Lee Feldman & Anor v Gambling Commission

This is my judgment on matters arising in consequence of my judgment on the trial in this matter, handed down on 19 January 2026 (“the Judgment”) but subject to an interim restricted reporting order (“RRO”). For reasons explained in my order on hand down, I adjourned determination of outstanding issues on (1) any application for permission to appeal; and (2) the question of the continuation and/or terms of a RRO. Following receipt of written submissions in accordance with the directions contained in my 19 January 2026 order, these matters were listed for hearing.

The claimants, represented before me by Mr de Wilde, have since formally applied for permission to appeal, and have made an application for a RRO pursuant to section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (“the 1981 Act). Mr Darbishire KC and Mr Broomfield, who represent the claimants’ interests in the criminal proceedings referenced below (“the Criminal Proceedings”), have also provided written submissions on the RRO application and attended the hearing, albeit they did not seek to make further oral representations. The RRO application is resisted by the defendant, represented by Mr Mitchell, and by the Crown Prosecution Service, which has appeared before me by Mr Watson. Although notice of the RRO application was served on the press, the only response in this regard was received from the Press Association, which stated it was neutral as to this application.

For ease of reference, I have continued to use the same abbreviations as in the Judgment handed down on 19 January 2026; relevantly, GVC Holdings Ltd is “GVC”; and its later iteration, Entain Plc, is “Entain”.

At the outset of the hearing, Mr de Wilde made an application for a RRO to order postponement of any report of the content of this hearing; that application was not opposed by the defendant or the interested party. For reasons explained orally at the time (but, in particular, as I considered it in the interests of justice to allow submissions to be fully made), I initially made an interim RRO to cover the hearing itself, indicating that I would return to this application at the close of the hearing. As Mr Watson (for the interested party) observed, however, during the course of oral submissions, there were a number of references to matters that fall within the RRO made by Hill J on 26 November 2025; as such, towards the end of the hearing I took the decision that the interim RRO should be extended such that the publication of any report of this hearing must be postponed until the return of the last verdict in the Criminal Proceedings, or further order.

Further to the dismissal of their claims, the claimants seek permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal on six grounds. The test I am to apply when considering an application for permission to appeal is as set out at CPR 52.6(1): whether the appeal would have a real prospect of success or whether there is some other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. For the reasons provided on the form N460HC (annexed to this judgment), I refuse the claimants’ application.

The present proceedings progressed in circumstances in which it was known that there were on-going criminal proceedings involving the claimants. Part of the relevant background to the claims related to a criminal investigation by HMRC into the former Turkish operations of GVC at a time when the claimants had held senior positions in that company (between 2004 and 2020, Mr Feldman had been a non-executive director and then became the non-executive chairman of GVC; from 2007 to 2020, Mr Alexander was GVC’s chief executive officer).

On 5 December 2023, Sharp LJ, President of the King’s Bench Division (“PKBD”), had approved a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (“DPA”) between the CPS and Entain. An open judgment, setting out the PKBD’s summary reasons for approving the DPA was published, but the order of 5 December 2023 included a RRO, which postponed reporting of the DPA hearing until the conclusion of any criminal proceedings against “relevant individuals” named in the statement of facts, and which made provision for postponing publication of the statement of facts and of the PKBD’s full judgment for the same duration.

Subsequently, on 19 August 2025, Mr Feldman and Mr Alexander, alongside a number of other former GVC/Entain directors and executives, were charged with conspiracy to defraud and conspiracy to bribe between 2011 and 2018. The charges are denied and a trial is scheduled to commence in February 2028.

Prior to the trial in the present matter, by application notice of 12 November 2025, the defendant sought a RRO under section 4(2) of the 1981 Act to restrain reporting of some aspects of the trial. The claimants opposed the application, setting out their position as follows (skeleton argument, 19 November 2025):

“64.

... If the trial is to take place on the terms now sought by D, one inevitable effect of the RRO would be to prevent public scrutiny of its conduct and any resulting vindication of the Cs and their privacy rights if their claim succeeds. Reporting of the trial and D’s conduct and disclosures on these terms would be disembodied, and have limited value to the Cs and the public more widely.”

