PBA v The Secretary of State for The Home Department

This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 11 June 2024.

In making this decision I have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties and family members. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the case concerns issues of international protection and matters relating to FGM.

It gives me no pleasure at all to say that the organisation of this case in anticipation of the hearing and the procedural history were nothing short of appalling. The claim dates as far back as July 2023. I appreciate that there was a pregnancy however the final hearing was adjourned in December 2025 and again in April 2026. I make no criticism of the Judges who made those decisions however the reasons behind those decisions to adjourn having to be made lay squarely at the foot of the Respondent Home Office.

Judge Rhys Davies provided the procedural history as follows;

The appeal was listed for final hearing before Judge Phillips on 22 December 2025. The hearing was ineffective. The Respondent had uploaded a document on 19 December 2025 that was said to be the Appellant’s divorce certificate. This was admitted into evidence by Judge Phillips without objection from the Appellant. The Appellant sought an adjournment to deal with the new evidence, which was not opposed by the Respondent.

Judge Phillips made Directions that the Appellant should provide an updated witness statement by 12 January 2026 and, if so advised, an updated ASA by the same date. The Respondent was directed to provide a new Review in light of the new witness statement (and any new ASA) by 2 February 2026, and to provide the Appellant’s entry clearance application and related documents by the same date. The final hearing was relisted for the first available date after 1 March 2026. A hearing notice for the new hearing date of 17 April 2026 was issued the same day.

In the event, the Appellant’s new statement and ASA were provided on 30 January 2026 and time was then extended to 13 February 2026 for the Respondent to comply. The Respondent did not comply.

The appeal then came before Judge Heaven on 17 April 2026. In the meantime, the Appellant had provided further evidence on 19 February 2026.

The hearing before Judge Heaven was also ineffective. The Respondent indicated that they withdrew a previous concession and wished to put credibility in issue. The Respondent applied to adjourn the hearing to provide further entry clearance documents. The application was supported by the Appellant as they had not had the opportunity to prepare to meet the new issue of credibility. Judge Heaven adjourned the hearing once more, making further Directions.

The upshot of the above is that the appeal came before me for a final hearing on 3^rd September, over three years since the initial claim and Judge Rhys-Davies ordered the Home office to pay the costs wasted by their actions.

To compound the difficulties, instead of both parties agreeing a further composite bundle of documents ready for the trial and instead of the parties ensuring that all documents relevant to the appeal which were submitted after the initial listing for a final hearing were in one bundle instead chose to upload a smorgasbord of documents at different times, barely labelled and not in any chronological order. In this case one has three separate witness statements of the appellant randomly uploaded and not properly numbered. One has two reviews of the evidence by the Home office but not one after the service of the final documents by the appellant which included an expert report.

One has print outs from Hospital records and GP records to which there is no reference or explanation as to their relevance. There are various documents printed from the internet about Ghanian divorce however there is no explanation as to their provenance or who is exhibiting them and why.

It is not for the Judge in a final hearing to have to trawl through a haphazardly organised set of documents to find and seek that which may be relevant. It would have been more helpful if the parties had provided a complete final set of documents in chronological order for the court to assess and utilise together with an essential reading list which would have enabled the focus properly to be on the issues in dispute rather than with one eye on what might be relevant in another document.

The hearing took place by video on the Cloud Video Platform. It was recorded. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.

The parties agreed that the issues the Tribunal must decide are:

The appellant’s case is thatshe is a national of Ghana. She states that she was forced by her father to marry her husband. Despite the marriage, she continued her relationship with another partner and became pregnant by him. She subsequently travelled lawfully to the United Kingdom with her husband.

The appellant's evidence is that, after she informed her husband of the pregnancy, he abandoned her. She further states that she has received threats against both herself and her daughter from her husband's family. She fears that, if returned to Ghana, her husband's family would physically assault her and subject her daughter to FGM.

The Respondent accepts that the appellant was subjected to a forced marriage and that she has received threats from her husband's family.

