Joseph Ngongo t/a African Swahili Project in the United Kingdom v OISC

This is an Appeal by Joseph Ngongo t/a The African Swahili Community Project in the UK (“ASCOP”) against a Decision of the Immigration Services Commissioner (“the Respondent”) dated 25^th August 2011, withdrawing the exemption of ASCOP, as an organisation heretofore exempted from registration with the Respondent under Section 84 (4) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (“the Act”).

Section 83 (3) of the Act provides, at sub-section (5), that: “The Commissioner must exercise her functions so as to secure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that those who provide immigration advice or immigration services – (a) are fit and competent to do so; (b) act in the best interests of their clients; (c) do not knowingly mislead any court, adjudicator or tribunal in the United Kingdom; (d) do not seek to abuse any procedure operating in the United Kingdom in connection with immigration or asylum; (e) do not advise any person to do something which would amount to such an abuse.

Section 84 (1) of the Act provides that: “No person may provide immigration advice or immigration services unless he is a qualified person.”

Section 84 (2) of the Act sets out the categories of qualification, including by registration.

However, Section 84 (4) of the Act provides that: “Subsection (1) (of Section 84 - that is the requirement of qualification) does not apply to a person who – (a) is certified by the Commissioner as exempt (“an exempt person”).

Succeeding provisions of Section 84 (4) provide, in the context of this Appeal, that qualification is not required by those who are employed by an “exempt person” or by those who work under the supervision of an “exempt person” or of an employee of “an exempt person”.

Section 84 (7) of the Act provides that: “An exemption given under subsection (4) (of Section 84) may be withdrawn by the Commissioner.

Accordingly, in simple terms, two categories of “persons” may provide immigration advice or services - firstly those “persons” who are qualified by virtue of Section 84 (2), including by registration, and secondly those “persons” who are certified by the Commissioner as “exempt persons” (that is, exempt from registration).

Again in simple terms, the first category, of registered persons, are persons who provide immigration advice or services for profit, whilst the second category, of exempt persons, are “not-for-profit” organisations which do not charge for their provision of immigration advice or services.

The material Decision in this Appeal, the aforesaid Decision of 25^th August 2011, withdrew the exemption of ASCOP pursuant to Section 84 (7) of the Act.

ASCOP, the African Swahili Community Project in the UK, is an established organisation, based in London, which provides support services for African Swahili speaking refugees and asylum seekers (mainly from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda), which services comprise translation and interpreting, health promotion, and advice and information on benefits, education and training, employment, finding accommodation, immigration and nationality and racial harassment.

Immigration advice and services was, accordingly, one aspect of a wide range of services provided by ASCOP to Africans in London.

It has not been in dispute in this Appeal that ASCOP was a reputable organisation, and a registered charity, of good standing which provided a wide range of valuable services to the African Swahili community in London.

In 2002, ASCOP provided immigration advice and services through the medium of one regulated adviser, Celestin Masudi, an adviser thus recognised by the Respondent as fit and competent to provide such advice and services.

On 23^rd December 2002, pursuant to Section 84 (4) of the Act, the Respondent certified ASCOP as exempt from qualification by registration, and thereby ASCOP became, under the provisions of the Act, an “exempt person”, permitted to provide immigration advice and services, and Celestin Masudi, that regulated adviser who worked for ASCOP, provided that advice and those services for that exempt person.

In 2008, the Respondent introduced a Continuing Professional Development (“CPD”) Scheme, which came into effect on 1^st April of that year.

All immigration advisers regulated by the Respondent were required to comply with that Scheme, by Code 23 of the Commissioner’s Code of Standards.

The purpose of the Scheme, of course, was the necessary and admirable purpose of ensuring that immigration advisers maintained their fitness and competence to provide immigration advice and services by maintaining, on a continuing basis, their knowledge of, and familiarity with, up-to-date immigration law and practice.

This requirement to comply with the Scheme applied to all regulated immigration advisers, working as and for registered persons, and working for exempt persons.

All regulated advisers, including Mr Masudi, were informed of the introduction of the scheme, and of the necessity for compliance, and of the mode of compliance, and of the fact that non-compliance would be regarded as a breach of Code 23, and (through the medium of the Guidance Booklet issued by the Respondent to all advisers) of the fact that non-compliance “will result in the possible de-regulation of the non-compliant adviser”.

