GB v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

GB made a claim for universal credit (“UC”) in July 2020. The Department for Work and Pensions (“DWP”) administers social security benefit on behalf of the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. GB’s position is that she provided DWP with a copy of her rental agreement in August 2020.

GB’s position is that in around March 2022, during a period when she was not able to work, she spoke to a work coach or adviser at a UC appointment and was told she could claim housing costs as part of her UC award. GB states that she was told DWP had initially given her incorrect advice about being able to claim this element of UC, and that her claim could be backdated to July 2020.

GB submitted an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal on 11 July 2022. She did not give a date for the decision she was challenging. In the box headed “No MRN”, GB wrote that she was informed by UC via her journal that they could not reconsider her appeal as they had already informed her of their decision and she would have to take it to the next stage.

On 22 July 2022, HMCTS completed a “Compliance Waiver Certificate” in respect of GB’s registered appeal. This set out a checklist process about whether GB had been through the mandatory reconsideration process before lodging her appeal. The certificate stated that GB gave the date of the mandatory reconsideration notice (“MRN”) as 04 July 2022 but ticked a box stating that no MRN had been submitted by GB in her appeal papers. The certificate ticked a box stating that the Respondent (i.e., DWP) had confirmed in writing that GB’s appeal had been through the MR process, and that the office dealing with the appeal was Universal Credit.

On 18 August 2022, DWP sent the First-tier Tribunal a submission challenging the validity of GB’s appeal. DWP submitted that GB was trying to appeal against a decision that was outside the jurisdiction of the First-tier Tribunal, because there is no right of appeal against a decision not to extend the time limit allowed for a person to give notice of a change of circumstances more than 13 months after the date on which the change occurred. DWP asked the First-tier Tribunal to strike out GB’s appeal.

The DWP submission contained what appeared to be a record of a DWP decision and may have come from GB’s UC journal. In it was a decision dated 01 July 2022. This stated GB contacted DWP on 30 April 2022 about her housing costs, asking for these to be backdated to 30 June 2020. DWP treated this as GB reporting a late change of circumstances. DWP decided that because more than 13 months had elapsed between the change occurring and GB notifying DWP of that change, she was out of time to report it. On 01 July 2022, DWP completed an internal record stating “To-do cancelled – decision not possible – the claimant has delayed until 30 April 2022 in notifying UC that they changed address from 30 June 2020.”

On 01 November 2022, having previously made directions for GB to provide observations, a First-tier Tribunal judge (the “FTT”) decided to strike out GB’s appeal under rule 8 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) Rules 2008 (“the FTT Rules 2008”).

The FTT provided a Statement of Reasons for that decision on 20 September 2024. On 22 January 2025, the FTT issued a decision refusing GB permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.

On 26 February 2025, GB applied to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal. In a decision dated 10 April 2025, I extended time for GB’s application to be admitted (it was 4 days late) and granted her permission to appeal.

I decided it was arguable the FTT had made one or more of the following errors of law:

Misdirecting itself in law by concluding GB had no right of appeal: the FTT accepted DWP’s argument there is no right of appeal against a decision not to extend the time limits for giving DWP notice of a change of circumstances. However, it was arguable DWP should have considered whether GB was asking it in 2022 to revise her UC award from July 2020 on the basis DWP had made an official error in the original award. This is an “any time” ground, meaning a person can ask DWP to consider it at any time after a decision is made. The FTT had not considered or addressed this possibility.

The FTT may have misdirected itself in law by concluding the fact that regulation 36 of the Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 2013 (“the UC etc. (D&A) regulations 2013”) does not carry a specific right of appeal, meant it did not have jurisdiction to consider whether GB had validly appealed against the decision DWP made in 2020 about her UC entitlement. Regulation 36 operates to state the date on which a supersession decision takes effect in certain circumstances. By concluding that regulation 36 did not itself provide a right of appeal, it was possible the FTT had failed to consider whether GB had an underlying right of appeal that she could exercise to the First-tier Tribunal.

