Coventry & Warwickshire Development Partnership LLP v Avison Young (UK) Limited

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWHC 2319 (TCC)

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Coventry & Warwickshire Development Partnership LLP v Avison Young (UK) Limited

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWHC 2319 (TCC)

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2319 (TCC)
Case No: HT-2026-000118
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES

TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT

Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building

Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL

Date: 15/09/2026

Before:

MR JUSTICE EYRE

Between :

COVENTRY & WARWICKSHIRE DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP LLP

Claimant

- and -

AVISON YOUNG (UK) LIMITED

Defendant

Jonathan Lewis KC (instructed by Eversheds Sutherland (International) LLP) for the Claimant

James Howells KC and Lauren Adams (instructed by Clyde & Co LLP) for the Defendant

Hearing date: 25th June 2026

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on [date] by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

.............................

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE EYRE

Mr Justice Eyre:

Introduction.

1.

From January 2020 to January 2023 the Defendant was engaged by the Claimant to act as NEC project manager and NEC supervisor in relation to the Claimant’s development works at Gateway South in Coventry. The Claimant contended that the Defendant failed to perform its duties with proper care and skill in relation to the certification of the sums due from the Claimant and that it suffered loss thereby. The Claimant referred the matter to adjudication and by his decision (“the Decision”) of 13th February 2026 Franco Mastrandrea (“the Adjudicator”) awarded the Claimant £8,729,179.33 plus interest as damages. On 16th February 2026 the Defendant said that it would not pay the sum awarded and invoked the grounds of defence which I will consider below. The Claimant commenced proceedings for payment of the sum awarded and now seeks summary judgment.

2.

The Defendant resists that application. It says that the Adjudicator failed to address the dispute referred to him but instead addressed a different dispute and that, in doing so, he acted outside his jurisdiction. It says that, instead of assessing whether the Defendant was in breach of its obligations and the loss flowing from any such breach, the Adjudicator engaged in undertaking his own valuation of the sums which should have been certified. In essence it is said that rather than addressing the matter as a claim for loss flowing from professional negligence the Adjudicator approached it on the footing of conducting a valuation exercise to find the true value. Alternatively, the Defendant contends that the Adjudicator failed to give adequate reasons for the Decision. It also says that there were material breaches of natural justice, the principal breach being said to have been that the Adjudicator took account of documents produced by Gardiner and Theobald in March 2024 (“the G&T Assessment”) without giving the parties an opportunity to address them. Finally, the Defendant says that, even if its contention that the Decision is unenforceable in its entirety is not accepted, parts of the Decision should be severed and the severed parts not enforced.

The Background to the Adjudication.

3.

The relevant works concerned the development of an industrial and logistics park on a 215-acre site which had previously been a sewage treatment plant. Substantial reclamation and remediation earthworks were required. The Claimant engaged Buckingham Group Contracting Ltd (“Buckingham”) to undertake works involving the excavation, treatment, and positioning of some 5,000,000 m3 of material to form a bund. Buckingham was to make monthly applications for interim payments. The amount of those was to be determined by reference to the Price for Work Done to Date (“the PWDD”) which was, in turn, to be calculated by determining what proportion of the total works in relation to the relevant activity had been properly completed at the date of the application and applying that proportion to the total lump sum to be paid for that activity. The Defendant’s role included the certification of the sums due on the monthly payment applications.

4.

The Claimant’s case was that the Defendant had significantly over-valued the amounts due to Buckingham. The Defendant had, the Claimant said, accepted without adequate questioning reduced volumes which Buckingham put forward for the total volume of material to be moved. This had the effect that the works performed at any given stage would be a greater proportion of the total than would otherwise have been the case. Further, the Defendant was said to have wrongly accepted Buckingham’s assertion of the extent of the work performed and to have failed to identify defects in the work which had been performed. An element in the Defendant’s failings was said to have been its use of the Permits, Equipment, and Earthworks Data (“the PEE”) which recorded excavation volumes as the primary source of data. Instead, the Claimant said, priority should have been given to the Earthworks Production Data (“the EPD”) which recorded the volume of material placed in its final location. The Claimant said that this had caused loss because it had overpaid Buckingham and the subsequent insolvency of Buckingham had meant that the overpayment could not be recouped from Buckingham.

5.

The Defendant did not accept that the criticism was merited. It said that the certification had been appropriate; that it had performed its task properly; and that in any event the difference between the sums certified and the correct amounts was negligible.

6.

That was the background to the adjudication. It will be necessary to consider in some detail below the cases which were put to the Adjudicator and the terms of the Decision.

The Approach to be taken to Applications for Summary Judgment arising out of an Adjudication.

7.

The Claimant is seeking summary judgment but is doing so in the context of proceedings to enforce the decision of an adjudicator. The effect is that a robust approach is to be taken. As O’Farrell J explained in Global Switch Estates Ltd v Sudlows Ltd [2020] EWHC 3314 (TCC) at [44] and [45]:

“44.

It is important to emphasise that the courts take a robust approach to adjudication enforcement. The relevant legal principles are well-established and clear, as summarised by Jackson J in Carillion v Devonport Royal Dockyard [2005] EWHC 778 (TCC) at [80]:

‘1. The adjudication procedure does not involve the final determination of anybody’s rights (unless all parties so wish)’;

2.

The Court of Appeal has repeatedly emphasised that adjudicators’ decisions must be enforced, even if they result from errors of procedure, fact or law: see Bouygues, C&B Scene and Levolux;

3.

Where an adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction or in serious breach of the rules of natural justice, the court will not enforce his decision: see Discain, Balfour Beatty and Pegram Shopfitters.

4.

Judges must be astute to examine technical defences with a degree of scepticism consonant with the policy of the 1996 Act. Errors of law, fact or procedure by an adjudicator must be examined critically before the Court accepts that such errors constitute excess of jurisdiction or serious breaches of the rules of natural justice: see Pegram Shopfitters and Amec.’

45.

The Court of Appeal approved the above summary and explained that the grounds for resisting summary judgment are circumscribed and limited: Carillion v Devonport Royal Dockyard [2005] EWCA 1358 per Chadwick LJ:

‘[85] The objective which underlies the Act and the statutory scheme requires the courts to respect and enforce the adjudicator’s decision unless it is plain that the question which he has decided is not the question referred to him or the manner in which he has gone about his task is obviously unfair. It should be only in rare circumstances that the courts will interfere with the decision of the adjudicator. The courts should give no encouragement to the approach adopted by DML in the present case; which (contrary to DML’s outline submissions, to which we have referred in paragraph 66 of this judgment) may, indeed, be aptly described as “simply scrabbling around to find some argument, however tenuous, to resist payment”.

[86] It is only too easy in a complex case for a party who is dissatisfied with the decision of an adjudicator to comb through the adjudicator’s reasons and identify points on which to present a challenge under the labels “excess of jurisdiction” of “breach of natural justice”. It must be kept in mind that the majority of adjudicators are not chosen for their expertise as lawyers. Their skills are as likely (if not more likely) to lie in other disciplines. The task of the adjudicator is not to act as arbitrator or judge. The time constraints within which he is expected to operate are proof of that. The task of the adjudicator is to find an interim solution which meets the needs of the case. Parliament may be taken to have recognised that, in the absence of an interim solution, the contractor (or sub-contractor) or his sub-contractors will be driven into insolvency through a wrongful withholding of payments properly due. The statutory scheme provides a means of meeting the legitimate cash-flow requirements of contractors and their subcontractors. The need to have the “right” answer has been subordinated to the need to have an answer quickly. The scheme was not enacted in order to provide definitive answers to complex questions. Indeed, it may be open to doubt whether Parliament contemplated that disputes involving difficult questions of law would be referred to adjudication under the statutory scheme; or whether such disputes are suitable for adjudication under the scheme. We have every sympathy for an adjudicator faced with the need to reach a decision in a case like the present.

[87] In short, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the proper course for the party who is unsuccessful in an adjudication under the scheme must be to pay the amount that he has been ordered to pay by the adjudicator. If he does not accept the adjudicator’s decision as correct (whether on the facts or in law), he can take legal or arbitration proceedings in order to establish the true position. To seek to challenge the adjudicator's decision on the ground that he has exceeded his jurisdiction or breached the rules of natural justice (save in the plainest cases) is likely to lead to a substantial waste of time and expense …’”

The Cases put to the Adjudicator.

8.

The Referral was dated 26th August 2025. In the Executive Summary the Claimant said:

“2.1

The dispute concerns a contract for infrastructure works at SEGRO Park, Coventry and the performance of AY’s role as Project Manager and Supervisor relating to an NEC 3 ECC Option A contract. …

2.2

AY fundamentally failed to perform its duties properly and with the required standard of skill and care. It did not assess the amount due to the contractor, BGCL, with an acceptable degree of accuracy and failed to properly identify Defects in BGCL’s Works in its role of Supervisor.

