Heshom Adamir v London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham

MRS JUSTICE HEATHER WILLIAMS: By an application notice dated 26 January 2026, Mr Adamir applied for an urgent, pre-issue interim injunction requiring the respondent to: (i) provide him with accommodation within 72 hours; (ii) disclose specified documents to him; (iii) make an interim payment of £60,000. He also sought to stay the enforcement of a costs order made against him on 3 September 2025 in earlier proceedings in the Administrative Court (Case No. AC-2024-LON-002018).

Mr Adamir was offered an urgent hearing on 6 February 2026 but indicated that, due to health difficulties, he wanted additional time to prepare. On 12 February 2026 he indicated he was ready for a hearing, and on that date he was directed to serve his application on the respondent. The applicant filed a certificate of service indicating service had been effected on 17 February 2026.

The case papers were then referred to Hill J sitting, at that time, as the Interim Applications Judge. Hill J indicated she had been minded to transfer the case to the Administrative Court given the previous proceedings but she noted the applicant's position that this was a damages claim properly brought in the general civil list of the King's Bench Division. She directed that the injunction application be listed for hearing in the week commencing 2 March 2026, with a two-hour time estimate. She also directed the respondent to file a response to the application and any evidence it wished to rely on by 4.00 pm on 26 February 2026. Hill J provided that the hearing was to be before a judge of the King's Bench Division authorised to sit in the Administrative Court to cater for the possibility that the view was taken at the hearing that the application should be transferred to the Administrative Court. Hill J also indicated the parties had permission to attend the hearing remotely and that the hearing was to be conducted bearing in mind the difficulties the applicant had described and the adjustments he sought at section 11 of his application notice. In due course the hearing was listed for today, 5 March 2026.

The respondent filed its response at 5.36 pm on 26 February 2026. This was one hour and 36 minutes late. I will grant the respondent permission to rely on the response. It is a short document comprising two pages, and the applicant has had ample time to deal with it. Indeed, he relied on aspects of it in support of his submissions today.

In short, the respondent denies that the applicant is entitled to the relief sought, save that it indicates it is willing to disclose his housing file to him and that it is unlikely it will pursue the order for costs made in its favour in the Administrative Court proceedings, given the applicant's current circumstances.

The applicant emailed the court on 26 February 2026 objecting to the respondent's late response and also pointing out that it had failed to engage with issues he had raised in his application. He asked that the respondent be directed to provide certain documents in advance of the hearing, suggesting his ability to present his case at the hearing would be compromised in the absence of this. However, the applicant filed no application notice in relation to this request, and I did not make an order in response to this informal email request as I did not consider it appropriate to do so, for reasons I will explain later in this judgment.

The applicant also filed a supplementary statement dated 2 March 2026 setting out his case in relation to this hearing. I grant him permission to rely on this.

I checked with Mr Adamir during the hearing whether he had filed a claim form with the court because he had not included one in his bundle of documents. He then emailed an unissued claim form which he said he had filed with the court on 22 December 2025. The document itself is dated 16 December 2025. I have not seen a letter or other communication confirming that filing took place on that date and the document is not on CE-File. However, for the purposes of today’s hearing, I will assume in Mr Adamir's favour that he did indeed provide this document to the court on 22 December 2025, as he says. He confirmed to me at the hearing, that no particulars of claim have been served or filed at this stage.

The brief details of the claim as set out on the claim form state that the claimant's claim is for damages for misfeasance in public office, fraud on the court, breach of statutory duty under the Housing Act 1996, discrimination under the Equality Act 2010, breaches of the Human Rights Act 1998 and breach of the EU Withdrawal Agreement. The text then names various officers of the respondent who are said to have engaged in systematic misconduct towards the application from 2022-2025, including: concealment of a Home Office certificate, fabrication of documents with impossible dates and fraud on the court. The applicant also refers to breach of directly effective EU treaty rights and deliberate exploitation of his disabilities. The value of the claim is said to exceed £10 million.

