
Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
Before :
THE HON MR JUSTICE MELLOR
Between :
MERCK SHARP & DOHME (UK) LIMITED. | Claimant |
- and - | |
HALOZYME, INC. | Defendant |
Andrew Waugh KC and Katherine Moggridge (instructed by Hogan Lovells LLP) for the Claimant
Michael Tappin KC and James Whyte (instructed by Osborne Clarke LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 1 July 2026
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on Monday 20 July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
.............................
THE HON MR JUSTICE MELLOR
Mr Justice Mellor :
On 1 July 2026 I heard MSD’s application seeking ‘Mayne Pharma disclosure’. A subsidiary issue raised by Halozyme was for directions on MSD’s expanded case on obviousness, but that issue was resolved on the eve of the hearing. Having heard full argument and reached a clear view, I announced my decision that I rejected MSD’s application for reasons to be given later. This judgment contains my reasons.
This action in outline
At one time this action concerned two European Patents owned by Halozyme: EP(UK) 2 797 622 (“EP 622”) and a divisional, EP(UK) 3 130 347 (“EP 347”). In the UK, Halozyme has submitted to revocation of EP 622, embodied in the order of HHJ Hacon dated 21 May 2026, so this action now only concerns EP 347. Both patents relate to modified human PH20 hyaluronidase enzymes.
Hyaluronidases are enzymes that break down hyaluronan in subcutaneous tissue. PH20 is a naturally occurring hyaluronidase that is active at neutral pH. Halozyme have for many years manufactured and sold a truncated recombinant form of human PH20 and licensed patents relating to such technology. Halozyme say it is particularly useful for enabling the subcutaneous delivery of drugs in larger volumes than would otherwise be possible and is licensed to companies including Roche and BMS.
EP 347 relates to human PH20 that has been modified by amino acid replacement(s) at specified locations to improve activity. EP 622 also related to modified human PH20 enzymes, but to improve stability in the presence of phenolic preservatives.
MSD has an established cancer therapy called Keytruda, which contains the monoclonal antibody pembrolizumab (a PD-1 inhibitor). MSD launched a subcutaneous version of Keytruda (the “SC Product”) that contains a recombinant PH20 enzyme known as berahyaluronidase alfa (“BHA” or “ALT-B4”) in the UK in May 2026. Halozyme contends that the SC Product infringes EP 347 because it contains ALT-B4.
MSD started these proceedings with a claim for invalidity of EP 622. Halozyme counterclaimed for infringement of EP 622 and EP 347. MSD denied infringement and counterclaimed in turn for invalidity of EP 347 too.
There are parallel proceedings in other jurisdictions, including in Europe, but they only involve local designations of EP 622 (and not EP 347):
In Germany, where Halozyme has a preliminary injunction, and where Halozyme has relied and continues to rely on experiments which it contends (and the German court accepted) show that ALT-B4 has the functional feature of the claims of EP 622 by demonstrating increased stability in the presence of a phenolic preservative compared to an unmodified human PH20 with SEQ ID NO: 3 (the “German experiments”). In the German experiments, the ALT-B4 was in the form of a product called Tergase. Tergase is made by Alteogen, the same company which supplies the ALT-B4 enzyme in MSD's SC Product, and contains the same ALT-B4 enzyme that is used by MSD in that product. The comparator was a reference standard called WRS6, which contains an enzyme of SEQ ID NO: 3 in EP 622 (and EP 347).
The German experiments are also relied on in proceedings in the Netherlands, where MSD began nullity proceedings and Halozyme counterclaimed for infringement.
In France, MSD began invalidity proceedings on 30 July 2025 but those are still at an early stage.
MSD has recently issued a revocation claim in Denmark.
The trial of the current claim is listed to begin in a window starting on 23 November 2026, with a current estimate of 15 days and complexity rating of 4.
I heard the CMC in October 2025 when Halozyme indicated it would not rely on the German experiments and sought provision of a sample of ALT-B4 which I ordered. I also ordered Halozyme to serve a statement of their case on infringement.
The inadequacy of the SOCI served was one of the disputes raised at a further hearing in January 2026 before Richards J. In addition, MSD issued an application for an order that the disclosure of work-up experiments to be disclosed with any Notice of Experiments served by Halozyme should extend to the German experiments. In the end, the order made by Richards J was simply that disclosure should be provided “in accordance with the principles in the case law concerning work-up experiments (including Mayne Pharma…” (see ¶5 of the order of Richards J).
Leaving aside the revocation of EP 622, I can summarise the events leading up to this hearing as follows:
On 2 April 2026, Halozyme served a Notice of Experiments in respect of EP 347, directed to whether the MSD ALT-B4 Enzyme satisfies the functional feature of the claims of EP 347 of having “increased hyaluronidase activity that is at least 120% of the hyaluronidase activity compared to the unmodified PH20 polypeptide”. MSD subsequently confirmed in correspondence that it does not seek to witness repeats of the experiments.
Alongside the Notice of Experiments (NOE), Halozyme provided a Disclosure Statement and what it termed ‘Mayne Pharma disclosure’. The Disclosure Statement set out the basis on which Mayne Pharma disclosure was being provided and the claims to privilege in respect of material which was not being disclosed.
On 14 April 2026, MSD served an RFI in respect of Halozyme’s Mayne Pharma disclosure and on 28 April 2026 Halozyme served its response to that RFI.
On 14 May 2026, MSD issued the current application relating to Halozyme’s Mayne Pharma disclosure.
So the issue for decision was whether Halozyme had complied with the Order of Richards J. to give Mayne Pharma disclosure, or, as MSD contended, the disclosure provided so far by Halozyme was ‘manifestly deficient (being both incomplete and overly redacted)’.
EP347
The Patent is a lengthy document. However, for present purposes, it is necessary only to summarise claim 1, which claims:
‘A modified PH20 polypeptide, comprising one or more amino acid replacements in an unmodified PH20 polypeptide, wherein:
the unmodified PH20 polypeptide consists of the sequence of amino acids set forth in SEQ ID NO: 3, 7 or 32-66;
the modified PH20 polypeptide exhibits increased hyaluronidase activity that is at least 120% of the hyaluronidase activity compared to the unmodified PH20 polypeptide not containing the amino acid replacement(s);
the amino acid replacement is at a position corresponding to a position selected from among [ a whole series of positions] with reference to amino acid positions set forth in SEQ ID NO:3.’
