IN THE FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL CASE NUMBER IMS/2013/1/RTR
IMMIGRATON SERVICES
GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER
Between
PATRICK CYRIL ADAMS T/A HERTFORD LAW SERVICES
(Appellant)
and
THE IMMIGRATION SERVICES COMMISSIONER
(Respondent)
Before
David Hunter QC (Chair)
Ms Orla Conway
Mr Martin Hoare
Sitting at:
Victory House
30-34 Kingsway
London WC2 6 EX
Sent to Parties: 4th June 2013
DECISION AND REASONS
(Rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-Tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 (“The Rules”)
THE APPEAL
This is an appeal by Hertford Law Service, in the person of Patrick Cyril Adams (“the Appellant”), against a Decision of the Immigration Services Commissioner (“the Respondent”), dated 10th December 2012, refusing an application by the Appellant for registration as a qualified person to provide immigration advice or immigration services at OISC Level 3, under Section 84 (2) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (“the Act”).
The Appellant duly appealed against this Decision by Notice of Appeal dated 27th December 2012.
The Tribunal, having been provided by the Respondent with a “Hearing Bundle”, containing all of those documents material to the Decision and the Appeal, including all material statements and representations of the Appellant, and upon due consideration of those documents, considered that the matter could be determined without an oral hearing, and so informed the Appellant and the Respondent.
By letters dated 18th February and 9th March 2013 the Appellant consented to the matter being determined without a hearing, and the Respondent also consented, by letter dated 28th February 2013.
Accordingly, those members of the Tribunal charged with the determination of this matter convened at Victory House, London, on 18th April 2013, and there gave, in the context of determination, full consideration to all of the papers relating to this Appeal, including the evidence contained therein, and each of the written submissions made by the Appellant and on behalf of the Respondent, and upon the basis of that consideration have determined this Appeal and issued this Decision, pursuant to Rule 32 (1) of the Rules.
Prior to its determination, the Tribunal has reminded itself that the statutory principle governing the material Decision of the Respondent, and the determination of this Appeal, is set out in Section 83 of the Act, which provides, at sub-section (5), that: “The Commissioner must exercise her functions so as to secure, so far as is reasonable practicable, that those who provide immigration advice or immigration services - (a) are fit and competent to do so; (b) act in the best interests of their clients; (c) do not knowingly mislead any court, adjudicator or tribunal in the United Kingdom; (d) do not seek to abuse any procedure operating in the United Kingdom in connection with immigration or asylum; (e) do not advise any person to do something which would amount to such an abuse.
The Tribunal has reminded itself also that the burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, the facts on which he relies rests on the Appellant.
THE BACKGROUND OF THE APPEAL
Section 84 (1) of the Act provides that no person may provide immigration advice or immigration services unless he is a qualified person.
Section 84 (2) (a) of the Act provides that a person is a qualified person if he is a registered person.
Schedule 6 of the Act requires persons seeking to become a qualified person by registration to make application for registration to the Immigration Services Commissioner.
Schedule 6, 1 (1) and (2), provide that an application for registration must be made to the Commissioner in such form and manner, and be accompanied by such information and supporting evidence, as the Commissioner may from time to time determine, and when considering an application for registration the Commissioner may require the applicant to provide her with such further information or supporting evidence as the Commissioner may reasonably require.
The Appellant applied for registration on 23rd May 2012.
At that time, pursuant to his application, the Appellant was required to furnish a Competence Statement declaring, inter alia, whether he had any criminal convictions, and, if so, to give details, and was further required to declare that the information which he had given was true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
The Appellant duly furnished that Competence Statement and made those declarations.
He declared that he had criminal convictions, under Section 91 of the Asylum and Information Act 199(1 sic), and that these convictions were “spent”, and that the information which he had given was true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
THE EVIDENCE MATERIAL TO THE APPEAL
The Appellant, Patrick Cyril Adams, had changed his name, from Patrick Cyrille Justin Couram to Patrick Cyril Adams, on 9th March 2010.
Under his former name, the Appellant submitted, on behalf of Shekina Advocacy Services, an application for registration, as a person qualified to provide immigration advice or immigration services, to the Immigration Services Commissioner (in effect to the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner, “OISC”) on 5th April 2007.
In the course of its consideration of this application, OISC became aware that the Appellant, without registration, was providing immigration advice and services, and established, through the Border and Immigration Agency, that he had provided that advice and those services to eleven persons. On seven occasions, between May and December 2007, OISC by letter warned the Appellant that he was providing immigration advice and services unlawfully (being then, under the Act, an unregistered and therefore unqualified person).
This application, by the Appellant on behalf of Shekina Advocacy Services, was refused by OISC on 24th January 2008, on the ground that OISC could not be satisfied that the applicant was fit and competent to provide immigration advice and services.
On 17th February 2010, Patrick Couram (the Appellant) was convicted, by confession, at Southwark Crown Court of 6 counts of providing immigration advice when not qualified to do so, contrary to Section 91 (1) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1991, and was sentenced to 9 months imprisonment suspended for 24 months concurrent on all counts, and to 120 hours unpaid work (community service). Those 6 counts related to the provision of advice to six persons in addition to the eleven persons referred to in the preceding paragraph.
