Appeal No. UA-2025-001151-PIP
BETWEEN:
CAG
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WORK AND PENSIONS
Respondent
Before: Upper Tribunal Judge West
Decided on consideration of the papers: 24 March 2026
On appeal from:
Tribunal: First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement
Chamber)
Tribunal Venue: Bexleyheath
Tribunal Case No: SC124/24/02103
Panel: Judge Hendry, Dr Mulvihill,
Mr Hoque
Tribunal Hearing Date: 13/2/2025
DECISION
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Bexleyheath dated 13 February 2025 under file reference SC124/24/03103 involves an error on a point of law. The appeal against that decision is allowed and the decision of the Tribunal is set aside.
The matter is remitted to a differently constituted tribunal for a complete rehearing.
The new tribunal must considerand make relevant findings as to whether or not the claimant satisfied the criteria to be awarded the daily living component and/or the mobility component of personal independence payment from and including 22 May 2023. In so doing the new tribunal should in particular have regard to the claimant’s grounds of appeal dated 9 July 2025 and the submissions of the Secretary of State dated 27 November 2025.
This decision is made under section 12(2)(b)(i) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
REASONS
This is an appeal, with my permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Bexleyheath on 13 February 2025.
I shall refer to the appellant hereafter as “the claimant”. The respondent is the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. I shall refer to him hereafter as “the Secretary of State”. I shall refer to the tribunal which sat on 13 February 2025 as “the Tribunal” and the tribunal to which I am remitting the matter as “the new tribunal”.
The claimant appealed against the decision of 22 May 2023 that he was entitled to 0 points for the daily living component and 0 points for the mobility component of personal independence payment. He was not therefore entitled to either component of personal independence payment from and including 22 May 2023. The decision was subsequently reconsidered, but not revised, on 9 July 2024. He had previously been entitled to both components of personal independence payment from and including 17 August 2018 to and including 16 August 2022, which was subsequently extended so that the decision under appeal was made during the currency of his previous award.
The matter came before the Tribunal on 13 February 2025 when the claimant appeared by videolink and gave oral evidence. A presenting officer was also in attendance. The appeal was refused.
The Tribunal found that the claimant was entitled to 0 points for the daily living component and 0 points for the mobility component of personal independence payment. He was not therefore entitled to either component of personal independence payment from and including 22 May 2023.
On 17 October 2025 I acceded to the claimant’s application and granted him permission to appeal. It seemed to me that there was an arguable case that the Tribunal had erred in law for the reasons set out in his grounds of appeal.
On 27 November 2025 the Secretary of State provided submissions and supported the appeal.
The Secretary of State confirmed that the claimant had not made any further claim for personal independence payment after the hearing on 13 February 2025.
The Secretary of State submitted that
“4.2 It is my submission, that the FtT has erred in law in both their fact finding and duty to provide adequate reasons for their decision. The conclusions from the FtT on how they assessed the claimant’s functional abilities appears limited in their reasoning. As noted above the claimant was awarded 0 points for daily living descriptors and 0 points for daily living activity. It seems that what the FtT has provided at paragraphs 27-29 and 46, 57 and 73 of the SOR with regards to the claimant’s medical conditions and how that impacts the full range of PIP activities appears to be no more than a rehearsal of part of the evidence and a conclusion without an adequate explanation.
4.3 The claimant was diagnosed with autism in May 2001, when he was aged five years. He was also later diagnosed with ADHD, after the decision had been made. In 2017, he was diagnosed with anxiety and depression. He was prescribed sertraline for depression but stopped this in 2021. Additionally, he was prescribed methylphenidate for ADHD, but he decided to stop this as he felt it was not effective. At the date of decision, he was not taking any medication.
4.4 As noted in the PTA (permission to appeal) the FtT found that the claimant did not satisfy mobility activity 1 - planning and following a route of a journey as they provided the following reasons detailed at paragraphs 27-29 and 46, 57 and 73 of the SOR which states:
“27. When he started work, he lived in a shared flat in Bromley. He was able to go out to socialize from time to time, and other people came to the house. He had a couple of friends from university and some friends from work. He went into the office sometimes. There were other people there, but he only had to liaise with the bishop. He would usually travel by taxi because he struggled with public transport.
He was able to go out, although occasionally he would get lost. He sometimes had to check with friends and family which was the best route and struggled a little with time management. He was also prone to losing things when outside his home.
He has been able to travel by coach from Bromley to Market Harborough on a number of occasions for medical treatment, at least once on his own.
…46. He preferred not to travel by public transport, but was able to do so. He preferred to travel by taxi, but was able to take public transport alone to see his father in Leicestershire, and he had made one journey to Switzerland for medical treatment. He was able to plan and follow the route of a journey and did not require prompting, neither did he experience overwhelming psychological distress outside.
…57. He also said that he needed support to plan and follow a route [161].
…73. In respect of descriptor 11, he said that he struggled to plan a route. However, at the date of the decision, he was living alone and working. He was able to travel to work albeit by cab most of the time. He was able to plan using his phone. There was no medical evidence, and he did not give evidence suggesting, that he experienced overwhelming psychological distress when outside. He was not engaging with mental health services at the time of the decision and was not prescribed either anti-depressant or anti-anxiety medication. We accepted that he preferred not to use public transport, but he was able to do so, and had undertaken coach journeys to see his father and journeys to Switzerland for medical treatment. Again, on the balance of the evidence, we considered that he was able to plan and follow a journey unaided most of the time.”
