Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc. & Anor v Nokia Corporation & Anor

On 3 November 2025 I granted Orders sought by the Claimants (‘WBD’) without notice to the Defendants for (a) a Confidentiality Order, (b) permission to serve these proceedings out of the jurisdiction on the Defendants and (c) an Order for Anti-Anti-Suit and associated relief (‘AASI’), pursuant to three applications (together the ‘Applications’). Since the current position is complex and fast-moving, both factually and in legal terms, and some precision is required, I indicated I would give my reasons in writing and this judgment contains my reasons.

This action and actions by the Defendants against one or more of the Claimants and/or associated companies in four jurisdictions (Brazil, Germany, the UPC and the US) were commenced on Saturday 1 November 2025, for reasons which are said to remain confidential. On Saturday evening I received the Applications Bundle and the Claimants’ detailed Skeleton Argument, and the remaining bundles on Sunday morning. I was able to carry out reasonably extensive reading on Sunday which culminated in a message which was conveyed by my clerk to the Claimants that I would commence the hearing at 10.30am on Monday 3 November 2025 but I would be assisted with submissions specifically directed to whether notice of the hearing (particularly of the AASI relief) should be given to the Defendants (collectively ‘Nokia’ unless the context requires otherwise, in which case ‘Nokia Corp’ or ‘Nokia Tech’).

The hearing duly commenced at 10.30am on Monday 3 November 2025 and I heard brief argument on the terms of the Confidentiality Order (which I granted pro tem), more substantial argument on the Service Out Application, which I also granted, but reserving the position on the provisions as to alternative service until after I had determined the application for AASI relief which took up the bulk of the hearing which continued until 3pm.

The Applications were supported by the First, Second and Third Witness Statements of Michael Washbrook, a partner at the Claimants’ solicitors and a First Witness Statement of Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont. Mr Washbrook made his Fourth Witness Statement on Sunday 2 November 2025 providing details of the claims commenced by Nokia in the four jurisdictions I mentioned above, even though none of them had been served on the Claimants and he was reporting details reported in the press, including the fact that Nokia is seeking urgent ex parte injunctive relief in the Rio de Janeiro actions which were filed at 00:00:02 (GMT-3). In response to my message, a Second Witness Statement of Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont was presented in draft, with a finalised version presented to me during the hearing.

Both witness statements from Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont were intended to and did assist me in understanding certain aspects of the procedure in the UPC and the German national courts, even though much of what he said was already familiar to me. Although he is not an independent witness, I agree that it was appropriate for foreign law evidence to be given in his witness statements.

I was supplied with an extensive and detailed Skeleton Argument which was primarily directed to the AASI relief, not least because the other two applications were dealt with in detail in Mr Washbrook’s First and Third Witness Statements. The Skeleton drew my attention to all the relevant authorities. In my pre-reading, I was struck by the comprehensive and accurate account of the existing caselaw in this area contained in Mr Washbrook’s witness statements and in the Skeleton Argument. In short, these applications appeared to me to be very well prepared.

Although it is necessary to summarise a lot of the background and the relevant legal principles, I will attempt to do it as succinctly as possible. With the relevant principles in mind, the AASI application came down to a relatively short point, which I detail below.

I should add at the outset that this application came at an awkward time, in the sense that I am still endeavouring to complete my judgment from a 4 day hearing in the Acer, ASUS & Hisense actions against Nokia, in which Nokia made their challenge to jurisdiction and the Claimants made their application for interim licence declaratory relief. Many of the considerations at play in those applications are likely to have application in this action in due course.

Furthermore, at 4pm on Friday 31 October 2025, the Court of Appeal handed down their judgment overturning my decision to grant interim licence declaratory relief in Samsung v ZTE and I have invited further submissions from the parties in Acer v Nokia to take account of that.

WBD are part of the Warner Bros. group of companies, a global media and entertainment business that produces and distributes a portfolio of content across television, film, streaming, interactive gaming and publishing. The First Claimant is the ultimate parent entity in the group, and the Second Claimant is a UK company which delivers content direct to consumers in the UK and other countries including in Europe, via online platforms.

WBD distributes branded audio-visual content that implement and/or interoperate with H.264 (AVC) and H.265 (HEVC) video coding recommendations (the ‘Relevant Standards’) of the ITU-T.

The Defendants need little introduction. Suffice to say that Nokia owns or has a right to license a portfolio of patents that have been declared essential to or are required to implement the Relevant Standards (defined by WBD as the ‘Codec SEP Portfolio’). WBD also referred to a second Nokia portfolio (‘the Remaining Video Portfolio’) – ‘other patents declared essential to or required to implement other video coding standards, and those relevant to multimedia technologies and not considered by Nokia to be essential or required for implementation of the Relevant Standards’, with both portfolios referred to jointly as the ‘Nokia Video Portfolio’.

WBD say this dispute arose following Nokia’s announcement of their intention in 2022 to expand its bilateral licensing business to the video and multimedia industry. Although WBD did not feel able to provide me with any information about negotiations for reasons which are said to remain confidential, I infer that negotiations commenced in 2023.

This claim by WBD is in familiar form. It is an implementer-led claim for the determination of a RAND licence to the UK SEPs in Nokia’s Codec SEP Portfolio. WBD’s case is that such a licence would be global and would cover both encoding and decoding patents that are necessarily infringed when using the Relevant Standards and would include terms to ensure patent peace over the Nokia Video Portfolio more generally.

WBD’s route to that relief is also in familiar form.

First, WBD seeks declarations of invalidity and/or non-essentiality in respect of two EP (UK) patents (‘the Challenged Patents’) owned by Nokia Tech (the ‘Technical Patent Claims’).

Second, WBD seek relief in the ‘RAND Claims’, as follows:

WBD has given an unequivocal undertaking to this Court to enter into the RAND Licence determined by this Court.

It is fair to say that WBD are seeking in this action the fullest extent of relief which they say is available and that point is relevant to my consideration of the AASI relief.

I can briefly summarise the bases on which I was satisfied it was appropriate to grant permission to serve these proceedings out of the jurisdiction on both Defendants, although it is fair to say the focus of the claims is the Second Defendant which, on the evidence, is likely to be the owner of all relevant SEPs.

In his first witness statement, Mr Washbrook set out a full analysis of WBD’s claim, F/RAND proceedings in the UK (including implementer-led claims), adjustable or ‘interim’ licence declarations (including the Court of Appeal decision in Samsung v ZTE [2025] EWCA Civ 1383), which was the background for WBD’s contentions as to the relevant Gateways for service out. It is unnecessary to set all of that out. Suffice to say that I was entirely satisfied that there was a serious issue to be tried on all aspects of WBD’s claim.

WBD relied, to the extent necessary, on the following gateways in relation to the Technical Patent and RAND Claims. WBD contended that there is a good arguable case that the respective claims fall within at least one of the grounds set out below. I summarise as follows.