At all times material to this Appeal Mr Ngongo, in whose name the Appeal was brought, has represented the interests of his organisation.

The non-compliance (asserted by the Respondent) of Mr Masudi, the regulated immigration adviser working for ASCOP, with the CPD Scheme, is the central factual issue in this Appeal.

The Appellant duly appealed, against the material Decision of the Respondent of 25^th August 2011, by Notice of Appeal dated 8^th September 2011.

In the Notice of Appeal the Appellant applied for the Decision to be stayed pending the outcome of the Appeal, and by a Direction of the Tribunal dated 3^rd October 2011 the effect of the Decision was suspended until the determination of the Appeal.

The Respondent’s Response to the Appeal was duly received on 13^th October 2011.

On 28^th October 2011 the Tribunal, in response to an application on 27^th October 2011 from the Respondent for Directions, gave directions in respect of the service of documents in advance of the hearing of the Appeal, and the Respondent and the Appellant duly furnished document bundles prior to the hearing.

The Tribunal sat to hear the Appeal on 19^th and 20^th December 2011.

Following that hearing the Tribunal gave Directions, on 21^st December 2011, in respect of the further conduct of the Appeal, effectively seeking further information, and a further submission, from the Respondent.

The Respondent complied with that Direction, and on 18^th January 2012 furnished the further information required, and a written submission, to the Tribunal.

The further hearing of the Appeal had been adjourned until 27^th January 2012, but the Tribunal was unable to sit on that date, and on 7^th March 2012 the Tribunal, having considered the response of the Respondent to the Directions of 21^st December 2011, gave further Directions in respect of the further conduct of the Appeal, fixing the adjourned hearing for Friday 30^th March 2012, and effectively seeking further information from the Respondent, and giving notice of the requirement of the Tribunal to hear a specific submission from the Respondent with regard to the fairness, reasonableness and proportionality of the material Decision.

On 15^th March 2012 the Respondent applied for a Direction of the Tribunal, seeking an oral hearing in respect of certain of the information sought by the Direction of the Tribunal of 7^th March 2012, and on 20^th March the Tribunal directed that the Tribunal would hear the Respondent orally in respect of that matter immediately prior to the substantive adjourned hearing on 20^th March.

On 20^th March 2012 the Tribunal sat to hear the aforesaid oral submissions of the Respondent, and thereafter to continue the substantive hearing of the Appeal. There was no appearance on behalf of the Appellant at that hearing, but, on the application of the Respondent, the Tribunal considered that matter, concluded that it was satisfied that the Appellant had been duly notified of the adjourned hearing and that it was in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing, ruled, in accordance with Rule 36 of the Rules, that the hearing should proceed.

The hearing on 20^th March did proceed.

Thereafter, on 2^nd April 2012, the Tribunal gave further Directions in respect of the further conduct of the Appeal, requiring the Respondent to furnish final written submissions to the Tribunal, and affording the Appellant the opportunity to respond to those final submission of the Respondent.

The Respondent duly furnished final, detailed, submissions to the Tribunal, on 13^th April 2012, which were furnished also to the Appellant, and on 25^th April 2012, by e-mail, the Appellant made a final submission to the Tribunal.

On 8^th May 2012 the Tribunal made gave further, final, Directions in respect of the further conduct of the Appeal, adjourning the Appeal until 20^th July 2012, and effectively affording the Appellant an opportunity of obtaining the services of a regulated immigration adviser, whether in the person of Mr Ngongo or another, within a period of three months, and removing in the interim that suspension of the material Decision of the Respondent which had been granted by the Tribunal on 3^rd October 2011.

On 6^th July 2012 the Appellant responded to that Direction, by e-mail, stating that “the community charity does not have anything to say again about the Directions Order (of 8^th May 2012) apart that we want to keep our authorisation to keep providing advice to our people such as helping them with the filling of applications form.”

The Tribunal did not require a further hearing of the Appeal.

As stated above, the central factual issue was the asserted non-compliance, by Mr Masudi, with the Continued Professional Development Scheme requirements of the Respondent.

At the hearing in December 2011, the Tribunal heard the evidence of Mr Ngongo on behalf of the Appellant, and the evidence of Ms Sally Hainsworth and Ms Melanie Lanerolle on behalf of the Respondent.