“78.

The Cs’ position in this regard is that: a) this application should fail because there is no risk of prejudice to the administration of justice in the Criminal Proceedings, and certainly no substantial risk. D has failed to articulate any nexus at all between issues to be raised in these proceedings and the existence of such a risk; b) D has failed to consider whether any risk would be eliminated by a s.4(2) order or whether it could be overcome by less restrictive means; and c) any degree of risk would in any event be the lesser of two evils, having regard to the public interest in freedom of expression and open justice, in the circumstances of a case involving alleged misconduct by D, a public body and regulator, which should be reported as fully as possible.”

After hearing argument on the application on 20 November 2025, and for the reasons provided in her judgment of 26 November ([2025] EWHC 3117 (KB)), Hill J made a RRO, restraining publication of any report referring to specified documents that would otherwise be included within the materials before the court at trial. The RRO was stated to have effect until after the return of the last verdict in the Criminal Proceedings.

A separate bundle of documents falling within the terms of Hill J’s order was before me at trial (“the RRO bundle”); this included two additional witness statements filed on behalf of the defendant (from its chief executive, Mr Rhodes, and from a manager in its enforcement team, Mr Cooper). In circulating the Judgment in draft form, references to evidence derived from the documents and statements contained within the RRO bundle were marked in red, with the proposal being made that, upon publication of an open judgment, these would be redacted in accordance with the RRO made by Hill J. There was (and is) no dissent from that proposal.

Having invited the parties to provide written submissions on any matters arising in consequence of the Judgment, I received written representations relating to costs, the question of a possible application by the claimants for permission to appeal, and a proposed application for a RRO in respect of aspects of the Judgment by the claimants. For the reasons provided in my order of 19 January 2026, I formally adjourned the hand-down hearing to a further listing, making an interim RRO in respect of the Judgment so as to “hold the ring” pending determination of the claimants’ application in this regard.

When considering an application to limit the reporting of court proceedings or of the reasons provided for a decision reached in such proceedings, the open justice principle provides my starting point: as a default, the general principle is that all court proceedings are conducted in public and judgment is to be publicly pronounced. That is the position both at common law and as required by article 6 (right to fair trial) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”). Full, contemporaneous reporting of legal proceedings by the media, and of judgments given in those proceedings, is an important extension of the concept of open justice. Limiting such reporting by means of a RRO is thus a derogation from the open justice principle and such orders are “exceptional, require clear justification and should be made only when they are strictly necessary to secure the proper administration of justice” (paragraph 10 Practice Guidance (Interim Non-disclosure Orders) [2012] 1 WLR 1003, issued by the Master of the Rolls in 2011 (“MR Guidance”)); as Chamberlain J emphasised in Secretary of State for Defence v Persons Unknown [2023] EWHC 2999:

“24.

...

(e)

Open justice is a cardinal constitutional principle, from which derogations can be justified only in exceptional circumstances, where strictly necessary as measures to secure the proper administration of justice. The grant of derogations is a matter of obligation, not discretion. ...”

A statutory derogation from the open justice principle is provided by section 4(2) of the 1981 Act, enabling a court to postpone the reporting of (otherwise public) legal proceedings:

“(2)

In any such proceedings the court may, where it appears to be necessary for avoiding a substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice in those proceedings, or in any other proceedings pending or imminent, order that the publication of any report of the proceedings, or any part of the proceedings, be postponed for such period as the court thinks necessary for that purpose.”

It is important, however, to recognise the significance of imposing a restriction on the reporting of legal proceedings pursuant to section 4(2); as Lord Sumption observed in Khuja v Times Newspapers Ltd [2017] UKSC 49, [2019] AC 161:

“16.

.... Arrangements for the conduct of the hearing itself fall within the court’s general power to control its own proceedings. They may result in some information not being available to be reported. But in Convention terms they are more likely to engage article 6 than article 10. Reporting restrictions are different. The material is there to be seen and heard, but may not be reported. This is direct press censorship.”

Section 4(2) operates within the framework of the 1981 Act, which is founded upon a strict liability rule, as defined by section 1, whereby:

“... conduct may be treated as a contempt of court as tending to interfere with the course of justice in particular legal proceedings regardless of intent to do so.”