2.3

As a result, at the point AY’s Appointment was terminated in January 2023, in reliance on AY’s assessments CWDP had over-paid BGCL by a significant amount by reference to the amount of work BGCL had properly carried out and the payment mechanism in the Contract. CWDP has not been able to recover the full extent of that over-payment from BGCL and, as a result, has suffered a loss.

2.4

The details of AY’s negligence can be summarised into some quite simple points.

2.5

The Contract required AY, as PM, to assess the PWDD based on the proportion of work for each activity that had been completed by BGCL as contractor. Therefore if the price for an activity is (say) £100 and the contractor had completed 25% of the work required for that activity, the amount due was £25.

2.6

In order to do this, AY needed to know three things:

2.6.1

The total amount of work required to complete each activity (in this case this would be the volume of material to be excavated, treated and placed);

2.6.2

The proportion of that total work that had been completed;

2.6.3

The extent to which any work done was defective (as this affected whether the work was considered ‘complete’).

2.7

AY failed in relation to all three of these key elements:

2.7.1

AY used and/or accepted significantly reduced baselines for the total work to complete that were included in the contractor’s applications for payment, even though:

2.7.1.1 There was no evidence to support any such reduction (so AY took the contractor’s claims at face value); and

2.7.1.2 The reduced baselines were contrary to other progress information being provided by the contractor at the same time (i.e. AY had conflicting information but did nothing with it);

2.7.2

As a result of this the contractor’s progress would be overstated compared to the actual progress because the payment process was using a smaller amount of total work to be done than was actually the case and which was being reported as progress information.

2.7.3

AY accepted the contractor’s calculations of the proportion of work done using information included in the contractor’s applications for payment that:

2.7.3.1 Failed to take account of all of the work required for the activity (and only took account of a small part of the total work); and

2.7.3.2 Were contrary to other progress information being provided by the contractor at the same time (so AY failed to ‘join the dots’ and consider other information readily available to it);

2.7.4

Again, this had the effect of over-stating the extent of the contractor’s progress: AY was compounding its first error (regarding the baseline of total work) by accepting that a greater proportion of work had been completed.

2.7.5

AY failed to properly identify defects in the contractor’s work even though AY’s appointment was as Project Manager and Supervisor and as Supervisor, AY was responsible for checking and notifying defects in the contractor’s work. As a result, BGCL was paid for work that was defective on the basis that it was ‘complete’, when it was not. Not only did this result in BGCL being paid more than it should have done, because of BGCL’s insolvency CWDP has had to pay a replacement contractor to put right the defective work.

…”

9.

After setting out the background to the project and to the engagement of the Defendant, the Claimant said, at paragraphs 3.15 and 3.16:

“3.15

CWDP considers that AY failed to discharge its duties under the Appointment with the required standard of skill and care.

3.16

AY, negligently and in breach of the duties owed to CWDP, made assessments of the amount due to BGCL on the basis that a significantly greater proportion of the work was complete (and free from defects) than was actually the case and that was or should have been readily apparent from the information available to AY. Consequently, the amount due assessed by AY was grossly overs-stated in comparison to the actual extent of progress and taking account of the defects present that AY ought to have been aware of.”

10.

At paragraph 3.21 and following the Claimant set out the sums it was claiming and described those as “damages representing the loss arising from AY’s breaches of the Appointment”.

11.

Section 6 of the Referral was entitled “Breaches by AY” and at paragraph 6.6 it said:

“AY failed to discharge its duties under the Appointment with the required standard of skill and care with the result that it failed to properly assess the PWDD and the amount due to BGCL in accordance with clause 50.1 of the Contract. The Report explains that the failings by AY were numerous and continued over a lengthy period. The failures by AY that led to the over-assessment of the PWDD and amount due include the following:

6.6.1

AY accepted, without any apparent question, revised (reduced) baseline volumes for the earthworks submitted by BGCL which significantly reduced the overall amount of work to be done, despite no evidence being provided to support such reduced volumes. By reducing the total amount of work to be done, BGCL was able to over-state the proportion of the total work completed and increase the value of the PWDD claimed in its applications for payment;

6.6.2

AY also accepted the extent of progress claimed by BGCL in its applications for payment without any apparent interrogation of the data presented and despite the fact that the progress claimed was materially over-stated compared to the progress reported by BGCL at the same point in time in other reports and other progress information in AY’s possession. Put simply, AY took BGCL’s applications for payment at face value despite AY being in possession of other information (including information from BGCL) that indicated a significantly smaller amount of work completed;

6.6.3

Further, AY failed to properly discharge its duties as NEC Supervisor. As a result, AY failed to identify Defects in the works which, if they had been properly identified, should have led to a reduced assessment of the PWDD. CWDP has incurred additional costs employing other contractors to make good the defects identified by BWB as Supervisor since the termination of AY’s Appointment but which should reasonably have been identified and reported by AY.”

12.

At paragraph 6.7 the Claimant said that it was relying on the reports of Chris Everett to support its case. It then set out what were said to be “some examples of AY’s failings to illustrate the issues with AY’s performance”.

13.

At paragraphs 6.21 and 6.22, under the sub-heading “Failure properly to assess progress”, the Claimant said:

“6.21

As noted above, in order to assess the PWDD, AY had to assess the proportion of the work completed for each activity. Therefore, AY had to properly assess progress against the baseline to work out the proportion of the work that was complete.

6.22

However, AY failed to make its own assessments and seemingly relied on the information provided in or with BGCL’s interim applications for payment, without taking account of additional information provided by BGCL contemporaneously that contradicted BGCL’s application, or making its own independent assessment.”

14.

Under the sub-heading “Defects” the Claimant referred to a number of defects in the works performed by Buckingham. It said that these had not been identified by the Defendant but that they should have been if the Defendant had carried out its duties properly. It said that the Defendant’s failure to identify these defects and/or to notify the Claimant of them was negligent.

15.

Section 7 was entitled “CWDP’s Claim”. For current purposes it is sufficient to note that paragraphs 7.1 and 7.5 said:

“7.1

As a result of the above, AY, negligently and in breach of the duties owed to CWDP, made assessments of the PWDD on the basis that a significantly greater proportion of work was complete (and free from defects) that was actually the case and readily apparent from the information available to AY. Consequently, the PWDD assessed by AY was grossly over-stated in comparison to the actual extent of progress and taking account of the defects present. AY failed to carry out its duties to the required standard of skill and care.

…

7.5

CWDP was entitled to and did rely on AY’s assessments of the PWDD in making payments to BGCL under the Contract. Therefore, in reliance on AY’s incorrect assessments of the PWDD as at January 2023 CWDP paid BGCL £25,374,883.84 more than the proper value of the works completed by BGCL at that point in time. …”

16.

Then, at paragraph 7.18 and following, the Claimant set out the sums which it claimed “as damages as a result of [the Defendant]’s breaches of the Appointment”.

17.

The Defendant’s response was dated 14th October 2025. The Executive Summary began at paragraph 2.1 by saying:

“CWDP’s claim is one based on breach of AY’s contractual obligations to assess applications made by Buckingham Construction Group Limited (“BGCL”) and certify the sums due to it from CWDP. As such, before considering any of the quantum analysis by the parties’ appointed experts, the Adjudicator must first find that AY did not act reasonably in performance of its contractual duty when assessing the sums due to BGCL.”

18.

At paragraph 2.10 and 2.11 it said:

“2.10

In conjunction with failing to present any positive case on liability, in summary, CWDP:

2.10.1

Ignores contemporaneous evidence (even when relying on the relevant document for other purposes) that provides insight into total actual volumes / contractual documents and instead elects to use volumes set out in tender documents as the basis of its quantum assessment;

2.10.2

Has not properly considered the assessment role structure that was determined by its contract with BGCL (“the Contract”) or its role in what documents were made available for AY to use, which impacted the data points available against which the certification was carried out;

2.10.3

Does not appear to have considered that on a project such as this, there is a reasonable tolerance level for variance between works completed and what is certified on a month to month basis, where there are numerous unknowns about the materials on site, not least the volumes and the topography of the land that sits under the lagoons;

2.10.4

Has made a claim for alleged Defects which either: (i) were not discoverable by AY; (ii) do not fall within the scope of the Adjudication and / or for those that do fall within the scope of the Adjudication (iii) are not properly substantiated;

2.10.5As a result of its incorrect assessment approach, has made a vastly inflated claim for additional finance / interest charges.

2.11

Putting the issue of liability to one side, AY’s position is that on a proper assessment of the position as at August 2023 (it is common ground that this is the relevant point from which to assess CWDP’s alleged losses),2 when BGCL went into administration, there is a negligible differential between the certified amount and the works that had been completed.

19.

At section 4A the Defendant referred to the witness statement of Russ Cairns who explained the involvement and actions of the Defendant and then, at paragraph 4.9, it said:

“Exhibit RC4 of Mr Cairns’ Witness Statement amply demonstrates AY’s challenges to BGCL’s payment applications. It is submitted that this is a clear demonstration that AY was actively assessing and considering the veracity of BGCL’s statements to it within its monthly applications – clearly performing its assessment function with reasonable skill, care and diligence, contrary to the factually inaccurate impression given by CWDP in its Referral.”

