SSIA v The Secretary of State for The Home Department

This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 27 November 2024.

In making this decision I have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties and family members. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the case concerns matters of international protection and issues relating to the appellant’s health and mental health and there is little public interest in knowing his identity given the details which are contained in the judgment.

The appellant was treated as a vulnerable witness in light of his claimed mental health difficulties. He was afforded breaks in his evidence and took advantage of the same twice. Counsel for the home office is an experienced Barrister, familiar with immigration law work, and I felt that the manner, content and style of questioning was appropriate. There was no complaint about the questioning from the appellant’s representative.

This case has a lamentable and unattractive history. It has been plagued with repeated failures by the appellant to comply with directions, haphazard compliance with other directions and issues and evidence being raised and served beyond the time limits provided.

I note that as late as 29^th August 2026, shortly before the August Bank Holiday and a Saturday, the appellant uploaded and served a supplementary bundle and witness statement from his claimed wife. The uploading of the material on a Saturday is lamentable enough but doing so on a bank holiday weekend compounds the difficulty.

There was an application to admit this into evidence and having heard from the Home office and the appellant I reluctantly allowed the evidence to be admitted however made it clear to the appellant that such weight as would or could be attached to the evidence was a matter for the court.

The appellant’s claimed wife did not attend the hearing. It was said that she was not well enough to attend the hearing due to problems associated with her pregnancy. There was no medical evidence confirming the same and no letter or note from a Registered Medical Practitioner providing that she was unfit to take part in the hearing. The appelalnt explained that she had last attended work on Tuesday before the hearing on the Thursday and had she not been ill she would have attended work on the Thursday. I bear well in mind also that this was a hearing heard via CVP and as such no travel was required.

Nonetheless, as I explained to the appellant such weight, if any, was a matter for the court having heard all of the arguments and evidence. The Home office submitted that the admission of her statement into evidence would not prejudice them overly and Miss King stated she was able to deal with in in her submissions.

The hearing took place by video on the Cloud Video Platform. It was recorded. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.

The parties agreed that the issues the Tribunal must decide are;

The evidence in this case was voluminous. The home office bundle was 437 pages. The first of the appellant bundles was 598 pages. The supplementary bundle of the appellant’s was 35 pages and a second supplementary bundle served late in August was 33 pages. There was a 10 page skeleton argument served by the appellant in addition to the witness statements of himself and his claimed wife and a muslim marriage certificate. The home office provided 2 supplemental reviews of the evidence which maintained their case.

It goes without saying that drip feeding evidence is a most unsatisfactory way in which to prepare a case. It makes the organisation of the matter incredibly difficult.

Nonetheless, the appellant’s evidence in chief is as follows;

The appellant relies upon a history of political involvement with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its student wing, Chhatra Dal. He states that photographic evidence documents this involvement over a number of years. He refers to attendance at a BNP pre-rally meeting on 30 November 2018, organised following instructions from BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir in support of an election boycott campaign. He also relies upon a photograph from a discussion meeting on 20 July 2019 concerning the imprisonment and alleged torture of student activists by the Awami League government. Further photographs are said to show him participating in a Habiganj District Chhatra Dal march on 20 December 2020 in support of a nationwide blockade programme called by the BNP, a protest rally on 20 January 2022 against killings and disappearances allegedly occurring under the government, and a fundraising event for autistic children organised by the Taranya Society on 25 January 2022. The appellant identifies his position in each photograph and contends that the images demonstrate continuous political engagement and visibility within opposition activities.

The appellant states that his political profile increased over time and led to repeated targeting by Awami League supporters and state authorities. He claims that in 2019 he was arrested during a political demonstration attended by journalists. He alleges that he was detained for two days, beaten whilst in custody, and released only following intervention by local BNP leaders. According to his account, police warned him not to continue his political activities. He further claims that on 7 March 2020, after becoming a district-level committee member, he was arrested during a major demonstration in Shayestaganj. He states that he was detained for three to four days alongside around twenty other protesters, beaten with batons and threatened with false criminal proceedings. He claims that he was released only on condition that he cease attending demonstrations. He maintains that these events are consistent with the accounts recorded in AIR1 paragraphs 58 to 63 and AIR2 paragraphs 79 to 82.

The appellant also alleges that he was subjected to serious physical violence by Awami League activists. He states that on 31 March 2020, whilst returning from a meeting in Shayestaganj, he was ambushed by a group led by a local Awami League leader. He claims that he was attacked with sharp weapons and suffered a deep stab wound to the left side of his chest. He relies upon photographs showing stitches and scarring following the attack and states that he remained hospitalised for several days. He maintains that the assault was carried out in retaliation for his role in organising anti-government protests. In addition to this alleged incident, he claims that throughout the period 2020 to 2022 Awami League MPs, local leaders and activists repeatedly assaulted him and other opposition activists. He states that he suffered numerous attacks whilst organising meetings and that these assaults included public slapping and kicking.

A major feature of the appellant's claim concerns what he describes as the “trigger event” that ultimately caused him to leave Bangladesh. He states that on 6 July 2022 police telephoned his family home whilst he was absent and informed family members that his ancestral land would be sold because of his political activities. He interprets this as a direct threat aimed at destroying his family economically. He further claims that prior to this his father's business had already been severely damaged because Awami League cadres had organised boycotts of the business and intimidated customers. The appellant contends that this threat to family property convinced him that remaining in Bangladesh was no longer safe and led to his eventual departure on 6 October 2022.

The appellant claims to have been falsely implicated in four politically motivated criminal cases. He emphasises that all four cases remain active and that no general amnesty has been declared. The first case, G.R. No. 197/20, arose from Chunarughat Police Station Case No. 23 dated 13 August 2020. The case alleges offences under sections 143, 323, 325, 326, 307, 506, 114 and 34 of the Penal Code relating to an alleged assault involving spades during a dispute over the excavation of soil from a mosque pond. The appellant is named as accused number three among seven accused persons and denies any involvement.

The second case, G.R. No. 76/21, arose from Chunarughat Police Station Case No. 7 dated 13 May 2021. This is a murder prosecution brought under sections 302, 114 and 34 of the Penal Code. The complainant alleges that the appellant and others murdered her father, Kalu Mia, on 12 May 2021 during a dispute concerning a pond and ducks and that a sharp agricultural tool described as a “fickol” was used to inflict the fatal injury. The appellant is identified as accused number five. He denies being present and asserts that the allegation is entirely fabricated.

The third case, G.R. No. 56/22, arose from Chunarughat Police Station Case No. 17 dated 17 January 2022. The appellant is accused of offences under sections 4, 7, 16 and 20 of the Land Crime Prevention and Remedy Act together with section 506(2) of the Penal Code. The allegations concern unlawful occupation of land and the making of death threats. The appellant states that the complainant is a local Awami League supporter and that the proceedings are motivated purely by political hostility. He denies any involvement in land disputes.

