S.S. v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

This case is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for reconsideration at an oral hearing.

The new First-tier Tribunal should not involve the tribunal judge, medical member or disability member previously involved in considering this appeal on 17 December 2024.

The First-tier Tribunal must undertake a complete reconsideration of the issues that are raised by the appeal and, subject to the First-tier Tribunal's discretion under section 12(8)(a) of the Social Security Act 1998, any other issues that merit consideration.

In reconsidering the issues raised by the appeal the First-tier Tribunal must not take account of circumstances which were not obtaining at the date of the original decision of the Secretary of State under appeal. Later evidence is admissible provided it relates to the time of the decision.

These Directions may be supplemented by later directions by a Tribunal Judge or Registrar in the Social Entitlement Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal.

This case concerns the appellant’s entitlement to personal independence payment (“PIP”) under the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and the Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/377). Permission to appeal against the First-tier Tribunal decision of 17 December 2024 was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Stout on 2 October 2025 and the appeal is supported by the respondent (the Secretary of State). Neither party has requested an oral hearing of the appeal to the Upper Tribunal, and I consider that I can properly determine the case on the papers.

The appellant appealed against the respondent’s decision of 6 January 2023 that she was not entitled to PIP with effect from 23 September 2022 because she was assessed as scoring 0 points in relation to both the daily living and mobility activities. The appellant’s main health conditions were reported as anxiety, depression and osteoarthritis.

The First-tier Tribunal considered the appeal at an oral hearing on 17 December 2024 which the appellant attended with her representative, and which a Presenting Officer attended on behalf of the respondent. The Tribunal held that the appellant scored 2 points in relation to daily living activity 1 (preparing food) and 2 points in relation to daily living activity 6 (dressing and undressing), on the basis that she needed prompting to be able to either prepare or cook a simple meal and to be able to dress or undress. The Tribunal held that she did not score any points in relation to the mobility activities. As the total of 4 points was insufficient for an award of PIP, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal. A statement of reasons was issued on 23 February 2025 and the appellant’s application for permission to appeal was refused on 2 June 2025 (issued 18 June). The appellant renewed her application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on 14 July 2025.

In her reasons for granting permission to appeal, Upper Tribunal Judge Stout commented:

“13.

A number of arguments are made in the grounds of appeal. For the most part, I do not consider them to have merit. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is, for the most part, well-drafted and well-reasoned and the First-tier Tribunal has properly directed itself as to the law, in particular as to the requirements of regulation 4(2A) and regulation 7. However, the arguments made in relation to the following activities are arguable in my judgment:

a.

Daily living activity 3 – Managing therapy or monitoring a health condition – In particular, it is arguable that the Tribunal has erred by failing to address the evidence about the support stockings;

b.

Daily living activity 9 – Engaging with other people face-to face – In particular, it is arguable that the Tribunal has failed properly to address the appellant’s ability to engage with unfamiliar people;

c.

Mobility activity 1 – Planning and following journeys – In particular, it is arguable that the Tribunal failed to properly to address the appellant’s ability to follow the route of an unfamiliar journey without another person or assistance.”

In a submission dated 5 November 2025 the respondent’s representative supports the appeal and invites me to set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision and remit the appeal for rehearing by a differently constituted Tribunal.

In relation to daily living activity 3 (managing therapy or monitoring a health condition) the respondent’s representative notes that the Tribunal held (at paragraph 63f of the statement of reasons) that “although support stockings may assist with varicose veins, there is insufficient evidence that a medical professional has recommended their use or that prompting is necessary”. She submits:

“4.7

It is noteworthy, that the FtT states that due to the claimant being able to take her medication for depression she does not require supervision, prompting or assistance with the compression stockings. However, a clinical practitioner states that wearing the stockings affects her mood and upon being advised to wear them more often she has agreed to do so; suggesting that she does in fact require prompting:

“Pain is constant - was severe at that [time] - better now. usually gets worse during summer time. long standing constant throughout the year - worse in summers. occasionally wears the compression stockings – [advised] to wear more often - talked about vascular referral – [explained] won’t fit the criteria as no skin ulcers or bleeding veins, exclusion criteria painful varicose. Says [wearing] the stockings bring her [mood] down. - agreed to wear them more often in the end lives alone - no one to talk to - noted known to social prescriber” (p118, FtT bundle).

Therefore, not only does this evidence clearly indicate a need for prompting to use the compression stockings, because she agreed to wear them more often, but it is also clear evidence of a medical professional’s recommendation of use which the FtT do not appear to acknowledge.

