JP v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP)

I am satisfied on the arguments before me that that the First-Tier Tribunal (“FTT”) erred in law in the decision to which it came on 16 May 2025 and that its decision should be set aside as a result.

The FTT erred in law in my judgement infailing to address adequately a key aspect of the appeal before it. This was the aspect of the appeal set out in the appeal to the FTT where the appellant said of the decision she was appealing: “You don[’]t deal with the days I don[’]t get out of bed”, which the appellant related to her depression. This was expanded upon, in detail, by the appellant in her letter at pages 1-2 of Addition G in the FTT’s bundle. However, the FTT’s reasoning and fact-finding fail to grapple adequately, if at all, with this aspect of the appeal. The only relevant findings the FTT (seemingly) made was that the appellant self-medicated for her depression and she cycled, but that was not a complete answer to the points made by the appellant in her in the appeal and her letter at Addition G, as shown by the Secretary of State’s submission set out below.

The Secretary of State supports the appeal being allowed in a helpful submission dated 22 September 2025. I agree with that submission, which reads materially as follows:

“2 The Tribunal stated in the SOR (UT bundle page 15, para 8) that the appellant “accepted that she self-medicated her depression by exercise (she is cycling again)”. There does not appear to be any further consideration regarding her depression and the impact it has on her. It appears the Tribunal are concluding that the depression is not having a significant impact on the appellant’s functional abilities due to her managing it through exercising.

3

It is unclear whether this was the sole consideration of the appellant’s depression by The Tribunal or may have considered the appellant’s depression further, but it has not been detailed in the SOR. It is important to note that as per South Bucks District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33, [2004] 1 WLR 1953 at [36] a Tribunal is required to provide adequate reasons for its decision so that the reader can understand in clear terms how that decision was made:

“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the ‘principal important controversial issues’, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved”.

4

The HP called the appellant and detailed within the assessment report (the Tribunal bundle page 49) that the appellant has bad days where they may stay in bed or indoors, due to their symptoms including low motivation. The appellant reports that they also don’t want to cook during such periods. This is repeated in a statement provided by the appellant (the Tribunal bundle addition G, pages 1-2) where they stated they sometimes “…cannot be bothered to eat…cannot face washing…needs very large amounts of support to engage with others” and “struggle to plan and complete unfamiliar journeys”. The Tribunal do not appear to have considered variability or explain what evidence they preferred and why. It is unclear from the SOR as currently drafted to what extent the appellant is impacted by their depression and how effective exercising is as a way to self-medicate. Does this mean they aren’t likely to suffer from the lowest period where they remain in bed? The Tribunal ought to have explained more than making the sole statement with respect to the appellant’s depression. The fact the Tribunal did not address this material evidence in its SOR is tantamount to providing inadequate reasons.

5

Although the Tribunal is entitled to give weighting to whatever evidence that it chooses, it must in the first instance explore and consider it in a holistic manner and provide sufficient reasons explaining why it preferred the evidence that it had. In this appeal the Tribunal does not appear to have done that. As such, I submit that the Tribunal have failed to give adequate reasons as to why evidence in parts was not accepted when deciding not to award points.

6

A further claim to Personal Independence Payment was made on 02/07/2025. The appellant was notified on 08/09/2025 that their claim was unsuccessful. They scored no points for either the Daily Living or Mobility activities of PIP from 02/07/2025. A reconsideration was requested by telephone on 16/09/2025. At the time of writing, the decision has not been made.”

For the reasons set out above, the appeal succeeds. The Upper Tribunal is not able to re-decide the first instance appeal, nor is it asked to do so. The appeal will therefore have to be re-decided afresh by a completely differently constituted FTT, after an oral hearing. Given the fresh claim the appellant has since made for PIP, the new FTT will be dealing with a closed period concerning the appellant’s entitlement to PIP from 19 August 2022 to 21 July 2025 inclusive.

The appellant’s success on this appeal to the Upper Tribunal on error of law says nothing one way or the other about whether her appeal will succeed on the facts before the new FTT, as that will be for that tribunal to assess in accordance with the law and once it has properly considered all the relevant evidence.