Muhammad Arshad v Wokingham Borough Council & Anor

This was the hearing of an application by the Defendants dated 9 October 2025 seeking strike out of the Claim Form and Particulars of Claim and/or summary judgment of the claim. The application was supported by the witness statement of Charlotte Russell dated 9 October 2025. Both parties provided skeleton arguments. The Claimant provided two, the second in response to the Defendants’ skeleton argument. There was also before me an application by the Claimant for judgment in default against both Defendants. I dismissed that application, giving reasons in an oral judgment at the hearing. This judgment therefore deals only with the Defendants’ application.

In this judgment I refer to the First Defendant as “Wokingham” for ease of reference, save where I refer to both Defendants. I will deal with the application so far as it concerns the claims against the Second Defendant later in this judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

The relevant factual and procedural background is contained in Ms Russell’s witness statement, in the Particulars of Claim, and in previous proceedings brought by the Claimant against the same Defendant, as set out in the judgments of HHJ Melissa Clarke and of Bourne J. ([2022] EWHC 2419 (KB).)I summarise it as follows.

The Claimant had been a hackney carriage driver licensed by Wokingham Borough Council for a number of years prior to the events material to his claim. His claim arose from the circumstances surrounding the initial grant, and later suspension and revocation, of a license issued in February 2017 for a new vehicle. Prior to presenting a proposed new vehicle for licensing the Claimant exchanged emails with Wokingham’s licensing department about a new requirement that the new vehicle must be wheelchair accessible. The Claimant presented his new Ford Galaxy vehicle for licensing and received a licence on 16 February 2017. The vehicle was not inspected by Wokingham prior to the issue of the licence.

Shortly afterwards Wokingham’s licensing team asked the Claimant to bring his Ford Galaxy to be inspected, as they had received complaints that it was not, in fact, wheelchair accessible. The vehicle was inspected on 27 February 2017, during which inspection a member of the licensing team attempted to board the vehicle using a wheelchair. The Ford Galaxy was found not to be suitable for wheelchair use. The result of the inspection was that the Claimant’s licence was suspended; although pending his appeal against this suspension, the Claimant was permitted to continue driving under his hackney carriage licence.

An appeal hearing held on 20 September 2017 upheld the suspension of the Claimant’s licence. The Claimant opted to convert his licence to a private hire licence in order to continue working as a taxi driver in the Ford Galaxy.

The Claimant issued proceedings against Wokingham in the County Court (Claim No. F84YJ610) on 1 July 2019, bringing claims for various financial losses and for personal injury, in the form of a psychiatric injury, as well as claims for aggravated and exemplary damages, and for injury to feelings. Ms Russell gives evidence at paragraph 16 of her statement that at a hearing before Deputy District Judge Lindsay at Reading County Court on 7 January 2021, the Claimant clarified the claims he was bringing as being discrimination on grounds of race and/or religion, negligence and breach of duty. Ms Russell also gives evidence at paragraph 17 that following a trial before HHJ Melisssa Clarke at Oxford County Court on 16 and 17 September 2021, in a reserved judgment Muhammad Sohaib Arshad v Wokingham Borough Council (Oxford County Court, 15 October 2021 unreported).

The judge held that:

Many of the Claimant’s claimed pecuniary losses were not proven [79; 80; 87; 89; 90]. The Claimant failed in his claims for aggravated and exemplary damage. [91]. The Claimant recovered £42,500 for psychiatric damage, namely a mild to moderate depressive disorder, precipitated by the loss of his hackney carriage licence. He also received special damages of £250 for prescription charges and £40 for sundry costs of the litigation.

There were applications for permission to appeal by Wokingham and for permission to cross appeal by the Claimant. Wokingham was given permission to appeal on some grounds but not others. A partial stay of £10,000 was ordered of the execution of the order for damages in the County Court by Robin Knowles J. The Claimant’s application for permission was refused, but he renewed that application before the judge who heard Wokingham’s appeal, Bourne J, adding two further grounds; namely that Wokingham had concealed documents from the trial bundle before the County Court; and that officers had continued to harass him and suspend his licence after it had been renewed, and that this amounted to victimisation.