At the request of both parties and in accordance with Hill J's earlier directions, this hearing has been held remotely. The applicant refers to having ADHD, dyslexia and dyspraxia amongst other conditions. In his application notice he asks for the following adjustments: extra time to process questions; questions to be phrased simply; frequent breaks, if needed, during the hearing; permission to refer to his notes; and allowance made for him to stand and move around, if needs be, because he suffers from back pain. I indicated at the outset of the hearing that I was willing to grant all of these adjustments and that the applicant should just ask if he wanted a break at any stage. In the event, oral submissions were relatively short, and Mr Adamir did not request a break. I had read all of documents in advance.

I made clear at the outset that this was a hearing of a pre-issue injunction made in relation to a misfeasance in public office damages claim; it was not a re-opening of the Administrative Court proceedings in which Mr Adamir had been refused permission to apply for judicial review.

The focus of all of the documentation filed in support of this injunction application is on the claim for misfeasance in public office. In his supporting documentation, Mr Adamir said the respondent had engaged in systemic fraud in the way it dealt with his application as a homeless person made under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. He identified three pieces of evidence in particular that he says proves the respondent's conduct towards him was fraudulent. I will refer to those contentions in more detail once I have summarised the relevant sequence of events.

Mr Adamir says he should be granted an interim mandatory injunction requiring the respondent to house him pending the final determination or settlement of this claim or until further order. He says relief should be granted as there is a high degree of assurance that his claim will succeed and that the balance of convenience is in his favour as he will suffer serious irreparable harm if this relief is not granted because he is homeless, disabled and in acute crisis. In addition to the difficulties I have identified earlier, he refers to having PTSD, anxiety, depression, chronic pain, IBS and eczema.

As to the other orders sought at this stage, in the application notice Mr Adamir says the disclosure he seeks is "essential to prove the fraud at trial". He says the costs order made in the Administrative Court proceedings was obtained by the same fraud and that is why that order must be stayed.

Before I come to a summary of the events, it is helpful to give a brief summary of the relevant duties.

Section 183(1) provides that the provisions of Part VII apply where a person applies to a local housing authority in England for accommodation and the authority has reason to believe the person is or may be homeless or threatened with homelessness.

Section 184(1) provides that if the local housing authority has reason to believe the applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness, they shall make such inquiries as are necessary to satisfy themselves: (a) whether he is eligible for assistance, and (b) if so, whether any duty, and if so what duty, is owed to him under the following provisions of Part VII.

If in due course the applicant is found to be in priority need and not homeless intentionally, subject to the local connection provisions, the full housing duty will be owed under section 193.

Section 184(3) states that on completing their inquiries the authority shall notify the applicant of their decision and, insofar as any issue is decided against his interests, inform him of the reasons for their decision.

The effect of section 185 is that persons from abroad who are subject to immigration control are not eligible for housing assistance save in specific situations provided for in the regulations.

Section 189(1) imposes a duty on the authority to provide interim accommodation in cases of apparent priority need. The category of those who have a priority need for accommodation are set out in section 189(1).

Section 189A(1) provides that if the local housing authority are satisfied that an applicant is homeless or threatened with homelessness and eligible for assistance, the authority must make an assessment of the applicant's case. As identified in subsection (2), this assessment will include an assessment of his housing needs. The local housing authority must notify the applicant in writing of the assessment the authority makes and try to agree the steps to be taken by the applicant and by the authority (see subsections (3) and (4)).

Section 189B imposes a duty which the local housing authority owes to all applicants who they are satisfied are homeless and eligible for assistance. This is often referred to as “the relief duty”. Under this duty the authority must take reasonable steps to help the applicant to secure that suitable accommodation becomes available for his occupation for at least six months. Subsection (5) provides that if any of the circumstances mentioned in subsection (7) apply, the authority may give notice to the applicant bringing the relief duty to an end. The circumstances listed in subsection (7) include that the authority has complied with the relief duty and the period of 56 days, beginning with the day when the housing authority was satisfied the duty arose, has ended.

Section 202 provides the applicant with the right to request a review of any decision of the local housing authority as to his eligibility for assistance; or any decision of the local housing authority as to what duty (if any) is owed to him under sections 189B to 193C; or any decision of the local housing authority as to the steps they are to take under subsection (2) of section 189B, or a decision to give notice under subsection (5) of that section bringing the relief duty to an end. There is a 21-day period in which to request a review.