Procedural irregularity in striking out GB’s appeal: At the time when the FTT struck out GB’s appeal, DWP had not provided a formal response to it or relevant information related to it, which was required under rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) Rules 2008 (“the FTT Rules 2008”). In the circumstances described at paragraphs 11 and 12 above, it was arguable the FTT did not have adequate evidence and information before it to conclude it did not have jurisdiction to deal with GB’s appeal and to be satisfied it was required to strike it out under rule 8(2)(a) of the FTT Rules 2008.

I observed that GB’s SSCS1 appeal form stated she had given DWP her housing costs information and rental agreement in August 2020, at DWP’s request. It was arguable this information should have given the FTT pause for thought in November 2022 about whether the grounds for striking out her appeal actually existed, before deciding to strike out her appeal.

W. Razzaq is the Secretary of State’s representative in these proceedings. I refer to them throughout this Decision Notice as “the SSWP’s representative”. They support GB’s appeal in a helpful written submission dated 13 June 2025. The SSWP’s representative invites the Upper Tribunal to set aside the FTT’s decision dated 01 November 2022 for containing material errors of law, for the reasons set out below.

Misdirection in law by concluding GB had no right of appeal: the SSWP’s representative submits the FTT could have considered GB’s request as one for an “any time” revision, if the original DWP decision was made through official error. They observe that this type of revision ground does not have a time limit, as confirmed by regulation 9 of the UC etc (D&A) regulations 2013”:

“9.

A decision may be revised where the decision-

(a)

arose from official error”

The SSWP’s representative argues this means a decision made by the Secretary of State, either initially or when superseded, can be revised at any time for an official error (by DWP).

The SSWP’s representative submits the FTT’s Statement of Reasons has not explained why it did not consider that GB might have been asking for DWP’s decision (about her entitlement starting in 2020) to be revised due to official error. The SSWP’s representative submits that applying the principle established by Mr Commissioner Howell in paragraph 2 of CCS/2152/04, the FTT did not make sufficient findings or provide sufficient reasons to give the parties a reasonable understanding of the basis on which the FTT reached its decision.

Procedural irregularity in deciding to strike out GB’s appeal: the SSWP’s representative submits it is evident from the FTT bundle that DWP may not have provided potentially relevant information for the appeal against its decision-making. The SSWP’s representative submits the FTT has not explained in its Statement of Reasons why it did not consider it relevant to make further directions to obtain this information. The SSWP’s representative submits that this is an error of law, as set out in paragraph 36 of South Bucks Council v Porter (No. 2) [2004] UKHL 33. They argue that rather than strike out GB’s appeal, the FTT should have directed for more information regarding the circumstances of GB’s appeal.

The SSWP’s representative submits that in relation to both appeal grounds, the FTT has made a material error of law.

GB has replied to the SSWP’s submission, in a document dated 27 July 2025. She writes that the crux of the appeal is the time delay, but she would say this was occasioned by DWP issuing incorrect information. GB submits that if DWP had given correct information in the first instance, there would have been no delay, and she would have received the housing benefit (housing element of UC). GB submits that through no fault of her own, she has been denied this element and has suffered the mental torment of the appeal process during a period of illness, which has added to the stress and anxiety she has suffered.

GB also submits that the decision to award the housing element should be upheld due to DWPs failure to give the correct advice. GB states she believes she gave all the correct information to DWP at the time of her claim and acted on the advice given by them (which turned out to be incorrect). GB submits she therefore has suffered due to no fault of her own.

Neither party requested an oral hearing of the appeal. I took these preferences into account. I considered the appeal file. I decided the interests of justice did not require an oral hearing. The parties agree the FTT made material errors of law. It was proportionate to determine the appeal on the papers.

There has been a delay of around 10 days in me being able to determine this appeal within the usual three-month period, for which I apologise to GB. The delay was triggered by needing to wait until a three-judge panel of the Upper Tribunal decided the linked appeals of TR & GD v SSWP (PIP/ESA) [2025] UKUT 332 (AAC) (“TR &GD”). The outcome of those appeals, which deal with challenges to DWP decisions on grounds of official error, was potentially relevant to GB’s appeal. I have determined GB’s appeal, having read and considered the decision in TR &GD.

At the permission stage, I only needed to be persuaded that it was arguable with a realistic (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of success that the FTT had made an error of law in a way that was material.

At this substantive stage, I need to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the FTT did make an error or errors of law that were material.