Bourne J. granted Wokingham’s appeal in a judgment handed down on 29 September 2022 ([2022] EWHC 2419 (KB)). The judge found thata psychiatric injury had not been a foreseeable consequence of the advice given to the Claimant, and thus no duty was owed [60-62]. Permission to the Claimant to cross appeal was refused, finding that overall, none of the grounds were arguable.

The Claimant then renewed his application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal by an appellant’s notice issued on 17 October 2022.

Permission to appeal was refused by William Davis LJ on 6 June 2023 who considered that the Claimant sought to raise issues not before HHJ Melissa Clarke or Bourne J; raised factual matters which were not part of the evidence in the courts below; and had no real prospect of success in any appeal.

The £10,000 paid to the Claimant by Wokingham following the partial stay of execution was not repaid by the Claimant, and on 30 April 2024 DDJ Gray-Jones at Reading County Court made a charging order over the Claimant’s property in favour of Wokingham.

On 21 May 2024, the Claimant made an application within the County Court proceedings to set aside the charging order, and “initiate fresh legal action under Fraud Act 2006” In his statement supporting the application the Claimant accused Wokingham of fraud, misfeasance, and the concealment of relevant documents during the earlier proceedings. He characterised this as being in breach of sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Fraud Act 2006. He further alleged breaches of Articles 6, 3, 8, and A1P1 of the ECHR. He sought a fresh trial.

On various dates in 2024 and 2025 the Claimant made further applications, in essence seeking permission to bring new proceedings against Wokingham under the Fraud Act 2006, and for “iniquity exception to legal and litigation privilege due to fraudulent litigation. To disclose the documents, correspondence and notes prepared for fraud and crime”. These came before DDJ Alderswick at Reading County Court on 1 October 2024, which were refused, and the Claimant sought permission to appeal on 22 October 2024, introducing a new allegation of “conspiracy to injure”, and made a further application on 5 November 2024 for disclosure from Wokingham for documents he claimed had been withheld from him in the previous proceedings “by the Defendants to execute a fraudulent scheme.”

On 9 December 2024 the Claimant made an application for default judgment on grounds of the failure of both Defendants to file defences to claim QA-2021-000237 (the High Court’s appeal number for the matter which went before Bourne J.). At this stage no new proceedings had been brought, issued, or served on the Defendants.In his statement in support of that application, the Claimant repeated his allegations of fraud and sought several individuals to be referred to prosecuting authorities for contempt of court pursuant to CPR Part 81.

On 21 May 2025, the Claimant made what was entitled “application for a new claim”. This document purported to be issued in the High Court, although no proceedings were on foot at that time. The Claimant’s allegations were that he had discovered new evidence of fraud, misrepresentation and harassment. The details set out were similar to the Particulars of Claim eventually provided in September 2025. It is not clear whether that application was ever dealt with.

The present proceedings (KB-2025-002188), naming both the original Defendant, Wokingham (in these proceedings the First Defendant) and as a Second Defendant Weightmans LLP, Wokingham’s solicitors, who had acted in the County Court proceedings, were issued in the High Court on 16 June 2025. On 11 August 2025, Master Eastman made an unless order, that the Claimant must file CPR-compliant Particulars of Claim by 12 September 2025, in default of which his claim would stand struck out.The Claimant supplied amended Particulars of Claim on 12 September 2025 although no application has been made, or permission given, to amend the original Particulars of Claim. I base my decision on the draft amended Particulars of Claim, (“the DAPOC”), as Master Eastman has already determined that the Particulars of Claim first filed do not comply with the requirements of the CPR and would be liable to be struck out on that ground alone.

Wokingham relies on the principles of Res Judicata and Henderson v Henderson in respect of the majority of the claims made, on the basis that most of the claims, save for the fraud claim, were brought or could have been brought in the previous County Court proceedings.

This claim relies on the same original facts as the County Court Claim, but the claims brought are differently formulated, being;

The short answer to the claim under the Fraud Act is that this Act does not give rise to a civil cause of action. However I will deal with the allegations as if they are pleaded in the DAPOC as civil fraud claims, alternatively as claims in deceit.

