DL v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions & Anor

This is an appeal against two decisions of the First-tier Tribunal (“the FTT”) which heard appeals against two decisions made the First Respondent, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (“the SSWP”) in relation to the Appellant’s financial obligation to pay Child Support Maintenance (“CSM”). The Second Respondent (“CL”) is the Appellant’s former wife, and the CSM decision concerns the support of their two children. The SSWP’s decisions under appeal to the FTT were dated 29 June 2021 and 29 December 2021; the two appeals were heard together.

In two decision notices dated 22 February 2024, the FTT set aside the SSWP’s decisions of 29 June 2021 and 29 December 2021, and substituted further decisions regarding the Appellant’s financial obligations. It found, materially, that there had been a ‘diversion of income’ within the meaning of Regulation 71 of the Child Maintenance and Support Regulations 2012 (“the 2012 Regulations”) and increased the income attributed to the Appellant by £53,762.00p.

The Appellant (“DL”) has appealed against this outcome to the Upper Tribunal. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge West on 22 April 2025. On 2 June 2025, the First Respondent (the SSWP) filed submissions resisting the appeal. The Second Respondent, CL, has not filed any response and has not played an active part in this appeal.

On 1 December 2025 (and supplemented in January and February 2026), the Appellant filed a Reply to the SSWP’s submissions. In this, as well as engaging with the substantive arguments, he has also asked for:

I have addressed these matters below, dealing first with the issue of an oral hearing and then the remaining issues at the conclusion of this decision.

In his Reply to the SSWP’s submissions, DL has asked for an oral hearing of the appeal, stating:

“An oral hearing is necessary to ensure procedural fairness, as multiple complex errors of law are alleged, including jurisdictional excess, failure to issue a Statement of Reasons, and unlawful treatment of retained profits as income without a valid variation application. The issues involve disputed findings of fact, substantial CMS procedural irregularities, and matters requiring oral clarification, including the treatment of pre–effective date periods and misapplied legislation. The Appellant intends to challenge the CMS’s submissions directly and cross-examine where appropriate. Given the significant public interest in the proper administration of the child maintenance system, the Appellant will invite national and local press to attend. An oral hearing is therefore essential to ensure transparency and justice.”

The Upper Tribunal has a discretion whether or not to hold an oral hearing of a substantive appeal. The test I have to apply is whether: “fairness requires such a hearing in the light of the facts of the case and the importance of what is at stake”: R (Osborn) v Parole Board [2014] AC 1115 at paragraph 2(i). In reaching this decision, Rule 34(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, also requires that I have regard to any view expressed by a party. I have therefore carefully considered the Appellant’s view that an oral hearing should be held.

An appeal to the Upper Tribunal must be based on “any point of law arising from a decision” (section 11(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007), not on the facts of the case. It is not an opportunity for give new evidence or to cross-examine witnesses, including any representative who appears on behalf of the SSWP. Findings of fact may be challenged, but only on the basis that they show a legal error on the part of the tribunal: e.g., that the findings lack a discernible basis in the evidence or are otherwise incapable of rational justification.

Given matters such as the significant sums at issue, I accept the importance of this appeal – not only for the Appellant, but also for his former wife and the Qualifying Children. However, the Appellant has set out his case in detail in clear and lengthy written submissions, in particular on 27 January 2025 and again on 1 December 2025 when he responded to the SSWP’s submissions, having been notified that the appeal was opposed (and why). In those circumstances, I am satisfied that I can dispose of the appeal fairly on the papers. In particular, I have not identified issues which require oral clarification - the legal issues and the underlying facts (including those matters now set out by the Appellant to the Upper Tribunal) are clearly evident from the papers.

I have noted that the Appellant also seeks an oral hearing in order to be able to invite national and local press to attend and to secure “transparency and justice”. I accept the importance of public scrutiny of official decisions, including those of the Upper Tribunal. However, as set out above the Rules empower the Upper Tribunal to make decisions without oral hearings, and the public is given information about its decisions, as well as of the underlying issues considered, via the publication of those decisions. Whilst I recognise that holding a hearing which members of the press may choose to attend may add further to public understanding of these processes, still I have to balance all the interests engaged here. This includes (under Rule 2 of the Procedure Rules) the need to deal with the appeal fairly and justly, including “in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties”. Overall, it seems to me that given that the legal issues raised by the appeal may be considered fully and fairly on the basis of the detailed written arguments before me, that it would be proportionate to do so.