20.

At paragraph 5.4 the Defendant explained the stages in which it would address the alleged over-certification saying:

“5.4

We address the alleged over-certification first (leaving Defects and Finance Charges to later in this Response) in the following stages:

5.4.1

Interpretation of the Contract;

5.4.2

The structure of the Activity Schedule;

5.4.3

Addressing what AY did when assessing applications for payment;

5.4.4

Why Mr Everett’s retrospective assessment is, with respect, flawed;

5.4.5

Based on all contemporaneous evidence available, what was the status of the works as against the sums paid to BGCL, as at:

5.4.5.1 January 2023;

5.4.5.2 August 2023.”

21.

At paragraph 5.26 the Defendant set out the processes which it had put in place to meet its contractual obligations to the Claimant.

22.

At section 5D the Defendant set out its critique of the approach taken by Mr Everett for the Claimant. Then, at section 5E, it summarized the approach and conclusions of its expert, David Somerset. At paragraph 5.59 the Defendant said:

“If the Adjudicator considers he must determine the proper retrospective assessment, as opposed to determining that CWDP has not established that AY was in breach of its obligations, we invite the Adjudicator to prefer the evidence of Mr Somerset over Mr Everett…”

23.

At paragraph 5.74 the Defendant said:

“5.74

In summary therefore, on a proper assessment of the contemporaneous evidence:

5.74.1

there is a nominal / very limited variance between the works done and the certified payments as at August 2023;

5.74.2

Any variance falls within reasonable tolerances for assessment and cannot justify a finding of any breach of AY’s assessment obligations; and

5.74.3

CWDP has not suffered any loss.”

24.

Section 5F was entitled “Allegations of Breach, Causation and Loss in relation to alleged Over-certification”. It contained a table setting out allegations by the Claimant and the Defendant’s response thereto followed by further commentary and the contention that the Claimant had failed to establish that any over-certification (which was denied by the Defendant) had caused loss.

25.

The response concluded thus at paragraph 6.1:

“6.1

The Adjudicator is invited to reject the invitation made by CWDP in paragraph 9.4 of the Referral to make the declarations set out therein. The Adjudicator is invited to make the following findings:

6.1.1

AY did not breach its contractual obligation to use reasonable skill, care and diligence in carrying out its assessment role in light of the information/data available to it during the Project;

6.1.2

In any event, the extent of any over-payment as at August 2023 was negligible;

6.1.3

CWDP has not suffered any loss as a result of AY’s assessments of BGCL’s monthly applications;

6.1.4

CWDP is not entitled to any sum for its claim for defects;

6.1.5

CWDP is not entitled to any sum for additional financing its payments to BGCL or in the alternative, the Adjudicator is invited to determine such sums additionally incurred by CWDP if the Adjudicator disagrees with paragraphs 6.1.1 to 6.1.5 of this Response.

6.1.6

That AY is not liable to pay CWDP the sum of £14,957,623.16 plus VAT in respect of damages determined under paragraphs 9.4.3 and 9.4.4 of the Referral (or any sum).”

26.

It follows that the Claimant’s case was being put fairly and squarely as a case of professional negligence on the footing of damages flowing from a breach of the duty to exercise proper care and skill and that the Defendant responded on the same basis.

27.

The material put before the Adjudicator included lay witness statements together with expert evidence on behalf of each party. The Defendant’s lay evidence consisted of statements from Russell Cairns, a director of the Defendant, who had acted as project manager for part of the relevant period.

The Decision.

28.

The Adjudicator set out the dispute he was to address at section 2 of the Decision. At paragraph 2.1 he said:

“The dispute is whether AY failed properly to assess the amount due to BGCL in accordance with clause 50.1 of the Main Contract [Referral/6.6]. CWDP alleges that AY failed to perform the duties that AY owed to CWDP properly and with the required standard of skill and care; more particularly, that it failed properly to:

(a)

assess the amounts due to BGCL (the Price for Work Done to Date (“PWDD”)) with an acceptable degree of accuracy; and/or

(b)

identify Defects in BGCL’s Works in its role of Supervisor.

I am required, if I conclude that AY did so fail, to determine the consequence of that/those failures.”

29.

At paragraph 2.2 the Adjudicator set out his understanding of the Claimant’s case saying that it was a contention the Defendant “had not correctly assessed the PWDD” and that as a result Buckingham had been overpaid. He said that the Claimant alleged that the Defendant’s “failure” included:

“(a)

acceptance, without any apparent reason, revised (reduced) baseline volumes for the earthworks submitted by BGCL which significantly reduced the overall amount of work to be done, despite no evidence being provided to support such reduced volumes. …

(b)

acceptance of the extent of progress claimed by BGCL in its applications for payment without any apparent interrogation of the data presented and despite the fact that the progress claimed was materially over-stated compared to the progress reported by BGCL at the same point in time in other reports and other progress information in AY’s possession. AY took BGCL’s applications for payment at face value despite AY being in possession of other information (including information from BGCL) that indicated a significantly smaller amount of work completed;

(c)

failure properly to discharge its duties as NEC Supervisor. As a result, AY failed to identify Defects in the works which, if they had been properly identified, should have led to a reduced assessment of the PWDD.”

30.

The Defendant’s case was summarized thus at paragraph 2.6:

“AY rejects the CWDP claims. It says that any overpayment in August 2023 was negligible; that CWDP has not suffered any loss as a result of AY’s assessments of BGCL’s monthly applications; that CWDP is not entitled to any sum for its claim for defects; and that CWDP is not entitled to any sum for additional financing.”

31.

The Adjudicator noted in passing that the Defendant “cannot be held liable for the consequences of [Buckingham]’s insolvency”.

32.

At section 3 the Adjudicator addressed a dispute as to his jurisdiction and at section 4 he recited the relevant contractual provisions. Then, in section 5, he set out his analysis.

33.

The Adjudicator began that discussion with a passage entitled "Background and Sums Claimed”. In that passage he noted, at paragraph 5.3, the Claimant’s expert’s criticism that Mr Cairns’s account of the approach which the Defendant had undertaken indicated no account had been taken of the EPD. At paragraph 5.4 he recorded that the Defendant’s expert had said that the Defendant’s approach “appear[ed] to him to have been a reasonable approach”. At paragraphs 5.10 and 5.11 the Adjudicator commented on the steps which the Claimant had taken after the over-payment had come to light and after Buckingham had left the site. He noted that the Claimant’s “mitigation approach” had not been criticised but said that he would comment further on the use of terms drawn from the post-departure arrangements “in the appraisal of any measure of damages or loss against [the Defendant]”.

34.

Next, the Adjudicator addressed how the PWDD was to be calculated. Then, he set out a passage under the heading “Quantities of Work”. This included, at paragraph 5.18:

“I wrote to the Parties again on 16 October 2025, that it seemed to me, given their approach to the matters in issue, that two things might be paramount:

(1)

what final adjusted quantities of work BGCL would have had to carry out had it taken the Works to term. It seemed from the evidence that had been submitted to that date, that CWDP considered the quantities were no less than, indeed more, than the quantities to be derived from the BGCL Bills of Quantities (“the BCGL BoQ”) (leaving to one side the issue whether the BCGL BoQ was contractually relevant/this was a lump sum or remeasurement contract, etc.) and the Hydrock Materials Management Strategy (“MMS”), whilst AY considered that they were considerably less.

(2)

how much of each of those final quantities of work were carried out by BGCL prior to termination, so that the proportion of each against those final adjusted quantities could be determined for the purposes of establishing what should properly have been paid by CWDP to BGCL for work carried out by BGCL before termination.”

35.

The Adjudicator turned to how T (the total amount of work covered by an activity) was to be calculated. This passage began thus, at paragraph 5.22:

“CWDP contends, appropriately in my decision, that if the Project Manager does not know the total amount of work to be completed for any particular Activity i.e. its baseline, or if the baseline total is wrong, then the Project Manager cannot calculate properly the proportion of the (total) work that the contractor had completed at any point.”

36.

At paragraphs 5.36 – 5.38 the Adjudicator summarized three criticisms which the Claimant had made of the approach which the Defendant had taken in performing its role before concluding, at paragraph 5.39, that “these all seem to me valid criticisms”.

37.

The Adjudicator had asked the parties various questions including a question as to the baseline quantities which should have been used. He dealt with this point from paragraph 5.40 to paragraph 5.57. Having summarized the responses the Adjudicator said at paragraphs 5.48 and 5.49:

“5.48

I am bound to conclude, based on this evidence, that it would be unsafe to rely on the quantities contended for by Mr. Everett, of 5,682,708m3, albeit that - as a figure - it is unchallenged by AY.

5.49

Nor, by contrast however, can I accept the baseline quantities relied on by AY, such as 5,030,107m³ based upon what CWDP alleges is incomplete data.”

38.

