Appeal No. UA-2025-001179-PIP
Between:
TW
Appellant
- v -
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
Respondent
Before: Upper Tribunal Judge Ward
Decided on consideration of the papers
Representation (papers only):
Appellant: Benefit Answers, Preston
Respondent: L. Howard, Decision Making and Appeals
On appeal from:
Tribunal: First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber)
Tribunal Case No: SC123/25/00057
Tribunal Venue: Burnley
Decision Date: 27 May 2025
DECISION
The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to allow the appeal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) sitting at Burnley on 27 May 2025 under reference SC123/25/00057 is set aside. The appeal against the DWP’s decision dated 19 September 2024 must be considered afresh by a new tribunal of the FtT, which must be wholly differently constituted.
REASONS FOR DECISION
Both the Appellant’s representative and the representative of the Secretary of State have expressed the view that the decision of the FtT involved the making of an error on a point of law and have agreed to a rehearing. That makes it unnecessary to set out the history of the case or to analyse the whole of the evidence or arguments in detail. I need only deal with the reason why I am setting aside the tribunal’s decision.
Permission to appeal was given by Upper Tribunal Judge Stout, observing:
In this case, the appeal was solely concerned with the mobility component and whether the appellant should have been assessed as being unable to move more than 20 metres (for 12 points) rather than as being able to stand and move using an aid or appliance more than 20 metres but no more than 50 metres (for 10 points).
The Appellant argues that the Tribunal has failed properly to apply the requirements of regulation 4(2A) of the PIP Regulations that the appellant should only be regarded as satisfying a descriptor if she can carry out the activity repeatedly, to an acceptable standard and safely within a reasonable time. In particular, the appellant argues that the Tribunal has failed properly to consider whether the appellant can walk the distance within a reasonable time.
I agree this point is arguable. Although the Tribunal has properly directed itself to the relevant legal principles at [10] of its SoR, at [23]-[27] it concentrates solely on whether the appellant can walk 20-50 metres. Nowhere does it say anything about the length of time it takes her to walk, and reference to the ‘reasonable time’ element of regulation 4(2A) is conspicuously absent from [26]. By regulation 4(4)(c) “reasonable time period” means no more than twice as long as the maximum period that a person without a physical or mental condition which limits that person’s ability to carry out the activity in question would normally take to complete that activity. The Tribunal has arguably failed to identify any evidence relevant to that issue, has failed to make any relevant findings of fact and has failed to give any reasons for why it concluded that element of the test was satisfied.
Miss Howard for the Secretary of State supports the appeal on a number of grounds, including (at para 4.9 of her submission), the ground which led Judge Stout to give permission. She refers to evidence from the Appellant and her mother-in-law which addresses the slow pace of the appellant’s walking and accepts that the FtT failed to establish how long it would take the Appellant to cover a particular distance.
The Appellant’s representatives provided a “No comment” Reply.
I agree that the FtT erred in law on the basis identified by Judge Stout as set out above.
I do not need to deal with any other error on a point of law that the tribunal may have made. Any that were made will be subsumed by the rehearing.
The fact that this appeal has succeeded on a point of law carries no implication as to the likely outcome of the rehearing, which is entirely a matter for the tribunal to which this case is remitted.
Christopher Ward
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Authorised by the Judge for issue on 16 January 2026