That rule is, however, limited as provided by section 2, which makes clear that:

“(2)

The strict liability rule applies only to a publication which creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the proceedings in question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced.”

And, by section 4(1), it is expressly provided that:

“(1)

Subject to this section a person is not guilty of contempt of court under the strict liability rule in respect of a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in good faith.”

Thus, if no order is made to postpone the reporting of proceedings pursuant to section 4(2), then, subject to any other order made by the court (for example, under section 1 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992), there will be no contempt under the strict liability rule in respect of fair and accurate reporting, published contemporaneously and in good faith, of legal proceedings held in public.

In In re British Broadcasting Corporation [2018] EWCA Crim 1341, [2018] 1 WLR 6023, Lord Burnett CJ, giving the judgment of the court, provided guidance as to the approach to be taken on an application for a RRO. Having regard to the guidance thus provided as to the procedural and notification requirements for such applications (see also R (on the application of Marandi) v Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2023] EWHC 587 (Admin); [2023] 2 Cr App R 15), I make clear that I am satisfied that these have been complied with in this case. As for the way in which the court should reach its substantive decision on such an application, Lord Burnett endorsed the staged approach identified by Longmore LJ in Ex p The Telegraph Group plc [2001] EWCA Crim 1075; [2001] 1 WLR 1983, at paragraph 22, as follows:

“(1)

The first question is whether reporting would give rise to a substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice in the relevant proceedings. If not, that will be the end of the matter. (2) If such a risk is perceived to exist, then the second question arises: would a section 4(2) order eliminate it? If not, obviously there could be no necessity to impose such a ban. ... On the other hand, even if the judge is satisfied that an order would achieve the objective, he or she would still have to consider whether the risk could satisfactorily be overcome by some less restrictive means. If so, it could not be said to be “necessary” to take the more drastic approach ...

(3)

Suppose the judge concludes that there is indeed no other way of eliminating the perceived risk of prejudice; it still does not follow necessarily that an order has to be made. The judge may still have to ask whether the degree of risk contemplated should be regarded as tolerable in the sense of being “the lesser of two evils”. It is at this stage that value judgments may have to be made as to the priority between “competing public interests” ...”

As for what would amount to “substantial prejudice” for section 4(2) purposes, in In re BBC, the court held:

“31.

The word “substantial” in the section does not mean “weighty”. It means “not insubstantial” or “not minimal”: Attorney General -v- News Group Newspapers [1987] QB 1, at 15D-E per Lord Donaldson MR; Re MGN Limited at [15] per Lord Judge CJ.

32.

It is important to focus on what prejudice it is said would be occasioned by the reports sought to be postponed. ....”

Considering the issues arising on sequential trials, in giving the court’s judgment in In re BBC, Lord Burnett provided the following guidance:

“34.

..., where a section 4(2) order is made in the first trial to protect the second trial or retrial, the judge must still consider carefully the nature of the prejudice that is relied upon to justify the order. Where the following trial will take place some months after the first, it must be demonstrated convincingly that the risk of prejudice is substantial (or that an order is necessary), having well in mind: (a) that the jury in the following trial must be taken to be willing and able faithfully to discharge their duty ..., and (b) the established “fade factor” (the effect of the lapse of time between publication and trial) that applies in news cases. In terms of jurors remembering publicity about a trial or the people involved in it, the “staying power of news reports is very limited”: In re C (A Child) (Private Judgment: Publication) [2016] 1 WLR 5204, para 30, per Lord Dyson MR (but cf Ex p The Telegraph Group plc [2001] 1 WLR 1983, para 31 in respect of very high-profile cases).”

I remind myself that “prejudice” in this context requires a focus on public policy interests, not the private rights of parties involved in the litigation in issue: the question is whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, the application of the open justice principle would frustrate the administration of justice; as Lord Reid observed in Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273, at 294:

“The law on this subject is and must be founded entirely on public policy. It is not there to protect the private rights of parties to a litigation or prosecution. It is there to prevent interference with the administration of justice and it should ... be limited to what it reasonably necessary for that purpose. Public policy generally requires a balancing of interests which may conflict. Freedom of speech should not be limited to any greater extent than is necessary but it cannot be allowed where there would be real prejudice to the administration of justice.”