The appellant was interviewed twice in respect of her claims. She also provided three witness statements. The first witness statement and thus her evidence can be summarised as follows;

The appellant states that since September 2024 she has lost contact with her mother, who was previously her only close family connection in Ghana. She says that her husband’s family threatened her mother in an effort to locate her and compel her return to Ghana. According to the appellant, the last time she spoke to her mother, her mother was distressed and fearful.

She claims that her husband’s family, who belong to the Dagomba tribe, wish to force her to return to undertake traditional rites because they regard her having had a child outside marriage as a serious transgression. She alleges that they intend to publicly humiliate her within the community. The appellant states that her child is regarded as an “abomination child” and that her husband’s family harbour hostility towards the child for this reason.

The appellant says she no longer has any family support in Ghana. She maintains that her maternal relatives support her husband’s family in accordance with the wishes of her late father, who insisted that she remain married. She also states that her paternal relatives are aligned with her husband’s family and would return her to them if they found her. She explains that, in her community, payment of a bride price is viewed as giving the husband’s family authority over the woman and her children.

The appellant fears that her husband’s family intend to subject her daughter to FGM, which she says is practised in their home area of Dagbon in northern Ghana. She believes that they regard themselves as entitled to make decisions concerning the child because the bride price was paid.

She contends that internal relocation would not be a viable option because she would be required to work as a community nurse and could be transferred throughout the country. Given the size and geographical spread of her husband’s extended family, she believes she would eventually be identified.

The appellant further states that women face significant discrimination in Ghana and that the police are unwilling to intervene in disputes regarded as traditional or family matters. She says her mother reported threats to the police but they refused to record the complaint, describing it as a traditional matter to be resolved within the family.

The appellant remains legally married and says her husband refuses to agree to a divorce. She maintains that following her father’s death, his younger brother became head of the family and continues to enforce her father’s wish that she remain married. She identifies this uncle as a continuing source of pressure and risk.

Finally, the appellant states that her mental health has deteriorated significantly as a result of these circumstances. She says that if returned to Ghana she would live in constant fear for her own safety and that of her child.

The appellant’s second witness statement dated 13^th February 2026 can be summarised as follows;

he appellant states that she was surprised to learn of the existence of a divorce certificate. She says that she has had no contact with either her mother or her husband for more than a year.

She notes that the certificate identifies her father as her attorney, but states that her father died shortly after the traditional wedding in December 2022 and was therefore not alive on the date shown on the certificate in May 2023.

The appellant says that she does not know whether the divorce certificate is genuine, but maintains that its existence does not alter her circumstances or fears.

She further states that she received a message via TikTok in July 2024 referring to her as still being married. She does not know who sent the message but believes the account may have been created solely to contact her after unsuccessful attempts to reach her by telephone.

The appellant expresses hope that her husband has moved on with his life and no longer has an interest in her or her child, J. However, she states that her primary fear is not her husband but his family, whom she describes as firmly committed to traditional practices. She says that she remains terrified about what they may do to her daughter.

The appellant’s third witness statement is dated 13^th May 2026. I note that this statement follows the revelation and the disclosure of the attempts by the appellant to enter the UK

It is summarised in the following manner;

The appellant states that she worked as a nurse in Ghana and had been employed in three different locations. While working in Okorase, she was contacted by the G.R.M.N.A. and asked whether she would accompany a patient travelling to the UK for medical treatment. She agreed and was informed that arrangements would be made for a visa application. Although she was aware of G.Q., she states that she had never met him in person.

The appellant says she did not see the visa application form before these proceedings and that her involvement in the process was limited to providing biometrics and receiving telephone updates. She explains that the term “partner” on the application was not intended to describe a romantic relationship. In her understanding, the term could refer to a work or travel partner, and G.Q. was simply the person with whom she was expected to travel.