That section of the Decision concluded thus:

“5.55

Taking stock at this point, I have been pointed to no satisfactory evidence to corroborate the contention that there were substantial changes in workscope beyond the work commissioned from BGCL. In any event, AY as not sought to quantify any such changes.

5.56

It is in just these sorts of circumstances, and particularly the substantial controversy between the Parties on quantities that measures, such as are identified at 5.19(a) and 5.19(d) above would have been appropriate. Unfortunately, neither has been available to me.

5.57

Standing back, therefore, from this largely unsatisfactory material, and turning to the additional factor - namely the submission on 21 January 2026 described by AY as to the “main discovery of the disclosure on (G&T Termination Assessment) Tab 16,” I conclude that I should in my own evaluations apply the proportions (original emphasis) shown in that Tab 16. I do so not only on the basis of the material set out in Tab 16, but also

(a)

given the lack of a quantified measure of quantities (see from 5.16 above),

(b)

having regard to the burden of proof, bearing in mind that CWDP is the Referring Party in this adjudication,

based nevertheless on the presumption, which I consider to be justifiable and one safer than following either one or other Party’s Expert appraisal given my misgivings about each, that even if the quantities shown in Tab 16 may not (and are unlikely to) be finite, and are very likely understated, they are nevertheless likely to have been produced on the basis of equivalence.”

39.

Next, the Adjudicator addressed the approach to calculating how much work had been done by Buckingham. Having summarized the competing evidence he said:

“5.66

It seems to me reasonably clear from this, that AY was prepared to accept largely at face value the progress information placed before it by BGCL, which in turn coincided with the PEE quantities.

5.67

I accept therefore, the CWDP assertion that AY did not much challenge the BGCL applications for payment and relied instead largely on the PEE application quantities which in turn did not well correlate with the EPD quantities.

5.68

As to that, [Everett 3/18] notes that both Experts agree that the EPD is the primary source of data for calculating the volumes of material placed into the environmental bund. He asserts that AY failed to consider that data, which contributed to AY’s over certification.

5.69

In that context, Mr. Everett further notes that Mr. Cairns appears to acknowledge [Cairns 1/17] that the placement activity Prices are absorbed into another activity (as to which see generally 2.5 above), although he links cut and fill together. If this were correct then Mr. Cairns would naturally have used the EPD figures (which include the cut, treatment, and fill volumes), and not the isolated PEE figures (which include only cut volumes). Whilst Mr. Cairns says this made sense to him, in Mr. Everett’s view he has not administered the assessment process with that same sense. [Everett 3/269]”

40.

The Adjudicator had asked the parties how much of the final quantities of work had been carried out by Buckingham before the termination of its engagement. Having summarized the responses he said, at paragraph 5.73, that he had arrived at an evaluation “based upon the proportions shown in Tab 16 of [the G&T Assessment] (again original emphasis)” saying that he was doing so for the reasons he had given at paragraph 5.57.

41.

The Adjudicator turned then to consider how to deal with sums which the Claimant had recovered under a performance bond. He noted that Defendant had contended these should be “considered as part of the final account of loss … before any damages can be claimed”. The Adjudicator rejected this argument for the reasons he gave at paragraph 5.82 including that the bond “was not intended to cover losses attributable to [the Defendant]”. At paragraph 5.83 he added, as an alternative reason, that:

“any benefit received by CWDP under the bond was quite independent of the circumstances giving rise to the loss contended for against AY in this case. It thus appears to have the complexion of an adventitious or collateral benefit.”

42.

There had been a dispute as to the approach to be taken to the retention monies. At paragraphs 5.90 and 5.91 the Adjudicator noted the Defendant’s contentions thus:

“5.90

AY invokes Townsend v. Stone Toms & Partners (No.2) to the effect that retention monies should be taken into account when considering the quantum of any professional negligence dispute. [Rejoinder/7.5] As to that, CWDP says that that authority can be readily distinguished from the facts here on the basis that no recovery has been made from BGCL that could reduce AY’s liability. [Surrejoinder/7.3]

5.91

AY rejoins that from any QS / legal analysis, it cannot be liable for alleged damages when CWDP holds funds that were retained from BGCL that have to be applied to the BGCL account. It would amount to a double recovery if CWDP were entitled to the benefit of the retention as well as to recover damages for the same sums ‘paid’ to BGCL but not actually transferred across. [Rejoinder/7.6]”

43.

The Adjudicator then explained that the retention was to be brought into account albeit in a different amount from that for which the Defendant had contended saying:

“5.92

I conclude that retention should be brought into account. Even (contrary to CWDP’s contention) had AY carried out a proper valuation, an adjustment would have been appropriately made in the certification process by AY for retention. Retention would have been withheld, albeit in a different sum attributable to a proper valuation. Thus, had AY rather than PIDG produced Certificate 42, it would, as PIDG did, have shown as being payable to BGCL only a net sum after retention.

5.93

Having so found, however does not result in a credit of the whole of the retention against the AY failings. What should be brought into the evaluation is the difference between the retention that ought to have been deducted upon a valuation of the works properly carried out at August 2023 and the retention that was in fact deducted against Certificate 42, i.e. the sum of -£241,549.93 (as to which see the quantum summary at 5.161 below) for otherwise the Employer’s legitimate security against BGCL’s defective performance would be lost, and was here lost given the subsequent course of events, as was canvassed in Townsend.”

44.

The Adjudicator addressed the contention that the Defendant had failed to identify defects in the works undertaken by Buckingham. He noted the Defendant’s response that the alleged defects had not been discoverable by the Defendant; fell outside the scope of the adjudication; and had not been substantiated. The Adjudicator analysed the arguments and included in this analysis his assessment that it was not a failure on the part of the Defendant to include in the interim payment valuation “defects which were latent or not readily apparent to a reasonably competent Project Manager” before concluding:

“I conclude, having regard to the foregoing, that CWDP has failed to make out its case on the majority of the claimed defects, whether on the basis that they could or should have been identified and excluded prior to PIDG Certificate No. 42, or because they were latent, or because they are replacement contractor cost-based as opposed to an excluded BGCL value base.”

45.

The Defendant had contended that account should have been taken of the materials left on site on the termination of Buckingham’s engagement. The Adjudicator noted, at paragraphs 5.113 and 5.114, that the point was raised at late stage by the Defendant and appeared to have arisen out of a review of the G&T Assessment. The Adjudicator explained, at paragraph 5.118, that he was taking into account the sum which had been allowed under this head in the G&T Assessment.

46.

At paragraphs 5.119 and 5.120 under the heading “Generally on Valuation and Progress Proportions” the Adjudicator explained that where the parties’ experts were “agreed on valuation” he had used their figures in his evaluation. Where they were not agreed he had taken a figure derived from the G&T Assessment. Having said that, the Adjudicator then, at paragraphs 5.121 – 5.147, set out the sums he was taking into account under various heads before stating, at paragraph 5.148, the total sum he was taking into his evaluation in relation to the sum in respect of remediation and earthworks on part of the land. He then explained the sums he was attributing to three other elements before saying, at paragraph 5.160:

“Having regard to the foregoing, I conclude that AY failed to carry out its duties under the Appointment to the required standard of skill and care, leading to its significant over-certification of the Price for Work Done to Date due to BGCL before Completion.”

47.

That was followed by what the Adjudicator described as “a quantum summary of my Decision”.

48.

The Decision was set out at section 6 and the following are of note for current purposes:

“(a)

in its payment certificate No. 37 issued 3 February 2023, AY over-valued the cumulative Price for Work Done to Date at that time;

(b)

the extent of the over-valuation by AY under paragraph (a) above was no less than £7,694,883.73;

(c)

as a result of AY’s over-valuation, CWDP has suffered a loss of £8,729,179.33, inclusive of interest;

(d)

AY is liable to compensate CWDP by way of damages in respect of that loss”.

The Alleged Failure to give Reasons.

49.

A failure by an adjudicator to give adequate reasons for his or her decision can indicate that the adjudicator failed to decide the dispute which had been referred to him or her (and so had made a decision outside the adjudicator’s jurisdiction). It can also be an indication that the adjudicator failed to comply with the rules of natural justice. Moreover, a failure to give adequate reasons can be a separate and freestanding ground of challenge to an adjudicator’s decision.

50.

The point was made by Jackson J, as he then was, in the fifth of the propositions listed at [81] in the first-instance decision in Carillion as was explained by HH Judge Stephen Davies, sitting as a judge of the High Court, in Thermal Energy Construction Ltd v AE & E Lentjes UK Ltd [2009] EWHC 408 (TCC) at [19] and following. Paragraph 22 of the Scheme for Construction Contracts requires an adjudicator to give reasons where a party requests this (as was done here by the Claimant in the referral). It follows that an adjudicator who fails to give reasons is not making a decision which accords with the requirements of the Scheme. As a referral under the Scheme is the source of the adjudicator’s jurisdiction such an adjudicator would be acting outside his or her jurisdiction.

51.