Gateway 11: The Technical Patent Claims against Nokia Tech fall within Gateway 11 given each one relates wholly to the Challenged Patents owned by Nokia Tech, with each being (i) a RAND-encumbered patent in force in the UK, and (ii) where a RAND licensing declaration has been made by Nokia Tech in relation to EP(UK)2,375,749 (and also by Nokia Corp for each Challenged Patent).

WBD also contended that the Technical Patent Claims engage Gateway 16A on the basis that any claim or counterclaim brought by Nokia Tech against WBD for infringement of the Challenged Patents (or any other patents in the Nokia Video Portfolio) would fall within Gateway 9(b) and 9(c) (a claim in tort with damage resulting from an act committed within the jurisdiction and/or governed by the law of England and Wales) and/or Gateway 11.

The RAND Claims against Nokia Corp and Nokia Tech (i) relate wholly or principally to property within the jurisdiction as required by Gateway 11, being the RAND-encumbered Challenged Patents and/or the UK SEPs in Nokia's Codec SEP Portfolio, and (ii) include claims for declarations, the effect of which is a claim to a right not to be subject to an injunction for infringing a UK SEP, as required by Gateway 16A. While WBD's position is that a RAND licence agreement would be global in scope and cover the Nokia Video Portfolio as a whole (including NEPs and foreign patents), this does not disentitle WBD from relying on Gateways 11 and 16A on the basis of the existing caselaw.

In very brief summary, the relevant caselaw starts with the observation by Birss LJ in Vestel v Access Advance [2021] EWCA Civ 440 at [71] that Gateway 11 could apply to a claim for a declaration of the F/RAND terms of a licence covering UK SEPs, even if the alleged or declared F/RAND licence also covers non-UK SEPs. This analysis was applied by Zacaroli J. (as he then was) in Alcatel/Nokia v Amazon [2024] EWHC 1921 (Pat) (‘Alcatel/Nokia v Amazon’), including his distinction between the subject matter of the licence sought and the subject matter of the claim, and also endorsed by Fancourt J. in his first instance judgment in Tesla v Avanci and InterDigital [2024] EWHC 1815 at [44]-[45] and [126]-[127]. On appeal, in his minority judgment in Tesla v Avanci and InterDigital [2025] EWCA Civ 193, Arnold LJ agreed with Birss LJ's reasoning in Vestel v Access Advance.

Finally, I was reminded of the latest decision, that of Leech J. in MediaTek v Huawei [2025] EWHC 649 (Pat), where he observed:

I should add that, in relation to the contentions which relied on Nokia Tech bringing a claim or counterclaim for infringement of the Challenged Patents or any of its relevant UK SEPs, I kept in mind that Nokia may adopt the same position as they have in Acer v Nokia, which is that they will not bring any claim for infringement of its UK video decoding SEPs, at least for the purposes of their challenge to jurisdiction.

Gateway 4A – WBD contended the RAND Claims also pass through Gateway 4A(c) on the basis that they arise out of the same or closely connected facts as the Technical Patent Claims.

Gateway 3 – which I will say a little about. WBD relied on this gateway in the alternative to serve the Technical Patent and RAND claims on Nokia Corp, the parent company in the group. WBD made it clear that Nokia Corp does not itself hold any ITU-T SEPs and Mr Washbrook mentioned the Order I made in the Acer v Nokia actions on 13 October 2025 giving those claimants permission to discontinue their claims against Nokia Corp, but contended that they have a good arguable case that Nokia Corp is a necessary and proper party to the claim, relying on the following points:

Mr Washbrook also drew my attention, by way of full and frank disclosure, to six matters which Nokia may seek to argue in a challenge to jurisdiction, drawing on the challenge which Nokia made in the Acer/ASUS/Hisense claims, with which I am very familiar. Again, in brief summary, leaving out the details mentioned by Mr Washbrook:

Notwithstanding all these points, I reached the clear view that WBD have a good arguable case on each of the Gateways mentioned above. I turn to the final consideration of whether England is the proper place in which to bring WBD’s claims.

Mr Washbrook set out in [105(a) to (l)] of his first witness statement a series of familiar reasons why he contended that the Courts of England & Wales are clearly the most appropriate forum for WBD’s claims, which I need not set out, but can be summarised as follows:

In any event, WBD point out that their application for an AASI is without prejudice to any jurisdiction challenge that Nokia may elect to bring in these proceedings which, if successful, would mean that the order sought would cease to be in force. The application is brought to preserve the status quo until an inter partes return date to ensure that Nokia does not take action in other jurisdictions that would deprive this Court of the opportunity to decide whether it is the most appropriate forum for this dispute.

In addition, Mr Washbrook pointed out that Nokia may contend there is or may be an alternative forum that is more appropriate for the resolution of the dispute. He noted that, for various reasons, Nokia might contend that the USA, Finland and an international arbitration are more appropriate fora. On the latter point, Mr Washbrook took the position that arbitration is a method of alternative dispute resolution and not a forum, citing by analogy Fancourt J. in Kigen v Thales [2022] EWHC 2846 (Pat)at [9], [18] and [33].

Arbitration aside, Nokia are likely to take the same position as they stated publicly in the Acer/ASUS/Hisense jurisdiction challenges – that no court has or should have to power to determine (F)RAND terms.

The final point by way of full and frank disclosure made in Mr Washbrook’s statement was to draw attention to the defensive claim which WBD has brought in Sao Paulo, Brazil, against Nokia Tech and a local Nokia subsidiary the existence of which has already been publicly reported.

Overall, on the current evidence I was satisfied that this is the proper forum for WBD’s claims, not least because of Nokia’s publicly stated position.

I should add that in the Service Out application, WBD sought orders for alternative service on various individuals (including representatives at Bird & Bird LLP). I postponed consideration of the orders for alternative service until after I had determined the AASI Application. However, as I have already mentioned, I decided at the hearing to grant the AASI relief, which confirmed that the orders for alternative service were appropriate.

WBD introduced their application on the basis that the object of the AASI and certain ancillary relief is to protect the integrity of the English court process and to prevent conduct by Nokia which they contend would be vexatious and oppressive. In particular, it is to restrain Nokia (or their affiliates) from seeking anti-suit relief which would have the effect of prohibiting WBD from pursuing inter alia its claims for this Court to declare the terms of a RAND licence for the UK SEPs in the Nokia Codec SEP Portfolio, at least on an interim basis. The AASI is designed to ‘hold the ring’ on a temporary basis, until an inter partes return date. WBD said that the relief sought is similar to that granted by Meade J in Amazon.com v InterDigital VC Holdings [2025] EWHC 2708 (Pat) (‘Amazon v InterDigital AASI Judgment’) and presented me with a track change version showing the changes over the Order granted by Meade J. Certain of those changes were reasonably extensive, as I shall describe.

