Wolverhampton City Council & Ors v Persons Unknown & Ors

This is the second annual review of a quasi-final injunction and power of arrest granted to the four local authority claimants (“the Claimants”). The review was listed alongside the review of a similar injunction granted to Birmingham City Council under claim number KB-2022-BHM-000221 (“the Birmingham claim”). The claims are not however consolidated and different issues arise in each. A separate judgment is handed down in respect of the review hearing in the Birmingham claim: [2026] EWHC 442 (KB).

The First, Third and Fourth Claimants seek the continuation of the substance of the existing injunction and power of arrest, with some minor amendments. The Second Claimant seeks to discontinue its claim and do not therefore seek ongoing relief.

The First to Fourth Defendants are categories of ‘Persons Unknown’. The remaining Defendants are named individuals (“the Named Defendants”), each of whom has been found to be in contempt of the interim or quasi-final versions of the injunction. None of the Defendants attended or were represented at the review hearing.

The claim arose from car cruising or street cruising activity that was occurring on the public highways or other areas to which the public had access within the Claimants’ local authority areas. For those not familiar with the concept of car cruising, it typically involves a congregation of motor vehicles (including motorcycles) on the public highway, or in another place to which the public have access. The drivers or riders of the vehicles drive at excessive speeds or otherwise dangerously, often racing, driving in convoy, performing stunts, and obstructing the public highway or private property. The gatherings often attract crowds of spectators.

On 22 December 2022, Hill J granted an urgent interim injunction and power of arrest. The interim orders were varied on a number of occasions prior to the final hearing.

On 27 February 2024, Julian Knowles J granted a quasi-final injunction (“the Injunction”) and power of arrest (“the Power of Arrest”). The Power of Arrest was attached to one limb only of the Injunction. By paragraph 9 of the Injunction, the Injunction and Power of Arrest were to “expire at 11.59pm on 1 March 2027 unless it is extended, varied or discharged by further order of the court”. The Injunction provided for a review hearing.

The first annual review of the Injunction and Power of Arrest took place before Ritchie J on 26 February 2025: [2025] EWHC 1102 (KB). The single judgment deals with both the review hearing in this case and in the Birmingham claim. Ritchie J made some minor amendments to the Injunction but otherwise continued it (“the Amended Injunction”). The substance of the Power of Arrest remained unchanged. By paragraph 5 of the Amended Injunction, the Power of Arrest remained “in force until 23.59 on 1 March 2027 unless extended, varied or discharged by further order of the court”. However, paragraph 9 of the Amended Injunction stated: “this injunction and power of arrest shall, continue until discharged by further order of the court but shall expire after 14 months if it is not renewed.” The approved transcript of the ex tempore judgment of Ritchie J from 26 February 2026 does not explain why there is an internal inconsistency in the Amended Injunction as to the date of expiry of the power of arrest, nor does it make any reference to an intention to reduce or otherwise alter the overall term of the Amended Injunction from that granted by Julian Knowles J. The Claimants do not recall any discussion during the hearing before Ritchie J as to any variation of the term and only noticed the reference to “14 months” when the sealed order was served. The Amended Injunction provided for a further review on 26 February 2026.

Ritchie J also made an accompanying directions order on 26 February 2025, amended under the slip rule on 7 March 2025 (“the Directions Order”).

The Claimants have filed and served the following updated witness statements:

By application notice, dated 24 February 2026, the Claimants seek (a) relief from sanctions to rely on the statement of Mr Sheen, dated 24 February 2026, (b) permission for the Second Claimant to discontinue its claim, and (c) an extension of the term of the injunction and power of arrest to reinstate the term ordered by Julian Knowles J.

To the extent that it was required, and for the reasons given in an ex tempore judgment during the hearing, I granted the Claimants relief from sanctions so as to be able to rely on Mr Sheen’s statement. The other two aspects of the Claimants’ application are dealt with in this judgment.