I have set the procedural history below out in some detail as it is relevant to the Appellant Ground 2, which raises the issue of procedural fairness. However, I have sought to capture key events, not every detail.

The Appellant, DL, has been assessed as liable to pay Child Support Maintenance (CSM) in respect of two Qualifying Children (“the QCs”). On 4 June 2021, he reported a change in his circumstances to the SSWP, relating to the arrangements for shared care. On 28 June 2021, he reported a change of circumstances in relation to his income. In response to these notifications:

By a decision notified on 29 June 2021, the SSWP reduced the payments due in respect of the QCs from £24.12/week to £12.94p, with effect from 28 June 2021 (i.e., the date when the reduced income had been reported);

On 19 July 2021, the decision was upheld on Mandatory Reconsideration.

Thereafter, DL lodged an appeal with the FTT. He alleged that (i) the reduced income should have been taken into account from 1 April 2021; (ii) an earlier report of his income notified in May 2021 had also not been properly backdated (leading to an overpayment for some 5 months that had not been properly allowed for); and, in addition (iii) the SSWP had failed to look at the Special Expenses relating to payments he had made in respect of mortgage and insurance payments for the former matrimonial home.

On 6 January 2022, solicitors acting for DL formally requested that the SSWP’s Child Maintenance Service should re-assess DL’s income, referring to findings and evidence in the family court proceedings (January 2021).

After the Appellant’s appeal (No. 00159) had been lodged, CL forwarded this solicitor’s letter to the Tribunal, with a covering letter making it clear that she did not accept the Appellant’s account of his income; he was “the director of a successful photography business”.

On 10 February 2022, the Tribunal issued Directions, defining the issues in the appeal as being “the level of [DL]’s income for the purpose of calculating child maintenance liability” (as at the effective date of 28.06.2021). Evidence relating to Mr DL’s earnings and bank statements were to be supplied.

On 29 December 2021, acting in response to the notification of 4 June 2021, the SSWP refused to supersede (i.e., effectively, to alter) the sums that DL had previously been assessed as owing, on account of the changes to shared care reported by DL; liability in the sum of £24.12/week to his former wife in respect of the QCs remained, with effect from 16 March 2021 until 27 June 2021. The SSWP noted that no objective evidence in support of the changed arrangements, such as a Court Order, had been filed by either party and that it was not agreed by CL, whose evidence was that there was no shared care arrangement in place between the former couple. She also disputed the figures provided by DL for his income, saying that he should be paying much more.

After the decisions were upheld on mandatory reconsideration (17/1/22), DL appealed it to the FTT, raising issues both about his income and shared care. There were thus two appeals, SC156/21/00159 and SC156/22/00326.

On 28 August 2022, a District Tribunal Judge gave directions in SC156/22/00326, including seeking information about DL’s business, income and accounts.

DL filed a statement dated 6 September 2022 in response to the Directions of 28 August 2022. He filed information about the Company accounts for 2019/20 and 2020/21.

On 22 September 2022, after the FTT became aware that there were two appeals involving the same parties, the two appeals were listed to be heard together; they have since been considered together throughout.

A hearing had been fixed for 3 November 2022, but was postponed.

On 10 January 2023, the Tribunal issued detailed further directions, seeking extensive further evidence from DL regarding the accounts, stock transfers, director’s renumeration and dividends etc, relating to DL’s business for (broadly) the years ending 31 July 2020, 2021 and 2021. Information from CL about her involvement was also required.

On 7 March 2023, again Directions were issued, requiring compliance by DL with the January 2023 Directions, and seeking further information about the payments on the former matrimonial home (relevant to the issues in 00159).

