Appeal No. UA-2025-001255-PIP
Between:
GAH
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WORK AND PENSIONS
Respondent
Before: Upper Tribunal Judge West
Decided on consideration of the papers: 11 March 2026
ON APPEAL FROM
Tribunal: First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement
Chamber)
Tribunal Venue: Cardiff
Tribunal Case No: 1678984686255294
Panel: Judge Tucker, Dr Kutner, Miss Stewart
Tribunal Hearing Date: 19/6/2025
DECISION
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Cardiff dated 19 June 2025 under file reference 1678984686255294 involves an error on a point of law. The appeal against that decision is allowed and the decision of the Tribunal is set aside.
The matter is remitted to a differently constituted tribunal for a complete rehearing.
The new tribunal must considerand make relevant findings as to whether or not the claimant satisfied the criteria to be awarded the daily living component and/or the mobility component of personal independence payment and at what rate from and including 2 June 2022 to and including 9 September 2024. In so doing the new tribunal should in particular have regard to the claimant’s grounds of appeal dared 26 August 2025 and the submissions of the Secretary of State dated 19 December 2025.
This decision is made under section 12(2)(b)(i) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
REASONS
This is an appeal, with my permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Cardiff on 19 June 2025.
I shall refer to the appellant hereafter as “the claimant”. The respondent is the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. I shall refer to him hereafter as “the Secretary of State”. I shall refer to the tribunal which sat on 19 June 2025 as “the Tribunal” and the tribunal to which I am remitting the matter as “the new tribunal”.
The claimant appealed against the decision of 7 October 2022 that she was entitled to 0 points for the daily living component and 0 points for the mobility component of personal independence payment. She was not therefore entitled to either component of personal independence payment from and including 21 June 2022. The decision was subsequently reconsidered, but not revised, on 7 February 2023.
The matter came before the Tribunal on 19 June 2025 when the claimant appeared and gave oral evidence. A presenting officer also appeared. The appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal found that the claimant was entitled to 8 points for the daily living component and 4 points for the mobility component of personal independence payment. She was therefore entitled to the daily living component, but not the mobility component, of personal independence payment from and including 21 June 2022 to and including 9 September 2024.
On 7 November 2025 I acceded to the claimant’s application and granted her permission to appeal. It seemed to me that there was an arguable case that the Tribunal had erred in law for the reasons set out in her grounds of appeal.
On 19 December 2025 the Secretary of State provided submissions and supported the appeal. The claimant had nothing to add on 28 January 2026.
The Secretary of State confirmed that the claimant made a further claim for personal independence payment on 10 September 2024. A decision was made and the claimant was awarded the standard rate of daily living component, but not the mobility component, of personal independence payment from and including 10 September 2024 to and including 28 June 2026.
Neither party has sought an oral hearing and I do not consider that it is necessary to hold one in order to resolve the matter. Both parties have also consented to a decision without reasons under rule 40(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
The Secretary of State submitted that
“4.2 It is my submission that the FtT has erred in law in both its fact finding and duty to provide adequate reasons for its decision. The conclusion from the FtT on how they assessed the claimant’s functional abilities when dealing with the mobility activity 1 – Planning and following a journey appears limited in their reasoning. It seems that what the FtT has provided when reading the SOR, appears to be no more than a rehearsal of evidence and a conclusion without an explanation.
4.3 In dealing with the claimant’s representative’s point of his grounds of appeal, that MM v SSWP (ESA) [2018] UKUT 446 (AAC), appears pertinent to the present case. I courteously agree that my views are aligned with the claimant’s representative, in so far as what is held in MM v SSWP (ESA) [2018] UKUT 446 (AAC) in which Judge Poynter said (at paragraphs [39]-[46]):
"When a Tribunal concludes that a claimant cannot be accurately describing the conditions from which she suffers because, if she were, she would be receiving different treatment, its reasoning is often reducible to this: that the Tribunal's medical member would not him-or herself treat a person with those conditions in that way." ... "There is therefore a real risk that drawing inferences about function from treatment will in some cases lead the Tribunal to conclude that claimants do not suffer from the loss of function they described because they are not being correctly treated for it. That is clearly not a permissible conclusion."
4.4 Upon one’s reading of the SOR, it appears that the FtT may have drawn adverse inferences from evidence about mental health difficulties, the treatment that the claimant may or may not have received, specifically when noting at paragraph’s 45 to 46 of the SOR where the following is recorded:
“…As Ms … notes, [claimant] was not receiving any input or treatment for her mental health at the date of decision. Although [claimant] was prescribed mirtazapine from 28th October 2022 (p.150; p.131), it is very unlikely that an individual who was experiencing mental health difficulties that resulted in overwhelming psychological distress would not have also been referred for specialist secondary care. We, therefore, agree with Ms …’ conclusion that [claimant] was not experiencing overwhelming psychological distress.
