Paramount Skydance Corporation & Anor v Nokia Corporation & Anor

This is the hearing of an urgent ex parte application by two companies in the Paramount Group (to whom I will refer simply as “Paramount”), for an interim anti-anti-suit injunction against two companies in the Nokia Group (I will refer to them simply as “Nokia”).

The relief was sought, as it is put in the very helpful and detailed skeleton of Mr. Purvis KC, who appears for Paramount today, to “hold the ring” and to preserve this court's ability to decide Paramount’s claims in this jurisdiction until a return date

The circumstances of the application and the relief are, as Mr. Purvis submits, very similar (but not identical) to those that arose in Warner Bros v Nokia [2025] EWHC 2888 (Pat), where Mellor J granted an ex parte interim anti-anti-suit injunction until an inter partes return date. Not only is the application similar, but the overall dispute between Paramount and Nokia, which has led to international litigation in a number of fora, is really quite similar to that between Warner Bros and Nokia, in that it covers RAND obligations under the ITU regime, as they relate to coding and decoding technology for video-streaming. I refer to Mellor J’s decision for a broader explanation of that strategic picture and I will not burden this judgment with it any further.

By its application and as supported in its skeleton argument, Paramount sought anti-anti-suit relief very similar to that in Warner Bros, permission to serve out by alternative means, so as to bring any anti-suit relief to the attention to Nokia speedily, and directions so that the return date of any order I made could be at the same time as the return date in the Warner Bros case, which is very probably the 1st or 2nd December.

I read the skeleton submitted and the evidence in support, which consists of two witness statements of Mr. Pereira, of Paramount’s solicitors, Kirkland & Ellis, and a witness statement of a German adviser to Paramount, Dr. Schröer, carefully and I have to say that it seemed to me that Paramount was dangerously close to making the argument that it was in exactly the same situation as Warner Bros in material respects and that an anti-anti-suit order ought to follow almost automatically.

For reasons I will come on to, it is unnecessary to examine that in any great detail, but I will say straight away, and I think this is important for future cases, that there is not (and never can be) anything automatic about an anti-suit injunction or an anti-anti-suit injunction, especially in the turbulent international situation that currently applies with this SEP/FRAND type of litigation in Europe. Every application of this kind has to be keenly scrutinised by the court with the greatest care, to make sure that an anti-suit or an anti-anti-suit injunction is justified on the unique facts of the case. It remains a quite exceptional remedy.

I do not read Mellor J’s decision in Warner Bros as saying anything different from that and, furthermore, at the moment, every case is even more unique (I appreciate that one should not really say something is “more unique”, but the reader of this judgment will understand what I mean) because of the rapidly fluctuating situation that arises from successive decisions of judges in this court and in the UPC, in particular.

Differences between this case and Warner Bros include, as Mr. Purvis very helpfully and rightly recognised and, indeed, as was stated in Paramount’s evidence, that there is a forthcoming hearing in the Warner Bros litigation, as I have mentioned, which might condition Nokia’s attitude to seeking anti-suit relief in Germany or the UPC and the timing of this litigation, which is very different because the UK action by Paramount and this anti-anti-suit injunction, are brought much later after the commencement of other litigation, including the German litigation by Nokia. These may or may not have been important differences had I had to come to consider it, but they illustrate that every case must be scrutinised very specifically before the court will ever contemplate granting anti-anti-suit relief, for all the reasons I have touched on and also because of the importance of comity.

As I have said, this is a picture that I might have had to consider in detail had events not moved on yesterday. I am likely to be the judge on the return date of the Warner Brothers AASI application and, in any event, as will come as no surprise to the reader, Mellor J and I liaise closely over the forthcoming business in the diary of the Patents Court. As a result, it came to my attention in the context of the Warner Bros litigation that a witness statement had been submitted by a Mr. Darvill of Bird & Bird, on behalf of Nokia, which stated that Nokia had not applied for an injunction in any jurisdiction seeking to prevent Warner Brothers from bringing a claim anywhere in the world and that Nokia does not intend to apply for an injunction to prevent Warner Brothers prosecuting any aspect of that claim in the UK.

I found this a difficult situation to be put in because this obviously, as indeed Paramount have very pragmatically accepted, if known to Paramount, would make the anti-anti-suit injunction application that Paramount intended close to impossible; indeed, it has effectively accepted that ex parte relief is now impossible. However, at the same time, the witness statement of Mr. Darvill was provided by Nokia in a different case. I should say that the witness statement is not designated as confidential in that case and is bound to become public in the next week or so, so there is most probably no issue with confidentiality.

I concluded that it was unreal and would be unjust to all concerned, including Nokia, for Paramount’s application today to go ahead without Paramount being aware of the situation and I say that I think it would have been unjust to Nokia because it was, it seemed to me, very probably in Nokia’s interests that an ex parte injunction, with all of the aggravation and disruption and concern that it would cause, not to be made if it was avoidable.

So, not without some concern and after a considerable amount of thought, I decided that the right course was to draw to Paramount’s attention a small extract of Mr. Darvill’s witness statement, setting out Nokia's not having made an application and not having any intention to do so. As I have said already, his witness statement was not confidential, but out of an abundance of caution, I provided only a short aspect and removed all litigation-specific material.

I also required that, despite not being designated “Confidential”, the extract should be treated as such, that it should only be provided to external advisers, for the purpose of this application and to one named client at Paramount. I am grateful for the fact that Paramount have worked with this and reacted to it in the spirit in which it was intended.