The reasons for an adjudicator’s decision can be expressed briefly. They are to be seen in the context both of the adjudication procedure generally and of the particular adjudication. In the latter regard it is of note that they are addressed to parties who know the issues and whose submissions will have formed the background to the decision. In Thermal Energy Judge Stephen Davies noted, at [21], the fact that an adjudicator will often have to address a “great number of matters within a short time frame” and that an adjudicator’s decision will only have “a temporary finality” but then explained that:

“the fact remains that an Adjudicator is obliged to give reasons so as to make it clear that he has decided all of the essential issues which he must decide as being issues properly put before him by the parties, and so that the parties can understand, in the context of the adjudication procedure, what it is that the Adjudicator has decided and why.”

52.

The question of whether adequate reasons have been given is to be answered by reading the relevant decision as a whole. An adjudicator is not obliged to give reasons for reasons. It is, moreover, to be remembered what is required are reasons for the adjudicator’s decision on the dispute referred to him or her. That does not require the adjudicator to address all the arguments advanced on a given issue although a failure to address particular arguments can indicate that the referred dispute has not been addressed or that there has been an unfair failure properly to consider a party’s case. It is to be remembered that a failure to give reasons can be a separate ground of challenge to an adjudicator’s decision (or a ground of resistance to enforcement of a decision). It is sufficient if the reasons enable the parties to understand what it is the adjudicator has decided and why. That means that reasons which demonstrate that the adjudicator has not addressed the dispute referred to him or her or that he or she has broken the rules of natural justice can be sufficient. Such reasons will give rise to separate grounds of challenge but will not provide a separate ground of defence.

53.

The fact that a party can mount a critique of an adjudicator’s decision identifying the ways in which it is said that the adjudicator erred (as has been done here) is not necessarily conclusive of the question of whether adequate reasons were given. It is, nonetheless, a significant pointer in that regard. A party who can say in detail how an adjudicator erred will find it hard to show that the reasons given did not enable that party to understand what the adjudicator had decided and why.

54.

In this case the Defendant’s argument that the Adjudicator failed to provide adequate reasons is based on an invocation of particular passages in the Decision without having regard to their context and without reading the Decision as a whole.

55.

In their skeleton argument Mr Howells KC and Miss Adams said that the conclusion expressed by the Adjudicator at paragraph 5.160 was a “bare statement” which had no reasons behind it.

56.

I do not accept that characterization of that paragraph let alone of the Decision as a whole. Paragraph 5.160 was avowedly the culmination and summation of the preceding analysis. In the preceding parts of section 5 the Adjudicator had set out the parties’ cases as to whether the Defendant had performed its role as project manager properly. He had identified which contentions he had accepted and which he had rejected in relation to that issue and had given brief reasons for doing so. The Adjudicator had also explained how he had reached his conclusion on causation and loss. The Decision did not address breach, causation, and loss in separate sections in the way which might have been done in a judgment but from reading the Decision as a whole it was clear both that the Adjudicator was addressing those matters and why he had reached his conclusions.

57.

The Defendant criticised the absence from the Decision of any analysis of its argument that the amounts certified had been within an acceptable tolerance. This was not, however, a distinct dispute which had been referred to the Adjudicator rather it was an argument advanced by the Defendant as to why the dispute which had been referred should be resolved in a particular way. The absence of such an analysis was an aspect of the Defendant’s contention that the Adjudicator had failed to address the dispute referred to him which I will consider next but it does not render the reasons given inadequate.

58.

It follows that the reasons set out in the Decision were sufficient to enable the parties to know what had been decided and why in respect of the dispute referred and this line of defence fails.

Did the Adjudicator address the Dispute which had been referred to Him?

The Applicable Law.

59.

In Global Switch O’Farrell J pointed out at [50(vii)] that:

“If the adjudicator asks the relevant question, it is irrelevant whether the answer arrived at it right or wrong. The decision will be enforced.”

60.

As HH Judge Kelly, sitting as judge of the High Court, explained in Exyte Hargreaves Ltd v NG Bailey Ltd [2023] EWHC 94 (TCC) at [15(4)]:

“If an adjudicator has answered the right question in the wrong way, the decision will be binding. If the wrong question has been answered, the decision will be made without jurisdiction.”

61.

The distinction drawn by Judge Kelly is clear in law. However, determining which side of the line a given adjudicator’s approach fell in a particular adjudication may be a less straightforward exercise. That is because, as HH Judge Thornton QC explained in William Verrey Ltd v North West London Communal Mikah [2004] EWHC 1300 (TCC) at [54], there can be errors of law by an adjudicator which are “so fundamental that their effect [is] to transform [the] consideration of the referred question or dispute into a consideration and determination of a different question or dispute” and so to leave “undecided the referred question”.

62.

The proper characterization of the Adjudicator’s approach is key to the Defendant’s primary line of defence here (although it is to be noted that the Claimant says that not only did the Adjudicator answer the right question but also that he did so in the right way). In considering how the Adjudicator’s approach is to be characterized I have also had regard to the guidance in Carillion at [85] and [86]. In light of that I am to look at the question in the round, having regard to the substance of the matter and to the reality of the adjudication. I am not to be concerned with semantics nor with the elegance or otherwise of the Adjudicator’s articulation of the law.

The Defendant’s Contentions.

63.

The Defendant advances two distinct arguments.

64.

The first contention is that the Adjudicator undertook a different exercise from that which was required by resolution of the dispute referred to him. He should have assessed whether the Defendant had failed to perform its duties as project manager with the requisite skill and care and then, if such a failure was established, consider what loss had been caused by that failure. The Defendant contends that instead the Adjudicator treated his task as being that of determining what the true valuation should have been at the time of the certification by the Defendant. In short, it is said that the Adjudicator approached the matter as being an exercise in valuation and not a determination of breach of duty and consequent loss. It follows, the Defendant says, that the Adjudicator failed thereby to address the dispute referred to him and gave a decision on a different dispute.

65.

The second contention is that even if the Adjudicator was attempting to address the correct dispute the approach he adopted was so flawed that he failed to do so. This line of defence is based on an argument derived from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Bratt v Jones [2025] EWCA Civ 562. Mr Howells submitted that the effect of this decision was that in order for the Adjudicator to determine whether the Defendant had been in breach of its duty it was necessary as a first step to establish whether the amount which it had certified as due to Buckingham was outside the range of amounts which could properly have been certified by a competent project manager exercising proper care and skill. The Adjudicator failed to determine that, whether as a first step or at all. This amounted, the Defendant says, to a failure by the Adjudicator to address the task which he had been engaged to perform and a failure to determine the dispute referred. The Defendant pointed to the fact that the Decision did not address the argument it had advanced about the appropriate tolerance in the figures as an aspect of this failing. The absence of treatment of the tolerance argument was also said to constitute part of the failure to provide adequate reasons, which I have addressed above.

Discussion and Analysis.

66.

For the following reasons I do not accept either of the contentions advanced by the Defendant.

67.

In respect of the first argument it is to be noted that the Adjudicator made it clear that he was engaged in determining whether the Defendant had failed to perform its duties with the requisite degree of care and skill and in considering the loss flowing from any failure in that regard. In analysing the Decision I have to be conscious that a decision-maker (whether a judge or an adjudicator) can express the question to be decided correctly but can still, on analysis, be shown to have failed to address that question. The fact that a decision-maker has correctly articulated the relevant issue is a powerful indication that he or she then proceeded to address that issue but it is not conclusive. Here, the Adjudicator not only identified the issue correctly but proceeded to address it. Thus:

i)

At paragraph 2.1 he identified the dispute in clear and unexceptionable terms.

ii)

At paragraph 5.10 he addressed the actions which the Claimant had taken in mitigation of its loss and set out the approach to be taken to “the measure of damages”.

iii)

At paragraphs 5.30 – 5.39 he set out the Claimant’s criticisms of the Defendant’s performance as project manager and said that those criticisms were valid.

iv)

At paragraphs 5.65 – 5.68 the Adjudicator summarized a further criticism of the Defendant and said that he accepted this.

v)

In the passage leading up to paragraph 5.83 he addressed the parties’ arguments in relation to the relevance of the performance bond and explained his conclusion as to why it should not be brought into account by way of reduction of the Claimant’s loss.

vi)

At paragraph 5.90 and following the Adjudicator undertook a similar exercise in relation to the retention monies doing so avowedly by reference to the approach to be taken “when considering the quantum of a professional negligence dispute”.

vii)

At paragraphs 5.94 – 5.110 the Adjudicator addressed the issue of those defects in Buckingham’s work which had not been identified by the Defendant. He did so by reference to whether the defects were “readily apparent to a reasonably competent project manager”.

viii)

The Adjudicator’s conclusion at paragraph 5.160 was expressed to be by reference to the Defendant’s failure to carry out its duties “to the required standard of skill and care” and to the consequences of that failure.

68.

