
First-tier Tribunal | |
Immigration and Asylum Chamber | Appeal Number: PA/73435/2024 |
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS | |
Heard at Birmingham | |
On 7 October 2026 | |
Before | |
TRIBUNAL JUDGE ASPINALL | |
Between | |
HH (Anonymity Order Made) | |
Appellant | |
and | |
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT | |
Respondent | |
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr H Samra, solicitor
For the Respondent: Mr M Evans, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the appellant against the decision of the respondent made on 16 October 2024 refusing his protection and human rights claims.
Anonymity
An anonymity order is already in force. This is a protection appeal concerning an asserted fear of the Taliban. Publication of information identifying the appellant or members of his family could undermine the protection sought and expose them to risk. I therefore maintain the order.
Background
The appellant is an adult national of Afghanistan. He claimed asylum in September 2023. His case is that his father was a local commander who fought against the Taliban. The appellant says that he was taken by persons associated with a prominent anti-Taliban figure to be trained to fight the Taliban, but escaped shortly afterwards. He says that the Taliban later killed his father and took his brothers, and that he would be at risk because of his own perceived association with anti-Taliban forces and his family’s profile.
The respondent accepted the appellant’s identity and nationality, that his father had been a local commander fighting the Taliban, and that his father was killed by the Taliban. The respondent did not accept the appellant’s account of his own involvement or that the Taliban would have any continuing adverse interest in him.
The Hearing
The hearing took place at Birmingham Civil and Family Justice Centre. Mr Evans attended in person on behalf of the respondent. The appellant and Mr Samra attended by CVP. The appellant gave oral evidence through a Dari interpreter. The hearing was digitally recorded by the Tribunal.
The appellant adopted his witness statement and was cross-examined by Mr Evans. There was no re-examination. I heard oral submissions from both representatives.
Issues
The live issues were
whether the appellant’s account of being taken for anti-Taliban training, escaping, remaining in hiding, and the subsequent targeting of his family was accepted
whether the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution by the Taliban for an imputed political opinion
whether sufficient protection or a reasonable internal relocation alternative is available
whether removal would breach Article 3 ECHR
No separate Article 8 case was pursued.
Agreed Matters
It was not in dispute that
the appellant is a national of Afghanistan
his father was a local commander who fought against the Taliban
his father was killed by the Taliban
the relevant Refugee Convention reason is imputed political opinion
if the material account giving rise to adverse Taliban interest were accepted, the harm feared would amount to persecution
if the appellant were at real risk from the Taliban, sufficient protection and internal relocation would not provide an answer because the Taliban are the de facto state authorities
Evidence
I have considered the evidence as a whole. It included the respondent’s refusal decision, the appellant’s screening and substantive asylum interviews, his witness statement, the medical evidence, the appellant’s skeleton argument, the respondent’s Review, and the oral evidence and submissions at the hearing. The Review relied upon the Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan, Fear of the Taliban, of August 2025. I have also had regard to the February 2026 version of that note, which was current at the date of the hearing and does not materially alter the relevant assessment.
The respondent maintained the credibility concerns set out in the refusal decision and Review. Mr Evans submitted that the appellant had not shown that he was taken to the camp as claimed, that there were inconsistencies concerning the period and place in which he stayed afterwards, that he had never personally fought the Taliban or received a direct threat from them, that he had remained in Kabul for more than two years, and that he had subsequently been able to leave Afghanistan by air using his own passport and an Iranian visa. He also relied upon the appellant’s uncertainty about any alleged list containing his name and upon his failure to claim asylum in countries through which he had travelled.
Mr Samra submitted that the core of the account had remained consistent, that the respondent had accepted the significant facts concerning the appellant’s father, and that the discrepancies relied upon were either immaterial or had been satisfactorily clarified in oral evidence. He submitted that the appellant’s own association with anti-Taliban mobilisation, taken together with the accepted family profile and the treatment of his father and brothers, gave rise to a real risk on return.
Legal Framework
This is an appeal under section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The protection claim was made after 28 June 2022 and sections 31 to 36 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 therefore apply.
