Akinola Nicholas George v OISC

This is an Appeal by Abraham, George & Associates, in the person of Akinola Nicholas George (“the Appellant”), against a decision of the Immigration Services Commissioner (“the Respondent”), dated 30^th September 2010, refusing the Appellant’s application, made on 15^th July 2009, for continued registration as a qualifed person to provide immigration advice or immigration services under Section 84 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (“the Act”).

The Appellant duly appealed against this Decision by Notice of Appeal dated 21^st October 2010.

The Tribunal sat to determine the Appeal on 10^th and 11^th March 2011.

On 10^th March, the Appellant, on that day unrepresented, applied for an adjournment of the Appeal, on the ground that he wished to be represented.

Having heard the material submissions of the Appellant, and those made on behalf of the Respondent, the Tribunal granted a peremptory adjournment until the following day, 11^th March.

On that following day the Appellant was represented, by Mr Chipperfield of Counsel, and the Hearing of the Appeal proceeded.

The Respondent was represented at all times by Mr Temme, of the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner.

Prior to the Hearing, the Tribunal had received from the Respondent a Hearing Bundle, containing the Decision Letter, the Notice of Appeal, the Appellant’s “Reasons for Appealing”, the Respondent’s Response to the Notice of Appeal, and relevant documentation, including witness statements of Michael Carmody and Helen Booker, employees of the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner.

Prior to the Hearing also, the Respondent made, on 12^th January 2011, an Application for Directions, and in response to that Application the Tribunal gave Directions on 18^th January 2011, directing, inter alia, that prior to the Hearing the Appellant should provide to the Tribunal copies of all witness statements, documents and other evidence on which he relied with regard to the issue of his supervision by Solicitors in respect of his material appearances before the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, and to the issue of the authorisation of such supervision.

In response to the aforesaid Directions of the Tribunal, the Appellant, on 17^th February 2011, provided to the Tribunal a “Reply to the Respondent’s Response to the Notice of Appeal”, with a witness statement of the Appellant and a number of documents.

At the Hearing on 11^th March 2011 Mr Chipperfield called the Appellant to give evidence, and the Appellant was cross-examined, and re-examined.

Ms Booker and Mr Carmody gave evidence on behalf of the Respondent, and were cross-examined.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the Tribunal directed that final written submissions were to be exchanged between the parties and provided to the Tribunal.

In response to this direction the Tribunal received the Respondent’s Submissions, dated 18^th March 2011, and received from the Appellant, on 5^th April 2011, the Draft Submission of the Appellant, also dated 18^th March 2011, and provided to the Appellant by Mr Chipperfield.

During and after the Hearing, and prior to its determination of the Appeal, the Tribunal has considered fully the evidence given on behalf of the Appellant and the Respondent, all of the documents furnished by the Appellant and the Respondent, and the written submissions made on behalf of the Appellant and the Respondent.

The Tribunal has reminded itself that the statutory principle governing the material decision of the Respondent, and the determination of this Appeal, is set out in Section 83 of the Act, which provides, at sub-section (5), that: “The Commissioner must exercise her functions so as to secure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that those who provide immigration advice or immigration services – (a) are fit and competent to do so; (b) act in the best interests of their clients; (c) do not knowingly mislead any court, adjudicator or tribunal in the United Kingdom; (d) do not seek to abuse any procedure operating in the United Kingdom in connection with immigration or asylum; (e) do not advise any person to do something which would amount to such an abuse.

The Tribunal has reminded itself also that the burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, the facts on which he relies rests on the Appellant.

Section 84 (1) of the Act provides that no person may provide immigration advice or immigration services unless he is a qualified person.

Section 84 (2) (a) of the Act provides that a person is a qualified person if he is a registered person.

Schedule 6 of the Act requires persons seeking to become a qualified person by registration to make an application for registration to the Immigration Services Commissioner (“the Commissioner”) (the Respondent).

Schedule 6 provides also that registration may be made so as to have effect only in relation to a specified field of advice or services.

The Respondent registers applicants to work at Level 3 (the highest level), Level 2 or Level 1 (the lowest level) (the levels relate to the nature and complexity of the immigration advices and immigration services provided by registered advisers).