Claim 1 contains various other more minor limitations, including that:
‘the modified PH20 polypeptide comprises up to 10 amino acid replacement(s) compared to the unmodified PH20 polypeptide not containing the replacement(s).’
Halozyme’s NOE and Mayne Pharma disclosure
The NOE sets out the following:
Statements of five facts which Halozyme says are established by the experimental results set out in the Notice;
Schedule A: the protocol for the activity assay comparing the activity of the reference standard (a Creative Biomart enzyme with SEQ ID NO: 3) vs the MSD ALT-B4 Enzyme, including:
Schedule A, Annex 1: the reagent data sheet for the biotinylated hyaluronan used;
Schedule A, Annex 2: the product report and certificate of analysis for the reference standard (SEQ ID NO:3) from Creative Biomart used;
Schedule B: the plate layout and results of the Activity Assay; and
Schedules C – D: Reference Standard (Creative Biomart SEQ ID NO: 3) and MSD ALT-B4 Enzyme UV Data.
At the same time as serving the Notice, Halozyme disclosed (and provided copies of) the documents that it accepts represent Mayne Pharma disclosure, i.e. those in which there has been consequential waiver of privilege by service of the Notice. The accompanying Disclosure Statement set out the following information:
Appendix A [B1/31/189]: the documents Halozyme was obliged to disclose as a result of serving the Notice of Experiments. This consisted of:
The protocols and results of preliminary experiments (1a, 1b, 2a, 2b and 2c) undertaken in contemplation of litigation in order to determine the parameters of the experiments relied upon in the Notice of Experiments. The nature of these experiments was described in Halozyme’s evidence.
The results of experiments (A and B) which utilised comparable experimental protocol(s) to the experiments relied upon in the Notice of Experiments, but whose results were not relied upon in the Notice of Experiments. Again, the nature of these experiments was described in Halozyme’s evidence.
Appendix B listed the categories of documents which Halozyme contend remain privileged and are therefore not disclosable. The table in Appendix B addressed each category and provides the reasons why Halozyme say privilege applies and has not been waived. The categories included:
Documents relating to any experiments undertaken in contemplation of litigation which: (a) do not utilise comparable experimental protocol(s) to the experiments relied on in the Notice of Experiments; and (b) do not represent preliminary investigations to determine the parameters of the experiments relied on in the Notice of Experiments.
Documents relating to any experiments that were considered in contemplation of litigation but which were not ultimately conducted, including documents relating to the production or contemplated production of reagents for use in experiments to be undertaken in contemplation of litigation, but where experiments utilising those reagents were not ultimately conducted.
As the Disclosure Statement made clear, certain documents relating to the German experiments fell within category 1 of Appendix B. Halozyme’s evidence explained that the German experiments were not part of the work-up for the experiment in the Notice of Experiments. They used different reagents and samples. Therefore, it was necessary to work up the parameters for the Notice experiment independently.
So far as the German experiments were concerned, Halozyme made two points:
First, that the use of Tergase in the German experiments led MSD to regard them as non-probative.
Second, that the purpose of the German experiments is different to that of the Notice experiment in this action. The German experiments are concerned with whether ALT-B4 possesses the functional feature of EP 622 (increased stability of the enzyme in the presence of a phenolic preservative) rather than the functional feature of EP 347 (increased activity of the enzyme).
MSD’s Application
In their application, MSD originally sought 5 categories of documents, along with an Order for full and proper answers to Requests 3-9 of the RFI and unredacted copies of the documents listed in Request 2. The categories of documents sought were:
‘(a) the production of any comparator PH20 polypeptide(s) the Defendant has produced or commissioned whether for potential use in experiments in these proceedings or as part of the Defendant’s preparation for experiments in these proceedings;
(b) any attempt(s) by the Defendant to produce any comparator PH20 polypeptide(s) whether for potential use in experiments in these proceedings or as part of the Defendant’s preparation for experiments in these proceedings;
(c) any testing in relation to any comparator PH20 polypeptide(s) the Defendant attempted to make, made, commissioned and/or purchased whether for potential use in experiments in these proceedings or as part of the Defendant’s preparation for experiments in these proceedings;
(d) any testing conducted by the Defendant to validate the SEQ ID NO: 3 comparator PH20 polypeptide disclosed in the Product Report and Certificate of Analysis at Schedule A, Annex 2 of the Notice of Experiments;’ [i.e. any testing to validate the Creative Biomart enzyme]
‘(e) any testing conducted by the Defendant comparing Alt-B4 against SEQ ID No.3 for potential use as experiments in these proceedings (whether with or without exposure to a phenolic preservative and whether or not in preparation for experiments in these proceedings in respect of EP 622).’
By the start of the hearing:
category (d) was not pursued in the light of evidence that no such testing had taken place.
MSD also accepted that category (e) had fallen away due to the revocation of EP 622.
Requests 8-9 were no longer pursued.
Thus, categories (a)-(c) were live, along with Requests 4-7, but MSD accepted they all raised essentially the same privilege issue.
The redactions issue, I was told, was still under discussion but remained unresolved. I deal with that issue towards the end of this judgment.
Categories (a) to (c) and Requests 4-7
In their Skeleton, Halozyme detailed what they said were the attempts by MSD to obtain disclosure about the German experiments, none of which succeeded. It is clear that MSD dearly wanted to obtain disclosure relating to the German experiments, despite the fact that they were never relied upon in this action (even when EP 622 was still in the case). Halozyme pointed out that by dropping category (e), MSD had finally abandoned their attempts to obtain disclosure relating to the German experiments.
The basis for MSD’s pursuit of the categories which remained live rested on inferences MSD said I should draw from developments leading up to the service of the NOE, which I must now explain.