Having looked in more detail at the papers in this appeal, it appears the FTT struck out GB’s appeal under rule 8(3)(a) of the FTT Rules 2008, rather than using rule 8(2)(a). With apologies to the parties, this affects some of the reasoning I need to apply in this decision. I set it out below.

Rule 8 provides:

“Striking out a party's case

8.

—(1) The proceedings, or the appropriate part of them, will automatically be struck out if the appellant has failed to comply with a direction that stated that failure by a party to comply with the direction would lead to the striking out of the proceedings or that part of them.

(2)

The Tribunal must strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if the Tribunal—

(a)

does not have jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings or that part of them; and

(b)

does not exercise its power under rule 5(3)(k)(i) (transfer to another court or tribunal) in relation to the proceedings or that part of them.

(3)

The Tribunal may strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if—

(a)

the appellant has failed to comply with a direction which stated that failure by the appellant to comply with the direction could lead to the striking out of the proceedings or part of them;

(b)

the appellant has failed to co-operate with the Tribunal to such an extent that the Tribunal cannot deal with the proceedings fairly and justly; or

(c)

the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the appellant's case, or part of it, succeeding.

(4)

The Tribunal may not strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings under paragraph (2) or (3)(b) or (c) without first giving the appellant an opportunity to make representations in relation to the proposed striking out.

(5)

If the proceedings, or part of them, have been struck out under paragraph (1) or (3)(a), the appellant may apply for the proceedings, or part of them, to be reinstated.”

On 24 August 2022, a Legal Officer in the First-tier Tribunal made directions referring to DWP’s argument that GB notified a change of circumstances more than 13 months after it took place and that the matter was outside the FTT’s jurisdiction. The Directions Notice invited GB to send in any comments she had before the FTT considered DWP’s application.

On 21 September 2022, further directions were made, this time by the FTT, stating that GB had not provided any comments about the proposed striking out of her appeal. The Judge wrote:

“2.

[GB], you have not complied with the Directions Notice of 24.8.22. I will extend the time for you to comply by a further 21 days. If you say that you informed the Respondent of your change of circumstances within 13 months, please provide evidence of this. The evidence may come from your Journal, for example, and / or a copy of your application for the housing element of Universal Credit.

3.

Should you fail to provide this evidence then it is proposed your appeal should be struck out under Rule 8(2)(a) Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008.

3.

Rule 8(4) of the above Rules states that the Tribunal cannot strike out the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without first giving you an opportunity to make representations in respect of the strike out.”

In a Decision Notice dated 01 November 2022, the same FTT struck out GB’s appeal. The Decision Notice does not have paragraph numbers (see paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Senior President of Tribunal’s Practice Statement dated 31 October 2008). The second paragraph of the FTT’s Decision Notice described the FTT giving GB sufficient time to comply with the directions, GB not complying with them and stated the appeal was now struck out. The third paragraph stated: “Rule 2 and Rule 8(3)(a) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008 applied”.

On 25 June 2023, the FTT refused to reinstate GB’s appeal, having treated two new appeals that GB lodged with FTT as a request to reinstate her appeal. The FTT refused to reinstate GB’s appeal on the basis that she had not provided evidence of difficulties she described in receiving the various directions made in August and September 2022.

On 20 September 2024, the FTT provided a Statement of Reasons for its decision striking out GB’s appeal and its refusal to reinstate her appeal. The second paragraph on page 1 of the document refers to it not being possible to backdate GB’s housing element to 30 June 2020, because regulation 36 of the UC etc. (D&A) regulations 2013 states a condition of an application for a change of circumstances is that it is made within 13 months of the date on which the change occurred.

The third paragraph on page 1 of the Statement of Reasons refers to DWP asking the FTT to strike out the appeal as the tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with it given the legislation is strict upon this time limit.

The fourth paragraph on page 1 of the Statement of Reasons describes the series of directions the FTT issued and that GB failed to respond to the first set of these. The fifth paragraph states that GB failed to respond to the directions and the FTT therefore struck out her appeal on 01 November 2022.

