BM v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP)

This is an appeal, with my permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal sitting at East London on 17 September 2024.

I shall refer to the appellant hereafter as “the claimant”. The respondent is the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. I shall refer to her hereafter as “the Secretary of State”. I shall refer to the tribunal which sat on 17 September 2024 as “the Tribunal” and the tribunal to which I am remitting the matter as “the new tribunal”.

The claimant appealed against the decision of 27 June 2023 that he was entitled to 6 points for the daily living component and 4 points for the mobility component of personal independence payment. He was not therefore entitled to either component of personal independence payment from and including 8 March 2023. The decision was subsequently reconsidered, but not revised, on 21 August 2023.

The matter came before the Tribunal on 17 September 2024 when the appellant appeared and gave oral evidence. No presenting officer was in attendance. The appeal was allowed.

The Tribunal found that the appellant was entitled to 7 points for the daily living component and 8 points for the mobility component of personal independence payment. He was therefore entitled to the mobility component of personal independence payment, but not the daily living component, at the standard rate from and including 8 March 2023 to and including 7 March 2026.

On 11 April 2025 I acceded to the claimant’s application and granted him permission to appeal. It seemed to me that there was an arguable case that the Tribunal erred in law for the reasons set out in his grounds of appeal.

On 30 May 2025 the Secretary of State provided submissions and supported the appeal. The claimant had nothing to add on 1 July 2025.

The Secretary of State confirmed that the claimant had not made any further application for benefit since the hearing on 17 September 2024.

Neither party has sought an oral hearing and I do not consider that it is necessary to hold one in order to resolve the matter. Both parties have also consented to a decision without reasons under rule 40(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.

The Secretary of State submitted that

“1

Permission to appeal has been granted by UT Judge West for the reasons set out in the appellant’s grounds for appeal. The errors identified are that:

•

The Tribunal arguably may have misdirected itself when making findings with respect to daily living activity 9 and the appellant's difficulties socially engaging with others in a contextually appropriate manner.

•

The Tribunal arguably have erred in law by making insufficient findings with regards to the appellant being able to understand complex written information.

2

... I shall first address the grounds related to daily living activity 9 (engaging with other people face to face). The Tribunal stated in the SOR (the Tribunal bundle addition F page 13, para 62) that the appellant “…is able to go to Mosque where there are lots of familiar and unfamiliar people.” It is unclear if the Tribunal have considered if this is with no support from another person.

3

The Tribunal also referred to a psychologist’s letter stating that the appellant’s “…concerns about his mental health were around feelings of anger and irritability and financial anxiety. There was no medical indication of social anxiety or other condition that would restrict the appellant’s ability to engage socially.” In the Psychologist’s letter (the Tribunal bundle page 53) it stated that the appellant was “put on a waiting list for individual therapy for support with the emotional impact of having a heart attack” and requested the GP discussed “the possibility of medication for anxiety.” It is not clear that the Tribunal considered this information especially given that at paragraph 46 of the SOR (the Tribunal bundle addition F, page 10) the Tribunal accepted that the appellant “…has experienced physical pain and limitations arising from his heart attack…” and “…his mental health has also been affected.”

4

In the PIP2 questionnaire (the Tribunal bundle page 34) the appellant stated he “doesn’t want to interact with people on bad days. Emotions can get in the way.” In the consultation report (the tribunal bundle page 62) it stated in the functional history that the appellant “feels low in mood. Is irritable. Gets frustrated by small things” and at page 63 that the appellant “can engage with others as needed, such as appointments. No confrontations reported.” It is not clear how the Tribunal considered this evidence and how or if they investigated this further at the hearing. How did they decide on what evidence to base their findings on?

5

Moving on to daily living activity 8 (reading and understanding signs, symbols and words). The Tribunal stated in the SOR (the Tribunal bundle addition F page 12, para 61) that; “There wasno reliable or persuasive evidence that [appellant] needs an aid or prompting to read and understand signs, symbols or words… GP had identified that [appellant] has difficulty with reading, the doctor went on to explain that this was a difficulty with understanding complex ideas, Caselaw tells us that complex written information means more than one sentence of standard size text.” The GP letter can be found in the Tribunal bundle at page 6.

6

The Tribunal stated in the SOR (the Tribunal bundle addition F, page 12) that the appellant “had not claimed difficulty with this activity until his representative’s written submissions.” In the mandatory reconsideration call transcript (the Tribunal bundle page C) the appellant stated that they are “non-native English so struggles reading and has vision issues due to medication. Minimal education and has son to read for him.” The appellant also stated in the consultation in the functional history (the Tribunal bundle page 63) that he “has difficulty reading English due to language barrier.” Illiteracy or lack of familiarity with written English are not health conditions and should not be considered, except where they arise as a consequence of a sensory or cognitive impairment. The Tribunal do not appear to have addressed this in their reasons.

7

The appellant’s representative stated in their letter (the Tribunal bundle addition B, page 11) that the appellant is “having vision issues, which he thinks are likely a byproduct of his medications”. “Words on a page will tend to blur up”. It does not appear from the SOR that this evidence was considered, investigated further, or explained as to why it wasn’t considered.

8

Although the Tribunal is entitled to give weighting to whatever evidence that it chooses, where there is conflicting evidence, it must in the first instance explore and consider it in a holistic manner and provide sufficient reasons explaining why it preferred the evidence that it had. In this appeal the Tribunal does not appear to have done that. There appears to be a distinct lack of reference to the evidence provided by the appellant, his wife and the medical evidence which demonstrate the long-standing nature of his health conditions. Therefore, it could be said that had the Tribunal given appropriate consideration to all the evidence, including accurately identifying the effects of the appellant’s conditions, the Tribunal may have considered the appellant’s limitations.  As such, I submit that the Tribunal have failed to give adequate reasons as to why evidence in parts was not accepted when deciding not to award points.”

For the reasons identified by the Secretary of State, I am satisfied that the Tribunal made errors of law which were material to the decision and for that reason the decision of the Tribunal should be set aside.

In the circumstances I do not need to consider whether the Tribunal made any other errors of law.

I am satisfied that the resolution of any other grounds of appeal will fall to be subsumed at the hearing before the new tribunal.

I therefore allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the Tribunal. I remit the matter to a new tribunal which should conduct a complete rehearing of the matter.

I must stress that the fact that this appeal to the Upper Tribunal has succeeded should not be taken as any indication as to the outcome of the rehearing by the new tribunal. It is quite possible that the new tribunal may end up effectively coming to the same decision as the previous Tribunal, namely that the claimant was entitled to the mobility component of personal independence payment, but not the daily living component, at the standard rate from and including 8 March 2023 to and including 7 March 2026.

Alternatively, it is possible that the new tribunal might take a different view of the facts from that of the Tribunal and reach the conclusion that in fact the claimant was entitled to both components of personal independence payment from and including 8 March 2023 to and including 7 March 2026.

It is for the new tribunal itself to decide which of these alternative options open to it applies, depending on the view it takes of the facts and providing it makes proper findings of fact and gives adequate reasons. It would not be appropriate for me to express any opinion either way on the merits of the appeal.

The following directions apply to the hearing before the new tribunal:

The new tribunal should not involve any member who was a member of the Tribunal involved in the hearing of the appeal.

The new tribunal must considerand make relevant findings as to whether or not the claimant satisfied the criteria to be awarded the daily living component and the mobility component of personal independence payment from and including 8 March 2023 to and including 7 March 2026. In so doing the new tribunal should, in particular, have regard to the claimant’s grounds of appeal dated 18 March 2025 and the submissions of the Secretary of State dated 30 May 2025.