Appeal No.UA-2025-000417-PIP
Between:
SN
Appellant
- v -
The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
Respondent
Before: Upper Tribunal Judge Price
Decision date: 15 January 2026
Decided on consideration of the papers
Representation:
Appellant: Ms Nicola McLaughlin
Respondent: Ms Clare Pettet
On appeal from
Tribunal: First Tier (Social Entitlement Chamber)
Tribunal Case No: SC914/24/00095
Tribunal Venue: Brighton
Decision Date: 22 April 2024
RULE 14 Order
Pursuant to rule 14(1) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, it is prohibited for any person to disclose or publish any matter likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant in these proceedings.
This order does not apply to: (a) the respondent; (b) any person to whom the respondent discloses such a matter or who learns of it through publication by the respondent; or (c) any person exercising statutory (including judicial) functions where knowledge of the matter is reasonably necessary for the proper exercise of the functions.
DECISION
The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to allow the appeal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal made on 22 April 2024 under number SC914/24/00095 was made in error of law. Under section 12(2)(a) and (b)(i) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 I set that decision aside and remit the case to be reconsidered by a fresh tribunal in accordance with the following directions.
Directions
This case is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for reconsideration at an oral hearing by a newly constituted panel.
REASONS FOR DECISION
Background to the appeal
The appellant made a claim for Personal Independence Payment (‘PIP’) on 21 March 2023. PIP is made up of two components, mobility and daily living. On 31 August 2023, the Secretary of State decided to refuse the appellant the daily living and mobility components. She was awarded nil points for both components. The appellant requested a mandatory reconsideration of this decision, however the decision remained unchanged. The appellant challenged this decision by way of appeal to the First -tier tribunal (‘FtT’).
The FtT heard the appeal on 22 April 2024 and refused the appeal. They gave a statement of reasons on 5 June 2024. The appellant applied to the FtT for permission to appeal this decision. This was refused on 5 August 2024. She renewed this application before the UT on 7 April 2025. She was granted permission to appeal out of time by UTJ Wright and I don’t therefore revisit that issue.
The FtT’s findings
At paragraphs 24, 25, 26 of their statement of reasons, the FtT set out the following,
“The appellant last worked in October 2021 when she was signed off and then she resigned from her role in January 2022. She worked on a maintenance helpdesk as a coordinator for Moto Hospitality a motorway services company which was located above the motorway service station at Toddington Services and she worked there from July 2021 to October 2021. Prior to that she worked in the Costa Coffee Head Office in Houghton Regis in the supply chain as a category planner where she dealt with stock in the stores and deliveries from suppliers. She said she lost her job after her mental health deteriorated but she also said that the temporary contract ended. She had been commuting by using her mother’s car to get to and from work. After she returned to the UK from Australia she went to work in Costa Coffee. She said she had 8 jobs in 10 years which she implied demonstrated how she had difficulty holding down jobs because of her mental health.
She explained that she had been signed off for a total of 3 years because of a combination of caring for her mother and her own mental health issues.
The Tribunal accepted that there may have been times in the past when the appellant’s mental health and her caring responsibilities for her mother were such that she was not able to work. However, she had managed to travel independently to Australia from November 2018 to June 2019 and she had returned to the UK and re-entered the workplace. The Tribunal is satisfied there are no barriers to the appellant re-entering the workplace now.”
In respect of issues raised by the second ground of appeal, the FtT statement of reasons set out the following:
“The appellant is physically able to wash and get in and out of the bath. She said she was actually washing every few days and then clarified by saying that she would bathe her body once a week, she would wash her face 5 days out of 7 but she was not brushing her teeth regularly, but she was using mouthwash daily.
38.She was asked what might make her wash/bathe more regularly and she said that nothing would and she explained that there was “no point”. The Tribunal put her ability to wash/bathe in the context of her mental health, which was assessed as being well controlled and she described how she was making an active choice about whether to wash/bathe or not. There was no facility for the staff at her accommodation to prompt or encourage her to bathe and in any event she said she was not aware that they could help with that.
39.When asked if prompting could help her bathe more often, she said she was now becoming defensive about some of the questions the Tribunal was putting to her and she said she dd not feel she could, which was at odds with her previous answers. She was asked again about her washing her face and he agreed she was doing that 5 days out of 7 and using mouthwash. That indicated that she was maintaining her personal hygiene repeatedly and for more than 50% of the days.”
Grounds of appeal
The grounds of appeal were put in the following helpfully succinct terms by the appellant:
“At point 35 the Tribunal has stated that they do not agree that [claimant’s] mood was low enough on 50% of the days to be awarded a scoring descriptor but have provided not referenced any evidence to support this statement.
At point 39 the Tribunal states that the fact she is able to wash her face and use mouthwash shows she was maintaining her personal hygiene for more than 50% of the days but have not applied regulation 4 by not considering if this is to an acceptable standard.
At point 42 the Tribunal has misdirected itself by placing too much weight on [claimant’s] historical ability to work despite the fact that she was not working at the time of the decision or the time of the hearing.
At point 46 the Tribunal has used an incorrect test of [claimant’s] ability to engage within the statutory definition, failing to consider that the hearing was not face to face and [claimant] has the benefit of a representative not only at the telephone hearing but with mentally preparing herself for the hearing.