The representation of appellants at hearings of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) constitutes work at Level 3.

All applicants for registration must demonstrate their competence prior to a decision by the Respondent as to the appropriate level of registration.

Having applied, in December 2007, to the Respondent for registration as an immigration adviser, the Appellant was registered at Level 1 on 19^th June 2008. His registration was limited to providing advice at Level 1 in limited categories, that is Entry/FLR/LR, Nationality & Citizenship and Asylum Limited Assistance, he having failed to demonstrate the necessary competence in the category of EU and EEA Immigration Law.

Schedule 5 of the Act provides that the Commissioner’s Code of Standards applies to ….. persons qualified by registration.

Code 6 of the Commissioner’s Code of Standards provides that: Advisers must not operate beyond the level of competence approved by the Commissioner or in categories that have not been approved.

The Appellant’s application for continued registration (the decision of the Respondent in respect of which is the subject of this Appeal) was made on 11^th June 2009. That application was for continued registration at an increased level, from Level 1 to Level 3.

The Appellant’s competence to work at Level 3 accordingly fell to be demonstrated to, and assessed by, the Respondent.

In September 2009 the Appellant submitted evidence to the Respondent which he deemed appropriate to support his application for registration at Level 3. This evidence took the form of a file of determinations by the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal of hearings at which the “appellant” to that Tribunal had been represented by this Appellant.

That evidence submitted by the Appellant to the Respondent provided prima facie evidence that the Appellant, in appearing as a representative at hearings of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (that is, providing immigration services at Level 3) had worked without authorisation by the Respondent before his first registration, in June 2008, and had worked beyond the level of his registration after that date.

It therefore appeared to the Respondent that the Appellant may have committed offences under Section 91 of the Act, which prohibits persons from providing immigration advice or immigration services in contravention of Section 84 of the Act, that is, from providing immigration advice or immigration services as an unqualified person, unqualified by not being registered with the Commissioner (the Respondent).

In essence, it appeared to the Respondent that the Appellant had represented persons at hearings of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (working as an immigration adviser at Level 3) both before his first registration, in June 2008, when he was wholly unqualified to provide immigration advice or immigration services, and after that registration, when he was qualified to provide such advice and services in limited categories of Level 1 only.

The Respondent set in train an investigation into this matter, which was conducted by the aforesaid Ms Booker, an investigator employed by the Respondent.

Whilst that investigation was in progress, consideration of the Appellant’s aforesaid application for continued registration, made in June 2009, was suspended, and he was so informed by the Respondent on 4^th November 2009.

During the course of this investigation, Ms Booker conducted an interview with the Appellant at the office of the Respondent on 21^st January 2010. The transcript of that interview was before the Tribunal.

Ms Booker’s investigation concluded in July 2010, and as a result thereof a Summons was issued, on 12^th August 2010, by City of Westminster Magistrate’s Court, charging the Appellant with nine offences contrary to Section 91 of the Immigration and Asylum Act. Seven of these offences related to appearances by the Appellant as representative at hearings of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal between 1^st February 2008 and 13^th May 2009.

The trial of these criminal proceedings has not yet taken place.

Following the conclusion of the aforesaid investigation and the issue of the said Summons, the Respondent issued her decision, to refuse the application of the Appellant for continued registration, on 30^th September 2010, on the ground that the Appellant had been in breach of the Code 6 of the Commissioner’s Code of Standards, which provides that: “Advisers must not operate beyond the level of competence approved by the Commissioner or in categories that have not been approved”.

It was not in dispute between the parties that the Appellant made the aforesaid appearances at hearings of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. The appearances are documented by that Tribunal, the Appellant himself provided evidence to the Respondent of appearances by him as representative before that Tribunal, and in the course of the aforesaid interview he freely admitted that he had made such appearances.

Accordingly, it was not in dispute that the Appellant made the aforesaid appearances (at Level 3), both before his first registration in June 2008 when he was not a person qualified by registration, and after that registration when, qualified to give immigration advice and immigration services only in limited categories at Level 1, those appearances constituted work beyond the level of his registered competence.