MSD’s contentions
The starting point lies in the original Statement of Case on Infringement (SOCI) served by Halozyme pursuant to my Order. MSD said it failed adequately to identify the relevant comparator sequence(s), but pointed out that Halozyme did state that it intended to compare ALT-B4 with SEQ ID NO:35. The original SOCI was directed to both EP 622 (which it addressed first) and then EP 347. I set out the relevant extract because MSD relied on two particular points which I discuss later (with MSD’s emphasis in bold):
“3. For the purpose of showing that BHA exhibits increased stability in the presence of a phenolic preservative(s) compared to the unmodified PH20 polypeptide not containing the amino acid replacement, Halozyme intends to compare BHA with a polypeptide with the sequence of SEQ ID NO: 35, which is the sequence from among the unmodified PH20 polypeptides listed in claim 1 of EP 622 that has the same C-terminal extent as BHA.
4. For the avoidance of doubt, the aforesaid does not mean that only data relating to a comparison of BHA to SEQ ID NO: 35 can be relevant to the issue of infringement. Halozyme’s case is that data relating to other comparisons may be probative of the presence of the Stability Feature.
…
10. Paragraphs 2 to 4 above are repeated mutatis mutandis with respect to the Activity Feature.”
Service of the original SOCI on 28 November 2025 led to complaints set out in Hogan Lovells letter of 9 December 2025, which asked Halozyme to rectify the deficiencies, including the failure to properly identify the relevant comparator(s) (given the caveat at paragraph 4 of the SOCI, as set out above).
On 12 December 2025, MSD applied for an unless order regarding the deficiencies and in response, Halozyme serve a draft amended SOCI on 9 January 2026. In this draft, Halozyme deleted the specific reliance on a comparison to SEQ ID No.35 and appeared to suggest the relevant comparator was SEQ ID NO:3, but could still be any of 3, 7, or 32-66. Halozyme also sought a 28 day extension for its NOE on the basis stated by their solicitors at the time, Quinn Emanuel, as follows:
“We and our client have been working expeditiously to produce comparator PH20 polypeptides. However, it is now clear that it will not be possible for these polypeptides to be produced and analysed in the time available. As your client acknowledged in its Rejoinder dated 27 November 2025 filed in the German PI Proceedings, the production of PH20 polypeptides can take many months”
There followed the hearing before Richards J. In addition to ordering Halozyme to give Mayne Pharma disclosure, he ordered Halozyme to serve a compliant SOCI and also extended time for service of the NOE to 6 March.
Halozyme served their amended SOCI on 4 February, but by letter dated 25 February 2026, Halozyme sought a further 3-week extension for their NOE. In view of the inference with MSD ask me to draw (see [33] of Bennett 8, quoted below), it is necessary to be precise on the reasons put forward for this and the yet further extension. Quinn Emanuel explained (my emphasis, where Bionsystems is the company, based in South Korea, which conducted both the German experiments and those relied upon in this action):
‘Strictly without waiving privilege, Bionsystems have encountered an unexpected technical issue relating to a reagent sourced from a third-party commercial supplier, which has delayed the process of validating an assay which is intended to be used in our client’s experiments. As a consequence, as at the date of this letter, your client’s sample of BHA has not yet been tested.’
‘One shipment of a potential alternative reagent is currently en route to Bionsystems and is scheduled to arrive there on Friday afternoon. A shipment of another potential alternative reagent from a different supplier is currently being arranged, which we hope will arrive in the course of next week, although that is not yet confirmed. If the alternative reagents arrive as expected and resolve the issue, or Bionsystems is otherwise able to solve the issue with the existing reagent, we anticipate that our client will require up to an additional 3 weeks to complete its experiments.’
On 26 March 2026, Halozyme sought and obtained a further extension until 2 April, on the basis that:
‘Strictly without waiving privilege, we believe the experiments are now complete, but there some final points which require verification with Bionsystems, our client’s CRO.’
It is relevant to note that two days before Halozyme’s NOE was due, Halozyme’s solicitors wrote on 31 March 2026, offering revocation of EP 622.
Following service of the NOE, on 7 May 2026, MSD amended by consent their Grounds of Invalidity to add in the following allegation of insufficiency:
‘h. Further, the claims are insufficient as it is not possible without undue burden to make an unmodified PH20 polypeptide, for example an unmodified polypeptide which consists of the sequence of amino acids set forth in SEQ ID NO: 35, as evidenced by:
(A) the amendment to the Defendant’s Statement of Case on Infringement [as described above]
(B) the Defendant’s statement in correspondence in its letter of 9th January 2026 in support of its application for an extension of time for service of its Notice of Experiments that:
“We write to request your client’s consent to an extension of 28 days to the deadline for Notices of Experiments specified at paragraph 11 of the Order. We and our client have been working expeditiously to produce comparator PH20 polypeptides. However, it is now clear that it will not be possible for these polypeptides to be produced and analysed in the time available. As your client acknowledged in its Rejoinder dated 27 November 2025 filed in the German PI Proceedings, the production of PH20 polypeptides can take many months.”
i. From the foregoing, it is to be inferred that the Defendant could not, without undue burden, make (a) comparator polypeptides of different lengths and/or (b) a polypeptide with the sequence of SEQ ID NO: 35.
j. Further, if the construction of the claim as set out in the ASoCI requires that the skilled person is to determine whether or not the functional requirements of the claims are met with each possible comparator polypeptide (having found that they are not met with some) EP 347 is further insufficient having regard to the undue burden of making just one SEQ ID as alleged above.
k. EP 347 is further insufficient as evidenced by the Defendant’s request for a yet further extension of time for service of its Notice of Experiments by letter dated 25th February 2026 regarding an “unexpected technical issue relating to a reagent sourced from a third-party commercial supplier, which has delayed the process of validating an assay which is intended to be used in our client’s experiments” and that they were “working with Bionsystems to try to troubleshoot and resolve this technical issue as quickly as possible, including by seeking to source alternative reagents”.
l. The consequences of the foregoing issues relating to the alleged difficulties in: (a) making the relevant comparator polypeptides; and (b) validating an assay means that as of 25th February 2026 no testing of the Claimant’s BHA sample had yet been undertaken, and accordingly EP 347 is insufficient.’
On this basis, MSD contended there were two bases on which to order the disclosure sought:
First, as part of the work-up to the experiment ultimately relied upon;
Second, what MSD termed ‘the failed attempts to make or procure the comparator sequence’ were also relevant to the new insufficiency plea.