Applying that approach to section 4(2), in Re Belfast Telegraph Newspapers Ltd’s Application [1997] NI 309, McCollum LJ concluded that:

“Under s 4(2) of the 1981 Act the court may order a postponement of publication for such period defined either in relation to time or the occurrence of some event, such as the conclusion of a trial as a court thinks necessary, and may only postpone where it appears to be necessary for avoiding a substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice in those proceedings or in any other proceedings pending or imminent.”

As is common ground before me, the ability to impose a RRO under section 4(2) in respect of sequential trials need not be limited to proceedings in the same jurisdiction; it is, for example, not uncommon for the fact-finding judgment in public law care proceedings in the family sphere to be the subject of a RRO pending the return of verdicts in related criminal proceedings (see RJ v Tigipko and ors [2019] EWHC 448 Fam, at paragraph 13). Further, for completeness, it is no bar to the imposition of a RRO under section 4(2) that matters to which it relates have already been the subject of reporting, or have previously been made public in some other context; see the observations of the PKBD in HM Attorney General v Yaxley-Lennon [2019] EWHC 1791 QB, at paragraph 51. Thus, it may well be that evidence given in open court has been the subject of earlier reporting but that a RRO is imposed under section 4(2) in respect of a judgment in the case, so as to avoid the prejudice that would otherwise arise in subsequent proceedings (see, for example, R v G(G) and B(S) [2009] EWCA Crim 1207).

By their application of 26 January 2026, the claimants seek an order postponing any report referring to the Judgment until after the return of the last verdict in the Criminal Proceedings. The application is supported by a witness statement from Mr Oliver Subhedar, counsel at the claimants’ solicitors in these proceedings. Mr Subhedar says that the claimants, their business activities, the Criminal Proceedings, and other litigation in which they are involved (including the current proceedings), are of great interest to the media, and observes that, when the Judgment was handed down, notwithstanding the interim RRO, there was “immediate and extensive media reporting of the outcome of the claim, in both specialist gambling media and mainstream news outlets”. Referring to various publications in this regard (and exhibiting reports from The Guardian, SBC News, Next.io, and Yogo.net), Mr Subhedar says that, absent a RRO, it can be inferred that the media would continue to cover this story.

Mr Subhedar identifies ten findings (“the Findings”) within the Judgment that are said to be likely to give rise to a substantial risk of prejudice in the Criminal Proceedings [REDACTED]. Mr Subhedar points out that the defendant (supported by HMRC and the CPS) had previously identified that a RRO was necessary in its application of 12 November 2025; that related to evidence pertaining to the underlying criminal investigation, which would, Mr Subhedar contends, give rise to a lesser risk than the Findings.

The claimants’ counsel in the Criminal Proceedings have also provided written submissions in support of their clients’ RRO application. [REDACTED]

In advancing submissions in support of the application, the claimants say the questions identified in Ex parte The Telegraph are to be answeredas follows: (1) the Findings were seriously adverse to the claimants, and gave rise to a substantial risk of prejudice in the Criminal Proceedings, as recognised by the reporting restrictions imposed by the PKBD in December 2023, and by the RRO imposed by Hill J in November 2025; (2) it was apparent that a section 4(2) order would eliminate this risk; (3) any value judgement between the competing public interests of fair trial and of freedom of expression/open justice should favour the public interest in the proper administration of justice, in particular given that, when the last verdict is returned in the Criminal Proceedings, the press will be free to report on the Judgment (including the Findings) in full.

As for the scope of any RRO, the claimants’ primary position is that this should be in respect of the entirety of the Judgment: (i) because a more limited order, covering only the passages containing the Findings, would remove essential context and risk prejudicial speculation; and (ii) because to rule otherwise would give rise to an unfairness for the claimants as they would be unable to explain or comment on key aspects of the decision.

