in which the Appellants intend to carry on a home.
The application was clearly in joint names. McSweeney's case established that no conditions, other than those relating to numbers, age, sex or category, may be imposed, (section 5(3) ). None, for example, could be attached to sever the financial or legal connections with the home, i.e. allowing the registration to be deemed to be in Mrs Ramiah's name solely. Therefore, since it is conceded that Mr Ramiah is unfit by reason of his conviction, and since section 9(a) states that registration may be refused, inter alia, if "he or any other person concerned or intended to be concerned in carrying on the home is not a fit person…" it follows that the appeal should be dismissed.
In the alternative, the substance of the Respondents' case is briefly as follows. The application was a joint application. The registration was a joint registration. The Respondents were clearly under the impression that Mrs Ramiah would deal with the day to day matters, including some administrative tasks, and that Mr Ramiah would be concerned in the running of the home. He was so concerned and it is of no consequence that Mrs Ramiah, particularly latterly, exercised a degree of control substantially greater than he did. He spoke to inspectors about fire prevention matters, wrote about staff, made a planning application in his own name. The fact of his conviction does of itself therefore preclude not only Mr Ramiah but Mrs Ramiah as well. The elderly are a notoriously vulnerable section of the community and it is incumbent on the Respondents to ensure their protection. In circumstances where a married couple both live together on the premises and one has a conviction, the Respondents' experience showed that that of itself is probably fatal. It is hard on Mrs Ramiah but the evidence shows that it is not possible to separate the two. In support of this the Respondents rely, inter alia, on the evidence of the application itself, the purchase price for the property, and the planning application.
It is conceded that Mrs Ramiah is a good nurse, a person who can be trusted with the elderly on a day to day basis. However, there is more to running a home than aspects of care. Important decisions must be made, negotiations entered into, legal, financial and other matters dealt with. It was intended that Mr Ramiah be concerned with the running of the home. It is said that Mrs Ramiah was running the home on her own, that she dealt with pension books, bank accounts and so on. It is denied that she ran it on her own. Even without the matter of her husband's conviction it is clear that she would not have been accepted for sole registration.
She has many redeeming features. However, she is married to Mr Ramiah, it is a close relationship and it is impossible to separate the two. She cannot be viewed in isolation when considering notoriously vulnerable old people. She becomes unfit, notwithstanding her qualities, by reason of her involvement with her husband. Her professional reputation and the commercial consequences of cancellation should she ever wish to apply again for registration must be weighed against the potential danger to old people exposed to a man who is clearly capable of deception and dishonesty. The Tribunal should not interfere with the decision to cancel the registration.
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE APPELLANTS' CASE
Equally in brief, the substance of the Appellants' case is as follows. As to the submissions of law, (1) There is no evidence as to whether the completion went ahead and as to whether the Appellants are / are no longer owners. (2) There is nothing in the Act to prevent the decision of the Subcommittee having no effect regarding Mr Ramiah. It is conceded that he is not a fit person. However, if the Tribunal makes a finding that he is not concerned in the running of the home, her registration need not be cancelled so far as it relates to her.
Mrs Ramiah is a fit person. She was "concerned or intended to be concerned in carrying" on the home, (section 9(a) ). He was NOT concerned or intended to be concerned. He was not the manager, and he should not be deemed to be carrying on a home by virtue of section 3. It is a question of fact and the case must decided on its merits.
The Sub-Committee arrived at a finding of fact it was not entitled to arrive at since it heard highly prejudicial, inadmissible evidence. At no stage was Mrs Ramiah ever charged with any matter in connection with her husband's prosecution. A conviction against one person cannot render another person unfit. Mr Ramiah's conviction goes only to his own unfitness.
His conviction apart, it is not disputed that Mrs Ramiah is a fit person to carry on a home. The Respondents' officers were satisfied that she is very capable, able to look after the residents' physical well-being and provide them with the necessary care. It has never been alleged that she is anything other than a person of integrity, able to run a home to high standards.