Finally, we noted that Mr … had argued that [claimant’s] anxiety in relation to undertaking a journey stemmed from her fear that she may meet her ex-partner. Whilst we accept that this could be a significant concern for someone who has experienced domestic abuse, [claimant] did not refer to being fearful of meeting her husband in either the history taken by Ms … or in her oral evidence to us. Had meeting her husband been a cause of overwhelming psychological distress, then we would have expected it to be one of the main concerns that [claimant] would have wanted to emphasise to us. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the correct assessment of [claimant’s] circumstances is that she is able to plan and follow the route of a journey unaided.”
It is unclear what findings the FtT made and whether all the evidence had been considered. I note that there is a letter from the claimant’s current GP at page 112 which records the following:
“I have been asked to provide information with regards to weather the afore named patient suffers from any mental health conditions. There has been no consultations pertaining to mental health issues since [claimant] joined our practise. In November 2021. I have obtained her old paper notes which dates back to September 2020 and can see that there is one entry on 2nd February 2021 where stress at home was mentioned and this was regarding her son but there is no further detail about this and no treatment was started/referrals made.
Looking back further that is a MASH meeting held (multi agency safeguarding hub) on the 13th of October 2020 looking at the safety of [claimant] and her 3 children. I have enclosed a copy of this. That is also an entry in her previous GPS notes (in Preston) stating that she took a deliberate overdose of paracetamol which was reported to have been witnessed by the children. She is then said to have fled Lancashire and take refuge in Cardiff in September 2020. There are reports of abuse from her husband towards her and her 3 children.
She has not complained of any mental health issues since being registered at our practise. It must be noted however that she and her children are alleged to have been victims of abuse from husband/family and this can have long lasting psychological implications.”
Whilst it is correct that the claimant’s GP does state that the claimant does not have any mental health conditions, it is clear that the GP also recorded (repeated above) that the claimant and her children are victims of abuse which can have ‘long lasting psychological implications, which the FtT do not appear to engage with.
Furthermore, whilst the FtT have stated that the claimant has not raised her mental health difficulties within her PIP2 questionnaire or in her oral evidence, I would note that the FtT have failed to consider the claimant’s evidence in her mandatory reconsideration letter that can be found at pages 122 to 124 where the following is recorded:
“She is suffering from anxiety, depression, panic attacks and traumatic flashback to a period of domestic violence from a former partner. He was very controlling and intimidating, subjected her to beatings and threatened to throw acid on her. She lives in a perpetual state of fear and continues to feel afraid as she worries she might bump into him.
In addition to fragile mental health, she also suffered with a bad back and has restrictions in her right shoulder. She feels continuously dizzy and fatigued with deficient iron levels and daily headaches.
She has become very isolated and is avoiding social contact and has very low levels of motivation.
She has been referred to the primary mental health team and she is now taking 15mg of mirtazapine and 500mg of naproxen.”
There is also evidence in the claimant’s representative’s submission (page Addition E2) that appears to explain why the claimant has not previously disclosed her mental health issues to professionals, that it was due to fear of her children being taken from her. However, whilst the FtT have recorded some of the findings (repeated above), it appears that that FtT have taken a somewhat less than balanced approach with regards to the claimant’s mental health, that she describes.
Furthermore, when making their findings at paragraph 46 of the SOR (repeated above) it appears that the FtT have incorrectly stated that: “…[claimant] did not refer to being fearful of meeting her husband in either the history taken by Ms … or in her oral evidence to us. Had meeting her husband been a cause of overwhelming psychological distress, then we would have expected it to be one of the main concerns that [claimant] would have wanted to emphasise to us.”. However, it is clear at page 124 of the claimant’s mandatory reconsideration letter that the claimant’s representative had detailed this fact when noting the following: “She suffers with panic attacks and she is constantly fearful that she might bump into her ex-partner…” As such, it appears that the FtT have failed to engage with the evidence and further findings of facts and adequate reasons are required.
In addressing the claimant’s representative’s ground with regards to mobility activity 1 – Planning and following a journey. The FtT stated at paragraph 43 of the SOR, the following:
“We invited [claimant] to tell us about any difficulties that she had planning and following a journey. She explained that, if she was going to an unfamiliar place or appointment, she would usually have either her children or her support worker with her, and that she usually travelled by bus as taxis were too expensive. When we asked what assistance her children or support worker provided, [claimant] told us that they were better than her at following a map, and that they also provided language support as their English is better than [claimant’s]. We asked [claimant] to describe any difficulties that she had experienced when undertaking journeys alone, and the only example that she was able to give us was when she was required to attend the Jobcentre, but had become lost as the bus driver had failed to indicate the stop at which [claimant] needed to alight. [Claimant] explained that she had become upset and tearful, but that a taxi driver had approached her, and that he,and his friend who spoke Kurdish, had accompanied [claimant] to the Jobcentre. We asked [claimant] to explain why she had become lost, but her explanation was unclear - saying that she both found Google Maps difficult to use, but that she also did not have access to the internet, and, therefore, did not know how to go about locating the Jobcentre, despite having the address.”