In the course of its consideration of the present application for registration (the subject of this Appeal), by the Appellant on behalf of Hertford Law Services, OISC received the Criminal Records Bureau standard check in respect of Patrick Cyril Adams.
That check revealed those convictions referred to above, in February 2010 of those 6 offences under Section 91 (1) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1991.
The check revealed also that in September 2010 the Appellant had been convicted of driving a motor vehicle with excess alcohol, in contravention of Section 5 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, and had been disqualified from driving for 14 months, and ordered to conduct 80 hours unpaid work, and that in December 2010 he had been convicted of failing to comply with the community service requirements of a suspended sentence order, and that in February 2011 he had been convicted of failing to comply with the requirements of a community order.
The convictions under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 had been declared by the Appellant in his Competence Statement which accompanied this application for registration, but had been referred to by him therein as “spent”.
Under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, those convictions will not become “spent” until the year 2020.
The Immigration Services Commissioner has a policy in respect of the consideration of applications for registrations from persons who have committed criminal offences.
That policy is stated thus, materially to the circumstances of this case: “Having a criminal record will not necessarily bar you from being regulated by OISC. However, unless there are exceptional and persuasive circumstances, the OISC is likely to refuse an application from a person who has a criminal conviction that is “unspent” as set out in the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974”, and: “We will place greater weight on the criminal conviction(s) if it appears that the individual has not given us all the details about his/her past.”
The Appellant failed to declare in that Competence Statement those further convictions of September 2010 (for “drink driving”), December 2010 and February 2011 (for breaches of community orders).
On 24th September 2012 OISC wrote to the Appellant, setting out the aforesaid convictions, enclosing a copy of the Commissioner’s policy in respect of application from offenders, and asking for details of any material exceptional and persuasive circumstances, and for further details regarding each offence.
On 28th September 2012 the Appellant responded, stating inter alia that he had stopped giving immigration advice and services as soon as it became apparent that he had breached the Immigration and Asylum Act. That statement was incorrect, in that it had been established by OISC (paragraph 18 above) that the Appellant had continued to provide immigration advice and services throughout 2007 after the first of the aforesaid warning letters and throughout the period during which the seven warning letters were sent.
In that response, the Appellant also stated that he had been convicted of “drink-driving” after the driver of a runaway vehicle had hit the back of the vehicle which he had been driving, and gave a confusing, purportedly exculpatory, account of his convictions for failures to comply with the requirements of community service orders.
He did not dispute any of the convictions.
THE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE APPELLANT
In his Notice of Appeal, the Appellant gave “Reasons for Appealing”. These were: “I have been forward with my statement declaring my convictions – I have been opened to and given accurate answers to the Commissioner. I submitted all necessary information to support my application. My convictions are satisfied and I am renowned person and promised to stay within the law and the Commissioner’s rules. The Commissioner failed to consider some part of me thus I have acted in the interest of clients – a legal requirement, I never abused, abused, advantage, vulnerability and deceptive in any form. In my dealings I have fair to my clients – for these reasons I request that the Tribunal overturn the Commissioner’s decision” (sic).
The Appellant wrote further letters to the Tribunal, on 18th February, 9th March and 16th March 2013. In those letters he conceded that he had provided immigration advice and services to eleven persons in 2007 when he was not registered, and thus unqualified to do so, and repeated his purportedly exculpatory statements in respect of his driving offence and failures to comply with community service orders, and asserted simply that he was fit and competent to provide immigration advice and services.
The Tribunal has considered fully the Appellant’s Reasons for Appealing, and the entirety of the contents of his further written submissions.
THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL
By his own admission, the Appellant has provided immigration advice and services unlawfully to eleven persons in and about 2007, and has been convicted, by confession, in February 2010, of six counts of providing immigration advice and services to when not qualified to do so, contrary to Section 91 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, to a further six persons.
The Tribunal considers that this history, of flagrant abuse of the system and law regulating the provision of immigration advice and immigration services, would in itself have fully justified the decision of the Respondent that the Appellant is now not fit to provide those services.
Further, in respect of those “unspent” convictions, the Respondent was fully entitled to conclude that the Appellant had failed to establish any exceptional or persuasive circumstances, such as to cause her to grant the application despite the existence of those convictions.
Further, the Respondent was entitled to weigh in the balance, in the context of her decision, the fact that the Appellant, in the material part of the Competence Statement, had failed to declare his convictions for drink driving and for failures to observe the requirements of community service orders.
That declaration failure in itself could not have been determinative of her decision, but cumulatively, that failure and, much more substantively, the material “immigration history” entirely validated the decision of the Respondent to refuse this application of the Appellant, on the ground that she could not be satisfied that he is fit to provide immigration advice or immigration services.
DECISION
Having regard to the aforesaid conclusions, the Decision of the Tribunal is to dismiss this Appeal.
David Hunter QC 31.5.13