The fourth case, G.R. No. 181/2024, arose from Habiganj Sadar Police Station Case No. 12 dated 21 August 2024. This case concerns allegations of unlawful assembly, attempted murder and murder arising from events said to have occurred in Habiganj town on 2 August 2024. The appellant is named as accused number 32 in a list of more than 100 accused persons. He states that many of the accused are senior Awami League figures. He contends that the continued existence of this case demonstrates that he remains at risk notwithstanding political changes in Bangladesh.

The appellant states that both before and after his departure from Bangladesh, police and Awami League supporters repeatedly attended his family home in connection with those four cases. He claims that they displayed arrest warrants and threatened his elderly parents, warning that he would be kidnapped or killed if he returned. He states that his parents continue to live in fear and that his father's business has been completely destroyed.

The appellant claims that immediately upon arrival in the United Kingdom he joined the BNP Cardiff branch and became active in demonstrations, meetings and fundraising activities. He states that photographs of these activities have been published on social media and that the Bangladeshi authorities monitor such material. He relies on AIR2 paragraphs 107 to 119 in support of this claim. He contends that these activities have contributed to increased pressure and harassment being directed towards family members in Bangladesh.

The appellant also advances a sur place claim based upon developments after the fall of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024. He states that he continued openly supporting the BNP and criticising corruption in Bangladesh. As a result, he claims that he came into conflict not only with Awami League supporters but also with rival factions within the BNP. Specifically, he alleges that he opposed a controversial parliamentary candidate for the 2026 election and that supporters of that candidate have subsequently threatened him through Facebook and by telephoning his family. In a section 120 statement served on 9 February 2026, he asserts that he now faces risks from both Awami League remnants and factions within his own political movement, leaving him "caught between two fires" and unable to seek meaningful protection from any political group.

The appellant also relies heavily upon evidence concerning his mental health. He states that the cumulative effects of arrests, assaults, threats, false criminal cases, exile and fear of return have caused severe clinical depression. He states that he has been prescribed Sertraline since October 2025 by his Cardiff GP. He further relies upon an expert psychological assessment undertaken by Consultant Psychologist Mr JUM Nazmul Hossain on 11 and 13 January 2026, followed by a report dated 5 February 2026. The report is said to diagnose serious depression directly connected to political persecution, threats and fear of return. According to the appellant, the report identifies intrusive memories, hypervigilance, concentration difficulties and suicidal ideation. He asserts that mental health treatment in Bangladesh would be inadequate and that removal would expose him to a real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment.

The appellant specifically addresses numerous credibility concerns raised in the refusal decision. He argues that any discrepancies concerning the details of his arrests arise from the limited nature of the screening interview and the expectation that fuller evidence would be provided later. He attributes minor differences in dates, numbers and details to the passage of time and his deteriorating mental health. He denies that his previous intention to return to Bangladesh following completion of his LLM undermines his claim, arguing that his circumstances changed significantly after his arrival in the United Kingdom due to continuing threats, the collapse of his father's business, worsening political conditions and his inability to complete his studies.

The appellant further argues that his ability to leave Bangladesh without interference does not damage his account because immigration authorities are not always linked to other law-enforcement databases. He explains his failure to mention the land threat at screening by noting that he was instructed to provide only a brief summary and later gave a fuller account in AIR2 paragraph 88. He also responds to issues concerning BNP membership fees, explaining that after paying the initial 10 Taka membership fee, subsequent payments were covered by an uncle who was a senior BNP figure.

Addressing criticism that he lacked detailed knowledge of his role within the district committee, the appellant states that his duties included organising protests, distributing leaflets and mobilising students under the direction of senior BNP figures including Tarique Rahman, Begum Khaleda Zia and Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir. He argues that committee lists would not necessarily record all activities performed by members. He similarly responds to criticism concerning his knowledge of BNP aims and leaflet contents, stating that his depression affected recall but that the BNP's core messages concerned democratisation, free and fair elections and opposition to corruption.

The appellant maintains that there is no inconsistency regarding leaflet distribution because, in Bangladesh, campaign materials are routinely distributed both to party members and to members of the wider public. He attributes his release following arrest despite previous detention records to corruption and poor coordination within the Bangladeshi police system. He denies inconsistencies concerning the timing of threats, asserting that threats began before his departure and continued afterward through social media and phone calls. He explains that untranslated documents resulted from failures on the part of previous legal representatives and states that certified translations have now been provided.

In relation to documentary evidence, the appellant disputes the respondent's contention that photographs fail to establish the level of his political involvement. He argues that the photographs, viewed collectively over a six-year period and alongside committee lists, supporting letters and evidence of injuries, demonstrate sustained and visible activism. He similarly argues that any delay in claiming asylum should not be treated as damaging to credibility because he was experiencing severe mental distress and only later realised that threats would continue notwithstanding his move to the United Kingdom.

The appellant ultimately contends that he is a recognised Chhatra Dal activist at union and district level, that four false criminal cases remain active against him, and that he faces a real risk of arrest, detention, torture or other serious harm if returned to Bangladesh. He maintains that risk arises from state actors, Awami League supporters and rival BNP factions. He also argues that return would breach Article 3 ECHR because of the likely deterioration of his mental health and risk of suicide. Under Article 8 ECHR he relies upon his residence in the United Kingdom since October 2022, his Islamic marriage, plans to formalise a civil marriage, plans to have children, the support he receives from his wife and brother, his friendships and his integration into British society. He contends that return would create very significant obstacles to reintegration because of insecurity, active criminal proceedings, lack of employment prospects, absence of savings or property, deterioration in mental health and disruption of established family life. He emphasises that he has no criminal convictions in the United Kingdom and has consistently been of good character.

He was cross examined by Counsel for the respondent. The appellant gave oral evidence and confirmed that he was giving evidence remotely from his solicitors' office. He stated that he lived some distance away and that travelling to the hearing venue would take approximately four hours.

The appellant confirmed that his wife was not present because she was unwell. He was asked about the contents of her witness statement dated 2 September 2026. He stated that he was familiar with the statement, although he added that he suffered from memory problems. When asked whether the contents were true to the best of his knowledge, he replied that they were.

The appellant was referred to his wife's evidence that she was working full-time. He confirmed that this was correct. Asked when she had last worked, he stated that she had worked on the Tuesday prior to the hearing and that she had been expected to work on the day of the hearing. He explained that she had not attended work because of illness. He was asked whether, had she not been ill, she would have attended work or the hearing. He answered that she was due to attend the hearing as a witness and that her illness had prevented her from doing anything that day. When asked about the nature of her illness, he stated that she was suffering stomach pain and was unable to get out of bed. He said that she was being cared for by his brother's wife.

The appellant was questioned about the production of the Nikah certificate shortly before the hearing. He explained that he had been searching for the document for a considerable period and had “ransacked” the house looking for it without success. When asked when it had been found, he stated that it was located on the same day that it was submitted. On further questioning, he said that this had been the day before the hearing. Asked how he had managed to find the document after searching unsuccessfully for so long, he explained that it had been located underneath a bag that had already been packed in preparation for attending the hearing.

