Amazon.Com, Inc & Ors v InterDigital VC Holdings, Inc & Ors

This hearing is of an application which arises following and in the context of my judgment of 9th October 2025, which is [2025] EWHC 2600 (Pat). I will not try to summarise that decision. It is well-known to the parties and the interested reader of this judgment can go and read the introductory sections of that judgment to get the overall context.

The application before me today is an application by Amazon (I use that abbreviation in the same sense as my previous judgment), for anti-anti-suit relief against InterDigital, which again I use in the same sense as in my previous judgment. It is an ex parte application, not on notice to InterDigital, for reasons I will come to.

My previous judgment was at a directions hearing which I set of my own motion, not at the request of either party, in the light of anti-suit relief granted by the German Regional Court in Munich and by the UPC Mannheim Local Division (“the ASIs”) against declaratory interim licence relief sought by Amazon in these proceedings. I make clear at the outset of this judgment that what I am asked to do today does not impact on the ASIs. Amazon has applied or intends to apply for a review of each ASI in the court that granted it, but in the mean time it is respecting them, including in this court. It is not now pursuing any interim licence relief, which is what the ASIs were clearly and explicitly directed against.

I made the provisional decision to hear the application today in private on the bases both that to do otherwise would potentially jeopardize the application (because InterDigital might seek urgent countermeasures) and also because there seemed to me to be a likelihood – which I think in the end did not come to pass or, in any case came to pass only very slightly – that reference might be to be made during the hearing to the confidential matter that I touched on in my previous decision, at paragraph 3. Iny any event, I do not need to say anything about the confidential matter in this judgment which can be entirely public.

Mr. Dudnikov, King’s Counsel, appears for Amazon and, as I say, InterDigital is not represented. The sixth and seventh defendants are not involved or the target of any relief.

Since my previous judgment, various events have taken place in close succession, and some more or less simultaneously with each other.

First, InterDigital has served a number of documents in accordance with my directions: an outline of its arguments on jurisdiction on 10th October, and then on 14^th October three witness statements: (1) a witness statement of Ms. Stephens, of Bird & Bird, to do with expedition and the timing of InterDigital’s jurisdiction challenge (whose further hearing I directed in my previous decision), (2) a witness statement of the solicitor at Bird & Bird who gave some of the original evidence in support of the ASI applications and whose name I kept out of my previous judgment, and (3) a witness statement of the German legal representative of InterDigital. The latter two statements both cover primarily the matters around the applications for the ASIs about which I expressed concern in my previous decision.

Second, also (by coincidence) on 14^th October, the Mannheim Division of the UPC made a directions order, I think on its own initiative. As I understand it, the order was the result of the challenge by way of review that Amazon has now made to the ex parte UPC ASI. The order directs a hearing which will take place on 14th November. It includes various requests for the parties to provide further information, in particular, in relation to the final RAND relief sought in these UK proceedings and the specific performance sought. It sets times for provision of skeleton arguments and so on.

I am informed that in the German national proceedings it is likely, I think intended, that Amazon will also make a challenge to that ex parte ASI. There is no specific time limit for that to be done. There has thus been no directions order of the Munich court, and I do not understand that any further hearing has been set.

The main issue which has triggered the application today can be summarised by reference to two paragraphs of Ms. Stephens's evidence. In paragraph 11, she says this:  

“In opposing Amazon’s applications to expedite the jurisdiction challenge and any RAND trial, InterDigital observes that, as it has given the above undertaking directed to this jurisdiction” – [I interject: that is an undertaking not in certain circumstances to assert its video streaming SEPs in the UK] “any such expedition could only be directed to influencing the conduct of foreign proceedings in a way which the German courts and the UPC understandably regard as unacceptable.”