The FtT in their reasoning (repeated above) appear to have simply summarised the evidence before them and then concluded that at the date of the decision under appeal, the claimant did not satisfy across all daily living activities providing reasoning that the FtT states it supports and explains how they reached their conclusion that the claimant was able to undertake the activities claimed for.
It appears the FtT failed to acknowledge that the claimant does have restrictions in his ability to plan and follow a journey. The FtTaccepts that the claimant prefers not to travel by public transport, relies on taxis to travel to unfamiliar places and depends on friends and family to work out the best route, yet the FtT maintain that the claimant can successfully plan and follow a journey (SOR, UT bundle, p. 25).
Furthermore, it is stated in the SOR that the claimant simply prefers not to travel by public transport but is able to do so (UT bundle, p.26). However, the FtT fail to acknowledge evidence that suggests that he is unable to plan and follow a journey not by preference but because of his autism, which is recorded below.
“Because of autism I have difficulty planning and organising and therefore find it difficult to travel long distances because I have poor memory, organisation, and ability to plan. I am unable to reliably travel on a train or bus to new locations, but am able to follow familiar routes”(Reconsideration letter, FtT bundle, p. 96).
If he has difficulty with planning and organisation due to poor memory, how can he reliably plan and follow the route of a journey?
Additionally, the SOR relies on the claimant’s trip to Switzerland to conclude that he can plan and follow a journey. However, this was only one trip, leaving one to consider if the claimant can plan and follow an unfamiliar journey the majority of days without any support? It is plainly stated, he “generally needs to be with somebody” while travelling (AR1 – How your disability affects you, FtT bundle, p.161). The FtT have failed to utilise their inquisitorial duty as it does not state if he had help on the unfamiliar journeys. As (AA v SSWP [2018] UKUT 339 (AAC)) states, the passive presence of another person does count.
In view of this, it is unclear how the FtT reached the conclusion that the claimant is capable planning and following the route of journeys and whether he is able to do so within the requirements of Regulation 4(2A) of The Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013 and whether he is able to do so without the passive presence of another person, specifically given that the claimant when undertaking journeys does in fact either go by taxi or with someone he knows.
I respectfully submit that the inadequacy of reasons makes it difficult for the claimant to know whether the FtT applied the correct legal tests in assessing the evidence, making its findings of fact, and arriving at its decision. Furthermore, the errors of law identified and detailed within this submission are material, as had the claimant been awarded at least 8 points for the mobility activity of PIP he would have scored sufficient points to be awarded the mobility component of PIP.
If the UT Judge accepts my submission that the FtT has erred in law, I invite them to set aside the FtT’s decision and remit the appeal to be re-heard by a differently constituted FtT.”
On 31 December 2025 the claimant submitted that
“Regarding whether the tribunal adequately addressed whether the respondent had a sound basis for exercising its power to supersede a previous award of the standard rate of both components to a zero points decision of 22 May 2023, it is submitted that TH v SSWP (PIP) [2017] UKUT 0231 (AAC) and SC v SSWP (PIP) [2019] UKUT 165 (AAC) would suggest that it did not. This is because a previous tribunal on 9 July 2020 had awarded the standard rate of both PIP components from 17 August 2018 to 26 August 2022, an award the respondent had decided to extend, meaning the decision of 22 May 2023 was made within the currency of an award.
The appellant does not request an oral hearing. He does not consent to a decision without reasons. He pleads for the decision to be remade such that his previous award is reinstated and extended.”
Neither party has sought an oral hearing and I do not consider that it is necessary to hold one in order to resolve the matter.
For the reasons identified by the Secretary of State, I am satisfied that the Tribunal made errors of law which were material to the decision and for that reason the decision of the Tribunal should be set aside.
In the circumstances I do not need to consider whether the Tribunal made any other errors of law.
I am satisfied that the resolution of any other grounds of appeal will fall to be subsumed at the hearing before the new tribunal.
I therefore allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the Tribunal. I remit the matter to a new tribunal which should conduct a complete rehearing of the matter. Although the claimant sought a remaking of the decision under appeal, I am satisfied that the appropriate course is that the matter should be considered by a new fact-finding tribunal which will hear evidence from the claimant.
I must stress that the fact that this appeal to the Upper Tribunal has succeeded should not be taken as any indication as to the outcome of the rehearing by the new tribunal. It is quite possible that the new tribunal may end up effectively coming to the same decision as the previous Tribunal, namely that the claimant was not entitled to either component of personal independence payment from and including 22 May 2023.
Alternatively, it is possible that the new tribunal might take a different view of the facts from that of the Tribunal and reach the conclusion that in fact the claimant was entitled to one or other or both components of personal independence payment from and including 22 May 2023.
It is for the new tribunal itself to decide which of these alternative options open to it applies, depending on the view it takes of the facts and providing it makes proper findings of fact and gives adequate reasons. It would not be appropriate for me to express any opinion either way on the merits of the appeal.
The following directions apply to the hearing before the new tribunal:
The new tribunal should not involve any member who was a member of the Tribunal involved in the hearing of the appeal.
The new tribunal must considerand make relevant findings as to whether or not the claimant satisfied the criteria to be awarded the daily living component and/or the mobility component of personal independence payment from and including 22 May 2023. In so doing the new tribunal should in particular have regard to the claimant’s grounds of appeal dated 9 July 2025 and the submissions of the Secretary of State dated 27 November 2025.
Mark West
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Signed on the original on 24 March 2026