The appellant was asked why he had not approached the Cardiff Mosque to obtain a copy of the marriage documentation. He stated that he had not thought of doing so. He confirmed that he held a law degree from Bangladesh and had come to the United Kingdom to undertake a master's degree. It was put to him that, despite his legal education, he had not considered obtaining a replacement copy of the document. He responded that he was experiencing serious memory difficulties, frequent headaches and sleep deprivation, and that he regularly forgot things after one or two days.

Asked whether either he or his solicitors had prepared a list of relevant documents, he stated that they had not. He confirmed that the marriage ceremony in Bangladesh had taken place privately and secretly without the involvement or support of family members. He said that a handwritten marriage certificate had been issued at the time but that the original document had been lost.

When asked whether he could have requested a replacement copy, he accepted that this would have been possible. He explained, however, that he avoided contacting individuals in Bangladesh through Facebook or WhatsApp because he feared doing so. He stated that using social media applications triggered thoughts of suicide and caused him significant anxiety. When it was suggested that there would be no obvious difficulty in contacting the Imam who had conducted the ceremony, he replied that he preferred to avoid all such contacts because his enemies knew people associated with him and had indicated that anyone who learned of his whereabouts could pass that information on.

The appellant was then asked why a second Nikah ceremony had taken place in the United Kingdom if the marriage had already been validly concluded in Bangladesh. He explained that the original ceremony had been conducted in secret because the families did not support the marriage and were unaware of it at that time. Once the families later became aware of and accepted the relationship, a further ceremony took place in the United Kingdom. He stated that he had attempted to register the marriage formally in the United Kingdom but had been unable to do so because his passport had expired.

When asked whether his religion generally permitted two marriages between the same parties, he replied that a person could not marry the same person twice but that it was common to have more than one event associated with the marriage, such as an engagement ceremony followed by a more formal wedding celebration.

The appellant confirmed that his wife was a Bangladeshi citizen and currently held temporary status in the United Kingdom. It was suggested to him that there was no reason why she could not accompany him to Bangladesh other than the matters raised in his asylum claim. He responded that she had become aware of his difficulties, regularly saw him crying and understood the effect his mental health problems had on him. He stated that she was aware of the threats made against him through information received from family members and others and that she worried about his psychological condition and safety.

Following a short break, the appellant was asked about his political involvement and membership documentation. He stated that he first became involved with the party in 2014 and regularly attended the party office at that time. He explained that he was underage when he initially became involved but became a full member in 2015. He stated that by 2017 he was a regular attendee at both the party office and party events. He further stated that he was later expelled from the party.

Asked whether he had been issued with membership documents or a membership card, the appellant stated that his membership had initially been arranged through his uncle, who was a party leader. According to the appellant, his uncle retained the documentation and later refused to provide it to him after relations deteriorated. He stated that the documents contained within his appeal bundle were those he had managed to obtain subsequently and that the earlier membership records remained with his uncle.

The appellant was questioned about his relationship with his uncle. He stated that relations had originally been good but subsequently deteriorated. He explained that the deterioration coincided with the period when his father became seriously ill with cancer and required substantial funds for treatment. According to the appellant, the family wished to sell land to raise money, and this contributed to the breakdown in relations. He stated that difficulties began in 2019, became serious in 2020 and continue to the present day. He alleged that his uncle had taken control of family property, burned his father's house and destroyed a farm building.

It was put to the appellant that the destruction of the family home, property and business appeared to be the result of a family dispute. He agreed that his uncle was involved but stated that the uncle had received support from local political leaders. He described the difficulties as both a family and political dispute. When asked why he had not previously referred to a family dispute in his account, he replied that he had initially believed the disagreement was simply a dispute between brothers that would eventually be resolved and therefore had not considered it significant to mention. He stated that, as events escalated, it became clear that the matter was larger than a private family disagreement.

The appellant was challenged on his case that the destruction of the family business was politically motivated, it being suggested that he had now acknowledged a family dispute as the origin of events. He responded that the matter was political in nature but that family issues subsequently became involved. When asked which factor arose first, the political issues or the proposal to sell land to fund his father's treatment, he stated that the dispute had originally begun for political reasons and that the disagreement over the sale of land arose later because his uncle believed he would receive a smaller share if the land were sold. He maintained that this development became intertwined with the pre-existing political dispute.

When it was put to him that there had been no political pressure on the family home or farm before the proposal to sell land, he agreed that this had not been a problem initially. He was asked whether his father had reported the alleged arson attacks to the police. The appellant said that his father had wished to do so but that the police would not accept the complaint because his uncle was an influential local figure. When asked why no statement had been obtained from his father, he explained that his father's health had deteriorated significantly, that he was dying and was not in a condition to prepare a statement or otherwise assist.

Following a further break, the appellant was questioned about a press release and an expulsion order dated 2026. He stated that these documents had been provided to him by a lawyer in Bangladesh. He explained that the lawyer dealt with his affairs in Bangladesh and acted in connection with the cases brought against him there.

When asked whether he had instructed this lawyer to seek dismissal of the criminal proceedings against him, he confirmed that he had done so and that efforts had been made to have the cases discharged. However, he stated that the courts had not allowed this. He was asked why there was no documentary evidence before the Tribunal showing contact with the lawyer or the alleged efforts to challenge the proceedings. He replied that he had not appreciated that such evidence would be necessary for the purposes of the appeal.

It was suggested to the appellant that, given the central importance of the criminal proceedings to his claim and his legal training, he ought to have recognised the importance of providing such evidence. He replied that his mental health difficulties made it difficult for him to focus on stressful matters and that he preferred to avoid thinking about them. Asked whether he was saying that the criminal proceedings formed a central part of his fear of return but that it was nevertheless too stressful to obtain supporting evidence, he agreed and stated that he feared being imprisoned indefinitely if returned. He referred to cases in which individuals had allegedly remained in prison for fourteen years.

The appellant was asked how the lawyer had sent him the documents upon which he relied. He stated that they had been sent via WhatsApp. It was then put to him that he had previously claimed to be fearful of using WhatsApp. He replied that threats had previously been sent to him through WhatsApp. When asked why no screenshots of threats received through WhatsApp or social media had been produced, he stated that he was frightened of using those platforms and generally kept them switched off so that he would not see threatening messages. He confirmed that he had not produced any screenshots of social media threats.

Finally, the appellant was questioned about a photograph showing an injury to his chest. He was asked why no hospital records had been produced in relation to the treatment shown in the photograph. The appellant stated that the treatment had been obtained secretly at a private hospital because he feared that others might discover he was receiving treatment and cause him further problems. When asked whether any medical records relating to that treatment existed, he stated that the incident had occurred many years ago and that he had not sought to obtain documents from the hospital.

The appellant’s claimed wife’s evidence was as follows. Although she did not attend to give evidence it is important to see her account and her explanation of matters which feature in this appeal.

The appellant's wife. She states that they were married in Bangladesh in 2020 through an Islamic marriage ceremony. At the outset of their relationship, neither family approved of the marriage, which created difficulties for both parties. She states, however, that over time both families came to accept the relationship and marriage. She describes their relationship as genuine, committed and continuing, explaining that they have supported one another through educational pursuits, financial hardship, her husband's political difficulties and his mental health problems.