The central issue is whether Mr Ramiah was concerned / intended to be concerned in the running of the home, whether he was the manager / intended manager. The second issue is whether Mrs Ramiah is capable of carrying on running the home without his support. The evidence shows she prepared and submitted the accounts, dealt with all DHSS matters, personal allowance books, the banks (her sole name was on the trading account), hired, supervised and fired staff. No evidence was given of Mr Ramiah's dealing with files (save Mr Nickson who saw him with "various documents"). It is accepted that he had conversations with inspectors and discussed fire precautions and the boundary wall. Between Christmas 1988 and March 1989 the Appellants lived apart, Mr Ramiah only visiting the home to collect the children and deal with their meals. There is no evidence that Mrs Ramiah did not cope without his support at that period. She was running the home in the ordinary sense of the word. From the formal registration she was taking practical control of the home, making decisions which affected it. She had her own bank accounts and was the legal owner of the home. Documents which support this evidence are enough to rebut the conclusion that Mr Ramiah at least intended to carry on the home, as indicated in the application form.
It is accepted that Mr Ramiah completed the planning application, and wrote a letter concerning staff, but he did so on behalf of his wife. It is accepted that Mrs Ramiah did on occasions receive advice from her husband. His involvement, however, was not such as to be capable of making him a manager or a person concerned. An explanation has been given as to why the application form was signed by both. Even if he were not persuaded to sign, as he says, this does not mean he was the manager, or person concerned. It was the Council's clearly defined policy that married couples who intended to live at the home would be running the home together.
Mrs Ramiah has a mind of her own. She was ready to take important decisions. In reality, from the registration in 1987 she ran the home. She maintained it to high standards. Every decision in every area was made by her. It was she who was concerned in the carrying on of the home. The fatal problem was the policy of the Respondents, in that she was married and lived with her husband on the premises of the home, as a consequence of which she is tainted with the brush which renders him unfit.
The burden of proof is on the Respondents who seek to maintain the decision of the Sub-Committee, on the balance of probability. The degree of probability, however, must be commensurate with the degree of gravity involved. In this case it is a high degree, bearing in mind Mrs Ramiah's professional reputation and the commercial consequences if she ever wished to apply to the Respondents again, but without prejudice to the interests of the elderly residents. The appeal should be allowed in part so that the decision of the Sub-Committee should have no effect as regards Mrs Ramiah.
REASONS FOR THE DECISION
Submissions of Law
The Tribunal finds as to the first submission of law that section 15(1) does not expressly prescribe who has the right of appeal. By necessary implication the right of appeal lies in the person/s against whom the registration authority made its decision to cancel, that is to say, (by section 10) "a person in respect of a residential care home" and, with reference to section 9, "an applicant for registration" who is a "person concerned or intended to be concerned in carrying on the home". Since the Appellants were the persons against whom the decision was made, the Tribunal finds that they are prima facie entitled to appeal. It also finds that they are entitled to pursue that appeal, notwithstanding they are no longer proprietors. This is because at the time the decision to cancel was made by the registration authority, White Eagles Rest Home was owned by one of the Appellants. The relevant dates were:
20th January 1989 | notice of proposal to cancel registration |
10th March 1989 | Sub-Committee meeting |
10th March 1989 | resolution to cancel the registration |
14th March 1989 | adoption of proposal by County Council |
14th March 1989 | formal reasons given to Appellants |
4th April 1989 | notice of appeal by Appellants |
14th June 1989 | first day of hearing |
15th June 1989 | date Mrs Ramiah said completion would take place |
The relevant date would appear to be 14th March, since a decision was made on this date and at that time the Appellants were still owners of the home. However, the decision does not take effect for 28 days or, if an appeal is brought, until an appeal is brought or abandoned, (section 14(3)(a) and (b) ). If this is not the relevant date, then the relevant date is 4th April, when the Appellants exercised their right of appeal, at which time they were the owners of the home. The Appellants were also owners on the date the Tribunal sat to determine whether they should confirm that decision or direct that it shall cease to have effect (section 15(4) ).
Having decided that the Tribunal does have jurisdiction and that the appeal can be allowed to proceed, the question arises as to whether our discretion SHOULD be exercised. It ought not to be allowed to proceed if the point raised by the Appellants is a moot point. If it is a moot point (which in this particular case it is not), notwithstanding the prima facie validity of the appeal, the Tribunal would dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the point is now academic, the home having been sold. However, as stated above, the Tribunal finds that it is not moot, since Mrs Ramiah's reputation is at stake and it is in the interests of justice that she has the right to have the issues decided on their merits.