She does not recognise the address listed on the application as her own and states that she was living in Tafo at the relevant time. She maintains that she was correctly described as being in a relationship, as she was then involved with I.P., although the form did not ask for the name of her partner. She emphatically states that she has never been in a relationship with G.Q.

The appellant explains that her relationship with I.P. began when they were young, shortly after she completed senior high school. Their relationship was known to her family but was disapproved of, ostensibly because of ethnic differences. She contends, however, that the real reason was that her father intended to marry her to R.D. in order to settle a debt owed to R.D.’s father.

According to the appellant, she was not given an opportunity to develop a relationship with R.D. before the marriage. She met him only briefly before the traditional marriage ceremony and travelled to the UK shortly afterwards. At that time, she was already pregnant by I.P. and feared that her father and R.D.’s father would harm her and the unborn child.

The appellant states that, after arriving in the UK, she and R.D. effectively lived as strangers sharing a home. She says that his behaviour became abusive after he discovered her pregnancy.

She reiterates that she has never met, nor had a relationship with, G.Q., and that I.P. is the only partner she has chosen and is the father of her daughter.

The appellant maintains that she was forced by her father to marry R.D. to clear a family debt. She says that she remains married to R.D. and that his family continue to regard her as their property because a bride price was paid. She attributes ongoing threats against her to this belief.

The appellant states that she has changed her telephone number several times because of fear of her husband’s family. When they were unable to contact her, they allegedly threatened her mother. She says her mother reported these threats to the police but was told that the matter was a family dispute and that the police could not assist.

The appellant states that she chose to cease contact with her mother because she feared that her mother would be used as a means of locating her. She adds that it is difficult for her daughter to grow up without her father and that, although she would like her daughter and I.P. to meet, she does not consider it safe to take her daughter to Ghana.

The appellant was cross examined. She maintained as follows;

The appellant stated that when she arrived in the UK in February 2023 she was already pregnant. The child was not her husband’s. She had been unable to disclose the pregnancy to those in Ghana because of the difficulties it would cause, but informed her husband after arriving in the UK.

She said her husband reacted very negatively when he learned of the pregnancy. He was angry, verbally abusive and made threats towards her. He never physically assaulted her, but she was frightened by his behaviour and left the relationship. She stated that both while they were living together and after she left, he threatened that both she and the child would die. He also told her to return to Ghana because having a child who was not her husband’s was unacceptable in their community.

The appellant explained that the marriage had been forced and arranged to satisfy family expectations and settle a debt. She believed her husband wanted her to return to Ghana because of the pregnancy and the perceived shame it brought upon the family. She has not received direct threats from her husband for approximately two years and does not know whether he remains in the UK or has returned to Ghana.

The appellant’s most recent threatening communication was a TikTok message received in July 2024. She took a screenshot and says it was provided to her solicitor. She believes the message was sent because those seeking her were unable to contact her by telephone after she changed her number. After receiving the message, she immediately blocked the account and subsequently changed her telephone number again. She has not received any further threats since then. The message was sent to an existing Ghanaian TikTok account which she was unable to change because she lost access to the account credentials.

The appellant stated that her daughter’s biological father is E.P., who remains in Ghana. She has had no recent contact with him, partly because she changed her telephone number due to fear of being traced. Although E.P. knows of the child’s existence, she does not know whether he would wish to have a relationship with her or the child if she returned to Ghana. She believes he may have moved on with his life and notes that her family did not approve of him.

When asked why she continued to fear return despite the absence of recent threats, the appellant stated that the TikTok message demonstrated that those seeking her had not abandoned their efforts. She believes they only lost contact with her because she repeatedly changed her telephone number and cut ties with people in Ghana.

Regarding the October 2022 visa application involving G.Q., the appellant maintained that she knew nothing of the details of the application. She explained that she had been working as a nurse when she was approached to accompany G.Q. to the UK in a professional capacity owing to his medical needs. She understood that she would be travelling as his nurse and had never met him personally. Her role in the process was limited to providing her passport details and attending for biometrics.