What Amazon understand that to be saying, which I consider to be at least arguable, is that InterDigital will be taking the position that the pursuit of final relief in these proceedings, particularly if expedited, would interfere with (“influencing”) the German and UPC proceedings. I imagine the nature of the influence would be said to be that if this court holds, at an expedited trial, that InterDigital is obliged as a matter of contract under the ITU regime to give Amazon a global licence on identified terms, and is ordered to do so, by way of specific performance, then Amazon will assert a licence defence to the German and UPC proceedings. Amazon has said that it would rely on a licence in that situation but that that does not mean that InterDigital is prevented from bringing infringement claims, just that a licence defence would be argued.

The other paragraph of Ms. Stephens’s evidence which I think is important, and certainly weight has been placed on it by Amazon, is paragraph 95(b), which says that:

“If Amazon considers that the Munich ASI Order and the UPC ASI Order should not have been granted and/or cause Amazon prejudice, then the correct course of action is for Amazon to seek an inter parties review of these orders in the German court and/or the UPC rather than seek expedition of these proceedings to circumvent the orders of the German Court and the UPC.”

I just interject to re-emphasise that what is sought to be expedited at the moment is final RAND relief because, as I have said, Amazon accepts that, at the moment, with the grant of the ASIs, interim relief cannot and does not form part of these proceedings. I think the circumvention referred to must, again, be Amazon getting an actual, contractual licence under the ITU regime to Interdigital’s portfolio and seeking to use it as a defence.

Amazon's concern, therefore, is that InterDigital may be formulating a position or an application to either the UPC in Mannheim or the German national court in Munich (or both, as before, or some other court): an application to restrain Amazon from carrying on its claim to the substantive, final RAND relief, which remains within these proceedings, as discussed below, and in relation to which I (or possibly Mellor J) am going to hear certain procedural applications in the next ten days or so following my previous order.

Amazon is further concerned that, in the light of previous events surrounding the making and timing of the two original ASIs, InterDigital might do that ex parte and without notice to Amazon in one of those courts.

It is possible that InterDigital has no such intention(s), in which case any order I make will have no impact, but in the light of the matters referred to below, I consider that Amazon has substantial reasons to consider that it is a real danger that InterDigital does.

Amazon also submits that it may be that InterDigital would be fortified in the objective of doing that by the remarks made by the UPC in its recent order, which I have touched on already, directing the 14th November hearing. I return to this below.

Amazon therefore seeks anti-anti-suit relief (an “AASI”) to block any such application by InterDigital in either of those two courts or, indeed, anywhere else, pending a return date of this application, which, I make clear, would be very soon.

In the light of the remarks I made in my previous judgment and in the context of this dispute as a whole, I reiterate with additional force that I have to be quite exceptionally careful about the grant of any relief of this kind. The considerations of comity are powerfully engaged and I must bear that in mind at all times. I also reiterate the comments I made in my previous judgment about respect for the process of the German national court and the UPC.

I also ought to say, straightaway, that to my mind the directions order made by the UPC on the 14^th October appears essentially (though it would not be for me to question it if I felt otherwise) to be a set of directions for the further management of the litigation, and it must not be confused or elided with tactical considerations which may have conditioned InterDigital’s behaviour. I understand why Amazon is sensitive about it, but it is an order which seeks information and sets up a further hearing. The requests for information seem to me to be, indeed, similar in general nature to the ones I made in advance of the hearing leading to my recent judgment.

I note, in passing, paragraph 9 of the UPC order, which encourages the parties to try to reach agreement, I think a procedural agreement, about where this whole dispute can be best resolved. I can only echo how welcome such an agreement would be in preference to these difficult, resource-consuming and sensitive (A)ASI fights.

So, absolutely nothing I say in the course of this judgment, and absolutely nothing arising from any order that I make (and I am going to make one) should be understood as hostile to the UPC or the Munich court, or retaliatory. It is neither. This application is very firmly directed at InterDigital and its possible conduct and, for reasons that I will touch on, I hope and expect that the order I make will be of short duration and such that it provides no interference at all with proceedings in the UPC or in the German national courts, because all I am asked to do today, and the most I would be willing to do, is to hold the ring until an inter partes hearing can be held.