WBD placed significant emphasis on the two recent anti-interim licence injunctions (the ‘AILI Decisions’) granted in the Munich Regional Court (Ref 21 O 12112/25) and by the Mannheim Local Division of the UPC (UPC_CFI_936/2025) in the Amazon v InterDigital proceedings, contending that those AILIs mark a significant escalation in SEP-holder tactics. Until September 2025, no SEP owner had sought to restrain an implementer’s RAND claims in this jurisdiction by way of an AILI. WBD submitted that InterDigital’s success in obtaining such orders demonstrates a new and potent tactic: seeking to pre-empt and suppress implementer-led RAND actions in the English courts on the basis that they interfere with foreign patent enforcement. WBD understands that Amazon has appealed or intends to appeal the AILI Decisions in Germany and the UPC. However, until this issue is resolved on appeal in those fora, WBD contended that this material shift in the conduct of global SEP litigation introduces a real and immediate risk that other SEP holders, including Nokia, will adopt the same approach in comparable circumstances in their proceedings.

I sincerely hope that this will not prove to be the case because, as I discuss later, there is a real need to de-escalate the jurisdictional conflict which currently exists or which is perceived to exist between the UK and the German and UPC courts in these (F)RAND disputes.

I have to assess WBD’s contentions in greater detail below. However, WBD submit that the balance of the risk of injustice plainly falls in favour of granting the relief sought, on the following basis.

Before proceeding further, I should briefly outline the Order which was sought (and granted), summarise the relevant background and outline the applicable legal principles to which my attention was drawn.

As I mentioned, the prohibitory parts of the Order were based on the Order granted by Meade J. but there were some significant additions:

In addition, WBD emphasised the Order was global in its scope, on the basis that once I had decided it was appropriate to grant relief, it made no sense to limit it to the territories of Germany or the UPC, for fear that Nokia would go elsewhere to persuade a Court to grant the proscribed relief.

The further significant feature of the Order which I had in mind was that it applied to the full gamut of relief sought by WBD including:

In this regard, it appeared one of WBD’s principal concerns was being prevented from commencing or pursuing this action at all or securing the jurisdiction of this Court over their requests for a determination by this Court of final RAND terms. I also detected there was a gradation of concern corresponding to the stages at which various relief would be sought and an understandable desire on WBD’s part not to be precluded from any of the relief to which they claim to be entitled.

I have already mentioned the ex parte AILIs granted against Amazon by the Munich Court and the UPC. I was taken through the reasoning in those decisions and particularly the approach in the UPC decision.

The UPC found that should Amazon's RAND Claims for an adjustable licence be granted by the UK High Court, including its claims for declaratory relief, this would have ‘negative consequences [which] may deter [InterDigital] from seeking judicial enforcement before the UPC, which is protected by fundamental rights’ [45]. The UPC stated that ‘there is even the threat of a ruling based on the continental European concept of specific performance’ [46]. They continued to state that ‘Given that the Unified Patent Court is bound by EU law, the case law of the ECJ, and the resulting obligation to enforce EU antitrust law within its jurisdiction, such an encroachment is unacceptable’ [47].

The difference in approach between the UK courts and the German and UPC courts to interim licence declarations in SEP/(F)RAND disputes was considered by Meade J in a case management conference in the Amazon v InterDigitalproceedingsfollowing the AILI Decisions. I can do no better than to repeat his [19]-[20] ([2025] EWHC 2600 (Pat), ‘Amazon v InterDigital CMC Judgment’):

‘Two of the key differences of opinion, and I am summarising and simplifying greatly, are whether and to what extent (F)RAND obligations are purely a matter of competition law, and, secondly, whether the interim licence declarations which the UK court has now made following Court of Appeal decisions in a number of cases starting with Panasonic v Xiaomi [2024] EWCA Civ 1143 , unduly hinder the freedom of patentees in other countries' courts (Arnold LJ in Panasonic sought to make clear at [94]-[97] why he regarded the declarations as appropriate having regard to comity, and that other courts are free to enforce patents entirely as they see fit, but, as the UPC anti-suit decision in this case in particular makes clear, they do not agree).

These are genuinely-held differences between the different courts, which will no doubt be explored and perhaps bridged by discussion, by further decisions, possibly by appeals to higher courts in all of the jurisdictions, or by references to the CJEU, and by various other means.’

As WBD submitted, the impact of the difference of opinion between the courts is reflected by the German courts and the UPC’s concerns in relation to the prospect of implementers such as Amazon seeking specific performance. Whereas the German courts and the UPC appear to have considered (at least thus far) that specific performance is an ‘unacceptable’ encroachment on rights as SEP holders as patent holders and the judicial sovereignty of other states, when viewed though a contractual lens, WBD submitted that an order for specific performance is an order requiring a party to do that which they willingly contracted to do. As Meade J observed, the question whether these differences of opinion will persist beyond these first few decisions (in any or all of the jurisdictions concerned) remains to be seen.

Of relevance to the present application, Counsel drew my attention to contrasting passages in the UPC decision where, on the one hand, it appears that the UPC might object to a final RAND determination being made against the will of the patent owner (a fortiori to an order of specific performance) and a later passage which goes the other way. I should add that I had it well in mind that in both AILI Decisions, the relief only applied to interim and not final relief.

The first point emerges from [48], an important paragraph in which WBD emphasised the underlined passage:

‘48. Of particular relevance in the present case is that, pursuant to Article 20 EPCU, the UPC must give priority to the enforcement of European law. This is only possible if the proceedings concerning a standard-essential patent are conducted in compliance with the EU antitrust law applicable in the present case within the meaning of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and any questions requiring clarification can be referred to the ECJ pursuant to Article 267 TFEU. These questions also include the question of whether the enforcement of prohibition rights under SEP is in conformity with EU antitrust law. This addresses a central area of regulation of patent law applicable to the EU internal market. One of the questions to be decided is whether, in negotiations for a FRAND license and in calculating its amount and the factors to be applied for this purpose, which are used in a comparison with third-party licenses in order to establish comparability, the SEP proprietor applies criteria that comply with antitrust law. Conversely, the Declaration may result in the SEP proprietor being de facto forced to accept an offer (at least for the time being) that is at the lower end of the FRAND corridor or, depending on the amount of the implementer's offer, even outside it. This question must also be answered in the context of EU antitrust law. If an EU court, in this case the UPC, were prevented from conducting this review, this could result in courts not bound by EU law making determinations on (F)RAND licenses that cannot be legally upheld in the European single market and may even be contrary to public policy. This is particularly to be feared in the present case because the granting of an interim license is not preceded by an examination of whether the competing offers are FRAND-compliant or not. If, therefore, the appropriate interim license rate is simply set at the midpoint between the competing offers, this may result in the determination falling outside the corridor of EU law. It is true that the actual FRAND compliance can be determined subsequently. However, the UK courts do not aim to do this, but consider it desirable for the parties to reach a settlement under the pressure of the interim license. In this case, the amount specified in the interim license may become a reference point in further negotiations that is contrary to EU antitrust law. Incidentally, it also seems doubtful whether this approach will encourage the parties to negotiate more rationally in the future.