The appellant stated that the visa arrangements had been made through her matron and nursing authorities in Ghana. She maintained that any reference to G.Q. as her “partner” related to him being a travel partner rather than a romantic partner. She accepted that she may herself have used the term “partner”, but intended it in that sense. She never saw the visa application before these proceedings.

When questioned about obtaining evidence from her former employer or hospital, the appellant explained that she had been transferred for work, lost contact details when she changed telephone numbers, and no longer wished to engage with individuals in Ghana because of her fears. Although she remembers the hospital where she worked, she does not know whether the relevant staff remain there.

The appellant stated that she did not claim asylum upon arrival in the UK because she was unaware of the asylum process. She said that it was only after speaking with a midwife, who advised her to do so for the safety of herself and her child, that she considered making a claim.

She explained that she left Ghana because she feared the consequences of her pregnancy becoming known. She described the environment there as toxic due to traditional expectations surrounding pregnancy and childbirth. She stated that she came to the UK to escape those traditional practices and that, unlike Ghana, no such rituals would be imposed upon her here.

In relation to the divorce certificate, the appellant said she could not confirm whether it was genuine. She was suspicious of it because it named her deceased father as her attorney, despite his having died before the purported divorce. She believes the document may be part of an attempt to induce her to return to Ghana. She referred to the July 2024 TikTok message, which asserted that she remained married, as evidence that her husband’s family continued to regard her as bound to them.

The appellant maintained that she remains at risk throughout Ghana because of traditional beliefs surrounding her having a child outside marriage. She stated that many people would regard the child as illegitimate and consider punishment necessary to remove the perceived shame or curse arising from the circumstances of the birth. She contends that relocation would not be effective because she works as a community nurse and would be visible within local communities. She stated that she is trained specifically as a community nurse and would not be able to work as a hospital ward nurse instead.

The appellant also relied upon two expert witnesses. The first was in relation to her substantive claims as to being in danger in Ghana. She explained that The expert report states that forced marriage of adult women is recognised in Ghana as a form of gender-based violence, although its prevalence is difficult to quantify because available data often combines adult forced marriage with child and early marriage. The report considers the appellant’s account of being forced into marriage to settle her father's debt to be plausible, noting evidence that debt-related and compensation-based marriages occur in some parts of Ghana and are driven by poverty and customary practices.

The report further concludes that the appellant’s account of threats from her husband’s family after they learned she was pregnant by another man is consistent with country evidence. Marriage in Ghana is commonly associated with expectations of male authority, fidelity, and control. A married woman becoming pregnant by another man is likely to be viewed as bringing shame upon both families, increasing the likelihood of punitive reactions. The report notes that the threats made by the husband’s family could exacerbate the risk of abuse.

According to the report, a married woman in the appellant’s circumstances could face a range of reprisals, including divorce, physical violence, social stigma, isolation, and verbal abuse from both family and community members. Given that the marriage was allegedly arranged to settle a debt, the report considers it likely that the appellant’s family would feel shame and be unwilling to provide support or protection. Any divorce could also revive financial obligations between the families, further complicating her position.

The report states that the appellant’s daughter could also face hostility, including derogatory treatment, discrimination, and stigma arising from being born outside the marriage. It is considered likely that the husband would refuse to acknowledge the child.

Although Ghana has legal measures and specialist police units intended to protect women and girls, the report concludes that effective protection would be unlikely in the appellant’s circumstances. It states that resource limitations, logistical challenges, cultural barriers, and possible family rejection would leave both the appellant and her daughter without meaningful protection.

Finally, the report concludes that internal relocation within Ghana would not be a viable option. It considers that family rejection, community stigma, economic vulnerability, and the absence of support networks would create significant difficulties for reintegration. The report further states that relocation would not provide adequate protection, particularly because the police are said to intervene only rarely in matters regarded as domestic or family disputes.