Paragraph 7 of the Amended Injunction states that the said order would be deemed served on completion of the final step in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Directions Order. It appears that the cross-referencing to the paragraph numbering has gone awry. Paragraph 6 of the Directions Order relates to the deemed date of service and paragraph 7 makes no order as to costs. It is paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Directions Order that deal with service. Paragraph 4 of the Directions Order granted permission to the Claimants to serve “this Order” on the First to Fourth Defendants by alternative methods specified in Schedule 2 to the order. The term “this Order” is not expressly defined in the Directions Order but Mr Singleton informed the court that the Claimants understood that to encompass all of the Directions Order, Amended Injunction and Power of Arrest. The Schedule 2 requirements involve the issuing of a media release, advertising on social media, updating of dedicated street racing webpages and home pages, provision of hard copies at front desks, and requesting West Midlands Police to post details on their social media. The provisions as to service of the Amended Injunction, Power of Arrest and Directions Order are arguably not as clear as they could be. However, the intention was clearly that the three documents should be served on the First to Fourth Defendants in accordance with the requirements of Schedule 2 of the Directions Order, and on the Named Defendants by the email or postal addresses provided by each of those Defendants to the Claimants earlier in the proceedings.

The witness statement of Paul Brown, dated 24 December 2025, addresses service of the Amended Injunction, Power of Arrest and Directions Order on the First to Fourth Defendants. Mr Brown describes the media releases issued, social media posts by the Claimants and West Midlands Police, the updating of the Claimants’ websites including direct links on the home page to the dedicated street racing webpages, media coverage, and the Claimant’s ongoing use of digital and fixed signage. Mr Brown’s earlier statement of 20 March 2025 also addressed the required service steps including the additional step of placing copies at the front desks of the Claimants’ main offices. The service steps taken by the Claimants accord with Schedule 2 in relation to service on the First to Fourth Defendants. Notwithstanding the ambiguity on the Injunction Order and Directions Order as to exactly what was required, I am satisfied that the steps taken to date by the Claimants amount to good service to ensure that the Defendants had notice of the orders.

Paragraph 5 of the Directions Order granted permission for the Claimants to serve “this Order” on the named Defendants “using email addresses and/or postal addresses that have been provided to the Claimants in the course of these proceedings”. A certificate of service dated 19 March 2025 confirms service on the Named Defendants.

Paragraph 10 of the Amended Injunction and paragraph 1 of the Directions Order provide the date and location of the review hearing. Therefore, even if a Defendant had not been present at the last review hearing, which they were not, they have since been served with notice of today’s hearing.

Paragraph 2 of the Directions Order required the Claimants to file an updating witness statement not less than 14 days prior to the review hearing. The order made no mention of such evidence being served on the Defendants. The Claimants have however taken steps of their own volition to publicise the annual review date and to serve copies of the updated evidence. Mr Brown’s statement of 6 February 2026 explains the steps taken by the Claimants, which involved replicating steps required by an order I made on 23 April 2024 in advance of the first review hearing. The Claimants issued a media release on 14 January 2026 highlighting the second review hearing, published information on their social media accounts the same day, updated their websites (including with a copy of the hearing bundle albeit minus the N244 application of 24 February 2026) and requested that West Midlands Police also post details on their social media accounts. The Claimants also served the hearing bundle on the Named Defendants and their solicitors on 3 February 2026. Notwithstanding the lack of direction as to service of evidence or a reminder as to the review hearing date, the steps taken by the Claimants were reasonable, responsible ones and I am satisfied that proper, adequate notice has been provided to the Defendants both of today’s hearing and the updated evidence relied upon. To the extent that the Defendants have not been served with the N244 application of 24 February 2026, I indicated during the hearing that any order made in relation to that application would have CPR 23.10 wording on the face of the order.

The Supreme Court identified the importance of review hearings, particularly in cases involving persons unknown, in Wolverhampton City Council & others v London Gypsies and Travellers & others [2023] UKSC 47 (“Wolverhampton”). At [225]:

“[the review hearing]…will give all parties an opportunity to make full and complete disclosure to the court, supported by appropriate evidence, as to how effective the order has been; whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made.”

I considered the approach to be taken on review in North Warwickshire Borough Council v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 2403 (KB). At [13]:

“13.