Ms Hainsworth has at all material times been the Continuing Professional Development Co-ordinator for the Respondent, and Ms Lanerolle, who has been employed by the Respondent since 2001, has since November 2010 been a Team Manager responsible for overseeing the CPD Scheme and for the direct line management of Ms Hainsworth.

Effectively, the failure of Mr Masudi to comply with the CPD Scheme requirements is not in dispute.

That Scheme, and Code 23 of the Commissioner’s Code of Standards, required Mr Masudi to complete, in each CPD year (running from 1^st April to 31^st March and commencing on 1^st April 2008) a certain number of “core knowledge” hours of CPD courses (in respect of on-going training specifically related to UK and EEA immigration and asylum law) and of “non-core knowledge” hours (in respect of professional development, management skills and personal skills).

To the aforesaid final submissions of the Respondent, furnished to the Tribunal on 13^th April 2012, was appended a Chronology of Events, setting out all of the material correspondence and dealings between the Respondent and ASCOP and Mr Masudi, continuing on a regular basis from 11^th October 2007 to 14^th April 2011, with regard to the obligations of the latter in respect of the CPD Scheme. The Tribunal accepts the accuracy of that Chronology, which was not challenged by the Appellant.

That Chronology, together with the evidence of Ms Hainsworth and Ms Lanerolle, and the material documents furnished to the Tribunal, establishes conclusively that Mr Masudi had, at the time of the material Decision of the Respondent, a clear history of both partial and total failure to fulfil his CPD Scheme requirements.

Specifically, Mr Masudi should have completed his 2008/2009 CPD requirements by 31^st March 2009, but did not in fact do so until February 2012, and then only because the Respondent waived the requirement for “non-core” hours. He should have completed his 2009/2010 CPD requirements by 31^st March 2010, but by August 2011 still had a significant number of “core” and “non-core” hours to complete. He should have completed his 2010/2011 CPD requirements by 31^st March 2011, but by August 2011 he had failed to complete any “core” or “non-core” hours.

These failures occurred against a background of repeated reminders by the Respondent, both to Mr Masudi and to ASCOP, and several extensions of time for completion granted by the Respondent. During the material period two Statements of Complaint were sent by the Respondent to the Appellant, in October 2009 and June 2010, in respect of Mr Masudi’s failures in respect of his CPD Scheme requirements, and in both cases the Respondent determined that there had been a breach of Code 23 of the Code of Standards. Despite those extensions, reminders and determinations, the aforesaid total failure to comply in the year 2010/2011 occurred.

Prior to the hearing of the Tribunal in December 2011, the Appellant, in the person of Mr Ngongo, had recognised, in a letter of 22^nd June 2010, that ASCOP had received letters and e-mails from the Respondent in respect of Mr Masudi’s obligations, and asserted that Mr Masudi was “at all times on the OISC website up-dating himself with the Code of Standards”, and purported to confirm that Mr Masudi had completed the required “core” and “non-core” hours.

The Appellant subsequently asserted, in the Notice of Appeal and in a memorandum which accompanied its document bundle (which comprised only the Notice of Appeal and that letter of 22^nd June 2010) that ASCOP had not received any correspondence from the Respondent after that letter (which assertion was not accepted by the Tribunal), and that Mr Masudi was currently the only immigration adviser for the Appellant, and had experienced “family trouble in April 2011 when he lost his wife”.

At the hearing in December 2011, Mr Ngongo effectively accepted those failures, recorded above, of Mr Masudi to fulfil his CPD Scheme requirements, and informed the Tribunal, effectively, that Mr Masudi no longer acted as an adviser for the Appellant. Mr Masudi did not appear at the hearing, nor was any further reason advanced for his failures in respect of his CPD Scheme requirements.

Additionally, Mr Ngongo asserted to the Tribunal that he wished to become a regulated immigration adviser, but that he required more time to complete the necessary reading and pass the required tests.

The Tribunal finds that the sole regulated immigration adviser of the Appellant, Mr Masudi, failed partially to fulfil his CPD requirements for the 2008/2009 CPD year, failed substantively to fulfil those requirements for the 2009/2010 year, and failed wholly to fulfil those requirements for the 2010/2011 year.

