STEVEN G. HAUGHTON ESQ Appellant
and
KIRKLEES METROPOLITAN COUNCIL Respondent
Decision of the Tribunal sitting at the Town Hall, Huddersfield, on Tuesday 7th.February 1989.
Before: | Margaret Rutherford, Chairman |
| R.Coleman Esq. |
| John Stephens Esq. |
Appeals against the decision of the Respondent to impose an additional condition of registration in relation to the Sunnyside Residential Home, 8 Oxford Road, Dewsbury, West Yorkshire
Representation:
For the Appellant: | V. Fraser Esq.,of Counsel, instructed by Eaton & Co., Solicitors |
For the Respondent: | Miss Eleanor Hamilton of Counsel, instructed by Mrs Anbery,Solicitor, Kirkless Metropolitan Council Legal Department. |
DECISION
It is the unanimous decision of the Tribunal that the Appellant's appeal succeeds and that the Respondent's decision to impose an additional condition of registration shall not have effect.
REASONS
After discussion with Counsel in chambers before the hearing began, it was conceded by Counsel for the Respondent that the Respondent had no authority to impose a condition relating to the installation of electronic devices in the Appellant's Home. This was in the light of a recent decision in the High Court, Warwickshire County Council v McSweeney, before Mr Justice Roch. In this case the learned judge said, inter alia, "In my judgment the correct interpretation of sections 5(3) and 5(4) of the Act is that the power to impose conditions is limited to those cases set out in section 5(3). Support for that interpretation of the Act is to be found in the judgment of Lord Justice Glidewell in the case of Lyons v East Sussex County Council at page 6..." (page 11 of the transcript).He also said (at page l0 of the transcript) "Section 15(6)(c) cannot be read as giving the Tribunal power to impose any condition that it thinks fit when it allows an appeal because, if that were right, then the Tribunal would have a wider power of imposing conditions than would the registration authority unless the registration authority's power to impose conditions is wholly unfettered..."
However, Counsel indicated to the Tribunal that they believed that the case of Warwickshire v McSweeney was to be appealed. Counsel for the Respondent felt that, in the light of this, it would be wrong to abandon the present appeal completely and that an adjournment might be appropriate until the matter relating to the imposition of conditions was clarified (i.e. confirmed or otherwise on appeal.). After the Tribunal had satisfied itself that the Claimant would not be prejudiced by such a delay, the appeal was formally adjourned sine die.
During the following days investigations were made as to whether Warwickshire v McSweeney was in fact being appealed. It finally transpired that this was NOT the case. Confirmation of this fact was received by the Registered Homes Tribunal Secretariat, from both Mrs McSweeney's Solicitors and the Solicitors for the Respondent authority that no appeal against the decision had been/was going to be made. Accordingly, in view of the High Court decision, which the Tribunal is bound to follow according to the doctrine of precedent, the Tribunal holds that the Respondent has no power to impose an additional condition of registration relating to the Appellant's registration of Sunnyside, other than one which relates to number, age, sex or category. Thus the Respondent has no power to impose a condition relating, inter alia, to the prohibition of the installation of electronic devices in the Home.
February |
| Margaret Rutherford |
|
| K.Coleman Esq |
|
| Stephens Esq. |