The witness emphasises that the appellant is not merely a person with whom she shares accommodation but is her husband, closest family member and the person with whom she has planned her future. She states that the uncertainty arising from his immigration status and asylum proceedings has had a profound effect on both of them. Following their arrival in the United Kingdom, they intended to register their marriage as a civil marriage. However, they were unable to complete this process. She explains that they obtained a Home Office-certified copy of the appellant's passport for submission to the marriage registration authorities, but the document was rejected because the passport had expired.

The witness states that neither she nor the appellant currently possess their marriage certificate or related marriage documentation. She explains that she did not bring those documents from Bangladesh when she travelled to the United Kingdom. She further states that both she and the appellant entered the United Kingdom as students and, as there was no need at that stage to provide marriage documentation to the Home Office, they did not consider it necessary to bring the Islamic marriage documents with them. Despite the absence of civil registration in the United Kingdom and the lack of immediate documentary evidence, she maintains that their relationship remains genuine and subsisting and that they continue to live together as husband and wife.

A significant feature of her evidence concerns the couple's expected first child. She states that she is pregnant with their first baby, due to be born in November 2026, and was approximately 28 weeks pregnant at the date of her statement. She explains that the pregnancy is of great importance to both of them and that they have spent considerable time discussing how they will raise their child, including the division of childcare responsibilities, household duties and parental roles. She states that the appellant wishes to be present at the birth of their child and to play an active and responsible role as a father. His presence is particularly important to her because this is her first pregnancy and her first experience of motherhood.

The witness expresses considerable concern about the possibility of having to give birth, recover from childbirth and care for a newborn child without the appellant's support. She explains that she is currently employed full-time and is responsible for helping manage the family's financial and household responsibilities. She states that after the birth she will need practical and emotional support from her husband and fears that prolonged separation would have a damaging effect on the stability of their family life and their ability to establish a secure environment for their child. She specifically states that she does not want the child to grow up without the father being able to participate fully in the early stages of the child's life and asks the Tribunal to consider the practical realities facing the family.

The witness outlines her own immigration and educational background. She states that she came to the United Kingdom as a student and successfully completed an MSc in Public Health. She currently holds leave to remain under the Graduate Route and is employed full-time. She intends to continue developing her professional and academic career and is considering further postgraduate study. At the same time, she intends to raise their child and continue building their family life. She states that the appellant's support will be important in enabling her to balance childcare responsibilities, employment and future educational ambitions. She explains that, if the appellant were required to return to Bangladesh, she would face substantial practical difficulties in managing childcare, work commitments, household responsibilities and further education largely on her own, particularly during the period immediately following the birth of their first child.

Turning to the appellant's circumstances, the witness states that he entered the United Kingdom as an international student with the intention of studying for an LLM and advancing his professional career. She explains that he had plans for his future education and employment before political difficulties in Bangladesh became a serious concern. She states that he was unable to complete his LLM because of political circumstances, uncertainty regarding his situation in Bangladesh and the financial difficulties which followed. According to the witness, she has personally observed the distress caused by his inability to complete the qualification. She explains that many of his friends and professional associates have completed LLM studies and that he feels returning to Bangladesh without completing his course would be professionally and personally difficult. However, she emphasises that his principal concern is not educational or economic disadvantage but rather the risks he believes he faces because of his political profile and ongoing legal difficulties in Bangladesh.

The witness states that the appellant informed her that he is involved in an ongoing political case in Bangladesh and is currently a warrant accused. She explains that he fears arrest if returned. She also states that she is aware of his political activities and support for Giyas Uddin Taheri. According to her evidence, the appellant has explained that his support for that individual has created hostility from persons connected to his former BNP political associates. She states that he has reported receiving threats to his life and fears that those hostile towards him may harm him if he returns to Bangladesh. She says that she has witnessed the seriousness with which he regards those risks and maintains that his fears relate principally to his personal safety rather than to employment or educational concerns.

The witness further states that the appellant has informed her that members of his family in Bangladesh have experienced threats arising from political circumstances. According to her understanding, those threats resulted in family members leaving their home and residing elsewhere for safety reasons. She states that this has increased the appellant's fear because he no longer believes that he has a safe or stable family environment to which he could return. While acknowledging that she cannot independently verify every event said to have occurred in Bangladesh, she explains that she has learned of these matters directly from her husband and asks that her evidence be considered alongside the documentary evidence relating to his political activities, legal proceedings, family circumstances and alleged threats.

A substantial section of the statement concerns the appellant's mental health. The witness states that she is particularly concerned about his psychological wellbeing and describes him as having suffered severe anxiety and depression. She explains that she has personally observed a deterioration in his mental health during the period in which he has been dealing with political difficulties, his asylum claim and uncertainty regarding his future. She states that the appellant is receiving support through his GP and remains under continuing medical care. She understands that he is awaiting psychological therapy and that relevant medical evidence, GP records, referrals and supporting documents have been supplied to his legal representatives.

The witness describes having observed significant anxiety, fear and distress in the appellant. She states that uncertainty concerning the possibility of return to Bangladesh has been especially difficult for him. Most significantly, she reports that the appellant has previously made two suicide attempts, a matter which has caused her considerable fear and distress. She expresses concern that any significant deterioration in his circumstances, particularly if he were separated from her and their unborn child and returned to a country which he fears, could have a serious impact upon his mental health. She makes clear that she is not purporting to give expert medical evidence and accepts that professional clinicians are responsible for assessing his condition. Her purpose, she explains, is to recount her personal observations and explain the basis of her concern for his wellbeing.

Returning to the impact of removal upon the family, the witness reiterates that she was approximately 28 weeks pregnant and preparing for the birth of the couple's first child. She states that the possibility of the appellant being required to leave the United Kingdom at this stage of the pregnancy is extremely distressing. In addition to working full-time, she is preparing for the arrival of the baby, managing household finances and planning future educational opportunities. She states that the appellant's emotional and practical support is therefore particularly important. If he were removed, she would face pregnancy, childbirth, post-natal recovery and the care of a newborn child without him, whilst continuing to meet employment, domestic and educational commitments.

The witness also expresses concern about the emotional consequences of separation. She explains that she has supported the appellant through his mental health difficulties and fears for his wellbeing if removed from the United Kingdom. At the same time, she would face the birth and care of their first child without her husband's presence. She describes this prospect as causing significant distress.

The witness further explains that her concern cannot be limited to any one issue in isolation. In her view, the appellant's political fears affect his mental health; his mental health affects his ability to cope with uncertainty; and the possibility of separation affects both parties at a time when they are preparing to become parents. She states that the combination of the appellant's claimed political risks, ongoing legal difficulties, continuing mental health treatment and impending fatherhood creates an unusually difficult situation.