The Tribunal has established as a fact also, by reason of the submissions made and information provided by the Respondent, that the Respondent has always granted certificates of exemption, under Section 84 (4) of the Act, “to organisations which provide immigration advice and services where the client is not charged a fee for the services provided” (Respondent’s Response to Direction 3 of the Order dated 21^st December 2011). Such exemption is not, as a matter of the Respondent’s policy, granted to individuals.

On the basis of those failures set out in paragraph 52 above, and in particular on the basis of the complete failure in respect of the 2010/2011 year, by the Decision of 25^th August 2011, the Respondent, pursuant to Section 84 (7) of the Act, withdrew the exemption of the Appellant, so that, on the basis of that Decision, the Appellant would therefore be unable to provide any immigration advice or services.

As stated above, Section 84 (4) of the Act provides for the certification by the Respondent of “an exempt person”.

That is a certification of exemption from Section 84 (1) of the Act, which provides that “no person may provide immigration advice or immigration services unless he is a qualified person”

The categories of qualification are provided for by Section 84 (2). In the context of this Appeal, the relevant categories are set out in Section 84 (2) (a) and (b) -those are: (a) a person who is registered with the Commissioner or is employed by, or works under the supervision of, such a person; and (b) a member or employee of a body which is a registered person, or works under the supervision of such a member or employee.

Accordingly, in terms of registration, the Act provides for the registration both of an individual person, and of a “body”, or effectively an organisation. Individual persons and bodies may thus be registered as fit and competent to provide immigration advice and services, and, as persons and bodies qualified to do so, are subject to the statutory authority of the Respondent to grant, refuse or remove registration, under Section 85 and Schedule 6 of the Act.

In contrast, Section 84 (4), in dealing with exemption, makes no provision for recognition of a statutory standing for both individuals and bodies. A Section 84 (4) exemption attaches to “an exempt person”, and, whilst qualification by registration is not required by a person who works for an exempt person (Section 84 (4) (b)) or who works under the supervision of an exempt person or an employee of an exempt person, the only statutory powers accorded to the Respondent by Section 84, in respect of exemption, are to grant it to, or withdraw it from, “an exempt person”.

The policy of the Respondent, as aforesaid, has at all material times been to grant exemption only to “bodies”, to organisations, and not to individuals. Individual persons provide immigration advice and services for those exempted organisations, but whilst they may do so, as employees and supervised persons of employees of exempt organisations, without registration, no certification attaches to them as individuals.

The issue of whether an exemption for “an exempt person” may be granted to a body, and not to an individual, is resolved by Section 5 and Schedule 1 of the Interpretation Act 1978, which provide that the term “person” includes a body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporated.

Accordingly, there are very many registered individuals who provide immigration advice and services, who are subject to the Respondent’s aforesaid statutory powers, amongst which, inter alia, is the sanction to remove registration.

In contrast, because of the aforesaid statutory provisions, a sanction to remove exempt certification from an individual, who provides immigration advice and services for an exempt organisation, is not available to the Respondent.

The factual issue in the Appeal (the asserted failure of Mr Masudi) has been determined as aforesaid.

By reason of the aforesaid failure of the individual adviser, Mr Masudi, to fulfil his CPD Scheme requirements, the Respondent has acted against the body for which he provided immigration advice and services, the Appellant, by exercising the statutory sanction of withdrawing the Appellant’s exemption.

It is accepted by the Respondent, as is logically inescapable, that the requirement to fulfil the obligations of the CPD Scheme is a requirement for an individual adviser, and not for the organisation for which the adviser provides advice.

The Respondent contends that, in all the circumstances of this case, in which, because of the material failure of the sole individual adviser, it cannot be satisfied that the Appellant remains fit and competent to provide immigration advice and services, the withdrawal of the exemption of the Appellant is a proper, fair and reasonable step.

The Appellant contends, essentially, that the withdrawal of the exemption of an organisation because of the failure of an individual, in respect of an obligation which attaches solely to him, within that organisation is unfair, unreasonable and disproportionate.

The Tribunal established, during the course of the Appeal, that in terms of size and numbers of advisers, there are various categories of exempt organisations. In broad terms, there are currently some 12 organisations, each with more than 10 regulated advisers (for example the Refugee Council with more than 100 advisers, and a number with between 10 and 30 advisers), and some 30 organisations with between 4 and 7 advisers, and some 65 organisations with 2 or 3 advisers, and some 100 organisations, each with a sole adviser. Further, in respect of the 2010/2011 “CPD” year, the Respondent had withdrawn exemption from 5 exempted organisations, each with a sole adviser, because of the failure of that adviser to fulfil his or her CPD Scheme requirements.