After I had done that, I was informed by Paramount’s representatives that there had been correspondence between it, that is Kirkland & Ellis, on behalf of Paramount, and Taylor Wessing, on behalf of Warner Brothers, about the provision of information from the latter to the former. It transpires, I make absolutely no criticism of this, it seems to me entirely sensible, that in telephone conversations, Kirkland & Ellis had told Warner Brothers of its intention to seek ex parte anti-anti-suit relief and, in a letter, Taylor Wessing have set out that they told Kirkland & Ellis that Nokia had set out its position in relation to the order in the Warner Bros proceedings in a witness statement, but that Taylor Wessing was constrained by the rules, in particular CPR 32.12, which I accept and agree is the right provision, from giving the witness statement to Paramount without an order of the court. Taylor Wessing did indicate that they would comply in short order with an order if I made one, and I think I may reasonably infer (although I could be wrong) that Taylor Wessing had also appreciated the potential significance of my seeing the witness statement of Mr. Darvill.

In all the circumstances, and in the very unusual situation that had arisen, I consider that I was right to do as I did and that I had power to do it under CPR 32.12, which permits the use of a witness statement for purposes other than the action in which it is provided with the permission of the Court. Of course I made that order without reference to Nokia and they are entitled to apply to set it aside. But I think and hope, with the wisdom of hindsight, that it has had the useful effect that I intended of heading off an ex parte order which would increase the temperature very greatly and provide a further threat to judicial comity in Europe.

So, I will now include in the order that I make on the application today an appropriate order under 32.12 retrospectively to formalise what I did yesterday.

Having in mind that which I have discussed, it seems to me that an application which might have succeeded or failed, but which was marginal, for an anti-anti-suit injunction, was rendered inappropriate and Paramount accept that. When I say “inappropriate”, I do not mean wrong to make, rather I simply mean overtaken by events. Rather than seek anti-anti-suit relief in the form of an injunction, Paramount have provided a much more moderate order which seeks simply that Nokia should make certain statements about its actions and its intentions.

Out of an extreme abundance of caution, again, I will not read out what those are, but I am not prepared to make an order requiring Nokia to do something at an ex parte hearing when they have no notice, in particular because the order sought requires them to do various things by 5.00 p.m. on Monday (today is Friday) and the information and assurances sought would require careful consideration on Nokia’s part. In any event, I think that it is inappropriate to make a mandatory order, even allowing for the fact it is a direction and not backed by a penal notice, without Nokia having any opportunity to comment.

I will say, however, and it was my intention to do this anyway, although Mr. Purvis encourages me to do it, that it will be most welcome if Nokia is able to respond constructively in broadly the way sought in paragraph 5 of the draft order before me (by which I mean addressing those sorts of matters) and the sooner the better. Importantly, I think it is extremely desirable, and I strongly encourage Nokia, to reply in good time before the return date of the hearing of the anti-anti-suit injunction in Warner Bros, which is the 1st or 2nd December.

I anticipate that although Monday would be too soon, Nokia ought to be able to respond shortly after that and without making an order requiring them to do so or as to the contents of their response, I encourage it.

I also encourage Nokia to consider and for Nokia and Paramount to confer about whether it is useful for this matter to return at the same time as the Warner Brothers application that I have referred to already (on the 1st or 2nd December). I consider it inappropriate to order that that definitely should happen in the absence of Nokia and without their input, but it is an obvious possibility that there is good sense in it. Again, without making an order, I strongly encourage Nokia to consider it and I encourage both parties to discuss it, and that will also need to include discussions with Warner Brothers and its representatives.

The draft order before me preserves Paramount’s opportunity to renew the anti-anti-suit injunction application hereafter, depending on events which must, of course, include, implicitly at least, Nokia’s response, and clearly that is appropriate. It is earnestly to be hoped that Nokia can provide information which makes it unnecessary, and I think it is likely that that will happen. But against the, I hope, relatively slim chance that it does not, it is obviously right that the claimants are able to renew the injunction application, perhaps in a modified form, if it is absolutely necessary.

I was also asked to order alternative service. I am going to come to permission to serve outside of the jurisdiction, which is also sought, last, but I was asked to consider alternative service in the event that anti-anti-suit relief was granted, so that the injunction could be brought to the attention of Nokia as soon as possible. In Mr. Purvis's skeleton and in Mr. Pereira’s evidence, alternative service was conditional on obtaining an anti-anti-suit injunction, so in that sense it may fall away.

Alternative service could still have been useful if I had been prepared to make a mandatory order for Nokia to provide information or comfort, but I have declined to do that as well. In those circumstances, Mr. Purvis has pragmatically accepted, for which I am grateful, that given that service in Finland can be accomplished very swiftly, refreshingly so, there is no need for alternative service and, in any event, in the context I have explained, including the ability to serve quickly in Finland, I would not have been willing to do it ex parte.

The last matter I have to deal with is service outside the jurisdiction. Ordinarily, if it were not for the present ex parte application, that is a matter that would be dealt with by a Master, but clearly it was appropriate to make the application along with the application for alternative service and the anti-anti-suit injunction, so I propose to deal with it.

I said at the beginning of these reasons that it was not appropriate to treat the grant of anti-anti-suit relief as automatic or following from a factual similarity between cases. That notion applies differently service out, where it is perfectly possible that with the rules being as they are and the long line of authority now on service out in these cases, that factual situations can be sufficiently similar, indeed materially identical, that it is appropriate to grant permission to serve out by reference to a previous case and for exactly the same reasons.

Mr. Purvis's skeleton stepped carefully through the gateways, the analysis in Mellor J's decision in Warner Bros, and the suitability of the English court as a suitable forum (indeed, I think it was said the only forum). But, in any event, I am satisfied that the decision of Mellor J in Warner Bros, at paragraphs 20-38, apply identically, mutatis mutandis, to this case, and I therefore will give permission to serve out for exactly the same reasons.

Subject to any sweeping-up of points that I have missed, that concludes my reasons on this application.