ABM v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the appellant against the decision of the respondent made on 17 September 2024.

In making this decision we have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties and family members. We have decided to make an anonymity direction because this is an international protection appeal where the anonymity of the appeal is necessary to determine it in the interests of justice.

The Appellant is a national of Iraq whose date of birth accepted by the respondent is 10 October 2005. On 13 November 2022 he entered the UK. He shortly thereafter claimed asylum. The respondent refused his asylum claim on 17 September 2024. The appellant appealed leading to the present proceedings.

The hearing took place face to face. It was recorded using the Cloud Video Platform. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.

At the outset of the hearing we sought to clarify the issues which the tribunal was being asked to decide in this appeal. The respondent had said in her decision that the Refugee Convention was not engaged as no convention reason had been identified. The appellant’s skeleton argument said that the Respondent’s decision breached the Refugee Convention but failed to identify convention reason. Mr Papasotiriou accepted that there is no convention reason in this case and therefore the core protection claim was based on humanitarian protection only. Mr Papasotiriou also said that the case was argued on Article 3 health grounds on the basis of material deprivation and risk of suicide, and on Article 8 grounds. We discussed this further because the core credibility dispute in relation to humanitarian protection affected the human rights grounds. It was agreed that there were two aspects to the humanitarian protection claim:

The second of these questions would also depend upon whether the appellant would be able to be documented in Iraq so as to be able to move through the country without a violation of his Article 3 rights. Furthermore, if the appellant’s claim to fear from his brother and mother is not true he would not suffer material deprivation, and if this is true, material deprivation would mean that internal relocation would not be reasonable. Therefore the remaining human rights grounds were:

The appellant had provided a supplementary bundle of 24 pages on the day before the hearing. As a preliminary matter we had to determine whether this should be admitted in evidence pursuant to the Practice Direction of 1 November 2024. Ms Jones did not oppose its admission into evidence. We decided that it was in the interests of justice to consider this document. Consequently the evidence before us was the hearing bundle of 568 pages, the supplementary bundle of 24 pages and the respondent’s Country Bulletin on Iraq dated July 2026.

We heard oral evidence from the appellant, who used a Kurdish Sorani interpreter. We note that he exhibited no apparent mental difficulties in giving his evidence. In fact, if anything his presentation improved as the material became more difficult.

We heard closing submissions from both advocates. Due to insufficient court time the closing submissions of Mr Papasotiriou were translated for the appellant after we had concluded the hearing. After hearing both parties’ submissions in English, we reserved our decision, which we now give.

To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the appellant.

The relevant provisions of the Immigration Rules in this appeal are in Appendix PL, being that there are very significant obstacles to integration.

In so far as they rely on article 8 outside the Rules it is for the appellant to show that article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged and if so, it is for the respondent to show that the decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Sections 117A to 117D of the 2002 Act are relevant to any assessment under article 8 of the ECHR outside the Rules.

The question is whether the refusal breaches the appellant's Article 3 ECHR right not to be "subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". The appellant must establish that they are a seriously ill person and adduce evidence capable of demonstrating that substantial grounds have been shown for believing that as a seriously ill person they would face a real risk, on account of the absence of appropriate treatment or the lack of access to such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in their state of health resulting in intense suffering, or to a significant reduction in life expectancy.

Our approach to assessing credibility comes from KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal commended consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. We consider any documents along with all the evidence in the round. We are also conscious that just because a person has lied about one thing does not mean he has lied about another.

Section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 means that behaviour designed or likely to conceal information, mislead, obstruct or delay consideration of a claim, and claims made after a negative decision has been made or after there was an opportunity to make a claim in a safe country are damaging to credibility.

The core of the appellant’s claim is that he fears his mother and brother because they used to beat him in Iraq. He also says that his brother is involved with the Patriotically Union of Kurdistan meaning that the appellant cannot get state protection. We do not find this claim to be credible for the following reasons when all the evidence is considered in the round.