An applicant who is dissatisfied with the outcome of the review may appeal to the County Court on any point of law arising from the review decision or the original decision (section 204), and that appeal must be brought within 21 days of notification of the decision.

I stress that it is not my role to make findings of fact at this stage, and I have heard no oral evidence. It is my role to assess the material before me to see if the tests I have to apply are met.

I also stress that I do not have a full copy of the applicant's housing file. I have only the documents provided to me for this hearing, which are primarily those contained in the applicant's bundle. Broadly speaking, this bundle comprises some of the correspondence between the applicant and the respondent regarding his housing application; documents he obtained from the respondent on a subject access request for; a transcript of the hearing before Mark Ockelton, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court at the renewal hearing in the judicial review proceedings on 3 September 2025, and a transcript of his judgment; and some medical records relating to the applicant. I will simply seek to summarise the main events at this stage. Where I give a page reference to help identify a document, it is to the applicant's bundle.

The applicant is a Swedish citizen. In early 2023 the applicant approached the respondent for housing as a homeless single applicant. There is a slight difference between the application date that is given by the applicant and the date given by the respondent, but nothing turns on that for present purposes. By letter dated 2 October 2023, the applicant's application was rejected on the basis he had no immigration status in the UK and thus was not eligible for housing assistance. As I will return to, the first plank of the applicant's case on the respondent's allegedly fraudulent behaviour relates to a Home Office certificate indicating that a check was carried out by the respondent on 2 October 2023 which showed that his application under the EU Settlement Scheme was pending.

On 1 February 2024, the decision that the applicant was not eligible for assistance was overturned on review.

On 12 July 2024, an internal email was sent within the respondent, which the applicant obtained via his subject access request. This is the second plank of the applicant's case that the respondent acted fraudulently towards him, so I will read that email. The names are redacted but it is apparent from the sign-off that it was sent by a Senior Housing Adviser on 12 July 2024, and it is said to have an attachment which is described as "S 184 NPN" and then the applicant's name. As I understand it, it is common ground that NPN is shorthand for "not in priority need". The text of the email said as follows:

"I have gone through the case and written an urgent decision letter to be sent out.

Please view and tweak the letter as seen fit.

I don't see that we have made any attempt to assist with private sector viewing since we accepted the section 189B duty so we may have to do something to show we have tried to help before sending the decision letter, but otherwise I think we should close the case by making the decision."

I will come back to this document in due course.

An email sent to the applicant on 30 July 2024 was headed "Assessment and Personalised Plan Housing Act 1996, section 189A and section 189B". The text said it was written to update the applicant on the progress of his application. As the council was satisfied he was homeless and eligible for assistance, the relief duty was owed and the council was required by section 189A to make an assessment of his case and notify him of the assessment that was made. The letter went on to refer to the assessment that was contained within the Personal Housing Plan published on 30 July 2024 ,which the applicant had agreed to via the customer portal.

At some stage during 2024 it appears the applicant may have received a letter telling him that the respondent had concluded he was not in priority need. The position here is unclear because the letter that appears at page 36 of the bundle is dated 25 March 2023, which, as Mr Mullin accepted, cannot be right, as the respondent's position is that the applicant had not made an application for housing as a homeless person by that stage. Furthermore, the body of the letter refers to various events and communications that took place in the first part of 2024. The latest specific date referred to in the body of the letter is correspondence with the applicant on 2 April 2024. Accordingly, the letter must have been written after that date. Mr Mullin was unable to help me with the correct date of this letter. However, I am satisfied that although I have been unable to get to the bottom of this point, it does not affect the conclusions I arrive at today.

On or about 12 August 2024, the respondent learnt that the applicant had an assured shorthand tenancy of a flat at 9 Broughton Road. This led the respondent to write to the applicant on 13 September 2024 indicating he was not regarded as homeless or threatened with homelessness in light of having this accommodation. On 12 February 2025 the applicant informed the respondent he had left this address two weeks previously. The respondent then proceeded to assess the applicant's circumstances as they now were as he was now homeless.