At point 47 the Tribunal acknowledge that she would have difficulty if talking about herself but would be able to engage with others this is contradictory and does not take into account the statutory test for this activity, in our submission we made reference to the correct assessment as set out in In CPIP/3622/2016 Judge Gray found ‘The definition of ‘engage socially’ informs activity 9 (SF-v-SSWP (PIP) [2016] UKUT 543 (AAC)).
At point 48 the Tribunal misdirected itself by assuming that [claimant] could afford the items she brought because she did not make returns, the Tribunal failed in its inquisitorial duty by not gathering any information about the state of [claimant’s] finances despite references in the papers to debts.
At point 56 the Tribunal misdirected itself by focusing again on historical work and travel without taking into account the variability over time of conditions such as anxiety and that these examples to no fall in the relevant period.
Permission to appeal
Permission was granted by UTJ Wright who stated as follows:
I give permission to appeal because I consider that overall the grounds of appeal are arguable and have a realistic prospect of establishing that the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) erred in law in its decision of 22 April 2024.
The recent decision of the Upper Tribunal in KL v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP) [2025] UKUT 153 (AAC) may be relevant to ground 2.
In relation to the third and seventh grounds of appeal, it may be arguable that the FTT either took into account irrelevant matters, in respect of the appellant’s prior history of working and going to Australia in 2018, or failed to provide an adequate explanation for why that evidence remained relevant.
KL v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP) [2025] UKUT 153 (AAC)
KL v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP) [2025] UKUT 153 (AAC) considered activity 4 and decided that it is testing the ability of the claimant to perform the mechanical functions of washing and bathing, which are getting in and out of a bath or shower and being able to wash their body parts as set out in the descriptors. It is not a test as to the quality of washing, but the physical and mental ability to do so.
Secretary of State’s submissions
In their written submissions dated 20 August 2025, the Secretary of State supports the appeal.
Their submissions note that the evidence of the Health Care Professional relied upon by the Secretary of State in making their original decision on the claim for PIP, on the issue of washing and bathing, appeared ‘at odds with the evidence detailed in the PIP2 questionnaire and the mandatory reconsideration letter’ [4.11]. They also made the point that ‘Furthermore, whilst noted by the HCP that she can wash her entire body, this is at odds with the oral evidence that the FtT has relied upon. When reading the SOR regarding washing and bathing, the FtT concluded that the claimant is able to wash her face and can do it 5 out of 7 days, did the FtT assume that given the claimant is able to wash her face that she is washing and bathing her whole body? Is washing one’s face washing to an adequate standard, particularly given that the claimant only showers maybe once a week, therefore not washing and bathing her whole body on the majority of days as per regulation 7 of the PIP regs 2013’ [4.12].
In relation to grounds 3 and 7 the Secretary of State submits, ‘it is clear from its reasons at paragraphs 24 to 26 and 42, 47 and 56 of the SOR (repeated above) that the FtT have relied on facts as of and including 2018 to 2019 and the end of 2021, which was some 5 years (2018) and her working history was 17 months prior to the date of decision. I submit, that it appears from its findings that the FtT have failed to consider the position at the date of decision, and it is arguable that the FtT has taken account of circumstances not obtaining at the date of the decision under appeal. Therefore, it is my submission that the FtT erred in law by not correctly applying s 12(8)(b) of the Social Security Act 1998’ [4.17].
Conclusions
As to ground 2, I agree with the submissions made on behalf of the Secretary of State. The FtT does not appear to have formed a conclusion on whether or not the appellant is mentally able to wash her body as set out in the descriptor of activity 4. The FtT appears to have inferred from the appellant’s ability to wash her face that she can wash her body. Further, to the extent they did not accept the appellant’s evidence about not being able to wash, they have not given reasons for why they did not.
As to grounds 3 and 7, I again agree with the submissions of the Secretary of State that the FtT has in its reasoning set out facts which were fairly historic at the date of the decision and inferred from these that the appellant could work. This is most obviously demonstrated by the FtT’s reasons at paragraph 26, which states ‘…she had managed to travel independently to Australia from November 2018 to June 2019 and she had returned to the UK and re-entered the workplace. The Tribunal is satisfied there are no barriers to the appellant re-entering the workplace now.” The FtT has not given a reason for reaching their final conclusion, and yet appear from their reasoning to have taken into account the appellant’s ability to travel in 2019 as a relevant factor in their decision. The FtT must consider a claimant’s abilities at the time of making their decision. Although what occurred in 2019 could be a relevant factor, the FtT have not provided any reasons why they considered it was. This coupled with the lack of any other reasons given for the conclusion they reach at paragraph 26, leads me to conclude they have either taken into account an irrelevant factor or they have failed to adequately reason their decision.
Given my conclusions, on these three grounds, I have not gone on to decide on the remaining grounds, as given my conclusions on grounds 2, 3 and 7 I am content that the matter must be remitted for a fresh determination of the appeal as a whole, to be a heard by a differently constituted panel of the FtT.
For these reasons, I allow this appeal.
Louise Price
Judge of the Upper Tribunal Authorised for issue on 15 January 2026