A FTT hearing took place, first, 4 September 2023. But it was adjourned part-heard, as the FTT required further evidence and argument. It issued a detailed Adjournment and Directions Notice, in which it noted that:

On 19 February 2024, the FTT reconvened and the appeals were determined as follows:-

A Decision Notice was issued on 22 February 2024, setting aside the SSWP’s decision of 29 June 2021. In this, the FTT noted that DL was a photographer who ran a photography business, through the structure of a limited company. DL and his former wife CL had the shareholders and directors of the company, but DL’s interest ended in 2021/22 (with effect from 23 April 2021), with the finalisation of the divorce proceedings between the two. The FTT held that:

This appeal related to the SSWP’s decision dated 29 December 2021, which was also set aside. The “Summary Reasons” (para 7 onwards) in this second Decision Notice confirmed that it related to the “matters differing in this Appeal”; so the two Notices should be considered together. The FTT also confirmed that the decision(s) under appeal were that of 28 (i.e. 29) June 2021 and 29 December 2021, and not earlier decisions by the SSWP.

In this second decision, the FTT confirmed the Appellant’s annual income to be £7,193 with effect from 4 June 2021 (until 27 June 2021, see above). In addition, it (a) added £53,762 under Regulation 71 (again see above) and (b) deducted special expenses in relations to sums paid under a mortgage; (c) again confirmed the deductions in respect of the weekly care of the Appellant’s daughter. The key element of this second decision therefore related to the treatment of the mortgage payments on the family home, which was not addressed in the first appeal.

However, a request for a Statement of Reasons was subsequently made to the FTT by the SSWP, in effect querying this element of the decision in SC156/22/00326. This resulted in a further Decision Notice dated 30 May 2024, in which the FTT reviewed the previous Decision. The FTT was satisfied that that the element of the decision relating to the special expenses variation in respect of the prior debt (mortgage payments) was erroneous and should be set aside – those payments had come to an end some six months before the date of the calculation of CL’s liabilities and should therefore not have been included.

Otherwise, the decision was maintained.

On 18 July 2024, after receipt of the amended decision notice of 30 May 2024, DL made an application to the FTT for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The sole challenge was to the tribunal’s decision (in appeal reference SC156/21/00159) that he remained the non-resident parent during the period between April to May 2020 in respect of his son and April 2020 and June 2020 in respect of his daughter when he had sole care of them during the first lockdown arising from the coronavirus pandemic. His application was refused by the FTT on 11 September 2024.

The application was renewed to the Upper Tribunal, by then with wider issues raised by the Appellant (see the summary of the Grounds below, para 26). Upper Tribunal Judge West granted permission to appeal on 22 April 2025.

The Grounds of Appeal are contained in the papers to the Upper Tribunal. As updated on 23 December 2024 and then amplified in written submissions dated 27 January 2025, they raise the following matters:

I have set out the parties’ submission (that is, those of the Appellant and the SSWP) in more detail below, when addressing the merits of these points.

The calculation of CSM is governed, relevantly, by the Child Support Maintenance Regulations 2012. This appeal concerns Reg. 71, which provides:

“Diversion of income

71.

—(1) A case is a case for a variation for the purposes of paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 4B to the 1991 Act where—

(a)

the non-resident parent (“P”) has the ability to control, whether directly or indirectly, the amount of income that—

(i)

P receives, or

(ii)

is taken into account as P's gross weekly income; and

(b)

the Secretary of State is satisfied that P has unreasonably reduced the amount of P's income which would otherwise fall to be taken into account as gross weekly income or as unearned income under regulation 69 by diverting it to other persons or for purposes other than the provision of such income for P.

(2)

Where a variation is agreed to under this regulation, the additional income to be taken into account is the whole of the amount by which the Secretary of State is satisfied that P has reduced the amount that would otherwise be taken into account as P's income.”

Caselaw on this provision includes DT v SSWP (CSM) [2023] UKUT 175 (AAC). In this, UT Judge Rowland confirmed that his reasoning in AS v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (CSM) [2018] UKUT 315 (AAC), which concerned the predecessor of regulation 71, regulation 19(4) of the Child Support (Variations) Regulations 2000, applied also to Reg 71 of the 2012 Regulations. In AS, he had said:

“[18]. The question of what is reasonable for the purposes of regulation 19(4) must be considered in the context of the purpose of the provision and, indeed, the purpose of the whole child support regime. It is expected that parents will support their children and regulation 19(4), like much of the rest of the 2000 Regulations, is obviously intended to prevent non-resident parents from avoiding that liability. An action that might be quite reasonable in the absence of any potential liability to support children may, for the purposes of regulation 19(4), be unreasonable if it has the effect of reducing a parent’s ability to pay child support maintenance. Whether a diversion was unreasonable will depend on a number of factors and is likely to be a matter of judgment. In particular, it is necessary to consider the extent to which the action that amounted to a diversion of income was purely voluntary or was forced upon the parent by circumstances and the extent to which the reasons for carrying out the action reflected what can fairly be regarded as a diminution in his ability to pay child support maintenance.