In conclusion, the witness states that she and the appellant wish to continue their family life together in the United Kingdom, raise their child jointly and continue building a stable family environment. She wishes the appellant to remain safe, continue receiving mental health treatment and be present for the birth and upbringing of their first child. She also wishes to continue her employment and educational aspirations whilst sharing childcare and family responsibilities with him. She notes that they have already experienced significant uncertainty arising from his asylum claim and the circumstances that caused him to leave Bangladesh and expresses the hope that their family can remain together as they approach the birth of their child.

Dr Kashmiri examined the appellant and provided her opinion in relation to his mental state.

The psychiatric report records that the appellant was assessed on 28 July 2026 for the purposes of an independent psychiatric evaluation. The psychiatrist states that the opinions expressed are based upon the history provided by the appellant, the findings of the mental state examination, and the documentary and background material reviewed as part of the assessment.

The report describes the appellant as a 28-year-old Bangladeshi national who attributes the onset of his mental health difficulties to a series of significant events beginning in 2020. According to the history provided, these included his father's diagnosis of stage IV bowel cancer, a longstanding inheritance dispute involving his paternal uncle, financial hardship, and what he characterises as political persecution in Bangladesh. The psychiatrist records that the appellant views these events as cumulative stressors which caused and perpetuated his psychological difficulties.

The report notes that the appellant described being subjected to threats, intimidation and violence arising both from the family inheritance dispute and his political activities. The psychiatrist records that the appellant's political circumstances evolved over time. Initially, he stated that he experienced persecution at the hands of Awami League supporters because of his involvement with the Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Chhatra Dal. He subsequently reported supporting a candidate from the Bangladesh Islami Front during a later election period. According to the appellant, this resulted in his expulsion from the Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Chhatra Dal and led to hostility and persecution from BNP members. The psychiatrist records that the appellant believes he became the target of political opponents from more than one source and that these experiences have made a significant contribution to his current psychological distress and his fear of return to Bangladesh.

The report further records allegations that the appellant was physically assaulted, prevented from selling family property in order to fund his father's cancer treatment, and falsely implicated in criminal proceedings. According to the history given to the psychiatrist, these matters resulted in ongoing criminal proceedings and the existence of an arrest warrant in Bangladesh. The appellant also reported that, after his departure from Bangladesh, threats towards his family continued. He described incidents of intimidation, damage to property and attempts to force family members to leave their home. The psychiatrist records that the appellant regards these experiences as central to his protection claim and that he continues to fear returning because he believes he would remain at risk of persecution.

The report identifies a claimed substantial psychiatric history. The psychiatrist notes that the appellant reports three previous suicide attempts and remains under the care of his GP. At the time of the assessment he was prescribed Mirtazapine, was receiving weekly psychological support from Oasis and was awaiting the commencement of NHS talking therapy. Despite these interventions, the psychiatrist records that the appellant reported little overall improvement in his mental state.

At assessment, the appellant described persistent symptoms of depression and anxiety. These included ongoing low mood, marked anxiety, disturbed sleep, fluctuating appetite, loss of motivation, social withdrawal, impaired concentration, neglect of personal hygiene, recurring panic attacks, excessive feelings of guilt, hopelessness and continuing suicidal thoughts, although without current suicidal intent. The psychiatrist reports that these symptoms have had a profound effect upon the appellant's day-to-day functioning. He stated that he had been unable to work for several months despite having permission to do so and had become dependent upon his brother, sister-in-law and wife for practical and emotional support.

The report notes that the appellant resides with his brother's family, whom he described as a major source of support and stability. His wife, who is pregnant with their first child, was also described as an important source of emotional support. Nevertheless, the psychiatrist records that the appellant experiences significant guilt because his mental health condition prevents him from working and contributing financially to the household. He reported constant concern about his ability to fulfil his responsibilities as a husband and future father.

The psychiatrist records that the appellant's primary concerns relate to uncertainty surrounding his immigration status and the possibility of return to Bangladesh. According to the report, the appellant believes that removal would expose him once again to the circumstances that contributed to the deterioration of his mental health. These circumstances include the unresolved inheritance dispute, alleged persecution by his paternal uncle and associated individuals, continuing political hostility and the wider conflict concerning the family estate. The appellant also expressed concern that return would interrupt the psychiatric treatment and support currently available to him in the United Kingdom. The psychiatrist concludes that these ongoing stressors continue to contribute significantly to his psychological distress and impaired functioning.

Applying the diagnostic criteria contained within the DSM-V, the psychiatrist concludes that the appellant meets the criteria for Severe Major Depressive Disorder without psychotic features. In support of that diagnosis, the report notes the appellant's longstanding low mood, significant reduction in interest and pleasure in daily activities, low motivation, lack of energy, sleep disturbance, fluctuating appetite accompanied by substantial weight gain, impaired concentration, excessive guilt, feelings of worthlessness, recurrent thoughts of death, continuing suicidal ideation and a history of three suicide attempts. The psychiatrist notes that these symptoms have persisted for several years, are present for the majority of the time, and have caused marked impairment across occupational, social and personal functioning. The report records that the appellant has been unable to work for a number of months, has withdrawn from routine activities, neglects aspects of personal hygiene and remains dependent upon family members for emotional and practical support.

The psychiatrist also concludes that the appellant meets DSM-V criteria for Generalised Anxiety Disorder. The report states that he experiences excessive and persistent anxiety which is difficult to control and relates to multiple areas of his life. These concerns include his father's serious illness, conflict over the family inheritance, financial hardship, uncertainty about his immigration status and the political persecution which he reports having experienced from both Awami League supporters and, subsequently, members of the BNP. The psychiatrist records that this anxiety is accompanied by a range of physical symptoms, including excessive sweating, palpitations, chest tightness, panic attacks, sleep disturbance, restlessness, fatigue and impaired concentration. The report states that these symptoms have been present over a prolonged period, occur on most days and cause significant distress and impairment in daily functioning. According to the psychiatrist, they interfere with the appellant's ability to work, maintain normal daily activities and participate fully in social and family life. The report further concludes that the symptoms are not better explained by any alternative psychiatric condition, substance misuse or underlying medical condition.

To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, in considering whether the appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:

If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:

To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.

The relevant provisions of the Immigration Rules in this appeal are: [Insert relevant paragraphs, usually no need to cite the full provisions unless they are in dispute]

In so far as they rely on article 8 outside the Rules it is for the appellant to show that article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged and if so, it is for the respondent to show that the decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Sections 117A to 117D of the 2002 Act are relevant to any assessment under article 8 of the ECHR outside the Rules.

For the appellant to succeed on Article 3 ECHR grounds, the appellant has the burden to prove to the lower standard a real risk of torture, inhuman and/or degrading treatment or punishment ("the treatment"). Article 3 is a non-derogable right. The treatment complained of must reach a minimum level of severity, which is a relative threshold and depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, the manner and method of execution, duration, physical or mental effects and the appellant's sex, age and state of health. Article 3 includes both positive and negative obligations on the state to refrain from the treatment and/or to take measures to effectively protect people from such treatment.