First, the appellant’s factual claim has been inconsistent over time. The first record of it is in an “Unaccompanied child welfare form” completed on 17 November 2022. In that form it is shown that when he was asked why he had come to the UK he said “I want to claim asylum”. Immediately after this the appellant talks about his family members mentioning:

He says they are all in Iraq and safe.

When asked if there is any other reason why the appellant has come to the UK he says:

When asked about how he got the UK he explained that his maternal uncle arranged the journey with a smuggler. The appellant had his mobile phone with him.

The next document is an initial assessment questions and responses document completed by a social worker on 26 November 2022. In this the appellant detailed that his father had died in 2020. He also mentioned another brother who had died by suicide. That brother would be the eldest of the siblings based on the age given. The appellant gave an account of his family similar to that in the earlier document. When asked if the appellant had been in contact with his family he explained:

He was then asked about his reasons for leaving Iraq and explained:

He was then asked if anyone hurt him or if he was ever detained or kept somewhere against his will and he said:

When asked if he had any injuries the appellant said:

This document also shows the appellant’s answer to questions about suicidal feelings and self-harm. In relation to this he said:

The document also records the appellant having Facebook, messenger, WhatsApp and Snapchat accounts.

There is an issue with this document that causes us to give less weight to that otherwise might be the case. This is that it describes the appellant as having come from Afghanistan when he clearly did not say that.

The next relevant document is an Unaccompanied Asylum Seeking Children Statement of Evidence form. It is dated 9 October 2023. It is accompanied by a statement from the appellant of the same date. To complete it the appellant had the assistance of his current legal representative. In these documents the appellant gives a similar description of his family but adds that he has his father’s cousin in the UK and gives a telephone number for this person. When asked if he is afraid of any members of his family whose details he has provided he mentions his older brother. When asked when he last contacted his family he said it was 11 September 2022 when he fled Iraq. He repeats that the journey was arranged by his maternal uncle.

The statement provides the appellant’s first detailed account of the harm he claims to fear. In the statement he did not mention at all the debts and creditors who he originally claimed to fear. Rather his focus was upon his mother and brother saying:

The appellant went on to describe how he was never hurt in front of his father, but once when he reported being hurt by his brother to his father, his father beat his brother and the appellant’s brother retaliated against the appellant. Later in the statement he explained that after his father passed away in 2020 his brother and mother would beat him with impunity. However he would also stay with his paternal grandmother for protection. He also mentioned that G, who was only 20 years old when the appellant left Kurdistan, had a substantial role with the Patriot Union of Kurdistan had his own bodyguard to protect him. He said that his brother had the right to kill anyone he wants and he could not tell anyone what he was going through.

The appellant had a substantive asylum interview on 12 January 2024. The interview begins with the appellant being asked about two pictures. The appellant refers to one being recorded by his friend while he was in hospital and the other one by his teacher. The former is screenshots of a video which appear at pages 552, 553 and 554 of the bundle. These were clearly considered by the respondent as they appear in the respondent’s bundle. The latter, taken by a teacher, do not appear in the respondent’s bundle. It is a photo that appears at page 218 of the bundle. We consider these pictures further below.

Turning to the substance of the interview, the appellant again recounted the same family structures he had described before. He said he did not have any contact with family members since coming to the UK and said the reason was he did not want to have a mother or a brother. He confirmed that his relationship with his grandmother was very good.

The detail of the claim only began at question 130. The appellant said he feared his brother, maternal uncle and everyone from Kurdistan. When asked why he feared his brother he said it is because he had been physically assaulting the appellant since childhood. In relation to his maternal uncle he said that he feared he may be the same as them (i.e. his mother and brother) despite never having done anything to the appellant. When asked why he thought this he mentioned his uncle saying to his mother that if he ever misbehaved he would “cut my tongue”. The general theme of the interview from then onwards was that the appellant did not trust his own family who always hurt him. However he was then asked if his father and grandmother were good to him, and he sought to change the question. They then took a break. On return the appellant was asked when his fears began and he said it was “exactly at the time when my father passed away”. He also said he did not fear anyone except the people he had mentioned.