It initially seemed to be the defendant’s case that a section 4(2) RRO could not restrict subsequent reporting of specific findings in a judgment which related to matters forming part of the public aspect of the proceedings, in respect of which there had been no RRO. In oral submissions, Mr Mitchell clarified that he was not suggesting that the court could not make such an order, but that the application was misconceived because there was no cogent evidence of prejudice: Mr Subhedar had referenced media reports around the time of the order dismissing the claims, but the trial in the Criminal Proceedings would not take place for two years and that (in contrast to the position discussed in Tigipko) would not be concerned with the same factual matrix as the current proceedings. As for the submissions of the claimants’ trial counsel, it was insufficient to assert, in general terms, [REDACTED]; that did not articulate the risk.Moreover, to the extent it was contended that reports of the Findings (which had expanded since the question of a RRO in respect of the draft Judgment was initially raised) would prejudice the claimants’ article 6 right to a fair trial, given the steps that could be put into place to mitigate the risk, there was a very high bar before that would be held to render the trial unfair (see, e.g. Ali v UK (2016) 62 EHRR 7). It was, the defendant contended, highly relevant that the interested party – which Hill J had seen as “best placed to understand and assess the risk of substantial prejudice in the criminal proceedings” (see paragraph 91 of her judgment) – did not support the present application.

For both the defendant and the interested party, it was emphasised that the restrictions imposed by the PKBD (in December 2023) and Hill J (in November 2025) related to the underlying investigation relevant to the Criminal Proceedings; there was, therefore, a direct nexus between the materials and facts with which those orders were concerned and the forthcoming criminal trial; that was not the position in relation to the Findings relied on for the purpose of this application.

Moreover, [REDACTED] the defendant points out that the claimants had themselves chosen to pursue these proceedings [REDACTED]; they had also made serious allegations of collusion and bad faith against the defendant (and its chief executive), which had been widely reported and remained on-line. As Lord Woolf MR had observed in R v Legal Aid Board, ex parte Kaim Todner [1999] QB 966 at p 978E, it was “not unreasonable to regard the person who initiates proceedings as having accepted the normal incidence of the public nature of court proceedings”. That, the defendant submits, was of particular relevance in the present case given the claimants had pursued this claim, even after they were aware of the criminal trial, without seeking any RRO; accepting (per Yaxley-Lennon) that it was possible to “put the genie back into the bottle” in this regard, this was a relevant consideration when assessing the cogency of the evidence relied on in support of the application.

As for the suggestion that the entirety of the Judgment should be made subject to a RRO, the defendant argues that would be the maximum derogation from open justice, and was neither proportionate nor necessary in accordance with article 10(2) of the Convention. For the interested party, Mr Watson observed that, to the extent the court was persuaded that a substantial risk of prejudice would arise from the reporting of the Judgment as a whole, any RRO would need to be limited to that which was necessary to avoid that risk, which might warrant restrictions on the reporting of specific findings (in respect of which, such prejudice had been identified) but not the Judgment as a whole.

I start with the general principle that all court proceedings are conducted in public and judgments are to be publicly pronounced. I am clear that, as a default, this principle of open justice necessarily requires that there should be no constraint on the fair, accurate, full and contemporaneous reporting of any judgment (and the reasons for that judgment) given in such proceedings. This is not a matter of affording a litigant the opportunity for public vindication or validation; the private interests of the parties are not the focus in this context. Moreover, whether seen through the prism of the common law, or by application of the Convention, this is not simply about respecting the media’s right to freedom of expression (although this is certainly a relevant consideration), it concerns, more generally, the public’s right to know what is happening in court proceedings, and to be informed as to the full details of any judgment reached, in order to understand how the court arrived at its decision. Limiting the reporting of a judgment by means of a RRO is thus a clear derogation from the open justice principle; it is rightly described as a form of press censorship (Khuja) and, as such, is to be treated as “exceptional” (MR Guidance), requiring clear justification, and only to be made where strictly necessary to secure the proper administration of justice (MR Guidance; SoS Defence v Persons Unknown).