Looking at rule 8(3) of the FTT Rules 2008, however, it is not clear that the FTT complied with what rule 8 required it to do. The directions made on 21 September 2022 referred to the possibility of striking out GB’s appeal if she did not comply with the directions but referred to the proposed strike out being under rule 8(2)(a) (lack of jurisdiction). What the FTT appears to have done is threaten to strike out the appeal under rule 8(2)(a) but then strike it out under rule 8(3)(a) instead.

This represents a mixing of two separate parts of rule 8, with unclear results. It would not be clear to a party receiving the directions dated 21 September 2022 whether the FTT was threatening to strike out the appeal within a specific time period because it had no jurisdiction to deal with it, or was threatening to do so if the party failed to respond (and if so, would be doing this on the basis of non-compliance, or something else)

Where a First-tier Tribunal intends to issue a warning that if a party fails to comply with a direction, the FTT might strike out proceedings, of part of them, the preferable approach would be to use the specific wording in rule 8(3)(a) and explain that the strike out will be actioned under rule 8(3)(a) rather than any other part of rule 8.

In its Statement of Reasons, the FTT did not address the basis on which it struck out the appeal other than to state that because GB failed to respond to the directions it struck out the appeal (fifth paragraph of page 1).

Furthermore, having raised the possibility in earlier directions that it might strike out GB’s appeal under rule 8(2)(a), reading the FTT’s Statement of Reasons, it is unclear what it made of DWP’s assertion that it did not have jurisdiction to deal with GB’s appeal. The FTT referred more than once in the Statement of Reasons to the time limits for reporting changes of circumstances being strict. This appears to represent its own assessment of the situation, since the DWP submission does not use the word “strict”.

I have considered whether the fact the FTT appears to have struck out the appeal under rule 8(3)(a) changes the grounds of appeal addressed at paragraphs 11 to 14 and 16 to 19 above. Having done so, I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the FTT made material errors of law in relation to the following matters, which reflect the SSWP’s arguments at paragraphs 16 to 19 above.

Misdirection in law: in its Statement of Reasons, the FTT appeared to accept that GB was reporting a change of circumstances to DWP in April 2022 by reporting her housing costs. The FTT appeared to accept that the matter should only be considered as a request for a supersession, on the basis of GB’s circumstances having changed. This was inconsistent with the appeal grounds in GB’s SSCS1 appeal form. These clearly argue that DWP made some form of mistake in relation to GB’s housing costs.

The mechanisms for changing the Secretary of State’s decisions include supersession or revision. A supersession decision takes effect either from the date it is made, or it can take effect from other dates, if they are set out in regulations. A revision decision will generally take effect from the date the original decision being changed was made (but again, regulations can provide for other dates). Where a decision is revised, it will generally be changed from an earlier date than if it were superseded.

As the SSWP’s representative has explained, a decision by the Secretary of State can be revised under regulation 9 of the UC etc. (D&A) regulations, where an official error has been made.

Regulation 2 of the UC etc. (D&A) regulations 1999 defines an official error as:

“official error” means an error made by—

(a)

an officer of the Department for Work and Pensions or HMRC acting as such which was not caused or materially contributed to by any person outside the Department or HMRC;

(b)

a person employed by, and acting on behalf of, a designated authority which was not caused or materially contributed to by any person outside that authority,

but excludes any error of law which is shown to have been such by a subsequent decision of the Upper Tribunal, or of the court as defined in section 27(7) of the 1998 Act.”

As the SSWP’s representative confirms, the FTT could and should have considered the possibility that GB was arguing that DWP’s earlier entitlement decision(s) about her UC, should be revised on the basis she was saying DWP had made an official error.

The relevance of this is that regulation 9 provides a revision ground that can be argued “at any time”. The effective date of a revision under regulation 9 is provided for in section 9(3) of the Social Security Act 1998 and is the date on which the original decision took (or was to take) effect.

Having considered the FTT’s Decision Notice dated 01 November 202 and the FTT’s Statement of Reasons, I am satisfied the FTT did not identify that GB’s appeal could, and arguably should, be treated as arising out of a request to revise an earlier entitlement decision or decisions for official error. This was a misdirection in law.