The second expert and the report in relation to the divorce certificate reads as follows:

‘In my opinion, the implications from the search results from the registry show that the Petition for Divorce does not exist, the Respondent did not file a reply, and a judgment was not entered by the Judge on the date indicated on the Certificate of Divorce, and the Certificate of Divorce did not exist in the records of the court.’

To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, in considering whether the appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:

If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:

To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.

My approach to assessing credibility comes from KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal commended consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. I consider any documents along with all the evidence in the round. I am also conscious that just because a person has lied about one thing does not mean he has lied about another.

Section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 means that behaviour designed or likely to conceal information, mislead, obstruct or delay consideration of a claim, and claims made after a negative decision has been made or after there was an opportunity to make a claim in a safe country are damaging to credibility.

I have considered the matter with the upmost care and find the following as facts;

The appellant is not credible in her account, claim or explanation of events

The explanation provided in respect of the Entry Clearance applications and her various attempts to enter the UK are not accurate and are false.

The appellant is not at risk in Ghana from either her claimed husband’s family or her claimed husband.

The appellant has never been harmed by her claimed husband.

The child is of no interest and is rejected by the claimed husband and the wider family therefore there is little risk of the child being subjected to FGM by them

The Daughter is not at risk of FGM in Ghana as the appellant is able to protect her and there is a sufficiency of protection

There is no credible or identifiable objective risk to the child due to FGM. I am satisfied that this is a convenient manufacture of the appellant in an attempt to remain in the UK.

There is no credible evidence that her claimed husband or his family have any influence or control over the state, police or machinery of government such that would inhibit or prevent the appellant achieving protection from the Police if needed.

There is no credible evidence that her claimed husband or his family have any influence or control over the state, police or machinery of government such that would inhibit or prevent the appellant from internally relocating should she so wish.

I have considered all of the evidence in the case. Having done so, the appeal is dismissed on all grounds.

I take this opportunity to thank both counsel for their skill and ability in marshalling the evidence and presenting it in a format which made it easier to comprehend and digest.

The acceptance that the Appellant was the victim of a forced marriage and had received threats from her estranged husband's family has been withdrawn by the Home Office. It was right to withdraw it. It was a concession which was based entirely on the appellant’s say so without any evidential foundation which would make such credible. Simply because an appellant claims it, it does not make it true or reliable. There needs to be a credibility to that claimed and that credibility and reliability emanates from an assured evidential basis.

The Respondent relies upon the Appellant's first Entry Clearance application of 11 October 2022 as demonstrating significant inconsistencies with her later evidence. During her second substantive interview, the Appellant stated that GQ was not her partner, that there had been no romantic relationship between them, that he was not a family member and that she was merely accompanying him to the United Kingdom in a professional capacity as a nurse. This account is contradicted by the information provided in the Entry Clearance application. In that application, the Appellant stated that she was accompanying "my partner" for medical treatment, identified Mr Q as that partner, recorded her relationship status as "unmarried partner", and explained that the visit was being funded because "my partner works with them, and they are funding our trip". She also provided the same residential address as Mr Q, stated that she had lived there for three years, described it as her partner's home, and confirmed that she would not be travelling with anyone other than a partner, spouse or dependant.

The Respondent therefore contended that the application presents Mr Q as a cohabiting unmarried partner with whom the Appellant had been living for a substantial period, which is fundamentally inconsistent with her later account that she was merely accompanying him in a professional capacity.

The appellant’s account in her oral evidence fundamentally undermines any semblance of credibility. When asked about the term ‘partner’ and the inference that it referred to romantic partner which was supported by the remainder of the application the appellant sought to explain that ‘partner’ to her and in this context should be read as ‘travel partner’. As in, ‘I am travelling with him therefore I am his [travelling] partner’.

I am sorry to say I found explanation casuistic and wholly lacking in any vestige of truth or reliability. It was a poor attempt to seek to explain a fundamentally damaging part of the evidence. The appellant did not explain it. Her evidence showed that the entry to the UK and the concoction of the subsequent claim was by design and not misfortune and happenstance. It shows a calculation and a planning given the timeframes involved.