The interviewer specifically asked about whether the appellant had been hurt prior to his father’s death, and the appellant said that he was but that when his father was alive no one would beat him up. The appellant also described difficulty staying with his grandmother, with whom he had a good relationship, because the grandmother lived with his father’s second wife.

At question 185 the appellant was specifically asked about the beatings he received. He mentioned two specific incidents. First was when he dropped some Pepsi and was hit over the head with a dinnerplate. Second was when he was cleaning the car and his brother hit him twice with a broom handle. When asked about going to hospital, he said that he needed to go to hospital after the injury to his head but was not permitted, and said that the only time he did go to hospital was when he caught his hand with the window. He said friend accompanied him to the hospital where he got stitches.

The appellant was also asked about his brother’s PUK involvement. The appellant said his brother had a PUK counterterrorism ID.

The appellant was asked about what he did in the run-up to leaving Kurdistan. He said that he stayed at home after applying for a passport so he could leave. The interviewer noticed that in his witness statement the appellant had said that he stayed with his grandmother during this period. The appellant claimed mistranslation or misinterpretation. The appellant was finally asked about whether he was struggling with his mental health recently and he said no.

On 30 August 2024 the appellant solicitors sent what they described as responses to further queries. Two points are relevant to note from this. First, the appellant said that his brother joined the PUK after his father died, and worked in a shampoo factory before. Second he said that he found out about G’s membership of the PUK after his sister saw his work ID.

The appellant provided a statement dated 27 March 2025 as part of this appeal. The order of the pages of this in the bundle is wrong. Page 51 should come after page 52. The appellant maintains that G was part of the PUK with a substantial role within the party and had a bodyguard. He said, by way of clarification, that around 8 or 9 months after their father’s death his brother mentioned he had joined the PUK and his sister saw his work ID. The appellant gave further details about splitting his time between his grandmother’s home and that of his own mother.

In this statement the appellant also provided to further details which would help explain the basis of the case. These appear on page 51 in the middle paragraph. The appellant says:

He also provided clarification about photos and videos, which we look at separately below.

The appellant provided a statement dated 22 September 2026 and the supplementary bundle. This is mainly about photographs of G in military uniform, which we look at in relation to the photo specifically below.

The appellant was cross-examined extensively about his account. From all the evidence, it is clear that the appellant’s narrative has changed significantly. It began with the appellant focusing upon his father’s debts, risk from creditors, and, as he put it, being stuck in the middle between the creditors and his mother and brother with whom he did not get on. It morphed at his asylum interview into being solely about risk from his mother and brother, and principally about his brother. His brother by this time had become a member of the PUK with influence. By the time of the appeal, the appellant had added that he was adopted and was an heir to part of his father’s estate. At the end of the hearing when I asked the appellant to tell me why he believed now that G wished him harm, he said it was because of the inheritance and that he never loved me and they were never on good terms. The failure to mention the inheritance or adoption earlier is a serious inconsistency across the overall narrative. The addition and increasing prominence of G’s political role is an inconsistency when one bears in mind that the appellant claimed not to have spoken to anyone in Kurdistan since leaving the country. Earlier on he accepted he said he had spoken to his grandmother, which is another inconsistency, but possibly also a source of further information.

There are three sets of relevant photographs.

First are the screenshots of the video at page 552 to 554 of the bundle. These appear to show some kind of medical procedure being performed on the appellant’s left-hand. The screenshots were taken on 6 February 2024. The filename of the video contains what appears to be a date of 8 January 2024. From the appellant’s answers in his asylum interview, it appears he was sent the video when he was in Kurdistan after he got a phone. In his statement dated 27 March 2025, the appellant said that the incident resulting in this video happened sometime in 2019 to 2020. He could not remember exactly when but it was before his father’s death.