I apply the approach in JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 (IAC). I first determine on the balance of probabilities whether there is a Refugee Convention reason and whether the appellant does in fact fear persecution for that reason. If those questions are answered in his favour, the questions whether he would be persecuted for that reason, whether sufficient protection would be available, and whether he could safely and reasonably relocate are assessed to the lower standard of a reasonable degree of likelihood.
I take into account, as damaging to credibility, any conduct falling within section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. Such conduct is relevant but is not determinative of credibility.
The Article 3 question is whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the appellant would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 on return.
I have considered AS (Safety of Kabul) Afghanistan CG [2020] UKUT 130 (IAC), together with the Home Office country material concerning fear of the Taliban. That material identifies former members of anti-Taliban security or armed structures, those associated with armed opposition, and in appropriate cases their close family members, as requiring an individual assessment of risk. Relevant factors include the nature and seniority of the role, the proximity of the family relationship, the period spent in Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover, and the period spent abroad. I regard the CPIN as a useful and generally reliable summary of the relevant country information.
AS remains relevant to the general reasonableness of relocation to Kabul for a single adult man where no specific Taliban risk exists. It does not provide an internal relocation answer where a person is found to face a real risk from the Taliban themselves.
Discussion and Conclusions
Convention reason and subjective fear
The respondent accepts that the relevant Convention reason is imputed political opinion. The appellant is the son of a man whom the respondent accepts was a local commander fighting the Taliban and whom the Taliban killed. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the appellant has a characteristic capable of causing him to fear persecution for an imputed political opinion.
I am also satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the appellant genuinely fears the Taliban. His evidence throughout has been that he fears detention or death because of his family’s opposition to the Taliban and his own perceived association with those who fought them. I do not consider his passage through other countries or the weaknesses in parts of his account sufficient to establish that his subjective fear is not genuine.
Credibility and findings of fact
I have considered the evidence in the round with anxious scrutiny. Mr Samra invited me to give the appellant the benefit of the doubt. I have not approached the matter in that way. I have instead applied the statutory standards of proof to each question, which is how the uncertainty inherent in protection claims is properly accommodated. There are aspects of the appellant’s evidence which cause me concern, but I do not consider that the adverse matters relied upon by the respondent justify rejecting the material core of the account.
The appellant’s claim that he was taken by persons associated with an anti-Taliban figure for training was not a late addition. It featured from the outset of his claim. One answer at screening records that he was required to fight for the Taliban. Elsewhere in the same screening interview, and consistently thereafter, his account was that he was taken by persons mobilising men to fight against the Taliban. Read in context, I consider the isolated reference to fighting for the Taliban to be an error of recording or interpretation rather than a material change in the account.
The respondent relied upon an apparent inconsistency between the appellant having stayed at the camp for one day and having escaped the same night. In oral evidence he explained that he was taken during the day and escaped that night. I do not consider that there is any material inconsistency between those two descriptions.
There was also an apparent difference between his having stayed with his maternal uncle and with his maternal uncle’s friend in Kabul. At the hearing he clarified that he stayed with a friend of his maternal uncle. I regard the earlier descriptions as imprecise rather than materially inconsistent.
I have considered the respondent’s reliance upon the appellant having answered at screening that he had not been involved with an armed or violent organisation. On his account, he had been taken against his will, remained only until that night, and never fought. I do not consider his answer at screening materially inconsistent with that account.
The respondent also relied upon the fact that the prominent anti-Taliban figure with whom the appellant associated the camp no longer held office as provincial governor at the relevant time. The appellant’s evidence was not dependent upon that person continuing formally to hold office. He described him as a former governor and an anti-Taliban figure. I place little adverse weight upon the distinction.
Mr Evans submitted that it was difficult to understand why the appellant’s father, who supported fighting the Taliban, would have assisted the appellant after he escaped from a group which itself opposed the Taliban. I do not regard that as inherently implausible. Opposition to the Taliban does not mean that a father would necessarily support the forced recruitment of his son. In any event, the question was reformulated several times through the interpreter and no clear answer was obtained before the questioning moved on. I place no material adverse weight upon it.