By emailed letter dated 1 April 2025, the respondent informed the applicant that they were satisfied he was homeless and that they were required by section 189A(1) to make an assessment of his case. The letter said the council would arrange to conduct an assessment and notify the applicant. Further, that under section 189B, the council must undertake the relief duty. This letter was headed "Your Homeless Application Housing Act 1996 section 184". However, the substance of the letter referred to the duties under section 189A(1) and section 189B(2). As I have already indicated, the third paragraph of the letter (page 47 of the bundle) indicated in terms that it was accepted that the relief duty applied.

An emailed letter sent on 2 April 2025, informed the applicant that the council was satisfied he was homeless and eligible for assistance and that, pursuant to the section 189A(1) duty, the respondent had carried out an assessment of his case as set out in the Personal Housing Plan. The Personal Housing Plan contains various entries regarding the applicant that are dated 1 April 2025. Steps for him to take and the respondent to take are dated either 6 or 7 April 2025 in this plan. The front page of the plan bears the date of 28 August 2025, as Mr Adamir highlights and I will return to.

On 14 June 2025, Mr Adamir issued the judicial review proceedings I have referred to. This was on the basis that the respondent had unlawfully delayed in reaching a decision on whether he had priority need (see, for example, the description at paragraph 8 of the transcript of the Deputy High Court Judge's judgment).

The respondent issued a letter on 23 June 2025 (wrongly dated 23 June 2024) indicating that the outcome of the inquiries into the applicant's application was that it had been determined he was not in priority need. This letter is the third plank of the applicant's current application. He describes it as a fabricated letter, as I will return to. The letter listed the medical evidence that had been considered and then went on to set out the applicant's circumstances and the material that had been obtained from the council's inquiries. It is a long letter and there is no need for me to set out the detail for present purposes. The medical evidence was addressed in detail. The respondent did not accept all of the applicant's assertions about his state of health, and reasons were given for the conclusion that he was not in priority need.

On 2 July 2025, the respondent wrote to the applicant confirming that in light of the decision he was not in priority need, the duties owed to him by the respondent had now ended. A further letter also dated 2 July 2025 stated that the relief duty referred to in the 1 April 2025 letter had now come to an end as more than 56 days had elapsed since the relief duty had been accepted.

On 9 July 2025, Johnson J considered the application for permission to apply for judicial review on the papers. By this stage the respondent had indicated it was treating the applicant's ongoing correspondence and ongoing proceedings as a request for a review to be conducted pursuant to section 202. In light of the ongoing review, Johnson J refused permission as there was an alternative remedy.

On 10 July 2025, the applicant wrote to the respondent demanding he be provided with same-day emergency accommodation pending the outcome of the section 202 review. On 16 July 2025 the respondent replied, declining the request.

By letter dated 21 April 2025, the respondent provided the decision on the section 202 review. The letter is long and detailed, but in short it upheld the conclusion that the applicant was not in priority need. The letter reviewed the available medical evidence, including a letter from Charing Cross Hospital dated 16 July 2025 (see paragraph 48 of that letter). It also referred to assessments made by the counsel's medical adviser and it noted that the applicant had been given the opportunity to make further representations. The letter advised the applicant he could appeal the decision to the County Court pursuant to section 204 of the Act. He did not do so.

The applicant renewed his application for permission to apply for judicial review. The application was heard on 3 September 2025. At the time the 21-day period for appealing to the County Court was still running. The Deputy High Court Judge refused the renewed application on the basis that the County Court appeal was a wholly adequate alternative remedy available to Mr Adamir. He also awarded the respondent the costs of attending the hearing. Added to the costs that had earlier been awarded to the respondent for preparing the Summary Grounds of Resistance, the overall costs figure the applicant was ordered to pay totalled £5,228.

The overarching principles to be applied by the court in deciding whether to grant interim injunctions are derived from American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396. Firstly, there must be a serious question to be tried, meaning the claim has a real prospect of succeeding. However, as the applicant accepts, where a mandatory injunction is sought, rather than simply asking if there is a serious issue to be tried, the court will require "a high degree of assurance" that the claimant will succeed at trial: see Eeles v Cobham Hire Services Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 204. If this hurdle is overcome the court should consider whether, if the claimant succeeds at trial, they would be adequately compensated by damages for any loss caused by the refusal to grant an interim injunction. If damages would not be an adequate remedy for the claimant, the court should consider whether, if any interim injunction were granted, the defendant would be adequately protected under a claimant's cross-undertaking as to damages. Where there is doubt as to the adequacy of the respective remedies in damages, the question of the balance of convenience arises and the court should take whatever course seems likely to cause the least irredeemable prejudice to one party or the other.