We asked the appellant at the hearing how old he was in the video. He said he was 16 or 17 years old. According to his own account, however, he turned 17 in 2022. In 2019 or 2020 he was only 14 or 15. We agree that the appearance of the appellant is more like being 16 or 17 in this video. We also note that the account of being locked in the room and hitting glass so as to injure his hand first appeared in the account on 26 November 2022. However it was never placed prior to the appellant’s father’s death. Indeed it is inconsistent with the appellant’s own evidence for him to have received a serious injury because of his brother or mother prior to his father’s death.

Second is the photo at page 218. This shows a boy with an injury to his nose. The appellant places this in his statement as sometime in 2015 or 2016. He says he remembers he was still a student when this incident took place but that he doesn’t remember exactly when it happened. He says in a statement he would like to clarify that it was from his mother not his brother and he was hit with a mop that day and kicked. He says he managed to get the photo from an old friend who was a son of the teacher who took the photo. He says that shortly after he arrived in the UK, he messaged this friend through Snapchat.

We asked the appellant how old he was in this photo and he said 12 or 13 years old. However in 2015 or 2016 he was only 10 or 11. We agree that the appearance of the appellant is more like 12 or 13 in this photo. His explanation of when it happened also does not relate to any incident he previously described. Again it is inconsistent with his evidence not to have received a serious injury because of his brother and mother prior to his father’s death.

These issues add to a broader chronological problem in this case. The appellant’s account was that he was born on 10 October 2005. He said in his statement dated 9 October 2023 that around four years ago (i.e. around October 2019) his father stopped working because he was unwell and his brother worked in a shampoo factory. He said that after some time he was forced to leave school so he could get a job and get out of the house. However his work history is that he started school when he was around seven years old and stopped after around four years. Starting at seven years old would mean he began school around October 2012. Going to school for around four years would take him to around October 2016.

The appellant’s account of his work is that initially he worked as a mechanic for about six months, then he had one and a half months looking for a job and then worked in a crisp factory for a week. After this he worked in a plastic door factory for two years until an accident work where his shoulder was severely harmed. He then returned to work in the factory for another one or two weeks. After that he left the job and started working in a different crisp factory for about one and a half years. This adds up to a total of over four years of work, which the appellant cannot have fitted into the period between leaving school in October 2019 and leaving Kurdistan in 2022.

We also note that at question 68 of the asylum interview, the appellant said that he was 18 and his brother was between 22 and 25 years old. However in November 2022 he said his brother was 20 years old. At that time, according to the date of birth of 10 October 2005 of the appellant, the appellant was already 17. Therefore in his account while he had got only one year older, his brother had aged between two and five years.

All of this evidence points towards the appellant being older than he claims in this appeal. That makes it possible for the photos fit in with the age he says and the work history to have enough time to take place. That is not to say that this supports his core account. It just makes it possible for the photographs to work. It does nothing to help the appellant’s credibility or show why he suffered the injuries shown in the documents.

The third set of photos are those in the supplementary bundle. The supplementary bundle comprises a response to the respondent’s review, a statement from the appellant, a series of screenshots (which include a conversation on a messaging system with someone called Shad) and a translation of the conversation into English.

In the appellant’s statement he says he recently received the photographs from Shad. He said he made contact with Shad several months ago and that he did not know what steps to locate the photos but he was able to obtain them and provide them to the appellant recently. He concluded the statement saying that he was providing the evidence as soon as it had become available to him and that although he first contacted shad several months ago he could not provide the photographs earlier because he had not yet received them. The substance of the screenshots and translation of the conversation substantially undermines account.

The translation of the conversation begins at page 17 of the supplementary bundle. The day on which it begins is “yesterday” which would be the day before the screenshot was taken. We asked the appellant which day the screenshots were taken and he said it was around Sunday or Monday in the week of the hearing. That would mean around 20 or 21 September. In the messages the appellant asked Shad:

Shad replied:

Shad then suggests looking on Snapchat and the appellant asks for a picture of G’s account. The conversation then turns stranger. On page 19 of the translations there is a picture of a man in army fatigues looking slightly to his right. Beneath the photo is the message:

On page 20 the translation continues slightly scrolled down to include more of the conversation, but still including a photo with the same message connected with the photo. From context it should be the same photo as on the previous page. However it shows the same man looking straight at the camera. It therefore appears that there are two versions of the same conversation with different photos.

