GR v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

This appeal concerns whether or not the Appellant – who I shall call GR – is entitled to Personal Independence Payment.

GR is a British/Italian National. She came to live in the UK in 1983 at the age of 20 and settled and worked here for many years. She made relevant national insurance contributions and raised a child in Scotland. Her husband, an Italian national, came to the UK in 2014 . GR married him in 2019 and they continue to live in the UK. GR stopped work in 2020 during the covid pandemic. Her husband receives an Italian state pension.

GR applied for PIP. She is both a British National but also an EU citizen both as an Italian national and her husband is an Italian national. She has settled status and an EU citizen because of Appendix EU of the European Union Settlement Scheme and the Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the European Union Atomic Energy Community – known usually as the “EU withdrawal agreement”. Under Article 30 (1) of that agreement she is someone covered by it as an EU national residing in the UK at the end of the transition period. Under Article 31 of that agreement, social security entitlements for EU citizens living in the UK after transition would be subject to the relevant EU social security co-ordination regulations – Regulation 883/2004.

Regulation EC 883/2004 provides a framework to decide whether individuals who may reside in other EU countries (and the UK if they have settled status) are entitled to claim benefits in their country of residence, or whether they must claim benefits in the country where they previously resided or another EU country. PIP is a cash sickness benefit for the purposes of these regulations. This means that someone is only entitled to PIP if the UK is the relevant body – known as the “competent authority” for the payment of cash sickness benefits.

Because GR’s husband received an Italian pension and she was economically inactive, the Secretary of State decided that the “competent authority” was Italy, on the basis of her reading of the social security co-ordination regulations at that time. That therefore meant (under s84(2)(b) of the Welfare Reform Act) that GR could not qualify for the daily living component.

GR applied to the First Tier Tribunal . It found :

“13.

Applying Regulation 883/2004 , and have considered relevant case law in this area, the Tribunal was satisfied that the facts outlined above in relation to GR being a British citizen who has lived and worked in the UK for many years, the UK is not the competent state for cash sickness benefits. At the time she claimed PIP she was not working or receiving a pension. The member state of her residence would only be the competent state if there is another member state where a family member is working or a member state from which a family member is receiving a pension. The appellant’s husband is a family member. He is not working in, or receiving a pension from the UK. He is in receipt of a pension from Italy. Accordingly, Italy is the competent state for payment of cash sickness benefits (the daily living component of Personal Independence Payment) to GR”.

GR appealed against this decision. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Jacobs on 30 December 2024. This was because the position of the FTT was an arguable error of law following the decision of SE v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2024] UKUT 405 which had been decided after the FTT decision in this case.

The SSWP sought a stay of this appeal because they wished to appeal the judgment in SE (above). This was granted in April 2025. In September 2025, the Tribunal asked for an update from the SSWP , who then made submissions in September asking for the stay to be lifted and to “take into account” the decision of SE. The Upper Tribunal asked for submissions from the SSWP to explain what was meant by this, and submission were filed on 10 November 2025.

The SSWP submitted that because of the decision in SE (above), had the FTT had the benefit of the SE judgement, they would have found that the UK was the competent state by examining Article 11 of Reg 883/2004. I agree with these submissions.

SE decides that when determining which is the competent authority , one examines Article 11 of 883/2004. Article 11 says:

“General rules

1.

Persons to whom this Regulation applies shall be subject to the legislation of a single member state only. Such legislation shall be determined in accordance with this Title. …

3.

Subject to articles 12 to 16:

(a)

a person pursuing an activity as an employed or self-employed person in a member state shall be subject to the legislation of that member state;

(b)

a civil servant shall be subject to the legislation of the member state to which the administration employing him/her is subject;

(c)

a person receiving unemployment benefits in accordance with article 65 under the legislation of the member state of residence shall be subject to the legislation of that member state;

(d)

a person called up or recalled for service in the armed forces or for civilian service in a member state shall be subject to the legislation of that member state; (e) any other person to whom sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) do not apply shall be subject to the legislation of the member state of residence, without prejudice to other provisions of this Regulation guaranteeing him/her benefits under the legislation of one or more other member states.”

For the purposes of deciding which State is responsible for the benefits, the starting point is the state of applicable legislation under Article 11. The general rule under Article 11 of the Regulations (read with others) is that an economically inactive insured person (such as GR) is subject to the legislation in the country where he or she resides and therefore entitled to benefits – including PIP - which is a cash sickness benefit under Title III of the Regulations , i.e. to those benefits which exist in the country where the person resides. The regulations which the SSWP had relied upon by deciding that a pensioner and his family would not benefit from that general rule were held, in SE, to only be applicable where they are not entitled to be paid such benefits in the state at which they are resident.

The First Tier Tribunal reached the incorrect decision by considering that Regulation 29 of the social security co-ordination regulations applied to GR’s situation. Whilst this was the position before SE, the case of SE (which followed a Court of Appeal decision called Harrington v SSWP [2023] EWCA Civ 443) found that Article 29 does not have the effect that the FTT considered that it did, and that in fact the Article was to be used only where Article 11 did not apply , not as the general default position.

Given these conclusions, the FTT decision was wrongly made, and should be changed on appeal. The relevant competent authority under the co-ordination Regulations for GR would be the United Kingdom.

The Appellant filed submissions on 10 December 2025 , agreeing with the submissions of the Secretary of State and expressing regret that the UK government had misconstrued its responsibilities.

Given the position of both parties, I grant permission to appeal and set aside the decision under s12(2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunal Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 as the FTT made an error of law.

Given that the FTT’s decision and the decision of the SSWP relied upon an erroneous interpretation of the co-ordination regulations, I am able and have the power to substitute the decision of the FTT for my own. I do so and determine that the relevant competent authority under Article 11(3)(e) for GR is the United Kingdom.

I considered if I needed to quash the decision but re-send it back to the FTT for a further decision. Such is not necessary as there is only one answer that the FTT could give and so I substitute my decision for that of the FTT.

I direct that the SSWP should reconsider GR’s entitlement to PIP .