The ingredients of the tort of misfeasance in public office were identified by the House of Lords in Three River District Council v Governor of the Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1. The tort may be committed by a public officer in two possible ways. The first form is called targeted malice. This is where the public officer's conduct is specifically intended to injure the claimant, the essence being that power is exercised for an improper motive. The second form of the tort is referred to as untargeted malice. This is where the public officer acts, knowing they have no power to do so, or with reckless indifference as to this, and knowing their actions will probably injure the claimant or they are recklessly indifferent to that. In both instances the claimant must show they suffered material damage in consequence.

Applications for pre-action disclosure are governed by CPR 31.16. The court can only make an order if satisfied: (a) the respondent is likely to be a party to the subsequent proceedings; (b) the applicant is likely to be a party to those proceedings; (c) that if the proceedings had already started, the documents would have been disclosable pursuant to CPR 31.6; and (d) disclosure before the proceedings have started is desirable in order to dispose of the anticipated proceedings fairly, to assist the dispute to be resolved without proceedings being issued or to save costs. If these threshold criteria are met, the court has a discretion whether to make the order. Material factors are discussed at paragraphs 31.16.4 and 31.16.5 of the White Book. They include (and are not limited to): whether the claim can be formulated without the documentation sought; whether the documents sought have been carefully circumscribed; and whether the applicant can show they have a properly arguable claim with a real prospect of success.

As I have indicated, the applicant puts his application on the basis that he can show a strong case of misfeasance in public office as a result of three pieces of documentary evidence from the respondent's own files which he refers to as the “smoking guns”. I will consider them in turn.

Firstly, Mr Adamir highlights that a document he obtained via his subject access request indicates that on 2 October 2023 an employee of the respondent, described as a “PRS Tenancy Relations Officer”, checked the Home Office records as to the applicant’s immigration status for the purpose of homelessness assistance and received the information that he had applied under the EU Settlement Scheme and was awaiting a decision on his application. If that were the case, it appears he would be eligible under Part VII of the Housing Act for homelessness assistance at the material time.

The applicant points out that on the same day, 2 October 2023, he received a letter from a PRS Tenancy Relations Officer informing him that he was not eligible for assistance. He says that in the circumstances the contents of this letter were false and must have been dishonestly written in the knowledge that he was in fact eligible in light of the Home Office document I have referred to.

I do not accept that this inference necessarily follows and I do not accept that Mr Adamir has shown a strong case in relation to this. The letter to him of 2 October 2023 expressly identifies the basis of the decision that he was not eligible for assistance as evidence obtained from the Home Office that there was a letter of 11 April 2023 indicating that Mr Adamir's application under the EU Settlement Scheme was refused. If this was the correct position, his application would not have been pending and he would not have been eligible for assistance under Part VII of the Housing Act.

Mr Adamir has not provided any other documentation that he obtained via the subject access request as to the checks that were carried out by the respondent at the time, so I do not know how or when the respondent learnt of the 11 April 2023 refusal of his EU Settlement Scheme application, nor has the applicant provided his own correspondence regarding his EU Settlement Scheme application status, so I do not know when he made a further application following the April 2023 refusal. The respondent's position, as set out in the 21 August 2025 review letter, is that the applicant made a further application for EU settlement status after the 2 October 2023 decision. As I have earlier indicated, on review in February 2024 the respondent accepted the applicant was now eligible for housing assistance. However, I have not been provided with a copy of that review decision and so I do not know what explanation the respondent gave in that letter for reversing its 2 October 2023 decision on the applicant’s eligibility. That letter may, for example, indicate when the applicant's EU Settlement Scheme status changed.