Rather, it could lead to the exact opposite, with both parties making even more difficult-to-bridge maximum demands in order to have the most favorable starting point possible for further negotiations when overcoming their differences.’

Whilst that paragraph contains statements with which we in the UK might disagree, WBD’s point was the underlined passage seems to suggest that the UPC court in question has a problem with any action which the UK courts may take that results in the UPC or other EU Member State court from forming its own view of whether the offers made are (F)RAND. Although the reasoning is aimed at an interim licence declaration which is made against the will of the SEP owner, WBD’s concern was that this passage may indicate that objection would be taken to a final FRAND determination made against the will of the SEP owner, with an even stronger objection being taken to an order for specific performance of the contractual obligation.

As Counsel pointed out, the next sentence ‘It is particularly to be feared…’ focusses on the context of an interim licence declaration but this reasoning does not say that a final global RAND determination by a UK Court would be acceptable.

The passage which might appear to go the other way is the first underlined passage in [52]:

‘Finally, when weighing up the interests involved, it had to be taken into account that the present order is exclusively defensive in nature and is intended to shield the proceedings before the UPC. Neither are the respondents themselves prohibited from pursuing their patent rights in foreign forums, nor is the jurisdiction of foreign courts interfered with. The UK courts are therefore free to decide in the proceedings pending before them how the FRAND rate is to be calculated and what consequences it has in the national territory if a party fails to comply with the court orders. Should this lead to parallel determination of FRAND licenses in different jurisdictions, this must be accepted as a decision of the litigating parties. However, there is no room for economic considerations by the court in the best interests of the parties without mutual consent.’

The second underlined passage appears to row back on that.

I acknowledge that this whole situation is developing rapidly and remains in a state of flux. Further decisions will bring more clarity. I mentioned above that WBD seek the full extent of relief to which they contend they are entitled on a proper contractual analysis, and they cannot be criticised for that. However, on the current information, there remains a risk that the German and UPC courts would react with ASI or AILI relief which might hinder the progress of WBD’s claim in this Court.

In WBD’s submissions these were divided under the following heads, all of which were engaged by the AASI order which WBD sought: (i) anti-suit injunctions, (ii) anti-anti-suit injunctions, (iii) anti-enforcement injunctions, (iv) mandatory relief and (v) quia timet relief.

I was referred to the recent summary of the relevant principles in JP Morgan International Finance Ltd v Werealize.com Ltd [2025] EWHC 1842 (Comm), [107] (Foxton J, although WBD noted his decision is under appeal) citing SAS Institute Inc v World Programming [2020] EWCA Civ 599, with WBD’s emphasis:

i)

The basic principle is that the jurisdiction is to be exercised ‘when the ends of justice require it’. 

ii)

Established categories of case where an injunction may be appropriate (which may overlap) include cases where an injunction is necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the English courtand cases where the pursuit of foreign proceedings is regarded as vexatious or oppressive, but the jurisdiction is not confined to these categories and must be applied flexibly. 

iii)

Great caution must be exercised before such an injunction is granted, at any rate in cases where the injunction is not sought in order to enforce an arbitration or exclusive jurisdiction clause, because of the requirements of comity. 

iv)

When an anti-suit injunction is sought on grounds which do not involve a breach of contract, comity, telling against interference with the process of a foreign court, will always require careful consideration. 

v)

Comity requires that in order for an anti-suit injunction to be granted, the English court must have ‘a sufficient interest’ in the matter in question. Often that sufficient interest will exist by reason of the fact that the English court is the natural forum for the determination of the parties' dispute. In a case where the injunction is sought in order to protect the jurisdiction or process of the English courts, the existence of a sufficient interest will generally be self-evident. 

vi)

The categories of factors which may amount to vexation and oppression are not closed (Elektrim SA v Vivendi Holdings 1 Corp [2008] EWCA Civ 1178, [83]).

vii)

omitted because it concerns an English arbitration or exclusive jurisdiction agreement, not relevant here.

As to point (vi) above, WBD cited [83] from Elektrim, (Lawrence Collins LJ):

‘The categories of factors which indicate vexation or oppression are not closed, but they include the institution of proceedings which are bound to fail, or bringing proceedings which interfere with or undermine the control of the English court of its own process, or proceedings which could and should have formed part of an English action brought earlier’

My attention was also drawn to the further, detailed exposition of the principles in Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP [2010] 1 WLR 1023, at [50] (Toulson LJ). To avoid repetition I do not cite all of his summary of the key principles, except I think it is worth stressing what he said in sub-paragraph (5):

‘(5) An anti-suit injunction always requires caution because by definition it involves interference with the process or potential process of a foreign court. An injunction to enforce an exclusive jurisdiction clause governed by English law is not regarded as a breach of comity, because it merely requires a party to honour his contract. In other cases, the principle of comity requires the court to recognise that, in deciding questions of weight to be attached to different factors, different judges operating under different legal systems with different legal policies may legitimately arrive at different answers, without occasioning a breach of customary international law or manifest injustice, and that in such circumstances it is not for an English court to arrogate to itself the decision how a foreign court should determine the matter. The stronger the connection of the foreign court with the parties and the subject matter of the dispute, the stronger the argument against intervention.’

WBD also drew attention to the distinction observed by Henshaw J. in Nigeria v Williams [2025] EWHC 2217 (Comm). Whereas, in [18], an applicant for an ASI on the ‘vexatious and oppressive’ ground (like an applicant relying on a contractual provision) must generally show a high probability that it will succeed in establishing its case for a final ASI at trial, the Judge went on to observe, at [19]:

The 'high probability' test is appropriate because an interim anti-suit injunction will often be decisive of the issue by determining, in practice, where the substantive dispute is tried (see, e.g., Raphael § 13.37). The position may be different where the order is granted on a temporary basis in order to 'hold the ring' pending a further hearing or trial and the interim order will not in practice be determinative of the outcome (ibid. § 13.38 and 13.48), in which circumstances an American Cyanamid approach may well be appropriate.

Finally, under this head, I was reminded and it is worth stressing that when an English court makes a restraining order, it is making an order which is addressed only to a party which is before it. The order is not directed against the foreign court: Turner v Grovit [2002] 1 WLR 107, [23] (Lord Hobhouse).

WBD submitted that the applicable principles are broadly the same as those which apply to the grant of an ASI. However, particular caution is required in the case of an AASI because potentially there is an even greater danger of interfering improperly with the conduct of foreign proceedings: IPCom GmbH & Co KG v Lenovo Technology (UK) Ltd [2020] FSR 493, [20] (HHJ Hacon) (‘IPCom v Lenovo’); Raphael, The Anti-Suit Injunction (2nd ed), §5.57-5.64.

Typically, the purpose of AASI relief is to protect the integrity of the English court process, as explained in Gee on Commercial Injunctions (7th ed), §14-107:

‘Where the ‘anti-anti-suit’ injunction is sought in proceedings brought in England for the protection of those proceedings from interference by a foreign court, the application is for a provisional measure enabling the English court to go on hearing and determining the underlying claim. The purpose of the injunction is to protect and defend the integrity of the administration of justice by the English court in the proceedings pending before it.’