I am satisfied it was a material error of law, because the question of striking out GB’s appeal only arose from DWP’s assertion that the FTT did not have jurisdiction in respect of it. Had the FTT identified that GB might in fact be asking for an earlier entitlement decision or decisions to be revised on an any time ground, she would have the right to appeal those earlier decisions to the FTT, and she could do this “at any time”. If so, there would be no basis for the FTT to conclude it did not have jurisdiction to hear GB’s appeal. The FTT might ultimately decide that GB’s appeal did not succeed on its merits but there would have been no basis to strike it out under rule 8 of the FTT Rules 2008 on the basis of the FTT lacking jurisdiction in respect of it.

Procedural irregularity: the FTT appeared to proceed on the basis that DWP’s position was correct. There were, however, several indications from the papers before the FTT that DWP’s position might be incomplete, incorrect, or not applicable to GB’s circumstances. The FTT should have explored these further.

The bottom of page 1 of DWP’s submission about striking out the appeal stated, in italics:

“SS Act 98 s12(1) & Sch 3, SS CS (D&A) regs, reg 26 and 36(3).”

The first part of this wording appears to be a reference to the Social Security Act 1998, section 12 of which gives a right of appeal and Schedule 3 to which sets out decisions that can and cannot be appealed to an FTT. The second part of this wording appears to be a reference to the Social Security and Child Support (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 1999, which govern benefits other than UC.

The FTT appears to have accepted that DWP had set out the relevant legislation to GB in the submission requesting a strike out. This was, however, a premature conclusion to reach, because:

Regulation 36 of the UC etc. (D&A) Regulations 2013 does not itself provide a basis for changing a Secretary of State decision. Instead, it deals with the possible effective dates that might apply where a decision is superseded on the basis of a change of circumstances (under regulation 23). Regulation 36 must be read in the context of regulation 35, which provides for a range of different dates for changes of circumstances decisions to take effect. Regulation 36 allows a person to report the change of circumstances late and still be able to have that change applied to their benefit award from an earlier date in time. Regulation 36 sets out conditions for this to happen.

If a request falls outside the conditions in regulation 36, a supersession decision can still be made for change of circumstances, but the effective date will not be governed by regulation 35. Instead, applying section 10(5) of the Social Security Act 1998, the change to the benefit award will only take effect from the (later) date of the supersession decision.

Regulation 36 would not prevent GB from having an underlying appeal right in respect of the relevant supersession decision, or a refusal to make one. Nor would it prevent GB appealing at any time against an underlying entitlement decision that DWP had refused to revise, if the revision ground was one of the any time grounds, including official error. Given this and given it was arguing the FTT did not even have the power to deal with GB’s appeal, DWP’s submission needed further clarification and explanation.

The FTT had been provided with limited information by the parties, in particular, because DWP had not yet provided a Response to the appeal under rule 24 of the FTT Rules 2008. The FTT therefore lacked information and evidence about what was the actual position as opposed to each party’s argued position. DWP’s submission appeared to contradict itself in terms of the relevant legislation being relied on. The argument that regulation 36 did not generate an appeal right and this meant the FTT lacked jurisdiction for GB’s appeal needed further exploration.

Given this and given there was a conflict between what DWP said and what GB said, the FTT should have used its inquisitorial function to draw the parties’ attention to this difference, and to ask both parties to address these matters.

Instead, the First-tier Tribunal made directions, which required only GB to provide a response. Both sets of directions stated “DWP state you did not inform them of your change of circumstances until more than 13 months after it occurred”, in a way that arguably suggested the FTT accepted that to be the correct position.

Furthermore, the FTT’s Directions Notice dated 21 September 2022 asked GB to tell the Tribunal if she informed her change of circumstances (about the housing element) within 13 months. This did not clearly address what GB had said in her appeal – that her circumstances had not changed, and that she reported her housing costs and provided her tenancy agreement in August 2020.

GB was an unrepresented party. The circumstances of her appeal suggest she was claiming benefit for the first time. She would be unlikely to know whether DWP was describing the legal position correctly. Nor would GB be likely to realise that she could argue that the FTT should be looking at other grounds for changing the Secretary of State’s decision rather than solely changes of circumstances.