Mr. Dudnikov has directed me in his written submissions to a good deal of relevant authority on the question of the grant of anti-suit injunctions of the sort sought from me and I have refreshed my memory of it. For present purposes, I can summarise the points that I think are important from a recent decision of Foxton J (now Foxton LJ), in J.P.  Morgan v Werealize.com [2025] EWHC 1842 (Comm), at 107:

“The principles for the granting of anti-suit relief on the vexation and oppression basis are summarised by Males LJ in SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 599 at [90]-[91], [103] and [108] and in JP Morgan I précised that summary and principles derived from other authorities cited in that case as follows:

(i)

The basic principle is that the jurisdiction is to be exercised ‘when the ends of Justice require it’.

(ii) Established categories of case where an injunction may be appropriate (which may overlap) include cases where an injunction is necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the English court and cases where the pursuit of foreign proceedings is regarded as vexatious or oppressive, but the jurisdiction is not confined to these categories and must be applied flexibly.

(iii)

Great caution must be exercised before such an injunction is granted, at any rate in cases where the injunction is not sought in order to enforce an arbitration or exclusive jurisdiction clause, because of the requirements of comity.

(iv)

When an anti-suit injunction is sought on grounds which do not involve a breach of contract, comity, telling against interference with the process of a foreign court, will always require careful consideration.

(v)

Comity requires that in order for an anti-suit injunction to be granted, the English court must have 'a sufficient interest' in the matter in question. Often that sufficient interest will exist by reason of the fact that the English court is the natural forum for the determination of the parties' dispute. In a case where the injunction is sought in order to protect the jurisdiction or process of the English courts, the existence of a sufficient interest will generally be self-evident.

(vi)

The categories of factors which may amount to vexation and oppression are not closed (Elektrim SA v Vivendi Holdings 1 Corp [2008]EWCA Civ 1178, [83]).

(vii)

At [146], I added my own observation that even in cases in which injunctive relief is not sought on a contractual or quasi-contractual basis, the fact that the foreign proceedings involve the circumvention of an agreement for arbitration with an English seat, or an English EJC, can itself be relevant in determining whether the commencement and pursuit of the foreign proceedings is vexatious and oppressive, as well as establishing the necessary ‘sufficient interest’ of the English court to act.”

This recognises that categories of cases where anti-suit (or anti-anti-suit) relief might be appropriate are those where it is necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the English court, and those where the pursuit of foreign proceedings is vexatious or oppressive (or would be if commenced – I accept that quia timet relief is possible, and that is what is sought), but also says that the jurisdiction is not confined and must be flexible.

I have also found useful and important Magomedov v PJSC Transneft [2024] 4 WLR 284, the decision of Bright J, which held that the court had the power to grant an interim AASI to last until the English court is able to decide its own jurisdiction. The relevance of that is that jurisdiction is substantively challenged by InterDigital in these proceedings. I am not able to reach a conclusion on that challenge and nor will I (or whichever judge hears this matter) be able to do so on any return date, if that were ahead of the jurisdiction challenge. But Magomedov decides there is power to grant interim anti-suit relief until jurisdiction is decided.

I also have had in mind my own previous decision in Cook v Boston [2022] EWHC 504 (Pat) which concerned comity and the limited grant of an anti-anti-anti-suit injunction pending the hearing of an anti-suit injunction application, in the form of a notice requirement.

The application for an AASI today is put on two bases. One is to protect the English court's jurisdiction and, separately, or cumulatively, on the basis that it is to restrain conduct by InterDigital that would be vexatious or oppressive.

I consider that both are at least sufficiently arguable for me to make an order for a brief period until the return date.

First, it is argued (and I accept that it is seriously arguable) that the heart of the UK proceedings is a determination of the scope and price and terms of a final RAND licence, of whether Amazon is entitled to such as a matter of contract, and of the availability of specific performance, and that it is reasonably arguable that an anti-suit injunction would block that; would undermine the jurisdiction of the UK courts in relation to the heart of the claim, in a situation where there are currently no proceedings anywhere else where those matters could be determined and where no other court has been suggested as available, or. more appropriate than the UK. Therefore, I conclude that is seriously arguable.