However, as helpfully noted by the claimant’s representative in the mandatory reconsideration letter at page 124, it is noted that: “…Although she can take her children to school, she would not be able to follow an unfamiliar journey unless accompanied.” However, the FtT do not engage with this evidence other than to comment on the one occasion that the claimant was lost when attending the jobcentre. Firstly, it is unclear if the jobcentre is familiar and secondly, I note that that the HealthCare Professional (HCP) has only recorded at page 81 that the claimant takes her children to school, which one can assume is a familiar journey.
Notwithstanding the FtT’s reasons at paragraph 43 of the SOR (repeated above), it is unclear what the FtT made of the claimant’s evidence that if she was going on an unfamiliar journey that either her children or support worker would accompany her. In failing to make adequate findings of facts with regards to unfamiliar journey’s and failing to give adequate reasons as to why none of the scoring descriptors may apply for mobility activity 1, I submit that this is a further error in law.
Conversely, it is my submission that the FtT’s conclusions and reasons demonstrate that it has failed to consider relevant evidence, and its own findings of the claimant’s restrictions. Taking into account the FtT accepted in parts the claimant is affected by physical and or mental health difficulties and lack of motivation, it was incumbent upon the FtT to further cogitate the claimant’s and that of her representative’s evidence, particularly given that there is evidence of the claimant’s longstanding mental health difficulties and is supported by services. In failing to do so, this I submit is an error of law.
Although the FtT is entitled to give weighting to whatever evidence that it chooses, where there is conflicting evidence, it must in the first instance explore and consider it in a holistic manner and provide sufficient reasons explaining why it preferred the evidence that it had. In this appeal the FtT does not appear to have done that. There appears to be a distinct lack of reference to the evidence provided by the claimant and the medical evidence which demonstrate the co-morbidities and nature of her health conditions. Therefore, it could be said that had the FtT given appropriate consideration to all the evidence, including accurately identifying the mental health, lack of motivation and effects of the claimant’s conditions, the FtT may have considered the claimant’s limitations. As such, I submit that the FtT have failed to give adequate reasons as to why evidence in parts was not accepted when deciding what points were award.
In view of the above, Iam in agreement with UT Judge [West] that the inadequacy of reasons makes it difficult for a claimant to know whether the FtT applied the correct legal tests in assessing the evidence, making its findings of fact, and arriving at its decision. Notwithstanding my support of the above grounds, I respectfully submit that any further grounds raised by the claimant’s representative will be subsumed by the newly constituted FtT.
If the UT Judge accepts my submission that the FtT has erred in law on points identified earlier in this submission, then I respectfully request that the appeal be remitted to a different first-tier tribunal for further fact finding.”
For the reasons identified by the Secretary of State, I am satisfied that there was the Tribunal made errors of law which were material to the decision and for that reason the decision of the Tribunal should be set aside.
In the circumstances I do not need to consider whether the Tribunal made any other errors of law.
I am satisfied that the resolution of any other grounds of appeal will fall to be subsumed at the hearing before the new tribunal.
I therefore allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the Tribunal. I remit the matter to a new tribunal which should conduct a complete rehearing of the matter.
I must stress that the fact that this appeal to the Upper Tribunal has succeeded should not be taken as any indication as to the outcome of the rehearing by the new tribunal. It is quite possible that the new tribunal may end up effectively coming to the same decision as the previous Tribunal, namely that the claimant was entitled to the daily living component, but not the mobility component, of personal independence payment from and including 21 June 2022 to and including 9 September 2024.
Alternatively, it is possible that the new tribunal might take a different view of the facts from that of the Tribunal and reach the conclusion that in fact the claimant was entitled to both components of personal independence payment from and including 21 June 2022 to and including 9 September 2024.
It is for the new tribunal itself to decide which of these alternative options open to it applies, depending on the view it takes of the facts and providing it makes proper findings of fact and gives adequate reasons. It would not be appropriate for me to express any opinion either way on the merits of the appeal.
The following directions apply to the hearing before the new tribunal:
The new tribunal should not involve any member who was a member of the Tribunal involved in the hearing of the appeal.
The new tribunal must considerand make relevant findings as to whether or not the claimant satisfied the criteria to be awarded the daily living component and/or the mobility component of personal independence payment and at what rate from and including 21 June 2022 to and including 9 September 2024. In so doing the new tribunal should in particular have regard to the claimant’s grounds of appeal dated 26 August 2025 and the submissions of the Secretary of State dated 19 December 2025.
Mark West
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Signed on the original on 11 March 2026