4.8

Furthermore, there is additional evidence from the Clinical Practitioner, dated 15/03/2023, which indicates that when the claimant did not wear the compression stockings, she experiences pain on her inner calf: “does wear stockings for the varicose veins. had not been wearing the stockings over last 24 hours. been taking ibuprofen which helps relieve the pain no calf swelling or tenderness. pain on the inner calf” (p116, FtT bundle). This contradicts the FtT’s conclusion that there is “insufficientevidence” that a medical professional has recommended the use of compressionstockings.

4.9

Although the FtT in the SOR at paragraph 55 acknowledge that depression affects “her motivation and concentration” (Addition J Page 6, UT bundle) with regards to cooking, the FtT remain silent on the evidence which suggests that depression similarly affects her ability to repeatedly put on her compression stockings and take medication. For instance, a Crisis and Liaison Service letter states that the claimant is “high risk of self-neglect” (Addition A Page 9, FtT bundle) as well as further evidence from the Crisis Team which states: “She reported she has been experiencing some suicidal ideation, unable to attend to her personal hygiene, poor concentration, forgetfulness, poor appetite, and low mood” (p101, FtT bundle). Therefore, given that the claimant has stated that she is forgetful and a medical professional has indicated that she neglects herself, it was incumbent upon the FtT to at the very least explain what they made of this evidence and consider how her symptoms of depression would affect her ability to reliably and repeatedly take her medication and wear her compression stocking.

4.10

In light of the evidence above it is unclear upon reading the SOR how the FtT reached their conclusions (repeated above) that the claimant was able to undertake daily living activity 3 in accordance with the provisions detailed within Regulation 4(2A) and 7 of the PIP Regs 2013. It is therefore my submission that the FtT has erred in law, as they have provided insufficient findings within the SOR to support and explain their decision and that further findings are required.”

In relation to daily living activity 9 (engaging with other people face to face) the respondent’s representative submits:

“4.12

Although the FtT acknowledge the claimant’s anxiety in social situations, it is unclear how they concluded that she is able to engage socially. I note at page 114 of the medical evidence, that the medical professional states that they had - “Discussed if [the claimant] would be interested in me supporting her access activities in the community. She expressed she doesn’t want to as "people are vile and nasty" and she said she has always disliked the community based on her past experiences. She said she is a roman catholic and has tried going to the church but she said even there people are nasty. For this reason she said she is not interested to engage in the community and not prepared to try it as her mental health will always be her barrier and her believes about people will not change now.” Therefore, this evidence contradicts the FtT’s assertion that she regularly attends church where she engages appropriately.

4.13

Moreover, the FtT state that the claimant maintains relationships with family and friends which they suggest is sufficient evidence to indicate that she is able to engage socially. However, UT Judge Knowles in the decision CPIP/3343/15 indicates at paragraph 6 of the decision that engagement must be with a range of people including strangers, not just people who are familiar to them. Further guidance with regards to daily living activity 9 can be found within the Supreme Court decision in SSWP v MM [2019] UKSC 34 and it is unclear upon reading the SOR whether the FtT had due regard to the guidance provided in the aforementioned decisions.

4.14

The FtT do not seem to engage with the significant amount of evidence which affirms that she struggles to engage with other people face-to-face. For instance, the HCP notes that during her PIP assessment she was unable to appropriately engage: “During assessment she presented with pressured speech, interjecting and would not give staff the opportunity to speak to her. She was jumping from one subject to another

and introducing irrelevant topics and when staff made attempts to divert her from irrelevant topics she appeared irritable. She was querying everything staff were suggesting or asking her during the assessment. She had moments of staring and unable to talk” (p31, FtT bundle). As well as further evidence, within the PA4 V3 form, which suggests she can engage with familiar people but finds engaging with others to be difficult: “They regularly engage with her parents and reports she does not really like speaking to others as she finds them difficult. She reports she would be able to ask someone in the bus station for directions but finds people with authority more scary… She was unsettled through the assessment was pacing up and down the making it difficult to engage with her” (p31, FtT bundle).

4.15

In light of the above detailed evidence it is unclear upon reading the SOR how the FtT reached their conclusions […] that the claimant was able to undertake daily living activity 9. It is therefore my submission that the FtT has erred in law, as they have provided insufficient findings within the SOR to support and explain their decision and that further findings are required.”