I turn to the ground of vexation or oppression, where I am particularly struck by what I provisionally (I stress this given my previous judgment) consider the extremely tactical and constantly changing position of InterDigital about whether final relief is or is not within the proper scope of these proceedings or may be restrained by the ASIs. I made it very clear in the context of the previous hearing before me that one of my main concerns was to identify what part of the UK proceedings was or might be said by InterDigital to be a breach of the ASIs granted in Mannheim and in Munich, so that the other parts, including forthcoming applications, could go ahead. The upshot was that before me, at the recent hearing, InterDigital eventually accepted that final RAND relief was not blocked by the ASIs. But that followed a good deal of to-ing and fro-ing in which I understood InterDigital first to say that final RAND relief was blocked in a letter (of, I think, 7 October) and then to say that the letter had been misconstrued. I rejected that explanation in my judgment. I consider it at least arguable that what is indicated in paragraphs 11 and 95(b) of Ms. Stephens’s evidence is a further change of heart, or the revealing of an intention held all along, and that InterDigital may well be intending to seek to argue that it is appropriate to try in the German and UPC proceedings (or elsewhere) to block final RAND in this court.

Parties are entitled to change their minds, but what I find particularly concerning is that InterDigital was invited to (and did) state its position in clear terms, at the last hearing before me, when it knew that the purpose of identifying its position was to set further procedural steps, which I, indeed, did, in reliance on what it said. Furthermore, I observe that at the time of the hearing before me, leading to my previous judgment, the fact that Amazon was going to seek expedition of final RAND relief was very clearly on the table. The application for the trial of final RAND relief to be expedited had been made by Amazon prior to the hearing, and I was being asked actually to expedite it there and then (I declined) or to set a timetable to hear the expedition application (which I did).

Therefore, in my view, there is an appropriate basis for granting anti-anti-suit relief under both heads, separately or cumulatively. I understand, of course, that that may well be challenged on the return date and the question of jurisdiction may not be determined until even after that. In the light of the authorities that I have touched on already, I nonetheless consider that I have power to grant the relief and I consider that the interests of justice require it.

I must also very carefully consider whether I should proceed ex parte, in the absence of InterDigital, who have not had even informal notice, and the question of comity.

In my previous judgment, at paragraphs 49-51, I mentioned the extreme restraint that the English court has for exercising anti-suit or anti-anti-suit jurisdiction and especially ex parte, and I said that I thought that InterDigital should have pointed out, in the Bird & Bird evidence, if it were to give a fair picture, that there would be considerable obstacles in the way of Amazon making such an application in the UK, especially ex parte, to head-off the anti-suit relief that was, in the event, granted in Mannheim and Munich, had it become aware of those applications.

I bear those principles in mind, but the facts are now very different. Things have moved on. The UPC and German courts have made their orders. I have conducted my hearing. The parties have taken positions; InterDigital has expanded its stance. I have made certain provisional criticisms of InterDigital’s behaviour on the previous occasion and I think from all of the much-changed context, there is a very real likelihood, which would have been harder to show at the earlier stage, that InterDigital would seek urgent ex parte relief in another court if given notice of this hearing. I also have to say that whilst my criticisms on the previous occasion were provisional and will be further discussed at the forthcoming hearing which I ordered, I still have considerable reservations about the way InterDigital proceeded, including the speed with which it did so, and the materials that it used to support those applications.

Therefore, I do conclude that, in the rather unique circumstances of this case, it is both appropriate and necessary to proceed ex parte and not on notice to InterDigital.