I do not accept that this was a work trip on account of her being a Nurse. The appellant made no attempt to verify that and her explanation that she wouldn’t be able to contact anyone about it showed a flippancy which, given the importance of the issues, may have not been there had the appellant been genuine and honest with the actual nature and purpose of the application.

The Respondent also relied upon the Appellant's evidence concerning IP, the father of her child, and the chronology of her relationships. In her first substantive interview, the Appellant identified Mr P as the father of her child and stated that she had been in a relationship with him before she was forced to marry RD. She explained that she had been seeing Mr P before the marriage and described the relationship as one that had existed for a considerable period.

This account is difficult to reconcile with the contents of the October 2022 Entry Clearance application, in which the Appellant was presenting herself as the unmarried partner of, and living with, GQ shortly before her marriage to RD on 21 December 2022. I am satisfied that the documentary evidence is inconsistent with the Appellant's account of the relationship chronology she later advanced.

Further reliance is placed upon the progression of the Appellant's immigration applications. I note that the Appellant first sought entry clearance as the claimed partner of GQ and that application was refused. Approximately two months later, she submitted a further Entry Clearance application based upon her relationship with RD, which was successful.

The Respondent submits that it is significant that, following the refusal of an application based upon one claimed partner, the Appellant shortly thereafter relied upon a relationship with a different individual who had already been granted entry clearance to the United Kingdom as a student. The timing of these applications is said to undermine the credibility of the Appellant's account and I agree with that assertion and claim. It further reinforces the conclusion I reached in relation to the mendacity of the appellant and her attempts to enter the UK being by design.

The Respondent further argues the Appellant's evidence is that her relationship with Mr Q came to an end when the visa application was refused. It was submitted that the ending of the relationship at the point of refusal is a further factor capable of undermining the credibility and genuineness of the relationship history relied upon by the Appellant. How that also fits with the appellant’s claims that she was never the romantic partner of Mr Q is a point which was completely lost on the appellant and one which was never ultimately explained by her.

Taking the evidence in the round, the Appellant's account that she was threatened by her husband's family, that her mother was threatened in Ghana, and that she had ceased contact with her mother is not accepted. In reaching that view, note is taken of evidence that she spoke with her mother on the day of her second substantive interview.

Having considered the matter and considered all of the issues closely I am satisfied that the appellant is not credible, she is not at risk in Ghana and she can return there together with her child.

I find that the Appellant has not established a well-founded fear of persecution in Ghana. I am satisfied that any feared harm arises from non-state actors and that the evidence does not demonstrate that the Ghanaian state is unable or unwilling to provide protection. I find that all past and feared future harm derives from said non-state actors. I am satisfied that there is no evidence that the Ghanaian state sanctions or condones such conduct. I find that the Appellant does not fear the Ghanaian authorities generally and is not of adverse interest to them. I am satisfied that avenues of protection exist and are available to her.

I therefore find that the treatment feared by the Appellant would not amount to persecution or serious harm because effective protection is available from the Ghanaian authorities

I find that the Appellant's claim centres upon a forced marriage arranged by her late father and a fear that her estranged husband's family will kill her because her child is fathered by another man. I find that her husband has disowned her and that his family contacted her until she changed her telephone number, after which they contacted members of her family. I find that, apart from her father, the Appellant does not claim that her family mistreated her and that she maintains good relations with them. I have also considered her claim that her child would be at risk of FGM. The claimed husband never harmed the appellant in the UK or in Ghana before they left. He did not harm her upon being told that the child she was carrying was not his according to the appellant.

I find that the Appellant continues to enjoy good relations with her family in Ghana. I find that her father, who compelled her marriage, has died. I am satisfied that he therefore no longer constitutes a source of risk on return and that her family represents a source of support. The appellant proffered no credible reason as to why they would not support her nor why she could not return to them for help and comfort.