In short, therefore, I have been provided with the 2 October 2023 letter and the Home Office's certificate but not the material that would have provided their relevant context. The circumstances I am aware of indicate that the respondent may well have had a legitimate reason for making the 2 October 2023 decision, namely the April 2023 refusal of the applicant’s EU Settlement Scheme application which the respondent had been made aware of by the Home Office, or, at the least, there may well have been some genuine confusion on the respondent’s part in light of inconsistent information from the Home Office as to the applicant's immigration status. If the respondent did have inconsistent information at the time, it might be said that further checks should have been undertaken before the 2 October 2023 letter was written, but I emphasise that this is not a proposed claim for carelessness or negligence or anything of that nature. It is a claim based on the proposition that the respondent dishonestly and knowingly exceeded its powers or deliberately acted to injure the applicant. For the reasons I have indicated, I do not accept there is a strong case for that inference being drawn.

I also take account of the fact the respondent did overturn the 2 October 2023 decision on the review, which tends against Mr Adamir's assertion that the respondent has been engaged in a four-year campaign to fraudulently defeat his housing application and conceal evidence of that.

I turn to the second alleged smoking gun, the internal email of 12 July 2024, which I have already read. Mr Adamir says this discloses an intention to fabricate evidence to show that the section 189B duty had been complied with, when in fact this had not been done.

I do not accept this contention is a strong one; indeed, I do not accept it is even arguable.

I note for completeness that I have not seen the draft letter that apparently accompanied this internal email. In any event, the draft letter appears to relate to the applicant’s substantive housing application given the designation "S184 NPN" to which I have already referred (in this context, a proposed decision that the applicant was not in priority need). That is what the first paragraph of the email appears to be dealing with, whereas the third paragraph of the email refers to the section 189B duty, noting that the council has not made attempts to assist Mr Adamir with obtaining private sector accommodation and thus "we may have to do something to show we've tried to help" before sending the decision letter. The natural reading of this is that the Senior Housing Adviser is saying that the respondent should take steps to help the applicant, pursuant to the relief duty, not that they should falsely claim to have done so when in fact that is not the case.

Although Mr Adamir submitted today that subsequent events bore out his submission, in fact, on the material available to me, the contrary appears to be the case. The respondent did not send a letter to the applicant shortly after this internal email, falsely claiming to have assisted him with private sector accommodation. To the contrary, the letter to him of 30 July 2024 accepted that the section 189B duty applied and set out the steps that have been agreed between applicant and respondent pursuant to the section 189A duty.

I turn to the third alleged smoking gun, which is the allegation that the letter of 23 June 2025 was fabricated to defeat the judicial review claim, as there was no outstanding determination of whether Mr Adamir was in priority need to be made at that stage.

As I have been able to clarify by the questions I have asked of Mr Adamir during the hearing today, his contention is essentially based on the proposition that the respondent had already determined that he was not in priority need and conveyed this to him on 1 April 2025 and he had made no further claim for housing after that.

However, there appears to be no documentary basis for the proposition that the respondent had made a substantive determination finding that that applicant was not in priority need on 1 April 2025. I asked Mr Adamir twice (so as to give him a full opportunity to address this point), to explain the basis of this contention, and the long and short of it seems to be that his submission is based on the heading of the 1 April 2025 letter, which I have already referred to. However, the letter probably bears the wrong heading insofar as it refers to section 184. It is quite clear from the content of the letter (which I have already summarised) that it was not setting out a determination that Mr Adamir was not in priority need; to the contrary, it was addressing the respondent’s section 189A and section 189B duties to him.

Furthermore, the reason that the 23 June 2025 decision letter came after the applicant had started the judicial review proceedings is not indicative of any dishonesty on the part of the respondent, as Mr Adamir suggests, but was because the applicant had jumped the gun in issuing the judicial review proceedings when he did, because (as is apparent from the terms of his application) he felt the respondent was taking too long to deal with his application. This impression is also confirmed by the content of the Deputy High Court Judge's judgment of 3 September 2025.

From his written materials, I think the applicant also relies upon certain observations made by the Deputy High Court Judge during the hearing. At one stage when he was querying the sequence of events, to try and understand the chronology, he suggested that there may have been a priority need determination on 1 April 2025. However, once his understanding had been clarified by the responses to his questions, he then indicated that, in fact, the priority need determination was the letter of 23 June 2025 (see page 101 of the applicant's bundle).