The essence of the Appellant’s case is that, in making those appearances, he was at all times acting under the supervision of a qualified person (in the context of this Appeal, a person qualified under Section 84 (2) (b) – a person authorised by a designated professional body to practise as a member of the profession whose members the body regulates – a Solicitor, in the context of this Appeal), and thus was himself qualified to provide those immigration advices and services under Section 84 (2) (e) of the Act.

The issue of the alleged supervision of the Appellant is central to the Appeal.

It is further asserted on the Appellant’s behalf that the material decision of the Respondent was unfair and unlawful in that, it is asserted, it was based solely upon the decision to charge the Appellant with the aforesaid offences.

Section 84 (2) of the Act (as amended by Section 37 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004) provides that (the relevant parts only are quoted): “A person is a qualified person if he is – (a) a registered person, (b) authorised by a designated professional body to practise as a member of the profession whose members the body regulates, (e) acting on behalf of, and under the supervision of, a person with any of paragraphs (a) to … (d) (whether or not under a contract of employment).

The issue of supervision is dealt with extensively in Codes 24 to 28 of the Commissioner’s Code of Standards.

Code 24 provides: An adviser who is seeking either to expand their area of experience or to increase their level of competence should seek effective supervision. Authorisation of any such supervision, including the supervision plan, must be obtained from the OISC prior to any such arrangements being put into effect.

Code 25 provides: Any individual adviser who is seeking to expand their level of competence should be supervised by a regulated adviser at that higher point or above or by an otherwise suitably qualified person.

Code 26 provides: Advisers seeking to act in a supervisory role must satisfy the OISC that they: (a) have at least two years’ recent and ongoing relevant experience in immigration advice and/or services; and (b) have experience of managing and/or supervising others.

Code 27 provides: A supervisor must: (a) be co-located with the person being supervised by them and readily accessible to them. (b) oversee the allocation of cases to the supervisee; (c) monitor the progress of the supervisee’s cases; (d) provide both general and specific guidance and assistance to the supervisee; (e) review the cases conducted by the supervisee and, having conducted such review, require the supervisee, as necessary, to take corrective action; and (f) spend on average a minimum of 12 hours per week supervising the supervisee while continuing to satisfactorily maintain their own caseload.

Code 28 provides: A supervisor or other competent person must undertake random sampling of the supervisee’s work in order to assess the quality of the supervisee’s advice. The sample must be sufficient, along with other indicators, for the supervisor or other competent person to be able adequately to assess the overall quality of the advice the supervisee has given. A record of the conclusions of this sampling must be retained on both the case file of the client concerned and the supervisee’s personal file, and made available to the Commissioner upon

Further, it is stated in Clarke v Roy Regina (2008) EWCA Crim 893, at paragraph 35 of the judgment of Lord Justice Leveson, dealing with the terms of Section 84 of the Act, that: “Additionally, a person not registered or authorised may provide these services if “acting on behalf of, and under the supervision of, a person” who is otherwise qualified. It is thus clearly not sufficient merely once (or for a period) to have acted on behalf of a qualified person; that person (which can include a body) must both be the principal and the supervisor in relation to the immigration advice or immigration services then being offered or provided.”

It may thus readily be seen that the bar, in respect of the nature, degree and efficacy of any material supervision, is set high. That this is so is clearly understandable, in light of the manifest public interest in ensuring the competent and effective representation (in the context of this case) of immigrants in appeal hearings before the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal which vitally affect both their lives and the public interest.

The Appellant asserted that, in each of the material hearings in which he represented appellants before the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, he was acting under supervision.

He asserted that he acted under the supervision of three persons: Mr Kusamotu of Kusamotu Associates, Ms Aisha Adeyinka and Mr Onokwai.

Mr Kusamotu, a Nigerian lawyer, appears to have sought to establish an office and practice in the United Kingdom. He was present in the United Kingdom for a period in 2007, and, it is said, in early 2008, but returned to Nigeria and did not return to the United Kingdom, apparently because of entry clearance problems, of which the Appellant was aware. The Appellant asserts that he “discussed cases” with Mr Kusamotu.