A review hearing is not an opportunity to revisit the original merits of the claim afresh. The proper focus of the review is to consider whether anything material has changed since the injunction and power of arrest were granted. Material changes may be factual and/or developments in the law since the order was granted. If there has been a material change or changes, the Court needs to question whether the scope of the injunction needs amending or indeed whether there remains a compelling need for any kind of injunction or power or arrest at all. Such an approach is consistent with the views expressed in a number of post-Wolverhampton cases including by Ritchie J in HS2 v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 1277 (KB) at [32]-[33], Hill J in Valero v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 207 (KB) (“Valero”) at [20]-[23], and Sweeting J in Esso Petroleum Company v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 1768 (KB) (“Esso”) at [5]-[8].”

The determination as to whether there has been any material change involves consideration of the factors that needed to be considered when the injunction was first granted or, in this case, last reviewed. Ritchie J identified the relevant factors at the first review hearing in this case at [44]-[59].

The Claimants’ updating evidence includes the following:

The Second Claimant seeks permission to discontinue its claim. By CPR 38.2(2), there are various circumstances in which a claimant wishing to discontinue must obtain the permission of the court to do so rather than simply filing and serving a notice of discontinuance. This includes, at CPR 38.2(2)(a) where the court has granted an interim injunction and, at CPR 38.2(2)(c) where there is more than one claimant unless every other claimant consents in writing.

The First, Third and Fourth Claimants have all provided their consent in writing to the Second Claimant discontinuing its claim. This is not therefore a case where the Court’s permission is required under CPR 38.2(2)(c). However, the Second Claimant recognises that the quasi-final nature of the Injunction against the First to Fourth Defendants could be considered interim in nature and thus seeks permission. It is not necessary for me to determine whether the quasi-final nature of the Injunction is such that it falls within the meaning of an interim injunction for the purposes of CPR 38.2(2)(a), although there may well be merit in that argument, as I am persuaded in any event that it is appropriate to grant permission. The Amended Injunction and Power of Arrest, extending as they do to Persons Unknown defendants, are draconian remedies. It would be inappropriate to tie a claimant to a claim for such remedies that they no longer seek. There is no prejudice to the Defendants in the Second Claimant discontinuing its claim as the terms proposed by the remaining Claimants would be less restrictive in nature. Further, the evidence before the Court is that no contempt proceedings have flowed from breaches of the Injunction in the Second Claimant’s administrative boundary. This suggests the nature of the street cruising problem is less pronounced in that area. I therefore grant permission for the Second Claimant to discontinue their claim.

At the review hearing on 26 February 2025, Ritchie J considered the substantive requirements (at [44] – [49]) and the procedural requirements (at [50] – [58]). Those findings are the starting point for this review.

I consider first whether there has been any material factual change which calls into question the need or required scope of the Amended Injunction. The Second Claimant’s decision to discontinue is a material factual change. However, in my judgment, that of itself does not detract from the merits of the remaining three Claimants’ positions. Each Claimant is a separate legal entity with its own local considerations to take into account. The only other change is an identified decrease in the amount of street cruising activity since the granting of the Injunction, with a further decrease over the last year.

I have also considered if there has been any material legal change since the last review hearing. Counsel for the Claimants is not aware of any material change in the law, neither am I. The potential ramifications of the decision in MBR Acres Ltd & others v Curtin [2025] EWHC 331 (KB) were known about and discussed at the review hearing before Ritchie J, and his judgment addresses the various issues. Nothing has changed in that regard since then.

Taking the substantive requirements in turn:

Turning to the procedural requirements:

In conclusion, I am satisfied that there have been no material changes to the facts, or any material legal developments, that warrant the discharge of injunctive protection or power of arrest. I propose to make minor amendments to the form of the Amended Injunction and Power of Arrest to reflect the observations I have made above. That is best achieved by a replacement form of injunction order and power of arrest to ensure clarity. The new orders will replace the Amended Injunction and current Power of Arrest, which will be discharged and cease to apply once the new orders have been served.

(NAMED DEFENDANTS)