Appeal No. UA-2025-000823-PIP
Between:
JS
Appellant
- v -
The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
Respondent
Before: Upper Tribunal Judge Gray
[Hearing date(s): 5 February 2026
Mode of hearing: Decided on consideration of the papers
Representation:
Appellant: Ijaz Ahmed
Rotherham Borough Council’s Money & Benefit Advice Service
Respondent: Ms Howard
On appeal from
Tribunal: First-tier Tribunal Social Entitlement Chamber
Judge/Panel:
Tribunal Case No: SC/147//011010
Tribunal Venue: Sheffield
Decision Date: 20/3/2025
DECISION
The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to allow the appeal.
The decision of the Tribunal sitting at Sheffield on 20/3/2025 under file reference SC 154/19/03810 was in error of law. I set it aside and refer the matter to a completely differently constituted panel in the Social Entitlement Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing and decision in accordance with the directions given below.
This decision is made under sections 11 and 12(1), (2)(a) and (b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
DIRECTIONS
These directions may be supplemented or changed by a District Tribunal Judge (DTJ) giving listing and case management directions.
The case will be listed as an oral hearing in front of a freshly constituted tribunal. The appellant is advised to attend.
She should be aware that the new tribunal will be looking at his health problems in relation to the qualifying periods for entitlement to a Personal Independence Payment, but that it must not take into account matters which did not obtain at the date that the Department’s decision under appeal was made. That does not mean than later matters are never relevant, but their relevance is limited to them shedding light on what the position was likely to have been at that time.
The new panel will make its own findings and decision on all relevant descriptors.
REASONS FOR DECISION
Factual background
What this appeal is about
I thank Ms Howard for her background to the appeal, from which this introduction to the case is substantially taken.
Since it concerns a claim for a Personal Independence Payment my references, unless otherwise stated, are to the Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013.
The appellant claimed a Personal Independence Payment (PIP) on 23/10/2023. A PIP2 questionnaire form dated 13/11/2023 was submitted, and he underwent a telephone consultation, on 30/01/2024. The Decision Maker (DM) on considering the available evidence awarded the claimant zero points for the activities in each component. Accordingly, 28/02/2024, a negative decision was issued.
The claimant requested a Mandatory Reconsideration of the above decision and on reviewing the available evidence, the DM decided that the decision remained unchanged. The claimant lodged an appeal dated 16/03/2024 against the decision.
The FtT awarded 4 points for daily living descriptor 9(c) and no points for the mobility component. As such the claimant scored insufficient points to be awarded any rate of daily living or mobility component of PIP from 23/10/2023, the date of claim.
He was refused permission to appeal by the FtT. With the assistance of his representative Ijaz Ahmed, he applied to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal.
The Upper Tribunal proceedings
The issues raised at that stage were in relation to the Daily Living component; however, Upper Tribunal Judge Church granted permission on 3/10/2025 in relation to the tribunal’s approach to the mobility component. He said:
The Tribunal explained its decision making on mobility activity 1 in paragraph 36 of its statement of reasons as follows: “[the claimant], through his rep, stated that he could get anxious and panicky if he had to go to an unfamiliar place and would take his parents with him (A3). He planned journeys meticulously (39) and sought reassurance as to his plans from others, but overall was able to do so independently. He travelled widely and alone on public transport before his mental health crash (e.g. he told the tribunal he would go on holidays alone) and, given that would be able to do so again. The Tribunal accepted that he may do a “dry run” with a family member to find a new place (such as the new places of work he had attended since leaving Ikea, one trip was sufficient to reassure him and thereafter he could manage the journey on his own. He told the tribunal that “masking” his Autism all day at work left him exhausted, but he was able to drive home after sitting in the car fro [sic] 5-10 minutes “of peace”. He employed good strategies to enable him to carry out the journey safely and independently.
In this paragraph the Tribunal has recited what it was told by your representative. It appears to have accepted those factual assertions. In some places it is not entirely clear whether what is being said represents an account of what it wastold by your representative, or whether it represents the panel’s own assessment in the light of the evidence it heard. For example, having said that you “planned journeys meticulously (39) and sought reassurance as to his plans from others”, it states a conclusion that “overall was able to do so independently”. It may not be adequately clear how the Tribunal decided that you were able to plan and follow journeys “independently” if you required reassurance as to your plans from others.
Similarly, it is not clear whether the Tribunal accepted that you can “get anxious and panicky” if you have to go to an unfamiliar place and would take your parents with you. The Tribunal expressly confirms its acceptance of the evidence that you may do a “dry run” with a family member to find a new place, but it then appears to conclude that because only one “dry run” is required to give you sufficient reassurance to manage the journey on your own, you are able to carry out that task independently. I am persuaded that it is realistically arguable that that is wrong in law because once the unfamiliar place has been visited on a (single) “dry run” with the support of a family member, it arguably ceases to be an “unfamiliar” place. Given that mobility descriptor 1(d) attracts 10 points, if the Tribunal did err in the way I say it might have done the error might well have been material in the sense that had it not been made the outcome of the appeal might have been different.
I am persuaded that this warrants a grant of permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. My grant of permission extends to all matters raised in your UT1.
The views of the parties
Ms Howard on behalf of the Secretary of State has now filed a submission supporting the appeal. Given that support the appellant’s representative makes no further observations, and does not require me to give reasons for my decision.
My decision
In my turn I am content to adopt the submissions of Ms Howard as providing the reasons for my decision that the previous tribunal erred in their consideration of the issues relevant to the mobility component, and I commend her explanation of other perceived problems with the Statement of Reasons to the fresh Tribunal.
I emphasise my agreement with Ms Howard that the FtT fell into the trap of reciting the evidence without explaining what they made of it, that is to say, the facts they found that it established. It is the task of the FtT to find the facts. I paraphrase a helpful tenet of my colleague Upper Tribunal Judge Jacobs in saying that a fact is what you get when you apply a process of reasoning to the evidence. It is that process of reasoning, and the facts that were generated by it, that constitute a proper explanation of the decision for an appellant and for an appellate body.
Conclusions
Other than thanking both representatives for their helpful submissions to the Upper Tribunal, I need to make only these short points.
Although only the mobility component has been under active consideration at the Upper Tribunal. The new FtT, however, must consider all the descriptors that are in contention in both components. As Judge Church said, his grant extended to all matters raised in the UT1, the appeal form to the Upper Tribunal.
The appellant himself or through his representative may, of course make any further points on all issues at the rehearing.
For completeness, I also draw to the attention of the Tribunal the approach set out by Upper Tribunal Judge Hemingway in TR-v-SSWP (PIP) [2015] UKUT 0626 (AAC) which establishes that if a claimant is unable to perform an activity for part of a day that day counts towards that period provided that the inability to perform it affects them on that day to more than a trivial extent: in particular see [32-34].
Finally, I warn theappellant that the fact this appeal has succeeded here on an issue of law is not an indication that the rehearing will automatically be successful, because it is the new Tribunal that will consider the evidence and determine the outcome.
Paula Gray
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Authorised by the Judge for issue on 6 February 2026