The Tribunal considers that, by reason of the aforesaid statutory framework, and by reason also of the policy of the Respondent of granting exemption to organisations and not to individuals, the exercise by the Respondent of the sanction of withdrawal of the exemption of an organisation by reason of a material failure of an individual within that organisation – in respect of an obligation which can attach only to that individual, and therefore this Appeal, does raise issues of fairness, reasonableness, and essentially proportionality.

The issue of the inability of the Respondent to act against an individual employee of “an exempt person” arose, starkly, in a case which came before the Tribunal in 2009 (IMS/2009/1WOE) in which an employee adviser of a large organisation ( which was “an exempt person”) had committed a criminal offence and in which the Respondent had sought to withdraw the “exempt status” of that employee because the commission of that criminal offence disqualified the offender from registration as an adviser. The contrasting legislative provisions in respect of registration and exemption, as set out aforesaid, were brought to the attention of the respective advisers of the Appellant and the Respondent, and the Respondent then recognised that there was no power to proceed as the Respondent had sought to do in that case.

However, despite that vivid highlighting of the material “gap” in the legislation, both the legislation and the policy of the Respondent with regard to exemption have remained unchanged.

In the context of the existing powers and policy of the Respondent, and in terms of proportionality, manifestly it would be absurdly unreasonable and disproportionate to seek to withdraw the exemption of a large organisation, with 100 advisers, because of the “unfitness and/or incompetence” of one of those advisers. It would, it seems to the Tribunal, to be clearly disproportionate to seek to withdraw the exemption of an organisation employing 20/30, or 10 advisers because of a material failure of one adviser. And so on, until one came to a case in which the exemption of an organisation employing 2 or 3 advisers came into question. In such a case the issue of reasonableness and proportion would come sharply into focus, and much would depend on the individual circumstances of the case. So also, in the opinion of the Tribunal, “a fortiori” in the case of an exempt organisation with a single adviser, as this case is.

The material legislation and policy, as they exist, draw a sharp distinction, in terms of the Respondent’s powers, between an “exempt person” and an individual employed or working for such a person, and accordingly any action sought to be taken by the Respondent against the exempt person because of the failure of the individual, in respect of an obligation which attaches solely to that individual, should, in the Tribunal’s view, be carefully scrutinised.

As set out above, the Respondent, in response to the Directions of the Tribunal, furnished final submissions in writing to the Tribunal in April 2012.

Those submissions consisted of 30 paragraphs, and were signed by Mr Paul Jarvis of Counsel, who appeared, for the first time, for the Respondent at the hearing of 30^th March 2012.

Paragraphs 21 to 30 dealt, appropriately and helpfully, with the merits of the Appeal.

Paragraphs 3 to 20 did not, and did not deal at all with the merits of the Appeal.

Therein, Mr Jarvis, on behalf of the Respondent, purported to deal with “The Appeal Process”, and ultimately, in paragraphs 18, 19 and 20, criticised, in strident terms, the Tribunal on the grounds of delay and “foisting responsibility for progressing the Appeal on the shoulders of the Respondent”.

There is a fine line between robust, valid and relevant submission, and impertinence and disrespect.

This Appeal, in the clear view of the Tribunal, raised important points of law and principle, which required the most careful consideration by the Tribunal. It is clear, from the thrust of those submissions which were valid, that the Respondent recognises the difficulties imposed by the legislation in the context of this case.

The Tribunal does not need to be reminded of its obligations under the Rules, and takes grave exception to the accusation of “encouraging delay”.

The Tribunal validly required further information from the Respondent on two occasions, and validly required time to consider that information in the context of the relevant legislation.

The Respondent has a clear responsibility to give all assistance required to this independent Tribunal, and has previously, in the experience of the Tribunal, always given such assistance fully and readily. And indeed the assistance required was given by the Respondent to the Tribunal in this Appeal. The submissions and information furnished by that assistance were wholly necessary to the determination of this Appeal. That information was wholly within the knowledge of the Respondent. That the giving of this assistance in this case should be a matter of subsequent complaint, and regarded as “foisting responsibility upon the shoulders of the Respondent”, is a matter of some astonishment to the Tribunal.