[19]. … I do not consider that gaining a tax advantage can ever contribute to the reasonableness of the diversion for the purposes of regulation 19(4). It would be absurd if a non-resident parent were to be allowed to enrich himself and members of his household at the expense of other children whom he is under an obligation to support, save to the extent that such enrichment is merely the consequence of action taken for some other good reason.”

Also relevant is AE v SSWP and PE (CSM) [2025] UKUT 49 (AAC), in which UT Judge Church, after considering the case of ‘unreasonable diversion’ under Reg 71, continued:

“[48]. Although this provision [i.e., Reg 71] is applicable where a non-resident parent has arranged their affairs with the intention of reducing their liability to make child support payments, no such skullduggery is required.

[49]. Regulation 71 may also apply where a non-resident parent has arranged their affairs in a way that is perfectly proper, and not designed to avoid or reduce their responsibility to support their children financially, but which just happens to result in them receiving a low income. In those circumstances the scheme operates to ensure that the calculation of the non-resident’s child support liability is adjusted to an appropriate level even though there is nothing “unreasonable” in the arrangements other than in their impact on the child support calculation. For these reasons, the Tribunal was wrong to say that a “more robust approach” was warranted in diversion appeals. The approach is the same, and that approach is informed by the principles set out in the 1991 Act, and especially Section 28E(2)(a)), which says that parents should be responsible for maintaining their children whenever they can afford to do so.”

It is apparent that:

The Provision of a Statement of Reasons (SOR) (paras 7 – 12 of the Grounds of 27 January 2025).

The Appellant says that he made two SOR requests (on 18th July 2024 and 26th July 2024) and sent a reminder on 2nd September 2024. He says that the Decision Notices that were provided are inadequate, and there was a failure to reply to these requests.

It is apparent that following receipt of the Decision Notices of 22 February 2024, the SSWP had already made a request for a SOR on 19 March 2024, and this resulted in the amended / further Decision Notice dated 30 May 2024 in the 0326 appeal.

The Appellant says that he first asked for a SOR on 18 July 2024, which is when he applied for permission to appeal the FTT decision(s), see the Decision Notice on the application for permission to appeal, dated 11 September 2024.

Rule 34(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) Rules 2008 provides that requests for a Statement of Reasons should be received within one month of the date when the decision in question is sent to the parties; an application for permission to appeal is treated as such a request, if made in time. In this case, even if I treat the relevant time as running from 30 May 2024 only, an application for a SOR made on 18 July 2024 would not have been made in time. Time for making the application for permission to appeal was extended by the FTT Judge (although the application itself was refused), but the issue of a SOR was not addressed. Rather, the FTT judge noted that the Decision Notice set out the reasons for the part of the decision that was under challenge.

In the case of R(IS) 11/99, which considered earlier but materially similar statutory provisions regarding the duty to supply reasons on request under the Social Security (Adjudication) Regulations 1995 (as amended), it was held that:

It seems that in practice, the two Decision Notices were treated as including sufficient reasons for the decision. Each one sets out not only the “Decision” (at paras 1 – 5), but then provides “Summary Reasons” (see paragraph 7 onwards); a reasonably full account of the evidence and findings follows. When the SSWP asked for a SOR in SC156/22/00326, the District Tribunal Judge revised the decision (30 May 2024), but did not provide further reasons in respect of the remainder of the decision, treating them as sufficient, and the same approach to sufficiency was taken when the FTT refused permission to appeal. If the issue is whether, notwithstanding that the request for full reasons was made late, a SOR should have been supplied, it is difficult to discern an error of law – there has been a “summary of grounds” [which] in fact contains everything that the parties could properly have expected from a full statement of the tribunal’s decision” (applying para 8 of R(IS) 11/99, by analogy). The Decision Notices have been sufficient for the purposes of granting permission to appeal to the UT, and (in my view) for disposing of this appeal.

However, even if that is wrong, the essential point is that given that the Appellant’s request for a SOR was made late, there was no failure to comply with the requirements of the Rules.