It is clear that the Adjudicator was not approaching the matter as an exercise in determining the true value. Nor was he considering solely whether the Defendant had certified as due more than was in fact due. This is shown by the analysis he set out at paragraph 5.109 explaining why he did not accept that the Defendant should have identified particular defects in the works performed by Buckingham. In making that finding the Adjudicator was demonstrating that he was drawing a distinction between the extent to which Buckingham had been overpaid (namely the extent to which the certified sums exceeded those properly due) and the consequences of the Defendant’s failure to perform its duties as project manager competently. This aspect of the Adjudicator’s analysis shows that he was alert to the possibility that the Defendant might not be responsible for the full extent of the overpayment of Buckingham and, moreover, that he made a finding which had that effect. This was very far from being solely an exercise in valuation.

69.

The Adjudicator did not structure the Decision as an analysis of whether there had been a breach of the Defendant’s duties followed by a separate analysis of the loss caused by the breaches which he had found to have been established in the way which might have been done in a judgment. Instead, the Adjudicator’s analysis was structured by reference to the various stages in the process leading up to the certification and to the calculation of the amount of the PWDD. In the course of that process the Adjudicator addressed the figures which should have been adopted at the various stages. It follows that consideration of the correct valuation (and so of loss) was interwoven with consideration of the issues of breach and causation. That was a matter of substance and not form. It appears to have flowed, at least in part, from the way in which the parties’ cases had been presented to the Adjudicator. It did not amount to a failure to address the dispute which had been referred.

70.

Turning to the Defendant’s second argument, some care is needed in considering the effect of the decision in Bratt v Jones. There are real differences between the exercise which the Defendant had to undertake as project manager and the valuation of land or shares. Here the certification of the amount due to Buckingham required an assessment by the Defendant of the work which had been done; an assessment of whether that work had been completed without defects; and a comparison with the total amount of work to be performed. Moreover, in Bratt v Jones the Court of Appeal was concerned with an argument which was the converse of the point being made by the Defendant. In that case the issue on the appeal was whether a finding that a valuation was outside the range of values which could have been given by a competent valuer shifted the burden of proof and could, without more and unless countered, lead to a finding of negligence: see the judgment of the court at [3] and [5]. The court rejected the appellant’s contention that the burden was shifted in that way. The proposition on which the Defendant relies derives, in fact, from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Merivale Moore plc v Strutt & Parker [2000] PNLR 498. The court did consider that decision in Bratt v Jones and accepted that it was a pre-condition of liability for negligence by a valuer that the valuation in question fell outside the range of reasonably possible valuations. However, in obiter comments from [50] onwards, the court cast some doubt on this as an absolute pre-condition noting, at [56]:

“Even on the basis that Merivale Moore is correct, it seems to us impossible to hold that a claimant could never succeed in obtaining damages for breach of duty against a careless valuer whose valuation fell within the bracket.”

71.

However, even if the analogy to a valuer is an apt one and even on the footing of the Merivale Mooreproposition this contention does not succeed. The fact that the Adjudicator did not first make a determination of whether the sums certified were outside the range of figures which could reasonably have been certified did not mean that he was failing to address the dispute referred to him. At their highest the points made by the Defendant in this regard amount to showing that the Adjudicator addressed the right question but did so in the wrong way. He was not addressing a different question from that which had been referred to him and nor was he failing to determine the relevant dispute.

72.

In this context it is illuminating to see how the Defendant put its case before the Adjudicator. I have set out some parts of the Defendant's response of 14th October 2025 above. The following passages are of note:

i)

At paragraph 2.1 the Defendant said that the claim was based on an alleged breach of its contractual obligations and that the Adjudicator had to find that the Defendant had not acted reasonably in the performance of its contractual duty “before considering any of the quantum analysis by the parties’ appointed experts”.

ii)

At paragraphs 2.10 and 4.9 the Defendant placed emphasis on the approach which it had taken to the certification process and asserted the reasonableness of that approach.

iii)

At paragraph 2.10.3 the Defendant did say that the nature of the project and of the site meant that there was a “reasonable tolerance level for variance between works completed and what is certified on a month to month basis”. This was advanced as one element in the Defendant’s contentions as to the reasonableness of its actions rather than as indicating a pre-condition which had to be surmounted for a finding of breach.

iv)

It is correct that the Defendant did say (at paragraph 2.11) that there was “a negligible differential between the certified amount” and the correct figure and (at paragraph 5.74.2) that “any variance falls within reasonable tolerances and cannot justify a finding of a breach of [the Defendant]’s assessment obligations”. However, in both cases the point was made in the context of the Defendant’s argument about quantum. Thus, the reference to a “negligible differential” at paragraph 2.11 came in a paragraph beginning “putting the issue of liability to one side”. The passage at paragraph 5.74.2 if read in isolation could be seen as an invocation of the Merivale Moore principle but it was made in the context of the part of the Defendant’s response which was addressing the question of whether the Claimant had suffered loss. That part of the response began at paragraph 5.59 with the Defendant saying that reference to the question of the correct valuation would only be needed if the Adjudicator had not adopted the Defendant’s preferred course of “determining that [the Claimant] has not established that [the Defendant] was in breach of its obligations”.

73.

It follows that the Adjudicator did determine the dispute which had been referred to him and the Decision was not outside his jurisdiction.

Was there a Breach of the Requirements of Natural Justice?

74.

The Defendant contended that there had been a number of breaches of the requirements of natural justice. Its principal argument related to the use which the Adjudicator had made of the G&T Assessment. In addition, it said that there had been failings in his approach to the extent to which account was to be taken of the retention figures and in his conclusion on the defects which should have been identified by the Defendant.

The Law.

75.

An adjudication award will not be enforced if the decision was vitiated by a material breach of the rules on natural justice on the part of the adjudicator. Having reviewed the authorities Akenhead J summarized the general principles thus in Cantillon Ltd v Urvasco Ltd [2008] EWHC 282 (TCC) at [57]:

“From this and other cases, I conclude as follows in relation to breaches of natural justice in adjudication cases:

(a)

It must first be established that the Adjudicator failed to apply the rules of natural justice;

(b)

Any breach of the rules must be more than peripheral; they must be material breaches;

(c)

Breaches of the rules will be material in cases where the adjudicator has failed to bring to the attention of the parties a point or issue which they ought to be given the opportunity to comment upon if it is one which is either decisive or of considerable potential importance to the outcome of the resolution of the dispute and is not peripheral or irrelevant.

(d)

Whether the issue is decisive or of considerable potential importance or is peripheral or irrelevant obviously involves a question of degree which must be assessed by any judge in a case such as this.

(e)

It is only if the adjudicator goes off on a frolic of his own, that is wishing to decide a case upon a factual or legal basis which has not been argued or put forward by either side, without giving the parties an opportunity to comment or, where relevant put in further evidence, that the type of breach of the rules of natural justice with which the case of Balfour Beatty Construction Company -v- The Camden Borough of Lambeth was concerned comes into play. It follows that, if either party has argued a particular point and the other party does not come back on the point, there is no breach of the rules of natural justice in relation thereto.”

76.

Further guidance was provided by Edwards-Stuart J in Roe Brickwork Ltd v Wates Construction Ltd [2013] EWHC 3417 (TCC) at [22] – [24] thus:

“22.

It is well understood that an adjudicator must observe the rules of natural justice. In this context, that means that he should not decide a point on a factual or legal basis that has not been argued or put forward in the submissions made to him: see Balfour Beatty Construction v London Borough of Lambeth [2002] BLR 288. However, this rule is often easier to state than to apply.

23.

If an adjudicator has it in mind to determine a point wholly or partly on the basis of material that has not been put before him by the parties, he must give them an opportunity to make submissions on it. For example, he should not arrive at a rate for particular work using a pricing guide to which no reference had been made during the course of the referral without giving the parties an opportunity to comment on it.

24.

By contrast, there is no rule that a judge, arbitrator or adjudicator must decide a case only by accepting the submissions of one party or the other. An adjudicator can reach a decision on a point of importance on the material before him on a basis for which neither party has contended, provided that the parties were aware of the relevant material and that the issues to which it gave rise had been fairly canvassed before the adjudicator. It is not unknown for a party to avoid raising an argument on one aspect of its case if that would involve making an assertion or a concession that could be very damaging to another aspect of its case.”

77.

As Jefford J explained in RGB P&C Ltd v Victory House General Partner Ltd [2019] EWHC 1188 (TCC), at [53] the failure by an adjudicator to address an issue can amount to a failure to decide the dispute referred or to a breach of the requirements of natural justice. However, it will rarely do so and a failure to address every sub-issue advanced by a party will not vitiate an adjudication award: thus:

“Where the adjudicator has deliberately but wrongly declined to address an issue, particularly a crucial defence, it may well be that he has not decided the dispute referred to him. Where he has not expressly taken such a deliberate decision but may appear not to have addressed every issue, the more likely conclusion is that the issue is subsumed within his consideration of the dispute as a whole. As Coulson LJ puts it, in his capacity as the author of Coulson on Construction Adjudication 4th ed., at paragraph 13.55:

‘Dawnus Construction Holdings Ltd. v Marsh Life Ltd. [[2017] EWHC 1066 (TCC)] is a clear example of the court’s approach: the judge will not put a fine tooth comb through the adjudicator’s decision, seeking to ensure that every single point has somehow been addressed. The court’s approach is broad-based, looking first at the dispute referred, and then second as to what the result was. It is not a breach of the rule of natural justice if one particular sub-issue is not specifically referred to in the adjudicator’s decision.’