The first of the two quotes in paragraph 4.14 of the respondent’s submission appears to me to be incorrectly attributed. It does not come from the report of the HCP’s PIP assessment, but in fact is taken from the appellant’s medical records, from the report of an assessment undertaken on 29 October 2022 by Mental Health Crisis and Liaison Services (at page 101 of the First-tier bundle). However, the misattribution does not undermine the point that the respondent’s representative is seeking to make, regarding the evidence of the appellant’s difficulty engaging with other people face to face.

The appellant’s representative, in a reply dated 5 December 2025, provides further information regarding the appellant’s history of PIP claims and awards:

“1.

Clarification of Claim History

At paragraph 2.1 of the Secretary of State’s submission it is stated that the claimant first made a claim on 22 September 2022, following the expiry of a previous award.

For accuracy, the claimant’s full claim history is set out below.

a.

Initial Claim (2016)

[The appellant] first claimed Personal Independence Payment on 4 November 2016.

This claim was initially refused by the Secretary of State.

On 24 January 2019, the First-tier Tribunal set aside that decision and awarded:

Daily Living: 11 points

Mobility: 0 points

The award covered the period 4 November 2016 to 17 September 2017.

b.

Subsequent Award (2017–2022)

A further award was in place from 18 September 2017 to 22 July 2022.

This award was extended on 9 November 2020 due to the COVID-19 emergency measures.

On 13 February 2018, the Secretary of State confirmed:

Daily Living: 11 points

Mobility: 0 points

c.

Early Review and Tribunal Appeal (2021–2024)

The Secretary of State initiated an early review on 17 November 2021.

A decision was issued on 15 July 2022, stating that [the appellant] no longer had entitlement to PIP.

This decision was appealed.

The First-tier Tribunal, in its decision dated 25 January 2024, found that:

There were no grounds for supersession;

The correct award was:

Standard Rate Daily Living (11 points)

Standard Rate Mobility (4 points)

The Tribunal limited the award to start from 22 September 2022, as the claimant had made a new claim without realising the effect this would have.

2.

Continuity of Award

Taking the above into account:

[The appellant] has had continuous entitlement to standard rate daily living since 4 November 2016.

She has had entitlement to standard rate mobility since 17 November 2021.

The current decision under appeal is, in practical terms, a supersession, as the new claim was made on 23 September 2022 and the previous award ended on 22 September 2022, leaving no break in entitlement.

3.

Additional Information

For completeness, [the appellant] submitted a further new claim on 26 March 2025, and that claim is also under appeal.”

There is a minor error in the appellant’s representative’s submission, in that it states that the First-tier Tribunal decision of 25 January 2024 awarded the appellant 4 points in relation to the mobility activities, on the basis of which she was entitled to the standard rate of the mobility component. A minimum of 8 points are needed for an award of the mobility component, and it is clear from the statement of reasons for the Tribunal’s decision (paragraph 12 at Addition B page 13) that the appellant was in fact awarded 10 points in respect of the mobility activities.

For the reasons identified by Judge Stout in granting permission to appeal, as expanded on in the respondent’s clear and comprehensive submission, I consider that the First-tier Tribunal decision of 17 December 2024 involved errors of law in relation to daily living activities 3 and 9. In relation to activity 3, the Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons for its conclusion that the appellant did not require prompting to use support stockings and that their use had not been recommended to her by a medical professional, in light of the evidence to the contrary. In relation to activity 9, the Tribunal gave inadequate reasons for its conclusion that the appellant could engage with other people unaided, and in particular, it failed to explain what it made of the evidence of the appellant’s difficulties with engaging in an appropriate manner.

Those errors were material, because the appellant would have scored an additional 2 points if the Tribunal had held that she required prompting in order to be able to manage therapy (descriptor 3.c.), and a further 2 points if it had held that she required prompting to be able to engage with other people (descriptor 9. b.). Taking into account the 4 points that the Tribunal awarded the appellant in relation to daily living activities 1 and 6, that would have given the appellant the 8 points needed for an award of the daily living component at the standard rate.

As I have found that the Tribunal erred materially in law, I am setting its decision aside. I therefore do not need to consider whether it also erred in its consideration of mobility activity 1, or in any other respect.

I have concluded that it would not be appropriate for me remake the decision, as facts need to be found and the First-tier Tribunal, as an expert fact-finding body with the benefit of specialist members, is in a better position to undertake that task. The appeal is therefore remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.