So far as comity is concerned, I have given careful thought to it. I only intend to make an order with a return date which I am going to set at the hearing that I have already ordered, in a window which runs down to 30th October. I am not aware of any proceeding in the UPC or in the German court or any step in those proceedings which is intended to take place in that short period that my order will hinder, so I consider that the impact of my order on the conduct of those proceedings will almost certainly be nil (I repeat the obvious but very important point that my order is directed to InterDigital and not the German Court or the UPC). If I am wrong about that, then InterDigital has the right to apply to set aside or vary my order, but the position (aside from this application today), is that there is another procedural hearing coming up in the UK, the UPC has a procedural hearing coming up, at which we will give further directions for our respective proceedings, and seek to understand the overall position better. I am making an order which will not interfere with that situation or that balance at all and, indeed, will simply preserve the position from what I think would be an exceptionally disruptive application by InterDigital, were it to be made in the short period between now and the return date.

Therefore, I do intend to make an anti-anti-suit order, with a scope which I will now discuss with counsel.

I also considered whether I ought to make an order which simply required InterDigital to give notice of any further anti-suit relief that it was going to seek in any other court, similar to what I did in Cook v Boston, as both a practical and symbolic effort to minimise even a theoretical impact on the proceedings of a foreign court. However, in view of the extremely short period to the return date, and the other matters I have referred to, and to the complexity which I think would be involved in this case in making an order requiring notice rather than simply an injunction, I do not think it is appropriate. I have already made clear why I think there is no lack of comity in what I am doing and I think the further challenge presented by converting the order sought to an order requiring notice is not merited and that to do so would just cause a potential lack of clarity and provide scope for unhelpful and unuseful argument.

My attention is drawn to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft order. Paragraph 5 contains the substantive relief, which is in the following terms:

“a.

Restrain, prevent or prohibit the Applicants or any of them from pursuing the Final Relief (or any part of it), the AASI Application, the Continuation Application, and/or the Expedition Application;

b.

Require the Applicants or any of them to withdraw any claims for the Final Relief (or any part of it), the AASI Application, the Continuation Application, and/or the Expedition Application;

c.

Seek to penalise the Applicants or any of them for the pursuit of the Final Relief (or any part of it), the AASI Application, the Continuation Application, and/or the Expedition Application.”

I consider that that relief adequately reflects what I think is appropriate. Quite properly, given the overall procedural context and the fact this is an ex parte application, Amazon has sought to make clear that the relief it seeks must not and does not interfere with InterDigital’s ability to bring what, in Mr. Brown’s (of Hogan Lovells) evidence, he calls substantive patent proceedings in the UPC, the German courts or any other jurisdiction, and what Mr. Brown means by “substantive patent proceedings” is an allegation that some claim of some patent is infringed by some act or product of Amazon.

I do not think it is even arguable on the face of paragraph 5 that that kind of substantive relief is blocked, and I make clear through these reasons that that is not the effect of paragraph 5.

The laudable effort to include a carve-out was by way of paragraph 6 in the order, which said as follows:

“For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Order prevents or is intended to prevent the Respondents (or any of them) from pursuing, continuing or conducting patent infringement proceedings based on their patents before any competent court and/or enforcing any resulting judgments or measures.”

To my mind that just introduces scope for doubt and could even undermine the injunctions in 5(a)-(c) which I have ordered. So I think it is unnecessary because I do not think there is any argument that paragraphs 5(a)-(c) do preclude an allegation by InterDigital that some particular claim of some particular patent or patents is infringed by some particular activity.

I will just say finally, for the sake of the transcript, in the course of submissions I heard argument on whether the injunction should be universal, i.e. directed to all courts, or whether it should be limited to the proceedings in the German court in Munich and the UPC in Mannheim. I have refreshed my memory with the help of counsel that the UPC ASI was not limited territorially or as to any specific court, whereas the Munich ASI was limited to the High Court of England and Wales.

I do think it is appropriate that there is not the limit to any particular court in paragraph 5 because it is perfectly possible that, if notified and if it intended to make an application for some kind of ASI, InterDigital could seek relief in some other court, whether another national European court, or another local division of the UPC, or some court outside Europe (InterDigital’s skeleton on the previous hearing referred in passing to the USA) and that ought to be prohibited.