The Claimant alleges “sustained pattern of fraudulent conduct, procedural manipulation, and deception”’. It states that the Defendants “deliberately concealed key evidence, fabricated documents, and misled the Court by falsely asserting mutual agreement on procedural matters such as bundle limits and grounds of claim”. The Claimant further says on the claim form that his claim is based on new evidence, which shows that Wokingham was “knowingly engaged in fraudulent conduct, including perjury, document forgery, misrepresentation, and active suppression of evidence”. The Claimant also alleges that the Second Defendant concealed evidence in the original County Court proceedings.

The forgery claim relates to an allegation that Wokingham altered its taxi policy and the Claimant’s redacted taxi application and fabricated a wheelchair accessible list.

The Defendants accept that there are exceptions to the rules in Res Judicata and Henderson v Henderson for judgments obtained by fraud, see Takhar v Gracefield Developments Ltd and others [2024] EWHC 1714 (Ch); [2019] UKSC 13, which held that where it could be shown that a judgment had been obtained by fraud, and where no allegation of fraud had been raised at the trial, a requirement of reasonable diligence should not be imposed on the party seeking to set aside the judgment. However, the Supreme Court’s judgment at [56] quoted and approved the general principles governing applications to set aside judgments for fraud as summarised by Newey J in Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Highland Financial Partners lp [2013] 1 CLC 596:

There is no evidence relied upon by the Claimant, or facts set out in the DAPOC, which demonstrates that he could satisfy those criteria. The allegation of forgery in relation to the taxi policy relies on a changed taxi policy from 2021. But it is apparent from the evidence of Ms Russell at paragraphs 84-86 that the taxi policy that was in force at the relevant time was disclosed in full to the court at trial and formed part of the trial bundle, and that this was also an allegation made in previous hearings, including the Claimant’s cross appeal to the High Court, for which permission to appeal was refused. I accept the Defendants submission that this is a matter which is res judicata and a Henderson v Henderson abuse of process to raise the allegation again.

It is entirely unclear how a taxi application form omitting the company registration details or a “fabricated” Wheelchair Access Vehicle list could be described as a forgery or how it would amount to evidence of fraud sufficient to set aside the judgment, let alone how “the fresh evidence would have entirely changed the way in which the first court approached and came to its decision.” There is no explanation provided of any new evidence.

The allegation that the Defendants concealed documents in the bundle before the trial in the County Court was made before the appeal hearing in the County Court on 1 October 2024 and before Bourne J. on the Claimant’s further application to the High Court for permission to appeal. Neither judge accepted this allegation as meeting the threshold for granting permission to appeal. The claim is res judicata.

Further, the tort of deceit requires one person to knowingly make a false representation, and the other to suffer loss by their reliance on it. The Claimant has not identified any fraud or deceit meeting this definition. He has not pleaded any false representation. Nor has he said how he relied upon it.

There is no new evidence provided by the Claimant that was unavailable in the County Court claim or on appeal. In any event, the Claimant succeeded in his claim in the County Court, save that certain of his claims were not granted.

I have concluded therefore that the fraud claims in the Claim Form and DAPOC shows no reasonable grounds for being made, are an abuse of process and fail to comply with either the requirements of the CPR or Master Eastman’s Order.

The Claimant’s cross-appeal from the judgment of HHJ Melissa Clarke relied on misfeasance. It was refused permission by Bourne J because it had not been raised at first instance and could not now be pursued on appeal. This was acknowledged in the first Particulars of Claim provided by the Claimant. It therefore cannot now be made in a new claim, on the basis of the rule in Henderson v Henderson. It is an abuse of processand should be struck out. It is also entirely unparticularised in the DAPOC and impossible for Wokingham to respond to. It shows no reasonable grounds for being made, and fails to comply with either the requirements of the CPR or Master Eastman’s Order.

This claim is particularised as follows in the DAPOC:

“Stalking, defamation, disregard of hospitalised family members while isolated/targeted actions and repeated license suspensions post-LGO findings. Considering D’s knowledge of the claimant’s challenges during the birth of triplets and his ongoing financial struggles, it was clear/foreseeable (and the purpose) that the injury would occur.”