Mr Adamir says that this third smoking gun is the strongest plank of his argument. To the contrary, I can see no basis whatsoever for the suggestion that the 23 June 2025 letter was anything other than the genuine section 184 decision as to whether he was in priority need, that the respondent was obliged to make and to inform him of.

I make three ancillary observations. First, Mr Adamir's theory that this was done to defeat his judicial review claim makes no sense. Even if the priority need decision had been made and conveyed at an earlier point than 23 June 2025, the applicant had not exercised the remedies open to him; he had not asked for a review of the decision and he had not brought a County Court appeal. In those circumstances, he would have had considerable difficulty with his application for judicial review in any event. Secondly, he suggests that the letter of 23 June 2025 deceived the judges who refused him permission to apply for judicial review. The judges were aware of the date of this letter and the material chronology of events. This is apparent from the judgment of the Deputy High Court Judge, and no basis has been shown to support the assertion that the judges were deceived. Thirdly, the applicant suggests that the 1 April and 2 April 2025 letters were in the wrong sequence in terms of the section 189A and section 189B duties. I do not accept this given the trigger for the relief duty to apply, which I have already referred to. However, in any event, this would afford no support for the applicant’s proposition that the 1 April 2025 letter was in fact a substantive determination of priority need when the letter says nothing of the kind. I also note that this point was raised in the judicial review proceedings and therefore is not open to the applicant to relitigate it at this stage.

Mr Adamir also relied on a number of supplementary points which I can deal with more briefly. First, he referred to inconsistent dates in the Personal Housing Plan: the fact that the document has a date of 28 August 2025 on its first page, as I have already indicated. Whilst I do not know the reason for this definitively, I do not consider it is suggestive of fraud or dishonesty. Indeed, the transcript of the 3 September 2025 hearing shows that Mr Adamir himself describes this as a likely typo or error (see page 105). Mr Mullin suggested the date may well reflect the last date that the document was accessed or that text was inputted into it, and that may well be the case.

Secondly, Mr Adamir has raised at various times, including in documents submitted in support of this application, that he did not receive a letter informing him that the section 189B relief duty applied. That is simply not correct. It says this in terms in the 1 April 2025 letter, as I have indicated.

Thirdly, I refer for completeness to a point that Mr Adamir did not pursue orally but is raised in his written application. He suggests that at the 3 September 2025 hearing the court was somehow misled about the period that the section 189B duty lasted for, namely whether it was six months or 56 days. This seems to be a misunderstanding as to the what the legislation requires. The relief duty lasts for at least 56 days pursuant to the provisions of subsections (5) and (7) that I have already explained, whereas the duty is to help the applicant secure that suitable accommodation becomes available for his occupation that is available for at least six months. In other words, the 56 days relates to how long the duty lasts and the six months to the nature of the accommodation the authority is to assist the applicant with finding.

Lastly, Mr Adamir said it was significant that in its reply to this application, the respondent had said that he had not submitted any medical evidence after 23 June 2025. I agree with him that this was a factual inaccuracy. It is apparent that he submitted the letter of 16 July 2005 that I have already referred to, and indeed it is referred to in terms in the review letter. So Mr Adamir is right that this is an inaccuracy, but it in no way supports his claim of dishonesty in relation to his housing application. As I have pointed out, the contemporaneous material, the 21 August 2025 review letter took it into account.

In short, the supplementary points do not advance the applicant’s claim. It follows that he has not shown there is a serious issue to be tried, let alone established to a high degree of assurance that he will succeed at trial.

In the circumstances the application for an injunction fails and I do not proceed to consider the balance of convenience.

I indicate for completeness that, in so far as Mr Adamir has at times in both his oral and his written submissions raised various criticisms of the way the respondent has discharged its housing duties to him, none of that is relevant to this proposed civil action for misfeasance. Those were points that either were raised or could have been raised in the Administrative Court proceedings, which are at an end. This injunction application cannot be used as a means of trying to relitigate issues that Mr Adamir did not succeed on in those earlier proceedings.

Although it was not formulated as such, in fairness to Mr Adamir I will treat this as an application for pre-action disclosure under the terms of CPR 31.16.