I find that the Appellant fears her husband's family rather than her husband. I am not satisfied, on the evidence, that those individuals possess any ability to obstruct or defeat a request for protection made to the authorities. The appellant led no credible or reliable evidence that any of the claimed family have any connection to the state, the police or security services or the like or any such body which could or would allow them to act with impunity.

I find that the Appellant's evidence was that any influence held by those she fears is limited to local government and traditional chiefs. I am satisfied that any influence is local in nature only. I find that they would not be able to prevent assistance being provided by higher authorities. I further find that the Appellant could relocate within Ghana and live safely elsewhere.

Applying Horvath, I find that the relevant question is whether Ghana operates a system of protection capable of providing a reasonable level of protection, rather than a guarantee of complete safety.

I find that the country evidence demonstrates that, in general, the Ghanaian authorities are willing and able to provide effective protection against non-state actors. I acknowledge evidence of corruption and inefficiency in some areas but find that efforts are being made to address those issues.

The Respondent relies upon the March 2025 Country Policy and Information Note: Ghana - Actors of Protection. Reference is made to paragraph 2.1.1, which states that, in general, the Ghanaian government takes reasonable steps to prevent persecution. Reliance is also placed upon paragraph 2.1.3, which indicates that the state is generally willing and able to provide a sufficient level of protection to persons who fear harm from non-state actors, including rogue state actors. Further reliance is placed upon paragraph 3.3.14, which refers to the USSD 2023 Human Rights Report and records that a number of Ghanaian laws prohibit Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting ("FGM/C").

The Respondent acknowledges the report of the Alliance for Reproductive Health Rights, Beyond the Laws: Stepping Up Efforts to End FGM in Ghana, dated 6 February 2025. That report confirms that FGM has been criminalised under the Ghanaian Criminal Code. Whilst the report observes that legislative prohibitions alone are insufficient to eradicate deeply embedded cultural practices and that wider educational and community-based measures remain necessary, the Respondent submits that the evidence nevertheless demonstrates the availability of a general level of state protection. It is further contended that such protection is sufficient when considered alongside the availability of internal relocation within Ghana.

I find that the Appellant did not report her concerns to the Ghanaian authorities. I am not satisfied that she has therefore demonstrated that the authorities would be unwilling or unable to assist her.

I have considered the Appellant's lack of confidence in the police. I find that the continued existence of FGM does not establish a systemic failure of protection. I am satisfied that the existence of criminal activity does not, in itself, demonstrate the absence of effective protective mechanisms.

I find that FGM has been practised by members of the Appellant's wider family in the past but only to the extent that it was significantly in the past. However, I find that the Appellant herself has not been subjected to FGM and that the practice has not occurred within her family for two generations. Given her positive relationship with her family, I am not satisfied that she would face a risk of FGM from them. The appellant did not advance any risk to herself from FGM

I find that the Appellant attributes the future risk of FGM to her husband's family. I am satisfied that FGM is unlawful in Ghana. I acknowledge evidence that prosecutions can be difficult and that incidents may be underreported. However, I find that the individuals feared by the Appellant do not hold a level of influence sufficient to prevent the authorities from acting. I find that state protection is available to her.

I am satisfied that the issue of FGM was raised as a convenient hook by which the appellant could seek to remain. The lack of any consistent application or usage of the practice/cutting by the claimed husband’s family and no reliable evidence that they even believe in it and no actual credible threats to do such leads me to conclude that the appellant was utilising the general risk which may exist in Ghana as a subject specific avenue for claim for herself.

The appellant was not able to evidence any threats saying that she had changed her number. She was, she claimed, contacted on tik tok but was unable to produce this threat despite having access to it and despite she states, providing it to her Solicitor.

In any event standard of protection does not have to be perfect. No system is and no state can provide impenetrable guarantees. The law does not require impenetrability. It requires sufficiency and that is adjudged by an assessment of all factors. Ghana is a fully functioning democratic state with a full functioning police force and a prosecution service. The country is governed by the rule of law like the UK and has appropriate mechanisms and systems for dealing with crime and offences.