The Tribunal was satisfied that Mr Masudi no longer played any part in the affairs of the Appellant, and that Mr Ngongo clearly recognised that immigration advice or services could not be provided by the Appellant in the absence of a regulated adviser. The Tribunal was accordingly satisfied that a full consideration of the issues in this Appeal, and the time involved, afforded no danger to the public interest – a danger which seemed to be implied by paragraph 17 of Mr Jarvis’s submissions.

In those submissions, the words “highly unsatisfactory”, “… encouraging … delay”, “deplorable” and “foisting … responsibility” are, in the Tribunal’s view, inappropriate and unhelpful. The Tribunal does not find it necessary to express a view as to whether that fine line, referred to above, was crossed.

However, the Tribunal wholly rejects the criticism contained in the aforesaid submissions.

In coming to its conclusions, the Tribunal has considered fully all of the evidence, the documents provided by the parties, and all of the submissions made by and on behalf of the parties.

The Tribunal considered, so far as Mr Ngongo and the Appellant, were concerned, that they may well have validly taken the view that the Appellant’s position, so far as the giving of immigration advice and services, was “frozen” by this Appeal process.

As set out above, Mr Ngongo had indicated that he wished to become a regulated immigration adviser, and that the overall position of the Appellant was that it wished to continue performing the valuable service of furnishing immigration advice and services to its community (this latter position was the simple thrust of all of the submissions of the Appellant).

Having considered fully all aspects of the factual matrix of the Appeal, and of the relevant legislation, the Tribunal came to the view, following the hearing of 30^th March 2012 and the receipt of the final submissions of the parties, that it should afford an opportunity to the Appellant to place itself in the position of being able to resume the provision of immigration advice and services through the medium of a regulated adviser, whether that be Mr Ngongo, having achieved regulated adviser status, or another regulated adviser whose services had been retained by the Appellant.

The Respondent had asserted that, if the withdrawal of the exempt status of the Appellant was confirmed by the determination of the Appeal, it would be a simple and straightforward matter for the Appellant to apply again for certification of exemption.

The Tribunal considered, on balance and having considered the process of the relevant application with the assistance of the expertise of one of its members, himself a regulated adviser, that that process imposed a not insignificant administrative burden upon an applicant, hence its decision, conveyed in its Directions of 8^th May 2012, to adjourn the Appeal for some three months to afford the aforesaid opportunity to the Appellant. Those Directions also required the Appellant to inform the Tribunal, on or before 6^th July 2012, of such steps as it had taken to obtain the services of a regulated immigration adviser.

Regrettably, the Appellant has not seen fit to avail itself of this opportunity. By e-mail message to the Tribunal on 6^th July 2012, the Appellant, through Mr Ngongo, simply informed the Tribunal, as set out above, that: “this community charity does not have anything to say again about the Directions Order apart that we want to keep our authorisation to keep providing advice to our people such as helping them with the filling of applications form.”

Ultimately, therefore, in all of the circumstances and having regard to the entire process of the Appeal, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that, in this case in which an exempted organisation had a sole adviser, and in which there was a significant history of continued and ultimately complete disregard of the material CPD Scheme requirements on the part of that adviser, to the clear knowledge of the organisation, then the Respondent could validly have implied an inability, and/or lack of will, on the part of the organisation to ensure that its sole adviser fulfilled that important and indeed vital obligation to maintain, through continued professional development, a complete and up-to-date knowledge of immigration law and practice, or to take steps to ensure that a regulated and “CPD compliant” adviser was in place, and consequently and validly concluded that such an organisation, unable to provide that assurance, was not then competent to continue to provide immigration advice or services.

The Tribunal considers that the material Decision of the Respondent was not unreasonable, and was, in all the circumstances, proportionate.

The Tribunal stresses that, in coming to this conclusion, it does not seek to set any precedent of principle. The resolution of any similar case must depend on the particular facts of that case, and on the reasonableness and proportionality of any material decision in the context of those facts. The potential difficulties for the Respondent, posed by the material legislation as it currently stands, remain.

The Tribunal notes also the ability to apply again for exemption.

Having regard to the aforesaid conclusions, the Decision of the Tribunal is to dismiss the Appeal.