The question is whether the refusal breaches the appellant's Article 3 ECHR right not to be "subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". The appellant must establish that they are a seriously ill person and adduce evidence capable of demonstrating that substantial grounds have been shown for believing that as a seriously ill person they would face a real risk, on account of the absence of appropriate treatment or the lack of access to such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in their state of health resulting in intense suffering, or to a significant reduction in life expectancy.

My approach to assessing credibility comes from KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal commended consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. I consider any documents along with all the evidence in the round. I am also conscious that just because a person has lied about one thing does not mean he has lied about another.

Section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 means that behaviour designed or likely to conceal information, mislead, obstruct or delay consideration of a claim, and claims made after a negative decision has been made or after there was an opportunity to make a claim in a safe country are damaging to credibility.

I do not accept that the appellant was a politically active BNP or Chhatra Dal member in Bangladesh.

I do not accept that the appellant held any significant position or role within the BNP or Chhatra Dal.

I do not accept that the appellant was arrested, detained or mistreated by the Bangladeshi authorities for reasons of his political activity.

I do not accept that the appellant came to the adverse attention of the Bangladeshi authorities, local Awami League leaders or any other political actors for the reasons claimed.

I do not accept that the appellant was subjected to politically motivated threats, attacks or persecution in Bangladesh.

I do not accept that the criminal proceedings and allegations relied upon by the appellant were politically motivated or fabricated for reasons connected to his claimed political profile.

I place no weight upon the evidence of the appellant's claimed wife.

I find that the evidence relating to the claimed marriage, including the existence of two separate marriage certificates relating to the same purported marriage, undermines the reliability of the appellant's account.

I place only limited weight upon the documentary and photographic evidence relied upon by the appellant.

I do not accept that the appellant has engaged in political activities in the United Kingdom which have brought him to the adverse attention of the authorities or any political actors in Bangladesh.

I do not accept that the appellant remains of adverse interest to the government of Bangladesh, the Awami League, BNP factions or any other political group.

I do not accept that the appellant faces a real risk of persecution, serious harm, arrest, detention or ill-treatment in Bangladesh for any Refugee Convention reason.

I do not accept that the essential factual basis of the appellant's protection claim has been established, even to the lower standard of proof.

Having considered the evidence in the round, including the appellant's oral evidence, witness statements, asylum interview records, documentary evidence, expert reports and background material, I am not satisfied that the core elements of the appellant's account are reasonably likely to be true.

Although I accept the appellant's nationality and identity, I do not accept the material aspects of his protection claim. In particular, I am not satisfied that the appellant has established that he was a politically active BNP or Chhatra Dal member in Bangladesh, that he occupied any significant political role within those organisations, that he came to the adverse attention of the Bangladeshi authorities or local Awami League leaders for political reasons, or that he has engaged in political activities in the United Kingdom which would place him at risk on return.

My conclusions derive not from any single inconsistency or evidential deficiency, but from the cumulative effect of numerous credibility concerns which arise throughout the evidence.

I have also considered the evidence of the appellant's claimed wife. I place no weight upon her evidence.

Her witness statement was served at a very late stage in the proceedings. No satisfactory explanation was provided for the delay. The matters addressed in her statement, namely the claimed relationship, marriage, pregnancy, family life and her observations of the appellant's circumstances, were matters which had been known for a considerable period. I am not persuaded that there was any good reason why such evidence could not have been prepared and served substantially earlier.

I have further considered the explanation advanced for her non-attendance. The appellant stated that she was suffering from stomach pain and was unable to leave her bed on the day of the hearing. However, there was no independent medical evidence before me confirming her condition or explaining why she could not give evidence remotely by video link. The appellant's evidence was that she had intended to attend as a witness before becoming unwell. It was also his evidence that she remained at home and was being cared for by his sister-in-law. Whilst I accept that she may have been unwell, I am not satisfied, on the evidence before me, that her condition prevented her from participating in the hearing remotely. No application was made supported by medical evidence, nor was any alternative arrangement proposed.

In circumstances where the witness was not available for cross-examination, where her statement was provided at a very late stage and where I am not satisfied that there was a good reason for her failure to give evidence, I attach no evidential weight to her witness statement. Consequently, I derive no assistance from her evidence in relation to the claimed marriage, the asserted family life, the appellant's political difficulties, his alleged fear of return, or his claimed mental health difficulties. Her account largely repeats matters relayed to her by the appellant in any event and does not provide independent corroboration of the central elements of the claim.

I also have significant concerns regarding the evidence surrounding the claimed marriage.

The appellant's case is that he married his claimed wife in Bangladesh in 2020 through an Islamic ceremony which was conducted secretly because their families did not approve of the relationship. He then claims that a further Islamic marriage ceremony took place in the United Kingdom after both families became aware of and accepted the relationship.

I found the evidence relating to these ceremonies unsatisfactory and inherently unusual. The appellant's explanation was that there had effectively been two marriage ceremonies involving the same parties because the first had been secret and the second occurred after family approval had been obtained. When this matter was explored in cross-examination, the appellant accepted that a person could not ordinarily marry the same person twice but sought to distinguish between different forms of ceremonies, describing one as a secret marriage and the other as a form of ceremonial event after family acceptance despite the fact that the families knew of the wedding and the marriage which had purportedly occurred in Bangladesh.

I do not find this explanation entirely persuasive. The existence of two separate marriage certificates relating to what is said to be the same marriage is a highly unusual feature of the evidence. It raises obvious questions regarding precisely what legal or religious events occurred on each occasion, the status of the respective ceremonies and the purpose of obtaining multiple certificates. Despite the centrality of the marriage to his Article 8 claim, the evidence concerning these matters remained confused and inadequately explained.

My concerns are heightened by the difficulties surrounding the documentary evidence. The appellant initially asserted that he did not possess the marriage documents and that they had effectively been lost. Despite claiming for a considerable period that he could not locate them, a Nikah certificate was suddenly discovered and produced only the day before the hearing. The explanation that this significant document was found underneath a bag packed for the hearing after extensive unsuccessful searches is not entirely convincing.

Further, although the appellant is legally educated and holds a law degree, he made no meaningful attempt to obtain replacement copies from obvious sources. He ultimately accepted during cross-examination that he could have sought copies from the relevant religious authorities. His explanation for failing to do so centred upon concerns regarding social media and contact with individuals in Bangladesh. However, this sits uneasily with his acceptance that he remained in communication with others in Bangladesh, including lawyers acting on his behalf, and that documents continued to be transmitted to him through electronic means.

The evidence concerning the marriage therefore presents a number of difficulties. The existence of multiple purported marriage certificates, the absence for a prolonged period of original documentation, the late production of key documents, the unsatisfactory explanation for their discovery and the absence of evidence from the claimed wife that could be tested in cross-examination all undermine the reliability of the appellant's account.

Whilst I do not find it necessary to make a definitive finding as to whether some form of relationship exists between the appellant and the claimed wife, I conclude that the marriage evidence is unreliable and adds further to my wider concerns regarding the appellant's credibility. The unusual circumstances surrounding the two claimed marriage ceremonies and the inconsistent and evolving explanations provided in relation to the supporting documentation materially undermine confidence in the appellant's evidence as a whole.