I have considered whether the Appellant would be at risk as a lone woman. I find that support mechanisms exist in Ghana for women at risk of gender-based violence and that Ghanaian law provides for equal treatment. I am satisfied that violence against women is not sanctioned or condoned by the state.

I find that the Appellant is educated, completed her education at the age of twenty-two, worked as a nurse in Ghana and has also worked as a care assistant in the United Kingdom. I find that she has expressed a desire to work and possesses the skills and experience necessary to obtain employment and establish herself in another part of Ghana.

I find that the Appellant remains in contact with her family through modern communication methods and has not suggested that such contact could not continue on return. I am satisfied that her family would remain a source of support even if she lived elsewhere within Ghana.

I have considered the Appellant's mental health concerns. I find that she is not presently taking medication and has not produced evidence of ongoing counselling. I further find that she has continued to live and work in the United Kingdom notwithstanding those concerns. I am not satisfied that her mental health would prevent her return to Ghana.

I find that the Appellant has not established that she would face destitution on return. I am satisfied that she has demonstrated an ability to relocate, adapt to new circumstances, build relationships and manage her finances independently. I further find that social assistance programmes exist in Ghana and that, given her professional employment history as a nurse, she would be able to access available support while seeking employment.

Taking all matters together, I find that the Appellant has not demonstrated a real risk of destitution upon return to Ghana.

I find that there are no legal barriers to the Appellant relocating within Ghana.

I find that the Appellant's fear relates to Accra and that she has not identified a risk elsewhere in Ghana. I further find that any influence possessed by those she fears is confined to a local area. I find that the Appellant has never attempted internal relocation.

I am satisfied that the individuals feared have not demonstrated any capacity to trace or locate the Appellant throughout Ghana.

I find that the Appellant has successfully adapted to life in the United Kingdom for approximately two years. I am satisfied that this demonstrates an ability to establish herself in a different environment and supports the conclusion that she could do so elsewhere in Ghana.

Considering the evidence as a whole, I am satisfied that it would not be unreasonable to expect the Appellant to relocate to another part of Ghana.

I further find that reintegration assistance would be available to the Appellant should she choose to return voluntarily.

I add that the entire issue about the divorce certificate and whether it is genuine or not or whether she is divorced or not was a complete red herring. It is irrelevant for the following reason. The appellant’s own expert states that the claimed husband has rejected her and the child as it is not his. The expert states that the claimed husband’s family would and do similarly reject the child as it is not his. It is not a child of his family. Therefore, there would be no reason for them to be interested in putting the child through FGM when it is a child that they have rejected as having anything to do with their family. The appellant does not credibly evidence that a family can pose a risk to a child that they have rejected and is not considered their family.

There are no very significant obstacles to the appellant’s return. She knows the languages, culture and how life works in Ghana. She can seek employment as she is a qualified nurse and she can obtain childcare which is not something which is unreasonable or unheard of. She has family who can assist her and given the short amount of time she has been in the UK she can no doubt get back in touch with friends who will be glad to help her I am sure.

The appellant’s child will remain with her. Family life will continue in Ghana. It is in the child’s best interests to go to Ghana with their Mother and live there. The child is not a British citizen nor a qualifying child in terms of the law and given the child’s age it is highly unlikely to have formed any meaningful private life outside the relationship with Mum. The child will grow up as a Ghanian citizen in Ghana and will this be able to enjoy all the advantages and benefits such brings. The child can have access to schooling and healthcare and the wider family. It is in the child’s best interests to remain with the appellant and go to Ghana with her.

I add that Miss Eckley could not have said more for the appellant or done so more persuasively. The factual matrix, as I have found it, and the evidence however did not support the contentions made despite the conspicuous ability of Miss Eckley in dealing with them.

The appeal is dismissed

Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant [and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified], is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.