Thus:

Furthermore, the less that an AASI granted in England would interfere with the foreign proceedings to which it is directed, the more likely it is that the Court will exercise its discretion to grant it: IPCom v Lenovo, [24]. In that case, an AASI was granted in respect of anti-suit proceedings in California. As noted at [45] and [58]:

45.

In resolving this matter, I think it is important to keep in mind the relief that IPCom is seeking. Often an anti-suit injunction (or an anti-anti-suit injunction) would affect the entirety of the proceedings brought or contemplated in another jurisdiction. In the present instance, that would not be the case if I were to make the order sought.

…

58.

I also think it is significant that the principle of comity would not be significantly infringed by the granting of the injunction sought. It would in no way interfere with the bulk of the issues before the US court.

I was reminded that in his Amazon v InterDigital AASI Judgment, Meade J (at [22]-[24]) referred to and relied upon the principles set out above and WBD cited in particular the following passage at [23]-[24]where Meade J stated:

‘23. [Foxton J’s judgment in J.P. Morgan v Werealize.com] recognises that categories of cases where anti -suit (or anti-anti-suit) relief might be appropriate are those where it is necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the English court, and those where the pursuit of foreign proceedings is vexatious or oppressive (or would be if commenced – I accept that quia timet relief is possible, and that is what is sought), but also says that the jurisdiction is not confined and must be flexible.

24.

I have also found useful and important Magomedov v PJSC Transneft [2024] 4 WLR 284, the decision of Bright J, which held that the court had the power to grant an interim AASI to last until the English court is able to decide its own jurisdiction. The relevance of that is that jurisdiction is substantively challenged by InterDigital in these proceedings. I am not able to reach a conclusion on that challenge and nor will I (or whichever judge hears this matter) be able to do so on any return date, if that were ahead of the jurisdiction challenge. But Magomedov decides there is power to grant interim anti-suit relief until jurisdiction is decided.’

In Magomedov v PJSC Transneft, Bright J granted an anti-enforcement injunction (‘AEI’, plus he also discussed an Anti-Reliance Injunction ‘ARI’). After reviewing the law in relation to AASIs, Bright J commented at [61]:

‘There are still fewer cases involving AEIs and ARIs. Such learning as there is suggests that an AEI or ARI will, in general, only be granted in conjunction with an ASI or AASI; or at any rate, only where the court would in principle be willing to grant an ASI or AASI. In this context, there is even greater reason for caution: Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws, 16th ed (2022), paras 12-126, 12-139; Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd (No 3) [2008] EWCA Civ 625; [2009] QB 503, para 94, per Lawrence Collins LJ; SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 599.’

In that case, Bright J granted the anti-enforcement injunction order on an interim basis in circumstances where it was ‘essential if the AASI is to be effective’ ([118]).

WBD submitted that the AASI sought is primarily prohibitory in nature but drew attention to the mandatory elements of the Draft Order. Accordingly, it was entirely appropriate that WBD set out the principles which apply to mandatory interim injunctions, as follows.

The basis on which mandatory interim injunctions are granted is fundamentally the same as that on which prohibitory interim injunctions are granted. In National Commercial Bank Jamaica Ltd v Olint Corp Ltd [2009] UKPC 16, [2009] 1 WLR 1405, Lord Hoffmann, delivering the opinion of the Privy Council, stated (at [19]) after referring to Lord Diplock's judgment in the American Cyanamid case:

‘There is however no reason to suppose that, in stating these principles, Lord Diplock was intending to confine them to injunctions which could be described as prohibitory rather than mandatory. In both cases, the underlying principle is the same, namely, that the court should take whichever course seems likely to cause the least irremediable prejudice to one party or the other: see Lord Jauncey in R v Secretary of State for Transport, Ex p Factortame Ltd (No 2) (Case C-213/89) [1991] 1 AC 603 , 682–683. What is true is that the features which ordinarily justify describing an injunction as mandatory are often more likely to cause irremediable prejudice than in cases in which a defendant is merely prevented from taking or continuing with some course of action: see Films Rover International Ltd v Cannon Film Sales Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 670 , 680. But this is no more than a generalisation. What is required in each case is to examine what on the particular facts of the case the consequences of granting or withholding of the injunction is likely to be. If it appears that the injunction is likely to cause irremediable prejudice to the defendant, a court may be reluctant to grant it unless satisfied that the chances that it will turn out to have been wrongly granted are low; that is to say, that the court will feel, as Megarry J said in Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham [1971] Ch 340 , 351, ‘a high degree of assurance that at the trial it will appear that the injunction was rightly granted’.

Accordingly, the key issue is not whether the anti-suit injunction is mandatory in form but the actual consequences of granting the specific relief sought, and the extent to which those consequences will cause irremediable prejudice to the respondent.

WBD also drew attention to authority that the Courts are more reluctant to grant a mandatory interim anti-suit injunction, that an applicant must demonstrate a ‘high degree of assurance’ and that such an injunction should be granted in only an ‘unusually strong and clear’ case on the basis that this form of injunction involves a greater degree of inference with the procedure of the foreign court: see, for example, Eraaya Lifespaces Ltd v Elara Capital Plc [2025] EWHC 1506 (Comm) at [75]. However, Raphael: The Anti-Suit Injunction (2nd ed) at §13.68 notes: ‘The first instance anti-suit case law mentioning a need for particular caution for interim mandatory relief has not, it seems, yet fully integrated the teachings of Olint, and should not be applied rigidly’.

The issue of the relevance of the merits of the underlying proceedings and, in particular, whether or not the Court should not grant an injunction unless there is a ‘high degree of assurance’ following Olint was recently considered in Airx Jet Support Ltd v London Jet Centre (Stanstead) Ltd [2025] EWHC 2628 (Ch), where Andrew de Mestre K.C. sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court stated at [25]:

‘It seems to me that the principle to be derived from these authorities is that, while it is not necessary for the court to have a ‘high degree of assurance’ in every case, the Court will generally wish to consider the merits of the applicant's case as part of assessing where the balance of convenience lies. Given that the underlying principle is that the Court should take whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of injustice if it should turn out at trial to have been ‘wrong’, the greater the degree of assurance which the Court has in the applicant's case then the less the risk of injustice will be if a mandatory order is granted. Thus a high degree of assurance will often be a relevant factor in favour of the grant of a mandatory injunction. Equally, it will generally only be in cases where withholding the injunction would carry a significantly greater risk of injustice than granting it that the Court will proceed without the relevant high degree of assurance.’