This conversation also includes expressing condolences for the death of the appellant’s grandmother. This is not something he ever testified to. When asked about this at the hearing, he said he had found out about this through media reports local to his area prior to conversing with Shad. He did not provide these media reports in evidence. However we note this is a convenient point in his claim because the appellant’s grandmother is the one person with whom the appellant accepted having a good relationship in Kurdistan. The conversation also mentions the harm from G, thereby supporting the claim of fear of him.

At pages 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the supplementary bundle are screenshots of photos purporting to be of G. The conversation between the appellant and Shad does not show any of these photos being sent to the appellant. When we asked the appellant about this he said he had in fact accessed his brother’s Snapchat account to take the screenshots himself. That flatly contradicts what he said in his statement.

We also note that the appellant has repeatedly claimed to be illiterate to the respondent yet seems to have communicated in writing with his friend.

Overall, this additional evidence appears to be contrived either through fabrication or deliberate concealment of its source so as to excuse late service and bolster key aspects of the case.

Finally, we note that in November 2022 G was described as being 20 years old. If the appellant is to be believed about not having contact with his family, that means that G had a body guard already at that age. The respondent also pointed out the dramatic transformation from working in a shampoo factory to working for the PUK between 2020 and 2022. We are cautious about making assumptions about life in Kurdistan, but find this account implausible.

It was agreed at the hearing that the appellant should be treated as a vulnerable witness. We are conscious that his vulnerability could affect his recall. However the medical evidence of his vulnerability has issues.

The appellant relies on a Psychological Assessment Report dated 23 April 2025 from Ms Lindsay Kirkwood. She is a Chartered Consultant Counselling Psychologist. She conducted her assessment by zoom for two hours on 3 April 2025 using an interpreter. There is no sign of her having been provided with the appellant’s medical records when completing her assessment or report. Ms Kirkwood fails to appreciate that what she describes as the Personal & Immigration History of the appellant is the core of the dispute on which she has been instructed to assist the Tribunal.

She diagnoses major depressive disorder, generalised anxiety disorder and complex post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). She reports the appellant telling her he had suicidal thoughts since he was around six years old and ongoing low mood and self-harm since childhood. In a particularly poignant sentence she says:

She goes on to describe the appellant telling her about his shame about adoption, fear of his brother, and consequent intrusive thoughts and nightmares.

Mr Papasitiriou accepted that the report could be criticised following HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 111 (IAC) because of the failure to provide the expert with the appellant’s medical records. He said he would explain how the medical records are consistent with the expert’s assessment anyway. We do not accept that they are.

The appellant’s medical records begin at page 67 of the bundle and were printed on 13 May 2025. There are two potential incidents of self-harm recorded in them.

The first appears to begin at page 133 with a call to NHS 111 at 15:25 on 25 July 2024. The informant is someone called Tatiana. The record describes self-harm with scissors less than 6 hours before the call. NHS 111 directed the appellant to contact his GP.

The GP records show on 25 July 2024 an online request to the surgery from Tatiana (albeit the time of day is 14:44, placing it slightly before the call to NHS 111 if the times are correct). It says:

The surgery arranged a telephone consultation that took place on 26 July 2024. The record shows the appellant not wanting to come and talk about his story or to see if the surgery could help. The appellant did agree to come for wound care.

On 30 July 2024 the appellant attended wound care with his support worker. The entry says as history:

The examination showed no treatment was needed as wounds had almost healed. An appointment was made for the appellant to attend the following day for a review.

The appellant did not attend that appointment and then there were no further appointments. An entry on 31 July 2024 shows that the appellant said he did not want to see a doctor.