Ms Adeyinka, a Solicitor, joined the Appellant’s firm. In a witness statement provided to the Tribunal the Appellant stated that she joined in April or July 2008, in his interview with Ms Booker he said that she joined “about” March 2008, and in evidence before the Tribunal he said that she joined in late 2007. She was employed to “replace” Mr Kusamotu. Although it was asserted initially in evidence that she was “more or less” a partner in the firm, it clearly transpired that she was employed on a “fee-earning” basis, and that her “pay” depended on “what she brought in”. She had health problems, worked on a part-time basis, and was absent on maternity leave from January to April 2009. It is not clear whether she returned to employment after April 2009, but she did have other significant health issues, although it is said that she and the Appellant were still “in touch” up to February 2010. She, it was asserted, had a management and a supervisory role, she had “experience in immigration”, there were regular discussions about cases between her and the Appellant, and a weekly Friday review meeting.

Mr Onokwai, a Solicitor, appears to have been a principal in the firm of Greenland Lawyers, a firm specialising in immigration law, which employed the Appellant prior to his setting up his own firm and applying for registration with OISC. The Appellant asserts that his relationship with Mr Onokwai continued after the cessation of his employment by Greenland Lawyers, and that Mr Onokwai and he “consulted” about cases in the absence of Ms Adeyinka.

The Tribunal finds that each of the facts asserted by evidence given on behalf of, and in documents provided by, the Respondent, and in the Respondent’s written submissions, has been established.

The Solicitors Regulation Authority has stated, in an e-mail of 11^th February 2011, that Kusamotu Associates is a Foreign Law Practice, with current and previous addresses in Lagos, Nigeria. There is no record of any branch or other office address based in England and Wales, and Kusamotu Associates is not a recognised body.

There is no evidence that Mr Kusamotu has ever been an enrolled Solicitor in England and Wales.

Mr Malcolm Lees, a Fraud Prevention Officer employed by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, has stated in a Witness Statement made on 15^th May 2010, that Ms Adeyinka was admitted to the Roll of Solicitors in England and Wales on 1^st May 2008. Her Practising Certificate expired on 9^th December 2009, and was not renewed.

In the documents accompanying his application for continued registration, made on 11^th June 2009, the Appellant has made no mention of any supervision by Kusamotu Associates or Ms Adeyinka, in particular in response to a specific enquiry as to whether he had ever been supervised by … a Solicitor. His reference in that regard to Greenland Solicitors (Mr Onokwai) was clearly made in the context of his previous employment by that firm.

The Appellant has made no mention whatsoever of Kusamotu Associates or Ms Adeyinka in any documents accompanying his applications for registration in 2008 and 2009 in the context of his experience or the structure of his organisation.

The Appellant purported to represent appellants on behalf of Kusamotu Associates before the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal on three occasions, between February and September 2008.

The Appellant represented four appellants on behalf of Abraham George and Associates (his firm) before the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal during the period of Ms Adeyinka’s alleged involvement with his firm. Three of those four representations occurred between January and April 2009 (the period of Ms Adeyinka’s maternity leave).

On 25^th January 2010, further to a telephone conversation between the two on that date, Ms Booker wrote on behalf of OISC to Mr Onokwai, asking him to provide details of his relationship with the Appellant, and enquiring in particular if he had ever supervised the Appellant to provide immigration advice and services. In a replying letter from Greenland Lawyers (Mr Onokwai’s firm), dated 27^th January 2010, dictated by Mr Onokwai on 25^th January 2010 and signed on his behalf by a Personal Assistant, it is stated: “Your telephone call was on the issue whether or not I acted as Supervisor for a company related to Mr Nicholas George (the Appellant). I confirmed that I did not and have never supervised that practice. I confirm to you again that this is the case.”

Ms Booker spoke to Ms Adeyinka and wrote to her a number of times requesting her attendance at an interview. Despite numerous promises to do so, Ms Adeyinka never attended an interview.

The Appellant was well aware that registration at Level 1 did not permit him to represent appellants at AIT. In the course of the Respondent’s consideration of his first application for registration, the Appellant submitted a fee scale which included services not permitted at Level 1 (including Immigration Appeal fees). This having been drawn to his attention by the Respondent, with a request to amend the fee scale to include only those services permitted at Level 1, a duly amended fee scale omitting (inter alia) Immigration Appeal fees was submitted by the Appellant.