Against that backdrop, I must now address the applicable legal principles before turning to the evidence served on this Application. I did not understand the principles to be in dispute, although Mr Waugh KC, in his submissions for MSD, sought to establish certain factual analogies from the case law to the current issue.
Applicable Legal Principles
Not surprisingly, the parties were very largely agreed as to the applicable caselaw. As Halozyme submitted, a part of the procedural landscape concerning experiments in Patent actions concerns the extent to which disclosure may be required of experiments in addition to the experiment actually relied upon. This is a consequence of the more general doctrine of waiver of privilege: when a party relies on an experiment, this can involve waiver of privilege in underlying material, and it may (or may not) then be appropriate to order disclosure of that material.
The issue of such disclosure relating to experiments in patent cases has its origins in Mayne Pharma Pty Ltd v Debiopharm SA [2006] EWHC 164 (Pat), [2006] FSR 37. That was a case of alleged anticipation by inevitable result, i.e. that in following the instructions contained in an item of prior art, the skilled person will inevitably do (or make) something within the claims of the patent that is under attack. In such a case, it is easy to see why it could give a misleading picture if a Notice of Experiments detailed only, say, the one experiment that gave the claimed result, and not a set of identical experiments that did not.
The scope of Mayne Pharma disclosure was considered in Magnesium Elektron v Neo Chemicals [2017] EWHC 2957 (Pat), [2018] FSR 11 by Daniel Alexander QC (sitting as a Deputy Judge). It is a comprehensive and lengthy judgment which is difficult to summarise accurately. In my pre-reading, I considered the relevant sections with care, and they repay reading in full. In terms of the general principles, MSD relied upon [37]-[60] and then [61]-[91] as regards the application of the general principles to patent litigation, with particular emphasis on this passage in [83]:
“Patent cases are no different to any other cases in that documents recording activity undertaken for the purpose of litigation attract privilege. Until they are deployed, they remain privileged. Once deployed, the question arises as to the extent to which, if at all, the effect of doing so is also to waive privilege in any other documents or material. The answer given in patent cases is in line with that in other cases although the patent case law has not always referred to all of the general authorities. In patent cases, as in any other, the opposite party and the court must have the opportunity of satisfying themselves that "what the party has chosen to release from privilege represents the whole of the material relevant to the issue in question". The problem arises in patent cases because, as in other cases, that proposition is itself somewhat imprecise: how are the boundaries of that which is relevant to the issue in question to be set?”
MSD also relied on the more recent decision of Mr Campbell Forsyth, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, in Safestand Limited v Weston Homes Plc [2023] EWHC 1098 (Pat) at [47], where he stated that the “problem is how to define the boundaries of the material that is relevant to the issue put in question.” After referring to Magnesium Elektron and Mayne Pharma, the Judge in Safestand held at [50] that:
“…‘work up’ experiments should not be limited to preliminary investigations leading to the experiment relied upon but could encompass other related litigation experiments which provide materially relevant contextual information on the experiments relied upon.”
For their part, Halozyme drew specific attention to the following paragraphs in Magnesium Elektron:
On the general principles: [35]-[36] (the issues which arise), [43] (what the party has chosen to release from privilege represents the whole of the material relevant to the issue in question), [47] (limits to the waiver), [51] (objective to avoid unfairness), [56]-[57] (the importance of the purpose for which the document was disclosed), [59] (waiver should go no further than necessary to avoid unfairness).
On their application to patent actions: [82] (different background), [90] (his conclusion on the proper scope of Mayne Pharma disclosure, which is also reflected in his summary at [109]), [92]-[96] (the two types of cases where Mayne Pharma can be clearly and easily applied, namely: the ‘inevitable result’ and ‘completeness of data’ cases), then [97]-[98] (regarding other, less straightforward cases) and the Deputy Judge’s summary of his conclusions at [109]-[116], from which I cite [109]:
‘109. The combination of (i) the general law of privilege, (ii) the approach to scope of waiver generally and (iii) the approach taken in the patent case law relating to experiments suggests that the court should adopt a relatively cautious and restrictive approach to waiver of privilege in material relating to experiments in cases other than clear ones of the kind identified above. Neither the general law nor the specific patent case law provides a warrant for broad and general disclosure of all information about earlier experiments on which the experiments in question may have been based if a later experiment is deployed. To the contrary, waiver of privilege in material not deployed should only be treated as having taken place to a limited additional extent and only in so far as necessary to satisfy the specific objects of the law relating to waiver set out in Nea Karteria set out above.’
On the basis of Magnesium Elektron, Halozyme submitted that the following principles can be derived:
The law seeks to prevent an individual item from being “plucked out of context” which would risk “injustice through its real weight or meaning being misunderstood”, and therefore to “avoid unfairness or misunderstanding” that might result from a partial or selective disclosure ([43], [51]).
It is not the case that, once a privileged document is deployed, all privileged documents related in some general way to that document or which can, in a general sense, be described as “relevant” to the issue must also be disclosed even if they deal directly with the subject matter in hand [47].
The scope of consequential waiver of privilege depends on what material is deployed, and for what purpose: the scope of waiver is a function of the contents of the document and the nature of its deployment ([56]-[57]).
Waiver of privilege in material not deployed should only be treated as having taken place to a limited additional extent and only in so far as necessary to satisfy the specific objects of the law relating to waiver set out in Nea Karteria ([59] and [109]).
The court should adopt a relatively cautious and restrictive approach to waiver of privilege in material relating to experiments in cases other than ‘inevitable result’ cases and ‘completeness of data’ cases ([109], referring back to these two types of cases as described at [92]-[96]).
The disclosure required to be given does not extend beyond materials recording preliminary investigation leading to the particular experiment which is deployed in evidence [90].
In particular, the required disclosure does not extend to other parts of an overall experimental programme even if the design of the experiment in question may have drawn on earlier experiments ([90] & [109]) – and a fortiori as regards parts of an overall experimental programme that are not drawn upon for the design of the experiment in the Notice.
Even where there is some degree of consequential waiver, it does not follow that disclosure should be ordered ([35], and see also [110]-[112]).