Nobody has testified about this incident. The evidence we have is inconsistent with itself. We do not know whether the injury happened on 25 July with scissors, as originally reported to NHS 111, or a week earlier with a razor blade as reported to the GP.

The other claimed incident of self-harm is not self-harm in the sense of the appellant deliberately hurting himself. It is recorded on page 152 of the bundle. It shows the appellant attended accident and emergency late on 15 February 2025. The appellant had injured himself when he punched a drinking glass in anger. The cause of him doing so is recorded as “had news that family will be deported”.

During his time in accident and emergency the mental health crisis team saw the appellant. Their report is at page 159. This document says that the appellant presented to the emergency department for self-harm because the appellant punched the glass and had a cut to his right hand triggered by an argument with family. The history taken from the appellant says that the appellant said:

The practitioner observed no mental health difficulties except impulsive self-harm when the appellant is angry. The report specifically records that the appellant had no suicidal thoughts or plans or any thoughts to harm himself.

He was discharged early on 16 February 2025. On 17 February 2025 he saw the plastic surgery service who appear to have decided no further treatment was needed.

There is a statement from a personal advisor named Charmain in the bundle dated 9 June 2025 that says the appellant “has struggled to manage his emotions and has had several episodes of self harm”. No details are given.

There is also a letter from Newham CAMHS dated 1 July 2024 that shows the appellant had been referred by his social worker in February 2023 particularly because of his suicidal thoughts. He was offered assessment appointments and the appellant might have attended two of the three. There is no record of the outcome of this.

Overall we find that the account given to Ms Kirkwood is inconsistent with the background medical evidence. She was told that the appellant has ongoing and long-standing suicidal ideation, whereas the medical records show this not to be the case. She was told that the appellant only feels better when he “sees blood” whereas there is only one record of deliberate self-harm and this itself is unclearly described. Ms Kirkwood should have been provided with the medical records so that she could have explored with the appellant what had actually happened. We consequently give little weight to her report. We do not accept that the appellant has complex PTSD or that he has genuine suicidal ideation. We do accept that the appellant has got angry and has inadvertently injured himself in anger. We find that the cause of this was principally the refusal of his asylum claim or an argument with his family with whom he claims to have no contact.

Finally, the respondent submitted that the appellant was also inconsistent about hospital treatment more generally. We agree. The appellant claimed never to have been taken to hospital by his family despite needing to go, saying his only visit was for the hand treatment shown in the video. However the medical records show at page 101 that in an initial health assessment on 20 February 2023 he reported receiving two blood transfusions in Iraq and was admitted to hospital for a few days for each one.

Looking at all of the evidence in the round, taking into account the appellant’s vulnerability both because of his age when the claimed incidents happened and his mental state as we have found it to be, and applying the low humanitarian standard of proof, we do not find the appellant to be a credible witness. We do not believe he is telling the truth about his fear or the reason for it. We therefore find that it is not reasonably likely that the appellant’s claim of risk from his brother and mother is true.

Consequently we specifically reject:

The appellant would therefore be able to avail himself of family assistance to be documented so as to be able to move safely in Iraq. It is consequently not necessary to consider internal relocation or sufficiency of protection.

In light of our findings in relation to the appellant’s humanitarian protection claim, the remaining grounds in relation to human rights can be dealt with quite simply.

The appellant does not face very significant obstacles to integration in Iraq. We do not accept he would not have family support there and we know that he speaks the language. He previously worked in Iraq and there are no reasons why he could not do so again to support himself.

Removal would be proportionate in Article 8 terms because the appellant does not claim to have family life in the UK and his private life gets little weight, having been developed while he was in the UK unlawfully. There is therefore little to give weight to. Weighing against this is the public interest in immigration control. That obviously outweighs the little weight his private life receives.

The appellant is not seriously ill for the purposes of Article 3. It is not claimed his heart condition engages Article 3. He is not suicidal. He would not face material deprivation in Iraq because he can avail himself of family support and work to support himself in the country.