The First-tier Tribunal is a specialist tribunal in social security legislation. Its inquisitorial role means the FTT should explore the relevant issues for itself, even if the parties do not raise them. The FTT should have explored the position further. This would include directing DWP to explain why it was relying on regulation 36, and why it was arguing that the lack of an appeal right under that regulation itself prevented GB from having a right of appeal at all. The FTT should also have invited DWP to focus on GB’s arguments, which made clear that she reported her housing costs in August 2020. The failure to do so amounts to a procedural irregularity capable of making a material difference to the outcome of GB’s appeal or the fairness of proceedings. It is therefore an error of law.

I am satisfied this procedural irregularity was material, because it could have made a difference to the outcome of GB’s appeal, both in terms of whether it was appropriate to consider striking it out, and also whether further information and evidence was required to be able to reach a conclusion on that issue.

Mandatory reconsideration in this appeal

GB did not provide a mandatory reconsideration notice with her appeal when she lodged it on 11 July 2022. DWP informed the Tribunal that GB had been through mandatory reconsideration, and therefore the requirement to provide proof of this was waived. This is consistent with what GB wrote in the “No MRN” box, that the UC part of DWP told her that they could not reconsider her appeal, and she would have to take it to the next stage. The word reconsider is important, because it relates to mandatory reconsideration.

As the three-Judge panel of Upper Tribunal Judges in R(CJ) and SG v SSWP (ESA) [2018] AACR 5 confirmed, the essential and driving Parliamentary purpose of introducing mandatory reconsideration was to give the Secretary of State a second opportunity to get the decision on entitlement right, applying the statutory tests that govern it (see paragraph 89 of that decision). The Upper Tribunal also decided that ruling out a full merits appeal on the basis that time had not been extended for a claimant to request mandatory reconsideration, would frustrate that essential and driving purpose.

That stated purpose has been achieved here. GB may have been through mandatory reconsideration. Alternatively, DWP has had had the opportunity to reconsider its decision dated on or around 1 July 2022 and has confirmed it does not wish to change its decision. This is evidenced by what GB wrote in the “No MRN” box, which suggests DWP decided not to change its decision. Alternatively, DWP has effectively reconsidered the correctness of its decision through its submission in August 2022 inviting the FTT to strike out GB’s appeal.

Either way, the appropriate course is to treat GB’s challenge to the Secretary of State’s decision as having been through mandatory reconsideration.

The effect of the Upper Tribunal decision in TR & GD v SSWP (PIP/ESA) on this appeal

I waited for the outcome of the three-Judge panel in TR & GD before making the final decision in GB’s appeal. It is a decision that gives guidance about how to approach the question whether an appellant’s appeal involves an argument that a decision should be revised for official error.

I have applied the approach set out in paragraph 121 of TR & GD to GB’s situation. It means the following:

It is therefore appropriate to direct the next FTT dealing with this appeal to proceed on the basis set out at paragraph 70 above, and to deal with the substance of the appeal. When doing so, the FTT should be aware that paragraph 121(e)i. of TR & GD confirms that where the application is for revision of an original decision under section 8, the FTT has jurisdiction on a “full merits” and “de novo” basis and must deal with the case as if it is standing in the shoes of the Secretary of State on the date that the Secretary of State made the original entitlement decision(s) that GB is challenging.

I therefore direct the next First-tier Tribunal dealing with GB’s appeal to proceed on the basis that:

Having decided the FTT’s decision involved material errors of law, it is appropriate to exercise my discretion to set aside the Tribunal’s decision dated 01 November 2022 under section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Having done so, section 12(2)(b) of that Act provides that I must either remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal with directions for their reconsideration or remake the decision.

I have decided not to remake the FTT’s decision. It is necessary for DWP to provide a Response to the appeal and all relevant information and evidence about the decision-making in relation to GB’s UC claim and award. The FTT now needs to explore and resolve the substance of GB’s appeal, including making all necessary factual findings and applying the relevant legislation.

I have, however, decided to make the directions set out at paragraph 71 above.

I therefore remit GB’s appeal to be considered by a new First-tier Tribunal. This will include considering whether there has been official error in relation to DWP’s decisions about GB’s UC entitlement and whether this should have included the housing element of UC from around July 2020 onwards.

Although I have set aside the FTT’s decision dated 01 November 2022, I am not making any findings, or expressing any view, about the substance of GB’s appeal. The next FTT will need to deal with these matters for itself.