To those points (which I did not understand MSD to dispute), I add one more which relates specifically to points iii) and vi) above and the quest to identify the scope of the waiver. In that regard and in the circumstances of the dispute in this case, I found the concepts of the ‘issue’ or ‘transaction’ helpful, although I acknowledge that Matthews & Malek on Disclosure, continues to say (as in 2017) that there is a conflict of authority “as to whether waiver is confined to the document or documents concerned…or goes wider [extending to “all material dealing with the transaction the subject of the documents concerned”].
As the Deputy Judge explained at [49] of Magnesium Elektron:
‘…in some cases citing the Nea Karteria passage, waiver of privilege in a document has been held to extend not just to the document as a whole but to other documents forming part of the transaction or communication in question.’
But he also gave this warning at [52]:
‘It is not possible to avoid these difficulties [as to the scope of waiver] altogether by reference to waiver of privilege taking place in the “transaction” as a whole, since that begs a related question of how the boundaries of the “transaction” are to be determined. There is, as Matthews & Malek acknowledges at para. 16.40, “room for argument in any given case as to what constitutes the “transaction” in question” and whether, even if that can be determined, the boundaries of implied or consequential waiver of privilege are limited to that.’
Having considered Safestand, I drew the following conclusions:
First, I did not find the discussion particularly easy to follow;
Second, as Halozyme submitted, it does not appear that Mr Forsyth disagreed with any of the statements of principle in Magnesium Elektron;
Third, to the extent that Mr Forsyth may have done (e.g. in the passage at [50] relied upon by MSD), I prefer to follow Magnesium Elektron.
Fourth, in any event, the passage at [50] says nothing more than waiver could extend more widely, which is in any event the case depending on the particular facts.
In the circumstances, I propose to apply the principles set out in Magnesium Elektron.
Application to the Facts
The evidence and the rival contentions
In his 8th witness statement in support of the Application, Mr Bennett raised two hypotheses in his evidence at [27]. To identify these I must refer to [26]-[29]. First, he stated in [26]:
‘Halozyme has not explained how it came to represent to MSD (in Quinn Emanuel’s letter of 9 January 2026) that the primary reason for requiring a 28-day extension for service of its Notice of Experiments was difficulties in producing “comparator PH20 polypeptides” which can take “many months”…’
He continued as follows (my emphasis):
‘27. On the basis of that representation by Halozyme, it is reasonable to infer that Halozyme intended to use one or more comparator polypeptides in its experiments (other than the one described in its Notice of Experiments), was struggling to make or have those made and ended up using the Creative Biomart product instead. Alternatively based on the representation Halozyme made to procure the extension of time, another explanation is that Halozyme did manage to obtain comparator PH20 polypeptides other than the Creative Biomart product, used those polypeptides in experiments but decided it preferred the results from experiments conducted with the Creative Biomart PH20 polypeptide
28. Given that Halozyme had previously pleaded that the comparator enzyme should be a PH20 having the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO: 35 of EP 347 and EP 622, the delay may have resulted from efforts to run the experiments with a PH20 having SEQ ID NO: 35 but that this ran into problems. But in any event Halozyme has not explained itself nor has it provided disclosure or made out a valid claim to privilege for that material.
29. According to the information provided by Halozyme, the material purchased from Creative Biomart is a formulation containing a PH20 enzyme having the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO: 3 of EP 347 (and EP 622). As noted at paragraph 10 above, Halozyme manufactures and sells a commercial product (Hylenex) that, according to its published description contains, along with a number of excipients, a PH20 enzyme having the sequence of amino acids of SEQ ID NO: 3. The Hylenex product is the comparator enzyme-containing formulation that Halozyme asserts it used for the experiments it relies upon in Germany and the Netherlands. No explanation has been offered by Halozyme as to why it didn’t simply use its own Hylenex PH20 enzyme in its UK experiments, as it did in Germany, rather than delay matters with repeated extension requests while it attempted to rely on other polypeptides.’
Mr Bennett then invited the following conclusions at [33] (emphasis added):
‘Halozyme’s Disclosure Statement and the accompanying work-up disclosure contain no explanation or documents concerning what had happened with Halozyme’s production of the comparator PH20 polypeptides for its experiments. Given Halozyme’s representation about the difficulties it had in making comparator polypeptides and its use in its Notice of Experiments of an off-the-shelf product made in 2025, it is beyond doubt that: Halozyme attempted to make PH20 comparators for the UK experiments; that those were intended to be relevant comparator enzymes; and were different to the comparator enzyme that it relies upon in its Notice of Experiments. Appendix B to the Disclosure Statement sets out the documents withheld. Halozyme expressly states in Appendix B that it has withheld documents relating to experiments in the ongoing German and Dutch proceedings between the parties and documents relating to the production or contemplated production of reagents for use in experiments to be undertaken in contemplation of litigation (but where experiments utilising those reagents were not ultimately conducted). Appendix B is silent as to documents relating to:
(a) Halozyme’s production or procurement of PH20 polypeptide comparators (from sources other than that disclosed in the Product Report);
(b) any testing conducted by Halozyme (or on its behalf) to validate data given by Creative Biomart with respect to the SEQ ID NO: 3 comparator PH20 polypeptide disclosed in the Product Report; and
(c) any testing conducted by Halozyme (or on its behalf) intended to evidence infringement of EP 622 (the parent patent of EP 347).”
I should also quote Mr Bennett’s [30] which makes clear MSD’s position as to the relevant ‘issue’ or ‘transaction’:
‘30. The importance of the identity of the comparator sequence and difficulties in making comparator polypeptides are matters in dispute on the pleadings in this case. It is relevant to pleaded issues of validity and infringement.’
So, to be clear:
the first hypothesis was that ‘Halozyme intended to use one or more comparator polypeptides in its experiments (other than the one described in its Notice of Experiments), was struggling to make or have those made and ended up using the Creative Biomart product instead.’
the second was that ‘Halozyme did manage to obtain comparator PH20 polypeptides other than the Creative Biomart product, used those polypeptides in experiments but decided it preferred the results from experiments conducted with the Creative Biomart PH20 polypeptide’
Mr Crosse addressed this second hypothesis directly in his first witness statement at [30]. Having set out the second hypothesis, Mr Crosse said this:
‘Without waiving privilege, I can say that that is not the case. Halozyme has not conducted any experiments comparing the MSD ALT-B4 Sample Enzyme with any comparator enzyme other than the Creative Biomart product described in the Notice of Experiments.’