The analysis in Pilon v Breyer left open the possibility that an inadvertent failure to consider one of a number of issues might render a decision in breach of natural justice, but it would not ordinarily do so and it is difficult to identify any case in which a decision has not been enforced for such a reason. The only example identified in Construction Adjudication is the decision of the Outer House in Whyte and MacKay v Blyth and Blyth Consulting Engineers [2013] CSOH 54. The rarity of such cases seems to me to be for two reasons. Firstly, an inadvertent failure to address a particular issue is in the nature of an error within the adjudicator’s jurisdiction rather than a breach of the rules of natural justice. Secondly, and if that is wrong, it would be an unusual case where the court would both draw the inference that an issue had not been addressed and conclude that the failure to address the issue was so significant that it meant that the adjudicator had not decided the dispute referred to him and/or that the conduct of the adjudication was so unfair that the decision should not enforced. The more significant the issue, the less likely it is to be inadvertently overlooked; the less significant it is, the more likely it is that it has been taken account of in the round.”

78.

The decision of Adrian Williamson KC, sitting as a deputy judge in Premier Modular Ltd v Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust [2026] EWHC 1404 (TCC) illustrates the stark circumstances which will be required for the court to find that there had been a breach of the rules of natural justice by an adjudicator going off on a frolic of his own. There the adjudicator had decided the central issue on a basis which not only had been argued by neither party but which was, moreover, “directly contrary” to the common position set out by the parties. He had done so without putting the point to the parties with the consequence that the first that the losing party knew of the proposition on which the adjudicator based his decision was when they received that decision. As Mr Williamson explained, at [39(iv)] adopting the language of Edwards-Stuart J, the test was whether the issues had been “fairly canvassed”.

The Adjudicator’s Use of the G&T Assessment.

79.

The Adjudicator made extensive use of the G&T Assessment in respect of the figures and the proportion of the works which had been completed at various stages. As he explained at paragraphs 5.119 and 5.120, where the parties’ experts were agreed on the figures he proceeded on that agreed basis but where they were not agreed he proceeded on the basis of the G&T Assessment. It is to be noted that the figures in the G&T Assessment fell between those advanced by the parties’ experts. It follows that by using the G&T Assessment the Adjudicator arrived at a higher figure for the over-certification than was accepted by the Defendant but a lower one than that for which the Claimant was contending.

80.

The Defendant says that the Adjudicator’s approach amounted to a breach of the requirements of natural justice of the kind identified by Akenhead J in Cantillon at [57(e)], namely deciding the matter on a basis which had not been put forward by either side and doing so without the parties having been given an adequate opportunity to address the point.

81.

I do not accept this contention. When the exchanges between the Adjudicator and the parties’ representatives are considered it is apparent that, although the Adjudicator did proceed on a basis which was not advanced by either party (and indeed which both parties disavowed), he had given a clear forewarning that he was minded to do so and had invited and received submissions from the parties on the issue. The exchanges showing this are as follows:

i)

On 18th December 2025 the Adjudicator raised various questions with the parties and invited a response. He referred to the G&T Assessment thus:

“Further in that context, I note that [Referral/ Appendix 10] contains Gardiner & Theobald’s termination account for the CDP works, seeming drawn on 1 March 2024, showing an Assessed Construction Costs to Complete of £56,524,817.00 against which it seems that a balance of £12,788,779.62 would have been payable to BGCL had it completed the works, albeit that it also shows £97,931,670.83 as the total Price for Buckingham. As I have not seen the various backup files invoked by that assessment, it is not clear whether the £12,788,779.62 includes what would have been future (or incomplete) varied work to BGCL at the date of termination.”

ii)

The Defendant replied on 19th December 2025 saying that the G&T Assessment was “not relevant” and explaining the reasons why it said that.

iii)

The Adjudicator replied to that on 1st January 2026 explaining why he regarded the assessment as being potentially relevant and saying:

“The reason for my asking is that I would have anticipated that Gardiner & Theobald’s termination account for the CDP works (which on any view is a document in this adjudication) would likely have taken account of the variations in coming to its valuation[.]

…

It may be that Files 01 & 02 Termination Valuation may provide some further insight, particularly as the Gardiner & Theobald valuation appears to have been arrived at a number of months after the termination, and therefore presumably will have been the subject of careful consideration.”

iv)

The Adjudicator expanded on that point in his email of 5th January 2026 when he said that the G&T Assessment might be of assistance because it appeared to the product of a “significant period of deliberation” and having regard to the “substantial difference” between the parties’ experts. In short he was explaining that a valuation made nearer to the events in question might assist in circumstances where the competing experts who had looked at matters later and after the dispute had arisen were not agreed.

v)

On 7th January 2026 the Adjudicator was sent the back-up files to the G&T Assessment. The Adjudicator considered those documents and emailed the parties on 8th January 2026 saying:

“It seems reasonably clear that Gardiner and Theobald considered in some detail

•

the Price for Work Done to (the termination) Date (£85,142,891.21)

•

the notional final Total of the Prices as at that date (£97,931,670.83)

•

the value of compensation events comprised in each (£2,150,951.63 and £2,381,670.83)

I leave it to the Parties to decide what if anything they want to say about this material, perhaps after consultation with each other.

I am also content to arrange to speak with them jointly once they have had time to consider it.”

vi)

The parties did not take up the Adjudicator’s offer of a meeting.

vii)

In its surrejoinder the Claimant contended that the approach set out in the G&T Assessment should cause the Adjudicator to favour the conclusions of its expert rather than the Defendant’s.

viii)

On 15th January 2026 the Adjudicator wrote to the parties in the following terms

“In relation to what is said in the Surrejoinder about the G&T assessment, and subject to what AY may want to say about that appraisal generally, is another way of looking at the issues that if G&T are right in their appraisal, the gap lies somewhere between £90,966,471.24 [paid] and £85,142,891.21 [due] (ignoring any margin of error that might be relevant to the G&T appraisal of the amount due at the due date of termination)?”

The Adjudicator was there giving a clear indication that he was considering using the G&T Assessment as the basis for the calculation of the amount of the overpayment. He was, moreover, making it clear that he was open to further submissions from the Defendant on that point.

ix)

The Claimant responded on 19th January 2026 setting out in some detail its submissions as to why the Adjudicator should not approach the matter on that basis but should instead proceed on the basis of its expert’s calculations. On the same day the Defendant asked for more time to provide its response to the Claimant’s submissions and to the Adjudicator’s question arising out of the G&T Assessment.

x)

The Adjudicator replied on 20th January 2026 asking that in its response the Defendant also address the points which had been made by the Claimant.

xi)

The Defendant sent its response on 21st January 2026. It set out its submissions on the G&T Assessment which ran to approximately 1½ pages. Those culminated in the contention that the G&T Assessment should not be regarded as correct. Having made further comments on another assessment by Mr Goddard, the Defendant said that the G&T Assessment “can be used only in a limited sense for understanding” and submitted that the Adjudicator should proceed on the basis of the calculations by the Defendant’s expert.

xii)

The Claimant then wrote making further submissions but the Defendant objected to this and said that the submissions should be regarded as closed and the Adjudicator acceded to that request.

82.

The effect of those exchanges is that the Adjudicator told the parties that he regarded the G&T Assessment as potentially relevant; he explained why he took that view; and he explained how he envisaged taking the assessment into account. The Adjudicator invited submissions from the parties and offered a meeting to address the point. The parties then made submissions as to the relevance of the G&T Assessment. They did so in detail and at length. The Adjudicator did not accept those submissions and instead made use of the assessment in the way in which he had foreshadowed.

83.

There was no breach of the requirements of natural justice in those circumstances. The Adjudicator’s approach was wholly consistent with that which Edwards-Stuart J had indicated was appropriate in Roe Brickwork at [23] and [24]. It is well-established that an adjudicator is not bound by the contentions of the parties and can reach a conclusion for which neither party has contended provided the parties have had a fair opportunity to address the matters which the adjudicator was considering taking into account. That was done here.

84.

Although Mr Howells did not express it quite in these terms, the Defendant’s argument amounted to saying that natural justice required the Adjudicator to inform the parties that, notwithstanding their submissions, he intended to take the G&T Assessment into account and to invite further submissions as to the approach to be taken on that footing. Such a two-stage process would prolong the period of the adjudication. In any event it was not required here because of the opportunities for comment which the Adjudicator had given the parties. The Defendant was given ample opportunity to address the G&T Assessment. It chose to say that the assessment was not correct and should not be relied upon. It did not advance a subsidiary or alternative case as to what should happen if the Adjudicator did not accept that contention and treated the assessment as relevant. It would have been open to the Defendant to do that but instead it took its stand on the contention the assessment should not be relied upon. Having done so it cannot now be said that there was a breach of the requirements of natural justice.