Following his first registration at Level 1, the Appellant sought no authorisation from the Respondent to work beyond the level of that registration

The Tribunal has set out the position in respect of the criminal proceedings instigated by the Respondent against the Appellant, which remain undetermined.

At paragraph 19 of his Witness Statement, which he adopted as his evidence at the Hearing of this Appeal, Mr Carmody, the Respondent’s Caseworker who had signed the Respondent’s Decision Letter of 30^th September 2010 refusing the Appellant’s application for continued registration, had stated: “The OISC considered at this point that Mr George had a case to answer relating to a number of unauthorised appearances at the AIT. The fact that these were criminal charges which imply unfitness in relation to providing immigration advice and services led me to put forward a refusal to continue the registration of Mr George”s organisation.” Mr Carmody was asked at the Hearing whether the fact of criminal charges was the basis for the decision to refuse the Appellant’s continued registration application, and answered “yes”.

These unfortunate assertions, that the fact of the criminal charges was the sole reason for the refusal, gave rise, understandably, to the submissions, by the Appellant and on his behalf, that the decision to refuse was therefore unfair and unlawful.

The Tribunal asked Mr Temme to address this point in his final written submissions on behalf of the Respondent, and he did so.

It is submitted on the Respondent’s behalf that Mr Carmody, in his earlier evidence, did make clear that the totality of the evidence in respect of the impugned representations of the Appellant was considered, in the context of the overall consideration of the application for continued registration, and not simply the fact of the criminal charges, and further submitted that the recommended decision is subject to an upward review process on three levels, including the Respondent’s legal team.

It is not in dispute that the Appellant represented appellants at hearings of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal both before his first registration as an OISC Level 1 (limited categories) Adviser on 19^th June 2008, and thereafter. (The pre-registration representations material to this Appeal occurred after the cessation of the Appellant’s employment by Greenland Lawyers.)

Such representation constitutes the provision of immigration advice and services at Level 3.

The Appellant was unqualified by registration prior to his first registration.

Following that registration, he was a qualified person registered, and thus authorised, to provide immigration advice and immigration services only in the aforesaid limited categories at Level 1.

Acting alone, and on his own behalf, he was therefore unqualified to perform this Level 3 representation work.

The Appellant claims to have been qualified to represent appellants at hearings of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal because he was at all material times acting under supervision of, seriatim, Kusamotu Associates (or Mr Kusamotu), Ms Adeyinka and Mr Onokwai.

This claim of the Appellant can only be valid, and can only sustain his Appeal (in the context of the issue of supervision) if he was acting on behalf of, and under the supervision of, those persons, and if each of those persons was a qualified person. (Section 84 (1) and (2) of the Act.)

The Tribunal finds that the Appellant has wholly failed to satisfy the Tribunal that he was a qualified person.

The issues of whether he was in reality acting on behalf of Kusamotu Associates (or Mr Kusamotu), and of whether either provided the necessary degree of (or any) supervision remains unresolved, and certainly not established by convincing evidence. However, conclusively with regard to this aspect of the case, neither Kusamotu Associates or Mr Kusamotu were capable of being qualified persons under paragraphs (a) to (d) of Section 84 (2) of the Act. Kusamotu Associates was not a firm of Solicitors in the United Kingdom, nor was Mr Kusamotu an enrolled Solicitor in the United Kingdom.

With regard to Ms Adeyinka, the evidence of the Appellant as to the nature, level and degree of her alleged supervision is wholly unsatisfactory. Such evidence as there is consists solely of the assertions of the Appellant. That evidence is wholly unsupported and uncorroborated, either by any evidence from Ms Adeyinka, statements of other witnesses, or any documentary evidence in the form of records of the alleged supervision. The Tribunal pays particular regard to the absence of such other evidence in the light of the specific pre-Hearing direction to the Appellant to provide such evidence, of supervision by Solicitors, to the Tribunal. Such independent evidence as there is, provided by the Respondent, significantly undermines the Appellant’s assertions. However, again conclusively with regard to this aspect of the case, it is clear that, regardless of the position in respect of the alleged supervision of Ms Adeyinka, the Appellant was not, with regard to any of the material immigration advices and services, acting on her behalf, as required by Section 84 (2) (e) of the Act. Whether Ms Adeyinka was or was not a supervisor, she was certainly not, as a fee-earning and irregularly attending employee, the principal with regard to any of the material representations of appellants at hearings of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal.