In their Skeleton MSD suggested this sentence raised a caveat – they submitted that what Mr Crosse said ‘does not rule out the possibility that they did compare (say) SEQ ID NO: 35 to SEQ ID NO:3 to work out which they preferred as a comparator.’
In response, Halozyme served Crosse 2 in which Mr Crosse:
First, pointed out that MSD had failed to note [32] of Crosse 1, where he confirmed that no testing had taken place using any comparator enzymes other than the Creative Biomart PH20 (subject to his footnote 3, which refers to experiments that used the WRS6 enzyme as a positive control which, like the Creative Biomart product, also has the sequence of SEQ ID NO:3, and in respect of which disclosure had already been provided).
Second, and in any event, confirmed that Halozyme did not compare the activity of a PH20 polypeptide of SEQ ID NO: 3 to a PH20 polypeptide having any other amino acid sequence in order to work out which Halozyme preferred to use as a comparator.
That disposed of the second hypothesis, leaving the first hypothesis, which Mr Bennett pointed out was not addressed in Mr Crosse’s evidence, other than indirectly in this paragraph:
“31. Halozyme’s position is that service of the Notice of Experiments containing an experiment in which the activity of the MSD ALT-B4 Sample Enzyme is compared to that of the Creative Biomart product does not waive privilege in any documents relating to the production (or attempted production) or testing (as to which see above) of any other comparator PH20 polypeptide(s) (Bennett 8 paragraph 3(a)(i)-(iii)), for the reasons given by Mr Bennett or otherwise. That will be the subject of legal submissions.”
Furthermore, MSD stressed the underlined passage in Mr Bennett’s [33], set out above, contending that nowhere did Mr Crosse address it.
For their part, Halozyme characterised the issue thus:
‘47. MSD is therefore seeking disclosure in relation to the production and testing of comparator polypeptides in circumstances where:
(i) The Notice of Experiments uses a SEQ ID NO: 3 enzyme, which was obtained off-the-shelf from Creative Biomart.
(ii) No other comparator polypeptide is relied upon by Halozyme.
(iii) No other comparator polypeptide has been compared with the MSD ALT-B4 Sample Enzyme.’
On that basis, Halozyme submitted a basic point arose:
‘that the experiments relied upon have nothing to do with any comparator with a sequence other than SEQ ID NO: 3, and no other comparator has been tested. Any work relating to preparation of an enzyme with a sequence other than SEQ ID NO: 3 cannot be regarded as work-up to the experiment in the Notice, nor is otherwise engaged by the principles in Mayne Pharma.’
Mr Bennett adopted essentially the same arguments when he addressed MSD’s RFI. It suffices to quote his [43]:
‘As explained in paragraphs 28-30 above, the issue of difficulty in making comparator polypeptides and the consequences from validity and infringement of testing that makes a comparison to other comparator sequences is a pleaded issue in dispute between the parties. In relation to the difficulty in making the enzymes there is clearly a story to be told by the withheld disclosure, in circumstances where the basis for Halozyme obtaining its 35-day extension for service of its Notice of Experiments was explicitly due to difficulties producing comparator PH20 polypeptides (plural) in time for the purposes of its experiments. How those enzymes were produced and difficulties in producing them are part of the work up for the experiments relied upon. Any testing of activity of comparator enzymes other than the Creative Biomart PH20 relied upon in the Notice of Experiments is also part of the work up in the sense that the testing will have included testing of activity of the comparator enzymes. Producing only the results for the comparator that suits its case is a partial production of the material generated by that transaction: it’s liable to present only part of the suite of relevant results and is an exercise in cherry-picking by Halozyme. MSD’s position is that privilege has been waived in the whole transaction which includes the matters raised by MSD’s RFI and the disclosure now sought.’
Finally, I refer to one argument made in MSD’s Skeleton which was to the effect that the teaching in the Patent required that the modified and unmodified polypeptide should be of equivalent length. This, MSD submitted, was the reason why Halozyme, in the original SOCI, intended to test using SEQ ID NO.35, with ‘the same C-terminal extent as BHA’. MSD’s Skeleton continued as follows:
‘31. This was, of course, on the basis that, if unmodified and modified polypeptides of different lengths are compared, there is no way of knowing to what extent any changes in activity or stability are due to the modifications or due to the different lengths. It is basic scientific protocol not to introduce more than one variable when trying to ascertain the effect of changing just one of them. This is, no doubt, the reason why Halozyme intended to use SEQ ID NO: 35, even though in the end they never did as described below.’
Although there was nothing in the evidence to support this point, I assume (in MSD’s favour) that it is correct.
Analysis
In my view, the dispute came down to a relatively short point. The key difference between the parties concerned the correct characterisation of the ‘issue’ or ‘transaction’ in respect of which privilege was waived by service of the NOE. MSD clearly contended for the widest possible ‘transaction’, essentially including any issue in the action – infringement or validity, so as to encompass their insufficiency plea.
For their part, Halozyme evidently contended the transaction was far narrower, although I consider I should address two possibilities:
The first is that the ‘issue’ or ‘transaction’ should be defined by Halozyme’s pleading of infringement.
The second is that the ‘issue’ or ‘transaction’ is confined to that which Halozyme seek to prove by their NOE.
On the first possibility, MSD relied on the fact that the plea of infringement includes an allegation of infringement of claim 1 (Particulars of Infringement [2]). On that basis, I understood MSD to invite me effectively to write in the whole text of claim 1 which covers modified polypeptides based on a class of some 37 unmodified polypeptides: SEQ ID NO: 3, 7 or 32-66. The contention appeared to be that the issue or transaction extended to any testing involving any of those sequences.
I regard that as a rather artificial argument in circumstances where it is clear that Halozyme only seek to prove infringement via the experiment in which the sequence used is SEQ ID NO: 3. After all, if Halozyme prove infringement via the experiment featuring SEQ ID NO:3, a finding of infringement would not be displaced by some other experiment involving SEQ ID NO:35 which, let me assume, failed to establish the increased activity required by claim 1.