As to the second submission of law, the Tribunal finds that in this particular case it would be contrary to the interests of justice to dismiss the appeal as soon as it is conceded that one of two joint registered proprietors is not fit. There is a conflict of evidence on the question of whether or not this was a joint registration as a matter of fact. This should be explored and decided on its merits.
* * *
The Tribunal finds that there was a joint application for registration, that both Appellants meant it to be a joint application and that they intended Mrs Ramiah to take over the day to day running of the home making many of the administrative decisions but with Mr Ramiah acting in the capacity of general business advisor, in charge of matters such as policy and organisation in relation to the fabric of the building, planning of extensions, fire precautions and the like. It is satisfied and so finds that the registration was a joint registration. It finds that Mr Ramiah was concerned in the running of the home and intended to be concerned in carrying on the home, albeit to a lesser degree than was Mrs Ramiah.
In reaching this decision it has given most careful thought and deliberation to all the evidence, in particular to that of Mr Nickson and Mr Bamber, and to the evidence of the Appellants themselves. It has also carefully considered all the documentation, in particular, the application form itself, letters signed by Mr Ramiah and the planning application. It noted the letter of Mrs Ramiah of 18th March 1987, and most carefully considered the evidence relating to the business account and the conveyance being in her name. It also most carefully considered the fact of their living apart for some time, Mrs Ramiah apparently being in sole charge of the running of the home during this period. However, it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Respondents' officers' account of how the application form was completed was the correct one and that no persuasion was used to induce Mr Ramiah to sign it. It was also satisfied by their evidence that Mr Ramiah did concern himself in the management of the home. It was unconvinced by his evidence, inter alia, as to his reasons for writing letters on his wife's behalf. An important factor in reaching this decision is the inconsistencies in both Appellants' evidence. In particular the evidence given by Mr Ramiah in some instances put his credibility in doubt and made it difficult for the Tribunal to place any reliance on it. The Tribunal, for example, is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that he never mentioned to the Respondents' officers that criminal proceedings were pending. It is also satisfied that the necessary form relating to convictions was never received by the Respondents.
The Tribunal finds that Mrs Ramiah is a caring and competent person as regards the elderly persons in her charge. It finds that she dealt with day to day running of the home entirely satisfactorily and that the residents' welfare was promoted. For the avoidance of doubt the Tribunal makes it clear that they disregarded any evidence as to her possible involvement in her husband's crime.
However, there were aspects of her evidence which caused the Tribunal concern. In particular she was evasive as to certain matters, and some of her evidence was not believed.
As to the matter of her capability of running the home without the support of her husband the Tribunal finds on the balance of probabilities that she would not be capable of so doing. In reaching this decision it has paid most careful attention to all the evidence. It has also instructed itself that it is contrary to the principles of justice that there is guilt by association, and that the crime of one person be attributed to another, expressly or by implication. However, whilst it makes no general findings, the particular circumstances of this relationship lead it to believe that she cannot be viewed in isolation, separate from Mr Ramiah. She is married to him. She is, according to the evidence, particularly close to her husband and he to her and the family. Where a married couple live together in a residential home, both being registered, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible to envisage a situation where one would not influence / affect / be affected by the other. The Tribunal has most carefully considered the somewhat artificial arrangement entered into when they lived in separate houses, but remains unconvinced by this solution.
The elderly and infirm need to be protected. The Regulations make it clear that first consideration shall be given by the registered person to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the resident (Reg. 9(2) ). The Act is silent as to this requirement but the underlying philosophy reflects it. The residents are, as has been said, particularly vulnerable members of our society. The Tribunal finds Mr Ramiah an unfit person by reason of his conviction. It finds Mrs Ramiah is an unfit person, notwithstanding her acknowledged qualities, by reason of her relationship and involvement with her husband. It finds she would not in reality run a rest home entirely independently of her husband and that she should not therefore be permitted to continue to hold a registration certificate in her own name. For these reasons the Tribunal is satisfied that the cancellation of the certificate of registration should stand.
July 1989
MARGARET RUTHERFORD (CHAIRMAN)
JOHN STEPHENS ESQ
KAY WELLS