I find, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant was taken to an anti-Taliban training camp and escaped that night without having fought the Taliban. I also accept that his personal details were recorded when he was taken there. I do not, however, find it established that the Taliban later obtained a particular camp list containing his name. The appellant has never seen such a list and his evidence as to Taliban possession of it was supposition. My conclusions do not depend upon that part of his account.
I also find, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant’s brothers were taken when the Taliban targeted the family. His oral evidence on that point was clear and accords with his earlier evidence in substance. To the extent that one passage in the interview record is capable of being read differently, I consider that to be an ambiguity in the interpreted evidence rather than a material inconsistency. It does not outweigh the evidence concerning the treatment of the family, particularly in the context of the respondent’s acceptance that the appellant’s father was killed by the Taliban.
The respondent also contended that the appellant had given differing accounts of why the Taliban came to the family home, attributing it at times to his father’s role and at times to his own recruitment. I do not regard those explanations as mutually exclusive, and at the hearing the appellant gave both. He has also said consistently, at interview, in his witness statement and at the hearing, that relatives on his father’s side support the Taliban. At interview he said that those relatives had spoken to the Taliban about his father and about the anti-Taliban figure, and that this led to his father’s death and the taking of his brothers. I do not need to make a finding as to precisely how the Taliban came to know of the appellant’s recruitment. It is sufficient that his account of the source of their interest is coherent and has remained consistent in its essentials.
There are nevertheless significant matters weighing against the appellant. He remained in Kabul for more than two years after leaving the camp, including a substantial period after the Taliban had taken national control. He was never personally confronted or directly threatened by the Taliban. He later left Afghanistan by air using his own passport and an Iranian visa. His evidence about how he did so has not been consistent. At interview he said that he passed through checkpoints without being identified, whereas his witness statement says that the facilitators who arranged his departure enabled him to bypass the normal checkpoints. Those are important matters and I give them adverse weight. The inconsistency concerns the mechanics of a departure arranged and paid for by others rather than the events giving rise to his fear, and I do not consider that it undermines the material core of his account.
The appellant’s evidence was, however, that while in Kabul he lived with a friend of his maternal uncle and substantially remained inside the house. In cross-examination he was recorded as saying that he was not hiding, but in the same answer he said that he could not leave the house or move about freely, and both his interview and his witness statement describe him as being in hiding. Read as a whole, I do not regard that answer as a retraction of his account. He said that house-to-house searches later caused the person sheltering him to conclude that he could no longer remain there. I accept that evidence. His successful departure from Afghanistan shows that he was not intercepted when he left. It does not, in my judgment, determine whether he would now be at risk if returned when all of the evidence is considered together.
I also take into account that the appellant had never received a direct threat from the Taliban. He accepted that candidly at the hearing. I attach weight to the point, but the basis of his claim is not that the Taliban had repeatedly communicated threats to him. It is that he would be perceived through his own history and his immediate family association as politically opposed to them.
The appellant did not claim asylum in Bulgaria or France, although he accepted at interview that he encountered officials in both countries. At interview he explained that he wished to reach the United Kingdom because his maternal uncle and cousins live here. In his witness statement he added that officials in Bulgaria told him to leave or face detention and removal, and that officials in France did not help him. I accept that he may have found his treatment in Bulgaria frightening, but neither explanation amounts to a reasonable explanation for failing to claim asylum in France, where he spent about three weeks. At screening he said candidly that he only ever wanted to come to the United Kingdom. I treat this conduct as damaging to his credibility under section 8 of the 2004 Act. I have taken it into account as part of the overall assessment, but it is not determinative.
There is medical evidence recording anxiety and depression together with complaints of poor sleep and memory difficulty. I give that evidence limited weight in assessing credibility. It provides some context for difficulty recalling exact dates but does not explain every discrepancy and I have not treated it as doing so. In particular, the appellant could not recall precisely when his father was killed. That omission carries little weight because the respondent already accepts that his father was killed by the Taliban.