In Manta Penyez Shipping Inc v Zuhoor Alsaeed Foodstuff [2024] EWHC 3109 (Comm), Mr Stephen Houseman KC sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, granted interim mandatory anti-suit relief to restrain proceedings brought in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. WBD submitted that the Judge’s analysis in the following paragraphs is instructive:

‘10.  The grant of a mandatory anti-suit injunction is normally reserved for a final hearing so as to avoid any prejudice that might flow if such remedy were granted on an interim basis only for the Court later to find it was not proven on a final basis. This in turn may justify expedition of the action itself in order to protect a claimant's legitimate interest in obtaining such final mandatory relief sooner rather than later. All things being equal in this context, as in many others, a mandatory injunction can be expected to be more effective than a prohibitory one. These labels are not, however, determinative. It is always a question of practical impact and weighing the balance of injustice: see National Commercial Bank Jamaica Ltd. v. Olint Corporation Ltd. - Practice Note [2009] UKPC 16; [2009] 1 WLR 1405 at [16]-[21].

11.

There is no hard and fast rule about the non-availability of an interim mandatory anti-suit injunction:

a.

Such orders are made on a narrow basis in certain circumstances - for example, requiring the defendant to seek an adjournment and/or stay in the first-seised foreign court in order to avoid prejudice to the claimant (as local defendant/respondent) in the meantime; requiring release of a vessel from arrest; or compelling a party to withdraw its own obviously unlawful or vexatious pre-emptive coercive counter-measure (e.g. anti-anti-suit or similar) in the foreign court so as to allow pursuit of anti-suit relief in this Court.

b.

These remedies can also be broader and terminal, requiring the defendant to withdraw or discontinue the relevant foreign legal process, where this is necessary to achieve the ends of justice: see Raphael: The Anti-Suit Injunction (2nd ed. 2019) at 13.65 - 13.68.

12.

An interim mandatory injunction requiring withdrawal or discontinuance of the relevant foreign proceedings may not, on proper analysis, be terminal or prejudicial to the relevant antagonist. This depends on local law and procedure on such matters, including the basis of such withdrawal or discontinuance and whether it forecloses re-litigation through concepts akin to abuse of process or preclusive doctrines. These effects can be ameliorated by an injunction claimant undertaking not to advance such arguments in the local court in the event that it fails to secure a final injunction in this Court, at any rate where there is no reason to doubt the efficacy of such undertaking in the local court system. The usual cross-undertaking in damages should cover the injunction defendant for added cost of stopping and re-starting the foreign proceedings where permissible.’

The Court, in appropriate cases, will grant an interim anti-suit injunction which includes mandatory relief on an ex parte basis:

Anti-suit relief can be granted on a quia timet basis. See Raphael, §4.101:

‘Anti-suit injunctions may be granted on a quia timet basis even before the targeted proceedings have commenced, if there is a sufficient threat that they will be commenced; and that if so, they will be of a nature which will justify the injunction. In one case, a mere reservation of rights to bring proceedings was held not to be sufficient to justify a quia timet injunction.’

As to what is required to justify quia timet relief generally, see Gee, §2-045 and §2-046:

‘There is no fixed or ‘absolute’ standard for measuring the degree of apprehension of a wrong which must be shown in order to justify quia timet relief. The graver the likely consequences and the risk of wrongdoing, the more the court will be reluctant to consider the application as ‘premature’. But there must be at least some real risk of an actionable wrong. If the court decides to grant a final injunction the width of that injunction is a matter for the court’s discretion and can be tailored according to the circumstances.

…

Whether a case is an appropriate one for the grant of quia timet relief has to be considered in the light of all the relevant circumstances known at the time of the hearing of an application for an interim injunction, or at the time of trial. Factors include whether there is a threat of imminent wrongdoing, the seriousness of the damage which might be done imminently, whether the defendant is actively seeking to prevent wrongdoing or is himself threatening to commit a wrong, and whether if damage were done, it would be rectifiable. The test is what is fair, and just in all the circumstances.’

WBD drew attention to the fact that it would be open to Nokia to rely on a more stringent test that has been formulated in other cases. On this point I was referred to the summary in Philips at [18] (Meade J), citing the decision of Marcus Smith J in Vastint v Persons Unknown [2018] EWHC 2456 (Ch), drawing on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Islington Borough Council v Elliott [2012] EWCA Civ 56 ('Islington Borough Council') at [29] – [31]. According to the more stringent test canvassed there, the relevant questions are:

However, WBD submitted that the ‘strong probability’ test is not applicable to this application. The quia timet injunction considered by the Court of Appeal in Islington Borough Council was ‘a permanent injunction at trial rather than an interlocutory order granted on American Cyanamid principles having regard to the balance of convenience. A permanent injunction can only be granted if the claimant has proved at the trial that there will be an actual infringement of his rights unless the injunction is granted’ ([29]). However I agree that the AASI sought in the present proceedings is different: it is an interlocutory order pending this Court’s determination of any jurisdiction challenge that Nokia may bring. It is noted that in the Amazon v InterDigital AASI Judgment, Meade J accepted that the relief he granted was quia timet relief ([23]), but did not apply this test. Instead, Meade J granted the AASI on the basis that Amazon’s contentions were ‘sufficiently arguable’ ([27]).

In any event, WBD submitted correctly that the assessment of the appropriateness of quia timet relief is a multifactorial test. Meade J stated in Philips that ‘the circumstances in which a quia timet injunction will be granted are flexible’ and ‘It is clear from the decision of Marcus Smith J and the earlier cases that he cites, including Islington Council v Elliot and Lloyd v Symonds that assessment of the appropriateness of quia timet relief is a multifactorial test. The court is not just to assess as a percentage the likelihood of the defendant doing the act which is sought to be restrained, but must have regard to the other matters identified in those paragraphs’ ([18]-[19]). Meade J, in particular, recognised that it was relevant that ‘if the defendants had obtained an anti-suit injunction in China that would have been irreversible and terminal for these proceedings’ ([20]).

Overall, WBD submitted that, whichever test applies, it is satisfied in the present circumstances:

As I have already mentioned, my pre-reading raised in my mind a real issue as to whether I should require WBD to give (very) short notice to Nokia of this application for AASI relief. I was acutely conscious of the criticisms made by Meade J. of InterDigital pressing for AILI relief to be granted without notice to Amazon. More generally, it would be preferable in these multi-national (F)RAND disputes to get away from relief being granted ex parte.

In the circumstance of the current application, one possibility was to determine the confidentiality and service out applications first at 10.30am, requiring notice to be given and resuming at 2pm, preferably with Nokia being present by Counsel.