Section 4(2) of the 1981 Act provides the court with the power to make a RRO, postponing the publication of any report of otherwise open legal proceedings (which includes any report of a judgment given in those proceedings) if that “appears to be necessary for avoiding a substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice”. Again, “prejudice” in this context is to be understood as a matter of public policy; it is not concerned with the private rights of the parties (AG v Times Newspapers), but recognises there is a public interest in not prejudicing the administration of justice and the fairness of a future trial. Thus understood, the making of an RRO is not an exercise of discretion, but of obligation: such a derogation from the open justice principle is to be made only when it is necessary (and then only to the limited extent necessary) for the proper administration of justice (SoS Defence v Persons Unknown).

In the present case, the defendant and the interested party point out that the claimants chose to bring, and pursue, these proceedings, notwithstanding their awareness of the Criminal Proceedings and the trial due to take place in 2028; as such, it is said, the claimants must be taken to have accepted “the normal incidence of the public nature of [these] proceedings” (Kaim Todner). It is further observed that [REDACTED] the allegations they chose to make against the defendant were widely reported by the media during the trial and still remain online. It is urged that the claimants are not entitled to sanitise the public record by censoring the Judgment, but, rather, it should be made fully accessible at the earliest opportunity, so the court’s adjudication on such serious allegations is known. That, the defendant contends, is required not merely in order to respect the article 10 rights of it and its employees, but also because this is a matter of the highest public interest, not least because of the defendant’s position as the regulator of the gambling industry in this jurisdiction, in which the public should expect to have confidence.

I accept that there is a public interest in understanding the court’s decision on allegations made in open court proceedings, particularly where such allegations concern a regulatory body such as the defendant. More generally, I accept that, in the normal course, those who chose to engage in litigation can be taken to have accepted that this will take place in public and the findings made will be part of the public record. The question for me is, however, whether those principles are outweighed by the public policy obligation to ensure that the administration of justice is not prejudiced, and that the possibility of a fair trial in the Criminal Proceedings is preserved. In this regard I am not solely concerned with the claimants’ article 6 right to a fair trial, but also with the rights of other defendants in the Criminal Proceedings and, more generally, with the public interest in the administration of justice in relation to those proceedings. If I conclude that the reporting of the Judgment at this stage would give rise to a serious risk of prejudice to the administration of justice in respect of the Criminal Proceedings, then I must weigh the public policy considerations that arise against the competing interests that the defendant and interested party have identified – the value judgement required at the Longmore LJ’s third stage (Ex p The Telegraph).

The defendant and interested party further emphasise the need for clear and cogent evidence to support any application for a RRO. That is obviously correct: although the assessment of prejudice necessarily requires the court to look forward, and to engage in a degree of prediction, there must be something more than a mere assertion as to the risk it is said would be occasioned by the reporting sought to be postponed (In re BBC). In this regard, however, I consider it is relevant to have regard to the reports that Mr Subhedar has referenced in his evidence, and to those exhibited to his statement. Considering that evidence, I accept that the current proceedings have attracted not insignificant media interest, and that there has been a wide range of reports relating to the outcome of the case, both on-line and in more traditional publications; I further accept that the headlines relating to such reports may attract the attention even of those who would otherwise have little interest in these matters. I take into account the length of time that will pass before any trial in the Criminal Proceedings, but I do not discount the power of a headline to continue to influence those who have seen it (whether consciously or sub-consciously), even after some time has passed. In this regard, I note that reporting restrictions were imposed in respect of the PKBD’s judgment on the DPA (in December 2023) and on certain of the materials in the current proceedings (by Hill J’s order of 26 November 2025); similarly, I do not consider I can assume that recollections of reports made at this stage will necessarily have faded away by the time that hearings commence in the Criminal Proceedings.

In seeking to distinguish the present application from those earlier orders, the defendant and interested party make the point that the matters that concerned the court in respect of the DPA and the RRO of 26 November 2025 related to the underlying criminal investigation; as such, they say, there was a close nexus with the evidence and issues that will necessarily be addressed in the Criminal Proceedings, which, they submit, cannot be said about the Findings identified in the present case. Emphasis is placed on the position adopted by the claimants in opposition to the application made for a RRO in November 2025 (see the passages from the claimants’ skeleton argument at that stage, cited at paragraph 9 above); it is submitted that the claimants cannot now seek to assert a risk of prejudice when their earlier position was to the contrary.