The Adjudicator’s Approach to the Retention and the Defects.

85.

The Defendant’s contentions in relation to these two aspects of the Decision can be considered together. For the following reasons I have concluded that the Adjudicator did not breach the requirements of natural justice in either regard.

86.

The Defendant’s case in relation to the retention had been that the full amount of the retention monies should be taken into account in reduction of the loss suffered by the Claimant as a result of the over-certification. The Claimant contended that none of the retention should be brought into account because the purpose of the retention was to provide security against breaches by Buckingham. The Adjudicator accepted that there was to be a reduction in the loss to take account of the fact of the retention but that this should not be in the full amount of the retention. He explained his reasoning and conclusion at paragraphs 5.92 and 5.93 which I have quoted above. In essence he said that some account was to be taken of the retention but that for the full amount to be brought into account would undermine the Claimant’s legitimate security against defective performance by Buckingham.

87.

The Defendant says that this amounted to a breach of the requirements of natural justice because the Adjudicator decided this issue on a basis which was different from that advanced by either party and without giving them an opportunity to address the point. I do not accept that argument. It is based on a mischaracterization of what it was that the Adjudicator was doing in this part of the Decision. The exercise in which the Adjudicator engaged was a classic example of the approach described and held to be appropriate in Roe Brickwork at [24]. The Adjudicator considered the parties’ argument. He accepted aspects of each argument but did not accept either side’s arguments in full. He then reached a conclusion based on those aspects which he had accepted. The Adjudicator was doing so in the context of calculating the loss suffered by the Claimant. The approach he took was wholly unexceptionable and there was no question of unfairness. The approach taken by the Adjudicator was far removed from the objectionable course of deciding the point on material which had not been considered by the parties or on a basis which the parties had not had an opportunity to address. It is verging on the fanciful to suggest that either side was unaware of the possibility that its arguments on this point might be accepted in part rather than in whole.

88.

The same analysis applies to the Adjudicator’s decision in respect of the defects in Buckingham’s works. The Claimant said that there were defects in those works which the Defendant should have but did not identify and that as a consequence of this the Claimant had lost the amount by which the payment to Buckingham would have been reduced if the defects had been identified. The Defendant said that the defects in question were latent and/or not capable of being identified by a project manager exercising proper care and skill. The Adjudicator concluded that the Defendant’s argument was right in respect of the majority of the defects but not all. That was a wholly appropriate and entirely fair approach. The Adjudicator might or might not have been right in his conclusion but there was no unfairness in that regard. Having reached that conclusion he made an assessment of the appropriate figure to represent the loss that the Claimant had suffered by reason of paying Buckingham an amount greater than would have been paid if the Defendant had identified those of the defects which it should have done. The Adjudicator stated his reasons for the figure he gave in short terms and after having commented on the unsatisfactory state of the evidence. There was no unfairness in that approach and, in particular, it was not necessary for the Adjudicator to inform the parties of the conclusion he had reached as to which defects the Defendant should have identified and those in relation to which it was not at fault for overlooking with a view to inviting a further round of submissions on the monetary consequences of that conclusion.

Should any Part of the Adjudicator’s Decision be severed?

89.

The Defendant argued that even if the Decision as a whole was not unenforceable the Adjudicator’s conclusions in relation to the extent to which the retention was brought into account and to the extent of the Defendant’s responsibility for failing to identify defects in Buckingham’s work were unenforceable and should be severed. The result of such an exercise would be the recalculation of the amount said to be due to the Claimant presumably on the basis of a de facto acceptance of the Defendant’s case on those issues.

90.

The severance argument was primarily advanced on the footing that those aspects of the Decision were vitiated by breaches of the requirements of natural justice. I have explained already why I do not accept that the Decision was flawed in that respect and this line of argument falls away accordingly. However, in respect of the retention issue the Defendant made a subsidiary or alternative submission to the effect that the Adjudicator’s conclusion was clearly wrong and should be severed on that basis.

91.

In the witness statement of Alexander Oldershaw served in response to the enforcement application a further point had been made. There it was said that there should also be severance of the Adjudicator’s findings on the Defendant’s argument based on the existence of a degree of tolerance in the figures. That argument was not pursued in the Defendant’s skeleton argument nor in Mr Howells’s oral submissions. That was an appropriate course and I can deal with the point shortly. In reality this contention would have amounted to an argument that the Decision as a whole should not be enforced or that the sum awarded by the Adjudicator as damages should be wholly recast. In effect it would require for the sum awarded to be recalculated on the basis of the difference between the upper point of the range of figures which could have been certified by a competent project manager and the amount actually certified. That would not be severance but rather a recasting of the Decision and would not have been appropriate.

92.

I return to the contention that the Adjudicator’s treatment of the retention was erroneous and capable of being severed.

93.

I set out my understanding of the approach to be taken to questions of severance in Downs Road Development LLP v Laxmanbhai Construction (UK) Ltd [2021] EWHC 2441 (TCC) at [92] – [96]. I did so by reference to the approach set out by Pepperall J in Willow Corp SARL v MTD Contractors Ltd [2019] EWHC 1591 (TCC) as seen in the light of the decision of the Inner House of the Court of Session in Dickie & Moore Ltd v McLeish [2020] CSIH 38.

94.

When considering an argument that part of an adjudication decision is wrong account is also to be taken of the decision of Coulson J, as he then was, in Hutton Construction Ltd v Wilson Properties (London) Ltd [2017] EWHC 517 (TCC) and of the guidance at paragraph 10.4 of the TCC Guide 2026 edition (repeating the guidance set out at paragraph 9.4 of the 2022 edition). Coulson J explained that it is not generally appropriate for a party to seek to resist summary enforcement of an adjudication decision on the basis that the decision or part of it was wrong. The Guide explained the limited circumstances in which the court will address an argument that there was an error in an adjudicator’s decision at the summary judgment stage. There is considerable force in the Claimant’s submission that the Defendant’s approach runs counter to that guidance and to the “pay now, argue later” principle. To the extent that the Defendant is saying that the Decision or parts of it were wrong in law then it should have commenced Part 8 proceedings seeking a declaration to that effect.

95.

Even if that difficulty for the Defendant were to be set aside the retention finding is, for the following reasons, one severance of which is not appropriate and I reject the Defendant’s argument in that regard.

96.

The circumstances here are very different from those with which Pepperall J was concerned in Willow Corp. There the issue on which it was said that the adjudicator had erred was the self-contained one of the construction of a supplemental agreement and where the error had resulted in a particular claim for a sum of liquidated damages being dismissed. Here, by way of contrast, the Adjudicator’s finding on the retention issue was a distinct finding but it was part of the chain of reasoning by which the Adjudicator calculated the amount of loss caused to the Claimant by the Defendant’s failings. It was more akin to the circumstances I described in Downs Road Development at [92] where there was a continuous and connected chain of reasoning leading to a single decision and where severance would not normally be appropriate.

97.

Moreover, severance is not really an apt term to describe what the Defendant is in fact seeking. It is not saying that there is a particular element of the award which should not be enforced. Instead, it is saying that the amount of the award should be recalculated on the basis of a different conclusion on the retention issue. That would not be the severance of a distinct decision nor even of a distinct part of a decision but it would be the reversal of one aspect of the Decision and a recalculation of the final sum on a different basis. Such a course would be inconsistent with the starting rule that the parties are bound by an adjudicator’s decision even if it is wrong provided that there was no breach of the requirements of natural justice and provided that the adjudicator acted within his or her jurisdiction.

98.

Those reasons mean that severance is not appropriate here. I am, in any event, not persuaded that the Adjudicator’s conclusion on this issue was wrong. In their skeleton argument at [107] Mr Howells and Miss Adams described the “erroneous” decision as being that “[the Defendant] should be liable to [the Claimant] in respect of part of the retention held by [the Claimant] as if it were a loss to [the Claimant]”. I do not accept that as a fair characterization of the Adjudicator’s decision on this point. The Adjudicator was not saying that the Defendant was liable in respect of part of the retention. Instead, the effect of the Decision was that in the calculation of the loss suffered credit for an element the retention was being given against the loss with a consequent reduction in the damages awarded. The Adjudicator did not bring the full amount of the retention into account in that exercise but that was because of the view he took of the purpose of the retention and his view that, but for the Defendant’s failings, the retention would have been in a different sum. I am not persuaded that there was any error in that approach. Certainly, it was not a clear error of the kind which might, in appropriate circumstances, warrant the severance of part of a decision. It is of note in that regard that before me this was a matter of assertion rather than argument by the Defendant and that the Defendant did not refer me to the authority on which it had relied in relation to this point before the Adjudicator let alone set out a legal argument based on it.

Conclusion.

99.

The lines of argument raised by the Defendant having failed it follows that the Claimant is entitled to summary judgment on its application for enforcement of the Decision.

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