The documents sought are widely drawn. The original scope of his request was set out at paragraph 3.1 of his draft order. It is unnecessary for me to read it in full, but it includes: “full metadata (including creation data, last modified data, author and editor information) for all documents dated between 1 April and 28 August 2025 that relate to the claimant's case”; all communications between the respondent and the respondent’s medical adviser “relating to the commissioning, preparation content or use of any assessment report concerning the claimant”; and documents in which it is said the defendant admitted the claimant was eligible for housing assistance "for several years now". In the documentation he has submitted to the court since then, particularly his supplementary statement for this hearing, Mr Adamir has appeared to broaden the request further, indicating he is seeking all systems records, audit logs, creation records and internal communications relating to his housing file.

I have already summarised the applicable criteria for the grant of pre-action disclosure. I will assume that criteria (a) to (c) are met in the present instance. I turn to criterion (d). There is no question of the disclosure sought saving costs or avoiding litigation. The history of this matter indicates Mr Adamir has taken a confrontational stance throughout with the housing authority. He has made multiple applications in the judicial review proceedings, none of which were successful. I do not consider that provision of the documents would save costs or avoid litigation.

Furthermore, I do not consider it is desirable for the documentation sought to be disclosed in order for the proceedings to be disposed of fairly. If Mr Adamir proceeds with a claim for misfeasance in public office, in due course he will be entitled to disclosure in the usual way. He has not made out a case as to why fairness requires disclosure at this pre-action stage. On his own arguments he is able to formulate his case as matters stand. Indeed, he says it is a strong and clear claim. Tellingly, his application notice, as I have already quoted, says he wants the documents because they are "essential to prove the fraud at trial". He does not say he cannot formulate his claim without them. Documents that are required to prove a pleaded case at trial will be disclosable under the usual disclosure process that applies once both parties have pleaded their cases.

Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the threshold criterion for pre-action disclosure is met. In any event, I would exercise my discretion against making such an order. The proposed claim is weak and speculative for the reasons I have indicated, and Mr Adamir has not shown it has a real prospect of success. Secondly, his approach appears to be an uncircumscribed fishing expedition pursued because he is unwilling to accept the outcome of the judicial review proceedings, which I understand he has also unsuccessfully tried to appeal. Accordingly, I refuse this application. I understand, as I have already indicated, the respondent is willing to supply the applicant’s housing file to him voluntarily.

I return, for completeness, to the request Mr Adamir made in his email of 26 February 2026 for the court to order that the respondent provide specified material to him in advance of the hearing. The matters in question are set out at section 3 of that email. He asked that the respondent be directed to: first, provide a full explanation of the irreconcilable dates on the Personal Housing Plan; secondly, produce the alleged section 189B notice dated 1 April 2025; thirdly, disclose who authored, received and acted upon the internal email of 12 July 2024, including the pre-drafted decision attached to it; fourthly, disclose the Home Office verification log from 2 October 2023, indicating the time it was accessed and by whom; and fifthly, provide all audit logs and metadata for the personal housing plan showing when the document was first created and all subsequent amendments.

As I indicated earlier, no application notice was filed by the applicant in relation to this. An application notice is to be filed save where the court dispenses with this or a rule or practice direction permits (see CPR 23.3), and that is not the case here. No proper basis was shown for the court to grant the request, and indeed granting it would have prejudged the merits of the application I was to hear today prior to me hearing the submissions and having the opportunity to read the bundle in full. There is no basis to order pre-action disclosure, as I have explained, and there would be even less basis to order the respondent to give disclosure in advance of a hearing of an application for pre-action disclosure. Indeed, I am not aware of any reference to such a procedure in the CPR. I also emphasise that Hill J's order was limited to the respondent providing the evidence that it wished to rely on at the hearing.

I have explained why the allegations of fraud are weak. No basis has been shown to stay the costs order that was in any event made in separate proceedings. Furthermore, the respondent has indicated it is not intending to enforce the costs order and this could not conceivably be an appropriate matter in which to grant pre-issue relief in separate proceedings.

The proposed claim appears weak for the reasons I have identified. Accordingly, no basis has been shown for directing the respondent to make an interim payment to Mr Adamir before the claim has even been pleaded.

It therefore follows that the application is refused in its entirety.