The appellant’s evidence is that having resumed contact with his mother, he has learned from her that the Taliban have continued to ask about him. Mr Evans submitted that this was a late development because the appellant had said at interview that he had no contact with his family. The interview record does not bear that out. The appellant said at interview that he had spoken to his mother the previous week, and it was the whereabouts of his brothers that were unknown. I nevertheless approach these reports with caution. They are hearsay at one remove and I have no means of testing them. I give them limited weight and my decision does not depend upon them.
Taking the evidence together, I accept the material core of the appellant’s account. His father fought the Taliban and was killed by them. The appellant was himself taken for anti-Taliban training and escaped without fighting. His brothers were taken. He thereafter remained concealed in Kabul before leaving Afghanistan. I do not accept that every detail of his account has been established, and in particular I do not find it established that the Taliban possess a specific camp list containing his name.
Risk on return
I assess the prospective risk to the lower standard and on the cumulative facts which I have accepted.
The appellant is not simply a person with a general fear of the Taliban. He is the son of a local anti-Taliban commander whom the Taliban killed. That is an accepted fact of considerable significance. He also has his own association, albeit brief and involuntary, with an anti-Taliban mobilisation group, and his brothers were taken in the course of the family being targeted.
The country material requires consideration of the role of the person with the anti-Taliban profile, the closeness of the family relationship, the appellant’s own history, the period for which he remained in Afghanistan, and the period spent abroad. I have taken all of those matters into account. I have also taken into account his ability to remain concealed in Kabul for a lengthy period, the absence of a direct threat to him, and his successful departure by air.
Those matters reduce the weight of the appellant’s claim but do not, considered cumulatively, reduce the risk below the required threshold. His relationship to the person with the accepted anti-Taliban profile is the closest possible family relationship. His father was not merely associated with the former authorities but fought the Taliban and was killed by them. The appellant also has his own connection with anti-Taliban mobilisation and other immediate family members were taken. The respondent relied upon the general amnesty announced by the Taliban. The country material records that, notwithstanding that announcement, former members of anti-Taliban forces and in some cases their relatives have continued to face arrest, detention, ill-treatment and killing. The appellant’s evidence, which was consistent in his witness statement and at the hearing, is that his father was killed after the Taliban had taken control of the country. I accept that evidence to the lower standard. The killing of his father in those circumstances is itself inconsistent with the amnesty having protected this family. I do not consider that the amnesty provides a sufficient answer to the risk in this case.
I am satisfied that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that, on return to Afghanistan, the appellant would be perceived by the Taliban as politically opposed to them because of his own history and his immediate family association. There is a reasonable degree of likelihood that this would expose him to detention, serious ill-treatment or death. The respondent accepted that such treatment would amount to persecution and that the Convention nexus would be imputed political opinion.
I therefore find that the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason.
Protection and internal relocation
The feared actor is the Taliban, who are the de facto state authorities throughout Afghanistan. The respondent accepted at the hearing that, if the material risk were established, sufficient protection and internal relocation would not provide an answer.
I am satisfied to the required standard that there would be no sufficient protection available to the appellant. For the same reason, I am satisfied that he could not avoid the risk by relocating to Kabul or elsewhere in Afghanistan.
The general proposition in AS concerning relocation to Kabul for a healthy single man does not alter that conclusion. The appellant’s difficulty is not the general humanitarian or economic situation in Kabul. It is the risk from the state authorities themselves.
Article 3 and humanitarian protection
The appellant’s Article 3 case was advanced on the same factual risk as his protection claim. No separate medical Article 3 case was pursued.
For the reasons already given, I am satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that the appellant would face a real risk of detention, serious ill-treatment or death at the hands of the Taliban. Removal to Afghanistan would therefore breach Article 3 ECHR.
As the appellant qualifies for refugee status, it is unnecessary to determine humanitarian protection separately.
No separate Article 8 case was pursued.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeal is allowed on Refugee Convention grounds and on human rights grounds under Article 3 ECHR.
ANONYMITY ORDER
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
FEE AWARD
The appeal fee was remitted. There is therefore no fee award.
M Aspinall
Tribunal Judge Aspinall
13 October 2026