However, having raised those concerns, I was eventually persuaded that notice should not be given to Nokia, on the basis that the giving of notice might enable Nokia to defeat the purpose of the AASI relief in its entirety. WBD addressed the possibilities that, when Nokia launched their German and UPC infringement actions on Saturday 1 November, Nokia also filed applications for ASI relief. If such applications had been filed, I do not know how quickly those applications would be dealt with in the normal course. However, the evidence in the Second Witness Statement of Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont persuaded me that it was a realistic possibility that if Nokia were pursuing ASI applications, on notice of this application being given to Nokia, Nokia’s German representatives would be able to telephone the relevant Judges, explain the scenario and request that ASIs should be granted immediately. It would be relatively easy (and quick) for the relevant Judges to adapt the existing decisions against Amazon to apply to WBD and to issue those decisions before the conclusion of argument in the UK hearing and/or anti-anti-anti-suit injunctions to prevent WBD from continuing to make the AASI application. Mr Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont also explained two more specific points, applicable in both the German courts and in the UPC:

Counsel also addressed me (both in WBD’s Skeleton and in oral submissions) on the Cook v Boston alternative. In Cook UK Ltd v Boston Scientific Ltd [2022] EWHC 504 (Pat):

WBD submitted there are a number of material differences between Cook v Boston and the present case:

WBD also submitted that a prior notice requirement would not be appropriate in the present case:

I agree that, if Nokia have already filed applications for ASI relief, the giving of notice could give rise to very considerable complexity, depending on how far those applications had progressed and what was done by Nokia in response to notice being given.

WBD emphasised that the position is different from the Amazon v InterDigital case, and accepted that the risk in the present case is less clear. WBD acknowledged that Nokia has not threatened to seek ASI relief, WBD is not aware of any instance of Nokia having sought relief of this kind in the past, and in particular Nokia has not sought relief of this kind in any of the recent and pending cases in which implementers have sought RAND determinations (including interim licences) in the English Court.

However, WBD submitted that ‘the world has now changed’ in that seeking an AILI on an ex parte basis is a litigation tactic that Nokia must know has recently become available to it following the AILI Decisions discussed above (pending further developments in Germany and the UPC). Moreover, WBD suggest that seeking an AILI would support the wider litigation strategy that Nokia is likely to adopt vis-à-vis WBD in the present dispute, namely seeking injunctions for patent infringement in foreign jurisdictions to put pressure on WBD (WBD submitted that the pressure was to agree a licence on terms favourable to Nokia that WBD considers to be supra-RAND, but I note that Nokia’s overwhelming preference is for RAND terms to be determined in arbitration). In those circumstances, WBD submitted there is at least a serious risk that Nokia will pursue that tactic in this case, nipping WBD’s claim in the bud before it has a chance to reach the more advanced stage reached by the other implementers seeking similar relief in the English court.

Ultimately, WBD submitted that the critical point is this: if there is any real chance of Nokia seeking an AILI, this application is the Court’s only chance to protect its jurisdiction against that risk. Moreover, granting this application now, with a short return date, will impose no material prejudice on Nokia if the application turns out to be unfounded, either on the basis that Nokia has no intention of seeking AILIs or because it does have such an intention and should be permitted to do so. In either case the injunction sought by WBD can be discharged at the return date without having caused any practical difficulties for Nokia in pursuing its chosen litigation tactics.

Against the background which I have attempted to summarise, in his second witness statement, Mr Washbrook identified the factors that WBD contend point towards an AILI being a tactic that is likely to be attractive to Nokia:

Each of these factors was explained in greater detail, which I set out. I state my overall assessment later.

As I have mentioned, Nokia is currently or has recently been engaged in RAND litigation in this Court with Acer, ASUS, Hisense and Amazon. I must set out WBD’s contentions concerning those proceedings.

In each of these proceedings, the implementers brought claims of a similar nature to WBD’s RAND Claims and had given an undertaking to this Court to enter into any licence that the Court determines to be RAND.

Despite the implementers taking these steps, in each of those proceedings, Nokia also continued or continues to pursue injunctive relief, exclusion orders and/or damages in multiple fora based on codec SEPs often in combination with NEPs or patents which it alleges to be NEPs (including through its affiliate, Alcatel).

In the Amazon proceedings: Nokia (and its affiliates, including, in particular, Alcatel) brought claims in Brazil, Germany, India, the UK, the UPC, the US District Court in Delaware and US International Trade Commission (the ‘US ITC’). A preliminary injunction was sought and granted against Amazon in Brazil. Nokia and Alcatel were characterised by Zacaroli J in Alcatel/Nokia v Amazon [2024] EWHC 1921 as mounting a ‘worldwide campaign of litigation’ against Amazon ([136]).

In the Acer, ASUS and Hisense proceedings, Nokia has brought claims in Brazil, Germany, India, the UPC, the US District Courts in Georgia, Texas and California, and US ITC. A preliminary injunction has been granted in Brazil against ASUS.

In addition, Nokia has brought proceedings against Paramount, another video streaming business, in Germany, the UPC, Brazil, and the US District Court in Delaware.

Alcatel is ultimately wholly owned and controlled by Nokia Corp. To the best of WBD's understanding, Alcatel is one of the primary entities in the Nokia Group that owns non-essential patents in the Nokia Video Portfolio.

WBD emphasise that in none of these proceedings has Nokia asked a Court to determine RAND licence terms. WBD stated its understanding that Nokia has offered in the Acer, ASUS and Hisense proceedings to engage in arbitration and offered an adjustable licence pending this arbitration. In those proceedings, Nokia has argued that the offer of a licence with terms to be determined using an ICC arbitration procedure, constitutes a RAND offer. Nokia has argued that this meant that Nokia had discharged its obligations to the ITU-T and that the Claimants in that case (Acer, ASUS and Hisense) had no choice but to accept that offer and abandon their English proceedings. Acer, ASUS and Hisense argued that the offer was not RAND taking into account its terms, the context of that litigation and the real purpose behind the offer (effectively, forum shopping). Acer/ASUS and Hisense also argued that because arbitration is not a contractual requirement under the ITU-T obligation, Nokia cannot now unilaterally seek to make it such a requirement. These issues await my judgment on the applications I heard between 20-24 October 2025.

WBD’s position is that Nokia’s conduct of pursuing injunctive relief despite implementers commencing actions to have RAND terms declared by this Court and having undertaken to accept this Court’s determination, is consistent with a strategy of putting commercial pressure on implementers to accept supra-RAND offers (again, the arbitration point applies). WBD relies on the fact that in Lenovo v Ericsson [2025] R.P.C. 11, Arnold LJ concluded that in circumstances where Ericsson was pursing ‘Brazilian, Colombian and US proceedings, and attempting to exclude Lenovo's products from those commercially important markets’ despite the fact though Lenovo had undertaken to accept a global licence declared by this Court ([108]), Ericsson was ‘aiming to coerce Lenovo into accepting terms more favourable to Ericsson than the English courts would determine to be FRAND, or at the very least to avoid the risk that the English courts would determine that FRAND terms are less advantageous to Ericsson than those sought by Ericsson.’ ([123]). In any event, Nokia’s strategy as deployed in those other cases and likely to be deployed in this case is certainly a strategy that is threatened by this Court’s RAND-determination jurisdiction, and accordingly seeking AILI relief would be supportive of Nokia’s strategy.