Ground 2: absence of a pre-existing application from the Receiving Parent (CL) (see paragraph 15 of the Grounds of 27 January 2025)

The next issue raised by the Appellant is the absence of an existing application for a variation from the Receiving Parent (i.e. CL) prior to the appellate proceedings. It is said that, therefore, it was not within the jurisdiction of the FTT to make its decision in respect of “diversion of income” under Regulation 71. The FTT should have looked at the issues raised by the Paying Parent (the Appellant) only.

It is right to say that the issues under Regulation 71 had not been the subject of consideration by the SSWP prior to the appeal and were not addressed by the SSWP in the response(s) to the appeal(s).

However, the issue of whether the figures for income being used by the SSWP were adequate was squarely raised by the Second Respondent, in (for example) her letter dated 4 February 2022 (p24, 0159 Bundle), referring to the success of the Appellant’s photography business; and which attached an email from CL’s solicitor to the CMS dated 6 January 2022, referring to the final hearing in the Family Court on 12 January 2021, and the judge’s acceptance that the Appellant would soon be in a position to earn in excess of £42,000 after tax, once the effects of the pandemic receded.

The FTT subsequently took account of this issue in the hearing heard on 4 September 2023. By this point the two appeals were listed together. The FTT adjournment directions stated clearly that “variations under regulations 69 and 71 Child Maintenance Support Regulations 2012 could be relevant and should be considered as part of the appeal. These would consider unearned income and whether any income was diverted.” (see the fuller excerpts at para [14] above).

I accept the submissions of the SSWP that the FTT had jurisdiction to consider this additional issue. See, first, DB v SSWP and CE [2024] UKUT 343 (AAC) at paragraph 45 and 46:

“[45] The FtT in the present case was considering an appeal against a maintenance calculation. The NRP [here, DL] set out grounds for arguing that the calculation was wrong. The PWC [here, CL] was also entitled to argue that the calculation was wrong. She was not limited to the grounds set out by the NRP. She could raise any issue which was relevant to the maintenance calculation decision. As I have set out, a variation is relevant to a maintenance calculation.

[46] Section 20(7)(a) provides that the tribunal need not consider any issue that is not raised in the appeal. An issue is raised in an appeal if it is raised by one of the parties at or before the appeal tribunal’s decision: see SC v CMEC (CSM) [2011] UKUT 458 (AAC) at paragraph 13. So in the present case the issue of the variation raised by the PWC in her submissions and addressed by the Secretary of State under section 28B was an issue raised in the appeal even though it was raised after the appeal was commenced.”

In the case of AB v SSWP and RS [2021] UKUT 129 UT Judge Poynter held:

“When is an issue raised by the appeal?

37.

The suggestion that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction other than to deal with the points expressly raised in the Notice of Appeal betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of an appeal to the Social Entitlement Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal.

38.

Such an appeal is not a trial of pleadings. Neither is it adversarial. Rather, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is inquisitorial and enabling. The Tribunal’s role is to ensure, as far as it can within its rules of procedure, that non-resident parents are assessed as liable to pay the amount of maintenance for which the law provides, neither more nor less (see SC v Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission and JM (CSM) [2011] UKUT 458 (AAC)).

39.

In the exercise of its inquisitorial and enabling jurisdiction, the Tribunal has power to give any decision that the Secretary of State could have given when deciding the matter under appeal. It is not merely entitled, but bound, to consider all the issues that are clearly apparent from the evidence and not just those raised by the parties (see, by analogy, Mongan v Department of Social Development [2005] NICA 16 reported as R3/05 (DLA) and Hooper v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2007] EWCA Civ 495 reported as R(IB) 4/07).

40.

Furthermore, a party can raise an issue at any time “at or before the hearing”: see the decision of a Tribunal of Commissioners in R(IB) 2/04 at [32] (which was disapproved, but not on the point of timing, in Mongan at [15]).”