In my view, the relevant ‘issue’ or ‘transaction’ in this case is confined by the NOE. In the normal way, the waiver extends to any work-up experiments for the experiment relied upon in the NOE, but, as I understand matters, Halozyme has already disclosed those.
A conclusion that the ‘issue’ or ‘transaction’ extends to the whole action, both infringement and validity, would be, in my view, far too wide and would be plainly contrary to the principles explained in Magnesium Elektron, particularly at [109].
Furthermore, as Halozyme submitted, the fact that there are pleaded issues in dispute (i.e. insufficiency) between the parties does not make privileged material disclosable. The only question is whether the NOE consequentially waived privilege in documents relating to the production of PH20 polypeptides with different sequences. I concluded not.
In this regard, it is relevant to note that in their arguments, MSD were selective as to the information and therefore the inferences they invited from Halozyme’s requests for more time to serve their NOE. This is the reason why I set out the relevant reasons which were put forward by Halozyme’s solicitors for the extensions of time requested. To a significant extent, MSD ignored those reasons and simply invited the inference that Halozyme had failed to make a SEQ ID NO.35 comparator because the task was too difficult i.e. an undue burden.
However, in their correspondence (as indicated above), Halozyme’s solicitors cited a specific problem with one reagent. In my view, it does not follow that a problem with a reagent establishes undue burden. It may simply be the case that there was a problem with a reagent. In any event, as I indicated during the hearing, MSD bear the onus of proving their insufficiency pleas and it is open to MSD to conduct experiments which establish undue burden.
Overall, I was satisfied that what Halozyme has released from privilege represents the whole of the material relevant to the issue in question and there is no unfairness here.
The redactions issue
On this issue, the submissions made to me appeared to revolve around a satellite dispute which arose following attempts to resolve this issue in correspondence, following service of Crosse 1. The satellite dispute concerned an issue of confidentiality. I must explain how this issue emerged.
Request 2 in the RFI asked Halozyme to explain the basis for the redactions in the documents supplied relating to Experiments A and B (see 16.i)b) above). The response explained that the material redacted ‘does not relate to experiments which used comparable experimental protocols to the experiments relied upon and are therefore privileged for the reasons explained in Appendix B to Halozyme’s Disclosure Certificate.’
Mr Bennett’s complaint was phrased as follows:
‘40. This response does not explain the basis for Halozyme’s redactions. Per its Disclosure Statement, Halozyme accepted that these documents constituted work-up – containing “results of experiments undertaken in contemplation of litigation which utilised comparable experimental protocol(s)” to those relied upon the Notice of Experiments – such that privilege has been waived. Indeed, documents 13 and 15 appear to themselves be comparable experimental protocols, yet Halozyme has selectively redacted certain parts of the protocol and results in respect of the same.’
In view of what transpired, it is important to note at the outset what Mr Crosse said in response in his first witness statement on the topic of the redactions relating to Experiments A and B.
First, he referred to that part of the Disclosure Statement served with the NOE which I summarised at 16.i)b) above, giving this further explanation:
‘(2) the results of experiments which utilised comparable experimental protocol(s) to the experiment relied upon in the Notice of Experiments, but whose results were not relied upon in the Notice of Experiments ("Category 2 Documents"). The Category 2 Documents consist of redacted protocols and results from experiments (referred to as Experiments A & B) that are different to the experiment which is the subject of the Notice of Experiments, and which were not experiments representing preliminary investigations leading to the experiment that was the subject of the Notice (in which case they would have fallen within Category 1). Once again, they are not documents or experiments that are the subject of the Notice of Experiments and Halozyme has not voluntarily waived privilege in them by its reliance on the Notice. Prior to service of the Notice both the redacted and unredacted parts of these documents were subject to litigation privilege. However, although Experiments A & B are different to the experiment which is described in the Notice, one part of the protocols for each of Experiments A and B uses the same assay and conditions as the experiment which is in the Notice, and conducting Experiment A or B therefore leads to the generation of some data which could be said to represent additional runs of the experiment in the Notice. Halozyme therefore accepted for the purpose of the UK proceedings (and subject to CPR 31.22) that the data in the Category 2 documents generated using the conditions used in the experiment of the Notice, and the parts of the Category 2 documents which set out how those data were generated, should be disclosed in accordance with the "completeness of data" principle in the Mayne Pharma line of cases. However, the redacted parts of the Category 2 documents relate to subject matter which could not possibly be characterised as a repeat run of the experiment in the Notice, and Halozyme therefore maintains that privilege in the redacted parts of these documents remains, and that they do not fall within the scope of the consequential disclosure obligations of Mayne Pharma. Halozyme therefore provided disclosure of the redacted documents to MSD, but resists disclosure of the unredacted versions.’
Later, he addressed Mr Bennett’s complaints in these paragraphs:
‘40. In paragraphs 36-37 of Bennett 8, Mr Bennett refers to the redactions made to the experimental protocol and results for Experiments A and B in the documents disclosed with Halozyme’s Notice of Experiments, and in paragraphs 39-40 he refers to Halozyme’s response to Requests 2 and 3 in the RFI, which relate to those redactions.
41. As I have explained above, Experiments A and B are not experiments relied on by Halozyme in its Notice of Experiments, nor are they experiments which led to the experiment in the Notice. The unredacted material disclosed in relation to Experiments A & B was disclosed under the "completeness of data" principles in the Mayne Pharma line of cases for the reasons explained in Halozyme’s disclosure statement. However, the redacted material (as Halozyme’s disclosure statement and RFI response make clear) does not relate to experiments which used comparable experimental protocols to the experiments relied on. Only parts of experiments A and B used protocols comparable to that of the experiment relied on in the Notice (and so those parts of the protocols and results were disclosed), whereas other parts did not (and so those protocols and results were not disclosed).’
On receipt of Crosse 1, MSD’s solicitors wrote saying this:
‘Crosse 1 fails to provide a proper explanation as to the basis for the redactions made to documents 13-17 of Halozyme’s work-up disclosure (which we understand to be the “Category 2 Documents” referred to in Crosse 1). The only basis it is reasonable to infer is that the redacted material concerns testing conducted in the presence of a phenolic preservative. Whilst it is MSD’s position that privilege has been waived in these documents and that unredacted copies of the Category 2 Documents ought to have been disclosed, MSD is prepared to refrain from seeking unredacted copies of these documents if Halozyme confirms, by return, that the redactions to the Category 2 Documents do relate to testing conducted in the presence of a phenolic preservative.’