The Claimant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal made an allegation of harassment. William Davies LJ held that this was a matter not raised below (see Paragraph 13 above). the rule in Henderson v Henderson therefore applies. Harassment has a non-extendable 6-year limitation period: s11(1A) Limitation Act 1980, so no action would lie for any alleged harassment later than 16 June 2019.

Bourne J. refused the Claimant’s renewed application for permission to appeal in relation to claims under Articles 6, 8, 9, 10 and 14, and Article 1 of Protocol 1 of ECHR, on the ground that these had not been before HHJ Melissa Clarke and could not now be pursued on appeal [101-103]. Accordingly this matter is res judicata because it has been determined both by Bourne J. and by William Davis LJ (see paragraph 13 above). Under the rule in Henderson v Henderson this claim is an abuse of process as it could have been raised in the County Court proceedings. It is also insufficiently particularised, shows no reasonable grounds for being made and fails to comply with either the requirements of the CPR or Master Eastman’s Order.

The Claimant expands upon his claims in both of his skeleton arguments, but neither assists in enabling him to make new claims that were not included in the County Court proceedings or which could have been made in those proceedings, or which have not been raised on any of the appeal hearings and not permitted to proceed.

The Claim against the Second Defendant

The Claimant has largely failed to differentiate the claims against each Defendant, but the claims against the Second Defendant cannot be res judicata or offend the rule in Henderson v Henderson as they were not a defendant to the County Court proceedings. However it is impossible to identify what claims that the Claimant could properly make against the Second Defendant, solicitors for Wokingham in the County Court proceedings and in this litigation. I draw the same conclusions in relation to the fraud and harassment claims as I do in relation to the same claim against Wokingham, namely that they show no reasonable grounds for being made, are an abuse of process, and fail to comply with the requirements of the CPR and the Order of Master Eastman. The claims for misfeasance in public office and under the Human Rights Act, could not be made against the Second Defendant, a private limited partnership, and fall to be struck out on the same grounds.

Accordingly the Claim Form and Particulars of Claim are struck out. I also conclude that the claim has no real prospect of success and that there are no compelling grounds to allow the claim to proceed to trial, so that summary judgment is also granted.

I dealt with the costs of both the Claimant’s application and the Defendants’ application at the hearing, seeing no reason to depart from the general rule that the successful party pays the costs of the unsuccessful party. I also summarily determined those costs.

I also conclude that the Claim Form and DAPOC are totally devoid of merit.

I also conclude that the application by the Claimant for judgment in default against both Defendants is devoid of merit. It was made apparent to the Claimant by the Defendants before the hearing that such application had no prospect of success whatsoever, spelling out the reasons why, yet the Claimant pursued that claim before the court.

The Defendants seek a Limited or an Extended Civil Restraint Order ((LCRO or ECRO). The conditions for an LCRO are met by this judgment, the court having found that both the Claimant’s application and his claim are totally devoid of merit. However that would be of little assistance to the Defendants as it would apply only to applications made in this litigation. Ms Russell also refers to various other applications made by the Claimant in relation to his grievances against Wokingham, as follows:

It is apparent from the procedural history of this matter that the Claimant has not been able to accept the decision in respect of his County Court claim and has devised ever increasing methods to circumvent the decision of Bourne J. I understand that this must have been a very disappointing decision for him, particularly after the judgment of HHJ Melissa Clarke which although dismissing some of his claims, awarded him a relatively substantial sum. However, it will not, in my view, assist him to continue to pursue a claim that has been determined where doing so is likely to put him further out of pocket by costs awards being made against him. It is also unfair that the Defendants, particularly Wokingham, funded as it is by the public purse, should have to fund the continuing costs of opposing this claim and the many applications brought by the Claimant.

I have no jurisdiction to make an ECRO, but for the reasons above I consider that it would be appropriate for me to refer this judgment to a High Court judge for consideration as to whether an ECRO should be made. At hand down of judgment or further hearing I will permit the Claimant to make submissions in respect of this decision.