A tribunal which has jurisdiction to consider a new issue must, of course, act fairly in so doing, by giving the parties reasonable notice of the issue and an adequate opportunity to present evidence and arguments (AB v SSWP and RS, para 43). However, in my view this opportunity was afforded by the Adjournment Directions and Notice of 4 September 2023, which (as set out above) gave clear notice that the issues of unearned income and the diversion of income would both be considered by the tribunal. I note that in later correspondence (see DL’s email to HMCTS dated 6 October 2023) he referred to being “ambushed” by the statement that the tribunal would deal with an unexpected variation application; but that email demonstrates that he understood that these new issues were now to be considered in the future. Whilst I appreciate that DL was not legally represented, he was given notice of the applicable legal provisions and in my view, had sufficient time to inform himself or to seek legal advice if desired.

The Appellant says, first, that questions on retained profits were confined to the last part of the hearing and this did not give him enough time to elaborate on the issues raised. But again I find that the fact that retained profits were within the scope of the appeal was apparent from the reference to Regulation 71 of the 2012 Regulations (coupled with the fact that it was apparent from the accounts that large sums had been retained). There was an obvious discrepancy between a company director declaring an income of some £13,158 in 2021/21, and his company retaining earnings of £37,467 by July 2020 (p538) and then £76,240 by July 2021 (p370), particularly when considered against the background of the caselaw referred to at pars 29 – 31 above.

The SSWP submits that the reasoning was adequate.

Leaving aside the jurisdictional complaint (covered under Ground 2) or the size of the business reserves needed (Ground 4), the Appellant says that the conclusions were unfair because part of the retained profits (5/12^th of £37,467) were for the financial period from 2019/2020. They dated back from the period before CL’s claim for CMS, made on 1 January 2020; so, it is said, these retained profits should not have been taken into account. Furthermore, the remainder of the profit for this year (Jan 2020 – July 2020) also predated the effective date of the decision, so they too were not properly to be taken into account.

I reject that approach. The essence of the “retained” profit was that it had remained in the Appellant’s company and was under his control. The sum considered was one available to the company by July 2021, even if it had built up over more than one year. It could have been paid to the Appellant by way of dividends in the relevant period and was thus potentially available as a resource for the QCs at the date of decision. It was thus fairly considered as a potential resource, from the point of view of Regulation 71.

The essence of this complaint is that the Appellant was not given a fair opportunity to explain what reserves his company should be allowed to retain. The tribunal decided that four months’ worth of expense would be reasonable (i.e. £22,480, given that the total expenses in 2020/2021 were £67,439). The Appellant says in his Notice of Appeal that something closer to 8 months was required. He elaborates on this by explaining to the Upper Tribunal: (i) the high value of his photographic equipment and the high cost of replacing it if lost, stolen or damaged (and losses were not covered by insurance, presumably); (ii) his possible losses if he was unable to work due to any such issues; and (iii) other potential costs that he might have to cover if his sole employee had to be paid Statutory Maternity Pay and cover that person’s absence (some £7,800 by way of SMP, plus replacement cover costs). On the subject of loss of equipment, he notes that he lost valuable equipment to theft in 2012 but was not able to make a successful claim “due to technicalities in the policy wording”.

The SSWP again submits that the reasoning was adequate. In particular, “Although the FTT may not have considered elements of the appellants financial situation in regard to any theft or damage to camera equipment, it does not mean that the decision finding that [DL] had sums within their business which could have been included as income was perverse”.

It is inevitable that an exercise of judgment will be required, in assessing what reserves are reasonably required (see the summary of the legal principles above). The tribunal, which had the benefit of sitting with a financially qualified member, appears to me to have made a careful assessment of this issue and reached a conclusion which was properly open to it, on the evidence before it. It noted – and this has not been challenged in the appeal – that there was no obvious significant capital expenditure planned. Given the cash in hand, some £30,000 would be left in the bank if the sum contemplated by the Tribunal was treated as a diversion of income. In addition, the Tribunal also took into account the fact that there were debtors owing some £24,020 to the company “much of which was likely to be available in the short term”.

Even if I assume that the Appellant was not in a position to make all the points now relied upon when asked about reserves in the hearing itself, it seems to me that nothing material has been raised which undermines the Tribunal’s conclusions. Again, I note that the Tribunal was obliged to have regard to the need to look at the Appellant’s duties as the company director in the context of the statutory framework and the importance attached to the appropriate support of the children. There is an element of ‘worst case’ scenarios in the Appellant’s outline of the potential drains on his company; but there was no particular reason to suppose that all would materialise, particularly at the same time, or to require contingency planning on such a basis.