These matters do not stand in isolation. They form part of a broader pattern throughout the evidence. The appellant has repeatedly relied upon late-produced evidence, documents of uncertain provenance, explanations which have evolved over time and accounts which have not remained consistent under scrutiny. The marriage evidence and the evidence of the claimed wife are examples of that wider difficulty and reinforce my conclusion that the appellant is not a reliable witness and that the central elements of his account have not been established even to the lower standard applicable in protection claims.

The appellant's account of his political activities and alleged persecution is undermined at the outset by significant omissions from his screening interview. He now relies upon arrests in 2019 and 2020 as central elements of his claim. He maintains that these arrests resulted in detention, beatings, threats and ongoing adverse attention from the authorities. However, when asked during screening why he sought asylum, whether he had ever been accused of a crime and whether he had ever been detained, he made no mention of either arrest. These are not peripheral matters. On his own account, they form an important part of the sequence of events which allegedly caused him to flee Bangladesh and later seek asylum in the United Kingdom. I do not accept the explanation that the screening interview was merely a brief process. Whilst it is recognised that screening interviews are not intended to elicit a full asylum narrative, an individual who claims to have been arrested, detained and beaten for political reasons would reasonably be expected to mention those events when specifically asked about detention, criminal accusations and the basis of his fear. The omission materially damages his credibility.

I reach a similar conclusion regarding the alleged threat involving family land. The appellant now describes a police threat in July 2022 that family land would be sold because of his political activities as the final event that caused him to leave Bangladesh. He expressly characterises this as the "trigger event" leading to his departure. However, despite its alleged significance, this matter was also omitted from the screening interview. I do not accept that such an event would have been forgotten or omitted if it genuinely constituted the immediate catalyst for leaving the country.

The appellant's evidence concerning his intentions when he entered the United Kingdom is also problematic. In his screening interview he stated that he intended to return to Bangladesh following the completion of his studies. That position sits uneasily with his later account that he had already suffered arrests, assaults, threats, intimidation and false prosecutions before leaving Bangladesh. If the circumstances in Bangladesh were genuinely as severe as now claimed, I consider it unlikely that the appellant would have arrived in the United Kingdom with a genuine intention of returning at the conclusion of his studies. His explanation that circumstances subsequently changed does not adequately address the contradiction between his stated intention to return and the seriousness of the risks he now claims already existed.

I also attach weight to the circumstances of his departure from Bangladesh. The appellant claims that he was of continuing adverse interest to politically connected individuals and to state authorities. He claims that he was arrested, targeted and threatened. Nevertheless, he departed Bangladesh using his own passport after obtaining a student visa and encountered no difficulties at the airport. His explanation was simply that he informed nobody of his travel arrangements other than his parents. In circumstances where he alleges sustained and serious political interest in him, I do not find this explanation persuasive.

I reject the claimed expertise and report prepared by Md Solaiman (Tushar). I note the criticisms of him made recently by the Upper Tribunal in SU (Expert reports – format) [2026] UKUT 00317. I adopt and endorse those criticism and concerns. The report in this case is generic, lacking in any credible referencing of the sources of claimed information and simply being a lawyer in the country does not make you an expert in matters concerning the political make up and happenings of that country. I place little weight on it and not any which would be meaningful for the appellant.

There are further difficulties concerning his claimed political membership. His evidence regarding BNP membership fees was inconsistent. During one interview he said that there was a membership fee of 10 Taka and that no further payments were required. During a later interview he stated that he paid no fees because students were not required to contribute financially. More recently he suggested that the initial fee was paid but subsequent fees were met by his uncle. These shifting explanations undermine confidence in his account of membership. Whilst any one discrepancy might be minor, membership of the BNP is a central feature of the claim and one would expect a consistent account of the process by which membership was obtained and maintained.

The appellant's claimed political role lacked clarity and detail. When asked about his responsibilities within the district committee, he referred to prominent national BNP figures but failed to provide a coherent account of his own reporting structure, duties or chain of command within the local organisation. The committee documents relied upon do not resolve that difficulty. Similarly, when questioned about BNP policies and objectives he provided limited and generic responses. Given the extent of the political involvement he claims, including years of activism, attendance at demonstrations and distribution of political material, I consider the lack of detail notable.

The appellant's evidence concerning leaflet distribution was also unsatisfactory. He was unable to provide a meaningful description of leaflet content despite claiming to have distributed such material repeatedly. He stated that he would need to obtain a copy from Bangladesh in order to remember what the leaflets contained. I do not find that explanation convincing. Individuals who actively participate in political campaigning would ordinarily be expected to recall at least the broad themes and messages of the materials they distributed.

There were also inconsistencies concerning the recipients of those leaflets and how he identified them. At one stage he stated that leaflets were distributed to BNP members. Later he said that they were distributed more generally, including to non-members. His explanations concerning how members and non-members were identified changed over time. Initially he suggested he knew the individuals concerned through regular telephone contact. Later he relied upon unnamed local sources who allegedly knew the political views of residents. His evidence lacked detail and consistency.

I was also unpersuaded by his explanation regarding his release following his second alleged arrest. He maintained that he was released because the police may not have known of his earlier detention. That explanation sits uneasily with his wider claim that he was already a known political activist subject to continuing adverse attention from the authorities. It strikes me as speculative rather than evidentially supported.

The appellant's evidence regarding threats was similarly inconsistent. He stated at one point that the last threats received in Bangladesh occurred shortly before his departure in August 2022. He later claimed that threats continued through Facebook and social media after his arrival in the United Kingdom. The chronology was unclear and changed during the course of the evidence.

During cross-examination, further concerns arose regarding the reliability of his account. The late production of the Nikah certificate was inadequately explained. The appellant stated that the document could not be located despite extensive searches and was discovered only the day before the hearing underneath a packed travel bag. Given the significance of the document to the issues before the Tribunal, I do not find that explanation entirely satisfactory. Equally, despite holding legal qualifications, he made no meaningful attempt to obtain replacement copies from obvious sources and ultimately conceded that he could have done so.

Additional concerns arose from his evidence regarding his uncle. In cross-examination, he introduced aspects of a family inheritance dispute which had not previously featured prominently in the account. At times he described the difficulties as political. At other times he accepted that they arose from a family dispute linked to the proposed sale of family land to fund his father's cancer treatment. His explanation as to how the dispute evolved shifted during his answers. I found it difficult to identify a coherent and consistent chronology. The evidence suggested that significant aspects of the difficulties involving his uncle may have had familial and financial origins rather than the exclusively political motivation now asserted.

The documentary evidence does not materially assist the appellant. Applying the principles in Tanveer Ahmed, the burden remains on the appellant to establish that documents relied upon can safely be accepted as genuine and reliable. Several documents were initially produced without translations. Others contain anomalies or inconsistencies when compared against the oral evidence. The letter from the local Chhatra Dal branch records a commencement date for his activities that is inconsistent with dates given elsewhere in the evidence. The appellant has also been unable to provide a satisfactory account of how a number of documents came into his possession in the United Kingdom. The claimed false prosecution documents are not shown to be reliable. False and fictitious documents can easily be obtained from Bangladesh and the appellant has not shown that the ones he relies upon are genuine.