With regard to Mr Onokwai, again the evidence as to the nature, level and degree of his alleged supervision is wholly unsatisfactory. Again such evidence as there is consists solely of the assertions of the Appellant. Again there is a total lack of support for, and corroboration of this evidence. Again the Tribunal notes the aforesaid pre-Hearing direction, and the Appellant’s failure to produce further evidence. So far as any further evidence is concerned, the position is stark. Mr Onokwai has in clear terms refuted the assertion that he provided any supervision at all to the Appellant. And again, conclusively with regard to this aspect of the case, it is wholly clear that the Appellant did not ever act on behalf of Mr Onokwai in respect of any of the material representations, nor was Mr Onokwai a principal in respect of any of them. With regard to the issue of the Appellant’s former employment by Mr Onokwai’s firm in respect of immigration matters, the Tribunal has already set out the position as stated in Roy Clarke v Regina (above), that it is not sufficient (for the purposes of Section 84 of the Act) to have acted merely once (or for a period) on behalf of a qualified person; that person must both be the principal and the supervisor in relation to the immigration advice or immigration services then being offered or provided.

Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that at no time material to this Appeal was the Appellant acting, in respect of the immigration advice and immigration services material to this Appeal, as a qualified person within the terms of Section 84 of the Act.

The consideration by the Respondent of the Appellant’s application for continued registration, and the investigation by the Repondent of suspected offences by the Appellant under Section 91 of the Act and the consequent instigation of associated criminal charges against the Appellant, were of course separate matters.

The Tribunal accepts that these matters were indeed dealt with separately – the application was duly considered on the Respondent’s behalf by a caseworker, and the investigation into the suspected offences was separately conducted by an investigator. The consideration of the application was suspended until the investigation had been completed.

A part of the evidence before the Tribunal consists of evidence gathered during the investigation, and that evidence was before the Respondent when her decision as to continued registration was made.

The Tribunal considers that the Respondent, in considering the application for continued registration, was entirely entitled to take into account such evidence as was gathered during the separate investigation, in respect of the pre-registration and post-registration history of the Appellant. Given her statutory responsibility imposed by Section 83 of the Act to secure so far as reasonable practicable those matters to which her attention is directed by that Section, including the fitness to provide immigration advice or immigration services, and the acting in the best interests of clients, it would have been a clear dereliction of her duty not to have taken such evidence into account.

A decision in respect of continued registration which was based solely upon the fact of the instigation of criminal charges, in respect of which, whilst undetermined, there is a presumption of innocence, would of course clearly have been invalid.

The Tribunal accepts and considers, however, that in fact the material decision was based not solely upon that fact, but upon the totality of the evidence then before the Respondent. The Tribunal accepts the material submissions of Mr Temme, and notes in particular that in the material Letter of Decision the reasons for that decision are comprehensively canvassed over three pages (pages 2 to 4) of the letter, by Mr Carmody.

In any event, the Tribunal considers that the upward review of the recommended decision, in particular by the Respondent’s legal team, will have ensured that the decision was not based solely upon the fact of the instigation of those criminal charges.

For the sake of completion, the Tribunal considers that the Appellant’s material application for continued registration was considered fully and fairly, and that he was at the time, and has been in respect of this Appeal, afforded every fair opportunity to put before the Respondent and this Tribunal all material, evidence and submissions which were deemed appropriate by him and on his behalf.

The Tribunal further considers that there has been no breach of any European Convention right of the Appellant or of any of the Appellant’s human rights.

The Tribunal concludes, overall, that the Appellant, in representing appellants at hearings of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal on a number of occasions as a person unqualified to do so, clearly demonstrated an unfitness to provide immigration advice and services, and a failure to act in the best interests of his clients.

In the light of its aforesaid conclusions in respect of the issues of supervision and of fairness, and of that overall conclusion, the Tribunal concludes that the material decision of the Respondent, to refuse the Appellant’s material application for continued registration, was fairly made and fully justified.

Having regard to the aforesaid conclusions, the Decision of the Tribunal is to dismiss this Appeal.