Although it might be said that the claimants’ current application sits uneasily with their submissions on the defendant’s earlier request for a RRO in these proceedings, that is not a point that can be determinative of the decision I have to make. It is of note that Hill J rejected the claimants’ argument in November 2025, and proceeded to make the RRO sought. Ultimately the question for me is not whether the claimants have adopted a consistent position throughout this litigation, but as to whether I am satisfied that there is a real risk of prejudice to the administration of justice that can be avoided by making the order sought.

As for whether there is any real risk of prejudice, as those acting for the claimants in the Criminal Proceedings have pointed out [REDACTED]. The risk of prejudice arises from the possibility that future jurors in the criminal trial will have seen headlines reporting court findings [REDACTED], when that is an issue that a jury will need to determine for itself in the Criminal Proceedings. A nexus is thus established between the Findings in the Judgment in these proceedings and the issue [REDACTED] that will be a matter for determination in the Criminal Proceedings.

Having thus identified the prejudice, the question is whether there is a substantial risk in this regard (where “substantial” means not “insubstantial” or “not minimal”; In re BBC). On this point, I accept that assertions of prejudice will face a high bar before it is found that a jury’s verdict has been rendered unsafe, and I am, of course, conscious that any jury will be directed to reach verdicts solely on the evidence adduced at trial, and to disregard anything they might have seen reported elsewhere. These are, however, points that would also have been taken into account in relation to the DPA in December 2023 (in respect of which the full judgment remains restricted), or to the matters addressed by Hill J in November 2025 (also made subject to a RRO). As for the risk identified in the current application, that relates to the difficulty of ensuring that jurors do not unwittingly (and possibly subconsciously) carry with them (and into their deliberations) earlier reporting relevant to the matters they must determine. Given the media interest in these matters, I do not consider I can say that is an insubstantial risk; it is, rather, a risk that the claimants will be prejudiced on an issue of real significance in the Criminal Proceedings. It is, moreover, a risk that can be addressed by some form of RRO.

Having thus satisfied myself on the first two stages identified by Longmore LJ in Ex p The Telegraph, I return to the value judgement required at stage three. A publicly available record of the court’s full reasoned judgment is a key aspect of the open justice principle, and I accept that is all the more so where serious allegations have been made against a public body such as the defendant. In this instance, there is a difficult balance to be struck in determining whether the degree of risk contemplated should be regarded as tolerable in the sense of being “the lesser of two evils”.

Put (as the claimants have sought to do) as an “all or nothing” choice, I am not persuaded that the balance would tip in favour of a RRO covering the Judgment in its entirety. That would mean that the explanation for rejecting these claims would remain unknown for a long time, notwithstanding the fact that much of the reasoning stands independently of the Findings the claimants have identified. It would further mean that findings in favour of the defendant – absolving it (and its chief executive) from many of the allegations made – would not be available, notwithstanding the very strong public interest in this regard. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that a RRO limited to the Findings will meet the justice of the case. In reaching this conclusion, I do not accept the suggestion that this will give rise to a risk of prejudicial speculation. Although the Findings are a necessary and important part of the Judgment given the way the claimants’ case was advanced, the objective nature of the tests applicable to the claims in these proceedings means that the essential reasons for the decision will be apparent even if publication of the Findings is further postponed. Furthermore, I do not accept the suggestion that this causes any unfairness to the claimants: a RRO that postpones reporting on the Findings avoids any need for the claimants to “explain” or “comment” in respect of those points; otherwise, of course, it will be open to them to “explain” or “comment” on the Judgment, just as it will be for anyone else to do so – that is, after all, an inevitable consequence of the open justice principle.

I therefore allow the claimants’ application for a RRO to the limited extent of postponing the reporting of the Findings they have identified. An open version of the Judgment will duly be published, that, along with those passages that have already been identified as being subject to Hill J’s RRO, will remove the Findings. Given the need to also ensure that this judgment – relating to the RRO itself – does not set out findings that are otherwise covered by the RRO I have made, such findings will be removed from the published version of this judgment and reporting of the full reasoning will similarly be postponed until the return of the last verdict in the Criminal Proceedings.