IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM ACT 1999
THE IMMIGRATION SERVICES TRIBUNAL
Appeal number IMS/2002/0 21/RCR
Between:
Francis Dike and Co
APPELLANT
and
Immigration Services Commissioner
RESPONDENT
Before:
George Marriott Chairman
Mahmud Quayum
Ian Newton
Sitting at
48/49 Chancery Lane London WC 2A 1JR
Hearing date 14th of April 2003
DECISIONS AND REASONS (RULE 24)
Background
1. Reference to documents is by reference to the paginated bundle prepared by the Respondent, and sent to the parties before the hearing.
2. By notification dated the 4th of November 2002 the Respondent refused the Appellant's application for continued registration and cancelled his registration. Cancellation was to take effect immediately upon the expiry of the 28 day appeal period. (Pp 4 to 17). The reasons given were extensive and referred to the relevant rules and the relevant codes.
3. By notification dated the 11th of November 2002, and received by the Tribunal on the 2nd December 2002, the Appellant appealed the decision of the Respondent, and set out 5 grounds of appeal. (Pp 1 to 3)
4. The Tribunal acknowledged the appeal on the 4th December 2002 and by letter dated the 21st January 2003, reminded the Appellant and that he had failed to comply with Rules 17 and 18. By further letter dated the 4th February 2003, the Tribunal notified both parties of two proposed hearing dates in April 2003. One letter was received by the Tribunal from the Appellant dated the 5th February 2003, asking for an extension of time up to the 28th February 2003 to lodge the required documents and bundles. At the date of the hearing no documents or bundles had been lodged by the Appellant. By letter dated the 11th February 2003, in the absence of any representations from the Appellant or the Respondent the Tribunal notified both parties that the hearing would take place on the 14th and 15th April 2003.
5. By letter dated the 12th March 2003 the Tribunal sent to the Appellant a bundle of documents provided by the Respondent; in accordance with the direction given by the Tribunal and five copies of a paginated appeal bundle were lodged by the Respondent with the Tribunal, and one set was sent to the Appellant by the Tribunal on the 7th April 2003.
THE HEARING
6. On the date of the hearing the Appellant did not attend and was not represented. The Tribunal Clerk made a telephone call to the Appellant and was told that the Appellant was withdrawing his appeal. The Appellant was told to submit that withdrawal in writing by fax but failed to do so.
7. Pursuant to Rule 23 the Appellant could withdraw his appeal provided written notice to that effect was given at any time between the sending of the notice of appeal and the date of the main hearing.
8. In the absence of written notice, the Tribunal had the power to proceed with the hearing in the absence of a party provided the party had been notified of the date of the hearing, but failed without reasonable excuse, to appear before the Tribunal. (Rule 20 (2) (b)). We were invited to proceed by Counsel for the Respondent, Mr Waite, and being satisfied that proper notices had been sent to both parties, and none had been returned by the Post Office, we exercised our discretion to proceed with the hearing.
THE EVIDENCE
9. We heard oral evidence from Paul Owen Johnson, a caseworker for the Respondent. He had provided a witness statement dated the 3rd April 2003 (pp 26 to 38) . He affirmed the truth of his witness statement and the documents which he had created and which were referred to in that statement. Our attention was drawn to the Identified Issues Report following his visit on the 8th August 2002 and the letter which accompanied it dated the 14th of August 2002 (pp 184 to 200). He was also taken to a letter from the Appellant dated the 14th October 2002 inviting him to inspect a number of files (pp 272 to273) and confirmed that inspection of those files was still being declined. He also confirmed that the Appellant was not highly rated on a previous audit, and that the terminology 'highly rated' was not terminology used by the Respondent in any audits.
1.0 We then heard oral evidence from Alasdair Mackenzie, an expert upon the Respondent's independent panel. He had provided a witness statement also dated the 3rd April 2003 (pp 40 to 44). He affirmed the truth of his witness statement and documents that he had created and that which were referred to in that statement. In particular our attention was drawn to his report following the audit he made of certain files on the 8th August 2002 (pp 176 to 183).
11. We were impressed by the quality of the evidence that we heard and the thoroughness of the work done by both witnesses. In particular the work identified the evident and substantial breaches by the Appellant by reference to the rules and codes promulgated in accordance with statute by the Respondent.
12. The grounds of appeal lodged by the Appellant were five in number. Because the Appellant was not present to advance them, we looked at them carefully.
13. The first ground asserted that Mr Johnson had a personal dislike for the Appellant and therefore although the word was not used, effectively alleged bias against him. We found nothing in the evidence or in the documents to support an allegation of bias and we noted that Mr Mackenzie corroborated the main points of Mr Johnson's evidence, and that no allegation of bias was made against Mr Mackenzie. We therefore were unimpressed by that ground of appeal.
14. The second ground of appeal asserted that the Appellant had complied with the rules and codes of the Respondent. We were satisfied that he had not in view of the evidence that we heard and documents we saw. However the Appellant also extended that ground appeal by using the words 'has taken advantage of the wider meaning of the intention of the OI SC'. We could not understand what that was supposed to mean, and therefore were equally unimpressed by that ground of appeal.
15. The third ground appeal was that the Respondent had failed to take into account an audit at the Luton office earlier which resulted in a high rating. We took the view that an earlier audit had no relevance to the current audit which led to the decision appealed against but that even if it had, were satisfied that those words had not been used, and were also satisfied that the contrary was the case namely that there were deficiencies which the Appellant had not corrected (pp 34 to 35). We therefore saw no merit in this ground appeal.
16. The fourth ground of appeal was that the Respondent did not allow sufficient time to the Appellant to respond to numerous demands. The evidence that we heard under documents that we saw demonstrated the contrary. We were satisfied that the Respondent had given in the Appellant sufficient and reasonable time to deal with his requests commensurately with his duties imposed by Parliament. Again we saw no merit in this ground of appeal.
17.The final ground of appeal was that the Respondent had failed to take into account the Appellant's family problems. Whilst this is expressed to be a separate ground of appeal, it really is an extension of the penultimate ground, and the evidence again did not support such ground of appeal; indeed there was a letter of sympathy from the Respondent, via Mr Johnson to the Appellant (pp 204 to 205). Again and for the reasons given in paragraph 16 above, we saw no merit in this ground of appeal.
DECISION
Pursuant to Rule 22, the burden of proof in this appeal is upon the Appellant. In other words for the appeal to be successful, the Appellant must be able to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that when the Respondent considered the Appellant's application for continued registration, he was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the Appellant was no longer competent or otherwise fit to provide immigration advice or services. Therefore he was wrong in cancelling the Appellant registration pursuant to his statutory duty as set out in Schedule 6, section 3 (5) of The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.
For the reasons set out above, we are satisfied that the Appellant has failed to do so and therefore his appeal is dismissed.
George Marriott