WBD’s evidence detailed how Nokia and its affiliates have sought ex parte anti-anti-suit relief in Germany and the UPC in the context of cellular SEP/FRAND proceedings. WBD provided details of the anti-suit relief which Nokia has sought:

Continental AASI: Nokia filed patent infringement actions in Munich, Mannheim and Düsseldorf against the car manufacturer, Daimler, in the context of a FRAND licensing dispute. Continental, a supplier of Daimler, joined these proceedings. In May 2019, Continental, filed an anti-trust and FRAND lawsuit against Nokia in the US District Court (Northern District of California). In those proceedings, Continental sought an anti-suit injunction to prevent Nokia from pursing infringement proceedings in Germany. In July 2019, Nokia sought and obtained ex parte AASIs from the Munich Regional Court against Continental entities (Washbrook 2, §64(a)).

Sunmi AASI: Sunmi, a company that makes commercial hardware such as point-of-sale (POS) terminals, payment devices, and retail IoT systems for businesses, had filed a global licence rate-setting proceeding in the Kunming Intermediate People's Court in China. Nokia filed infringement actions in the UPC (Local Division Munich) and Germany (Munich Regional Court and Mannheim Regional Court). In February 2025, Nokia Tech and an associated company, Nokia Solutions and Network Oy, sought and obtained an urgent ex parte AASI against Sunmi from the UPC. An ex parte AASI was also obtained from the Munich Regional Court (Washbrook 2, §63(b)).

WBD made it clear that they do not suggest that the AASIs sought by Nokia are directly analogous to the AILI Decisions obtained by InterDigital. However, WBD contended that, in circumstances where (at least) interim licence claims are considered by the German courts and the UPC to be in the nature of an anti-suit injunction, if Nokia takes the same position (which WBD submitted that Nokia is likely to do), its prior conduct of seeking AASIs is consistent with Nokia seeking ASIs in the present case to prevent proceedings which interfere with any infringement proceedings it commences. In any event, these cases do demonstrate that where Nokia considers that it is appropriate to seek ASI relief, it has a propensity to do so on an ex parte basis.

As a matter of full and frank disclosure, WBD noted that Nokia has not sought to prevent RAND claims from proceeding in this Court by way of an anti-suit injunction in another jurisdiction. However, WBD’s point is that no SEP holder had sought to prevent RAND claims from proceeding in this Court by way of an anti-suit injunction until InterDigital did so in September 2025. WBD suggest this is a new strategy that may have come to Nokia’s attention too late for its existing proceedings, or Nokia may have chosen not to invoke it because Acer, ASUS and Hisense did not pursue their claims for specific performance of an interim licence at the recent hearing of these claims between 20-24 October 2025 (although WBD acknowledged that this was speculation). In any event, WBD point out that Nokia has sought to prevent RAND claims brought by implementers being heard by this Court through jurisdiction challenges, case management stay applications and/or by way of its general strategy of putting commercial pressure on implementers by commencing in litigation and seeking injunctions across multiple fora. WBD invite the conclusion that anti-suit relief of the kind obtained by InterDigital in the AILIs would seem to be an attractive additional string to Nokia’s bow.

WBD submitted that part of the context in which this application is made is the fact that in SEP/(F)RAND litigation, SEP holders and implementers tend to adopt and adapt each other’s strategies. WBD cited a number of recent examples of this practice:

WBD’s point was that these trends set out above show that when a new strategy is alighted upon by a SEP holder or implementer, it tends to be adopted by parties in similar positions. WBD therefore considered there to be a serious risk that Nokia will be motivated to adopt or even build on the AILI Decisions secured by InterDigital, given that this tactic would be supportive of the wider strategy (i.e. seeking injunctions rather than RAND determinations from a court) that Nokia is likely to deploy against WBD.

I was somewhat sceptical as to the force of each of these factors for the following reasons.

First, the evidence was to the effect that Nokia, at least in the Acer/ASUS/Hisense proceedings, are represented by the same team at Bird & Bird LLP as InterDigital, and have the same German representation, raising an inference that Nokia has the same (very experienced) representation in its dispute against WBD.

Second, accordingly, I do not consider it likely that Nokia’s representatives needed to see ‘similar strategies’ in action to open their eyes to the possibility of seeking AILI or ASI relief. Having said that, it is true, as WBD submitted, that any uncertainty over the availability of ASI relief from the German national or UPC courts in the circumstances of these current (F)RAND actions, has now been dispelled.

Third, it is significant, in my view, that Nokia has not (at least to date) sought any ASI or AILI relief against the Acer/ASUS/Hisense parties. Indeed, Nokia may well be waiting for the outcome of the applications by those parties for interim declaratory relief before deciding how to proceed in those actions and how, if necessary, to adapt their strategy in other cases including this one.

Indeed, in that regard, WBD’s application for AASI relief created a particular difficulty for me. Although I have not managed to complete my judgment from the applications in the Acer/ASUS/Hisense proceedings (in part due to this hearing and others late last week), my hope and expectation is that what I say in that judgment will (if upheld on any appeal) (a) serve to modify the practice in relation to interim licences/declarations (following the sentiments expressed by the Court of Appeal in Samsung v ZTE) and (b) serve to reduce the degree of conflict with the German national and UPC courts. Of course, in advance of handing down that judgment (or giving a flavour of it here), the German and UPC courts are likely to react in the same way they did in Amazon. Indeed, there is perhaps a greater risk as regards these proceedings, because WBD are not shy of emphasising they seek the fullest relief, including specific performance of both final RAND licence terms and interim licence terms.

Fourth, I have a suspicion that the recent experience in the Amazon v InterDigital litigation might have had a chastening effect on the representatives acting for InterDigital. It certainly should have done. If that is correct, that lessens the risk of ASI or AILI relief being sought in Germany or the UPC, at least on an ex parte basis.

I also take account of the fact that the UPC, in its Amazon AILI decision, stated at [52] (cited above at [57]) that its Order was ‘purely defensive in nature and intended to shield the proceedings before the UPC’. This suggests to me that there may also be a desire in the German and UPC courts to de-escalate the current conflict. Against that, those courts can only act on what parties put before them. However, as a result of what has happened in the Amazon v InterDigital litigation, I suspect there is a more nuanced understanding of the risks of when particular events are likely to happen in proceedings here.

Overall, the net result was that, although I was somewhat sceptical of the force of the factors said by WBD to give rise to a real risk that Nokia have already sought or will seek ASI (including AILI) relief in Germany and the UPC, I was unable to find that the risk was negligible or so small as not to justify relief. I revert to the point I mentioned in [95] above, an analysis which I accept. Essentially, I concluded that WBD were entitled to relief to guard against the non-negligible risk that Nokia have sought or will seek AILI or ASI relief in either Germany or the UPC.

As I mentioned above, I sincerely hope that Nokia have not done so, with the result that the AASI relief can be promptly discharged but that remains to be seen.

The final point to mention is that, as I summarised above, WBD sought and I granted what may be termed a full-throated AASI order, including AEI relief, but I concluded the full extent of the relief was justified to take account of the many uncertainties and imponderables in the current situation and to ensure the relief achieved its objective of protecting the integrity of these proceedings.