At this point, it should be noted that testing conducted in the presence of a phenolic preservative related to EP 622 and not to EP 347.
Halozyme’s solicitors responded as follows:
‘We note your confirmation that MSD will no longer seek an order for provision of the materials encompassed by paragraphs 1(d), 1(e) and 2 (insofar as it relates to Request 8 and 9 of the RFI) of the draft Order.
With regard to the position set out in your first letter of 18 June that MSD will no longer seek an order for provision of unredacted copies of the Category 2 Documents (i.e. paragraph 3 of the draft Order) if our client were to confirm that the redactions to the Category 2 Documents relate to testing conducted in the presence of a phenolic preservative, we are taking instructions.
However, our client would plainly be unable to provide your client with information characterising the nature of the experiments described in the redacted parts of the Category 2 Documents ("Category 2 Characterising Information") if the act of doing so might itself be said to amount to a broader waiver of privilege. Please therefore confirm the following by return:
1. That, if our client were to provide your client with any Category 2 Characterising Information, such information would only be disclosed to, and would be kept confidential by, the solicitors and counsel acting for MSD in the above-captioned proceedings, and the specific individuals at MSD responsible for instructing them in those proceedings;
2. That MSD will not argue, in these proceedings or otherwise, that the provision by Halozyme of any Category 2 Characterising Information amounts to a waiver of privilege in the information provided (with regard to any party other than MSD) or any other information whatsoever (with regard to any party including MSD); and
3. That any Category 2 Characterising Information provided by Halozyme will be subject to CPR 31.22, and MSD will not make any application under CPR 31.22(1) or oppose any application under CPR 31.22(2) to maintain confidentiality and privilege in such information.’
The correspondence continued, but in essence, MSD indicated they would agree point 3 and, on that basis, disputed the need for the confirmation at point 1. On point 2, MSD agreed that it would not argue for a broader waiver of privilege in other information.
This response was not acceptable to Halozyme. They contended that the confirmations offered by MSD were insufficient to preserve privilege in any Category 2 Characterising Information, on the basis that privileged material had to remain confidential. Furthermore, in view of the proposal only to use any such information solely for the purposes of these proceedings, Halozyme’s solicitors said they could not understand why it was objectionable to agree to point 1.
MSD’s response was simply to say that the assurances they had offered were sufficient.
In his submissions on this aspect, Mr Waugh KC submitted that Halozyme’s position was driven by their position on their appeal against HHJ Hacon’s decision to award indemnity costs against Halozyme on EP 622. Mr Waugh suggested it was reasonable to infer that the redactions relate to testing in phenolic conditions and therefore relate to the EP622 case. So he submitted, it cannot be right for Halozyme to sit on documents which show that HHJ Hacon was entirely right to draw the inference he did, but demand they be kept confidential over and above CPR31.22 when, as he suggested, ‘there was nothing confidential in them other than the fact that they would have scuppered their 622 case’.
I could not see an unsurmountable difficulty and asked Mr Waugh why the appeal could not be conducted on the basis (at least initially) that the documents were confidential – after all the Court of Appeal would be able to take a view as to whether to maintain confidentiality. On this basis, MSD would have the documents and would know whether their inference was correct or not. Mr Waugh nonetheless maintained that maintaining confidence would put MSD in a very difficult position.
In response, Mr Tappin KC pointed out that what MSD was now seeking was not what is sought in their application notice.
Mr Tappin made his submissions on the basis that MSD’s hypothesis was correct, but made it clear he was not saying one way or the other whether it was or not (to avoid any suggestion of further waiver of privilege). On that basis, Mr Tappin first pointed out that MSD did have a request for documents relating to testing in the presence of a phenolic preservative – in 1(e) of their Application Notice, but that was abandoned following service of Crosse 1. He referred me to the passages in Crosse 1 which explained that testing in the presence of a phenolic preservative (relating to stability) was quite different to the testing the subject of the experiment(s) in the NOE (relating to activity).
Halozyme’s Grounds of Appeal against the Order of HHJ Hacon awarding the costs of EP 622 on the indemnity basis were not in the bundles – which Mr Tappin suggested meant this argument was very much an afterthought. Nonetheless, in the course of his submissions, Mr Tappin was able to explain the two aspects of Halozyme’s appeal to me, having laid his hands on those Grounds. Only the second appeared to be the basis of Mr Waugh’s argument and Mr Tappin read it out as follows:
‘The learned judge erred in principle in supporting his decision to award costs on the indemnity basis by the view he formed about [the] English experiments. The learned judge wrongly drew an inference from Halozyme’s maintenance of privilege.’
On that basis, Mr Tappin submitted that cannot possibly amount to a waiver of privilege. In his reply submissions, Mr Waugh appeared to me to have no answer to that.
Analysis
From Halozyme’s response, it was clear to me that the basis for the redactions was that the material redacted was irrelevant. This point was rather confirmed by the arguments presented by Mr Waugh KC, which revolved around EP 622.
The arguments presented to me revolved around whether the redacted material, if disclosed to MSD, should be kept confidential. There was no evidence, to my mind, to contradict what Mr Crosse had explained.
Accordingly, on the two possible bases put forward:
The primary basis argued before me was that the redacted material either was not confidential or confidentiality should not be maintained. I conclude there was no substance to this basis. Experiments A and B were done in private. Waiver aside, there is no basis on which I can simply remove the confidence attaching to those materials.
The second possible basis was waiver – in essence the allegation of cherry-picking. I conclude this had no substance, in view of what Mr Crosse had explained.
Having reached those conclusions on the basis of what is in issue in this action, I pause to consider whether Halozyme’s appeal against the award of indemnity costs on EP 622 involves a waiver. In view of what was explained to me about the appeal, there is no substance to this either. Furthermore, revealing the redacted material without confidentiality would or might result in a waiver of privilege.
These reasons explain why I also rejected this aspect of MSD’s application.
The remaining points were agreed and embodied in the Order which the parties managed to agree following the hearing.