The photographic evidence similarly carries limited weight. The photographs undoubtedly depict the appellant attending events involving groups of people. However, photographs of attendance at gatherings do not establish the nature, significance or level of political involvement claimed. They do not independently verify leadership roles, organisational responsibilities or adverse interest from the authorities. Viewed in the context of the wider credibility concerns identified above, I attach only limited weight to those images.

I also take into account the delay in claiming asylum. The appellant entered the United Kingdom in October 2022 but did not claim asylum until approximately nine months later. Although explanations have been advanced concerning mental health and changing circumstances, I consider that an individual genuinely fearing return for reasons already known before departure would ordinarily seek protection sooner. I regard the delay as a further factor damaging credibility.

Taking all of these matters together, I am not satisfied that the appellant has established, even to the lower standard applicable in protection appeals, that he was a politically active BNP or Chhatra Dal member as claimed, that he was arrested or persecuted for political reasons, that false politically motivated criminal proceedings exist against him, that he remains of adverse interest to state authorities or Awami League actors, or that his political activities in the United Kingdom have brought him to the attention of any relevant actors in Bangladesh. I therefore reject the essential factual basis of the protection claim.

Turning to Article 3 ECHR. I have directed myself in accordance with AM (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 17. The relevant question is whether the Appellant has established substantial grounds for believing that, if returned to Bangladesh, he would face a real risk of either:

a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health resulting in intense suffering; or

a substantial reduction in life expectancy,

arising from the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving state or the lack of access to such treatment.

I accept that Dr Mariam Kashmiri possesses the requisite professional qualifications to comment on matters within the scope of her expertise. However, I note that it is not apparent from her report that she had access to, or considered, the Appellant's complete GP records. Whilst reference is made to correspondence from The City Surgery, there is no clear indication that the full primary care records were reviewed. I regard this as a limitation in the evidential weight that can properly be attached to the report, particularly in light of the guidance in HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 111 (IAC).

I also note that the Appellant has not produced his GP records for the Tribunal's consideration. In circumstances where those records would be directly relevant to the assessment of his mental health, I draw no positive inference from their absence.

I have considered Dr Kashmiri's diagnosis of major depressive disorder without psychotic features and generalised anxiety disorder. I accept that the Appellant may suffer from symptoms of depression and anxiety. However, I do not find that the diagnosis, of itself, establishes that he is a seriously ill person for the purposes of the Article 3 medical threshold.

I further find that the report does not adequately engage with the possibility that the Appellant's account may be inaccurate or unreliable. Given my findings elsewhere regarding the Appellant's credibility, I consider that this omission reduces the weight I can attach to conclusions that depend upon acceptance of the Appellant's account. I also find that the report does not fully explore alternative explanations for the Appellant's presentation before attributing causation to the matters relied upon by the Appellant.

Having considered the report as a whole, I do not find that the evidence establishes that the Appellant would face a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his health resulting in intense suffering if returned to Bangladesh. Nor do I find that the evidence establishes a real risk of a substantial reduction in his life expectancy. Whilst Dr Kashmiri describes the prognosis as "guarded", I do not consider that this amounts to evidence capable of satisfying the high threshold identified in AM (Zimbabwe).

My conclusion in this regard is reinforced by my findings on credibility. To the extent that aspects of the diagnosis and prognosis are based upon events which I have not accepted occurred as claimed, the foundation for those opinions is materially weakened.

I have also considered whether any deterioration in the Appellant's condition would arise from the absence of appropriate treatment in Bangladesh or an inability to access such treatment. The evidence before me does not establish either proposition. I find that mental health treatment, including psychological therapies such as cognitive behavioural therapy, is available in Bangladesh. I am not satisfied that the Appellant would be unable to access appropriate treatment upon return.

Insofar as reliance is placed upon any risk of suicide, I have considered the guidance in J v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 629. I find that any such risk is closely linked to the Appellant's asserted fear of events in Bangladesh. For the reasons set out elsewhere in this decision, I do not accept that the Appellant has established an objectively well-founded fear of such treatment. That finding weighs against the conclusion that removal would give rise to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3.

Accordingly, I find that the Appellant has failed to establish that removal to Bangladesh would breach Article 3 ECHR on medical grounds.

I have considered whether the facts disclose any separate basis upon which Article 8 ECHR may succeed. I find that the matters relied upon by the Appellant in respect of his health do not disclose any additional or distinct factual element beyond those advanced under Article 3. Applying the principles set out in GS (India) & Others v SSHD [2015] EWCA Civ 40, I find that the Appellant has not demonstrated circumstances capable of engaging Article 8 on health grounds independently of his unsuccessful Article 3 claim. Accordingly, the claim cannot succeed under Article 8 for those reasons.

I have considered whether the Appellant has established the existence of a genuine and subsisting relationship for the purposes of Article 8 ECHR.

I am not satisfied, on the evidence before me, that the Appellant has established such a relationship. In reaching that conclusion, I have taken into account the limited documentary evidence produced in support of the claimed relationship.

I note that the Appellant states that an Islamic marriage ceremony took place in Bangladesh. However, no photographs of that ceremony have been provided. The Appellant also states that a further Islamic marriage ceremony took place in the United Kingdom. In support of that claim, only a single photograph has been produced. I find that the photographic evidence is extremely limited.

I further note that the Appellant described his relationship status as "single" in his Entry Clearance Application Form. I regard this as inconsistent with his current claim to be in a genuine and subsisting marital relationship.

In addition, there is no documentary evidence of communication between the Appellant and his claimed partner, either during periods when they were apart or whilst residing in different countries. I have already dealt with the claimed partner’s statement and place no reliance upon it. Her absence compounds my concerns in relation to it.

Considering the evidence in the round, I am not satisfied that the Appellant has discharged the burden of proving that he is in a genuine and subsisting relationship. I therefore find that Article 8 family life is not engaged on the basis advanced.

Alternatively, if I am wrong in that conclusion and the Appellant is in a genuine and subsisting relationship, I find that he cannot meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules. In particular, I find that the relevant immigration status requirements are not met.

I have also considered whether there are exceptional circumstances such that refusal of the appeal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Appellant or his claimed partner. I find that there are not.

I find that family life could reasonably continue in Bangladesh should the Appellant and his partner choose to reside there together. Alternatively, if the partner chooses to remain in the United Kingdom to complete her studies or work, I find that family life could be maintained through modern means of communication together with visits between the United Kingdom and Bangladesh. Whilst such arrangements would inevitably involve inconvenience and emotional hardship, I do not find that the consequences would be unjustifiably harsh or disproportionate. The graduate visa that the claimed wife currently enjoys is not a route to settlement.

Accordingly, I find that the appeal cannot succeed under Article 8 ECHR.

The appeal is dismissed on all grounds

Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant To rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant [and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified], is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.