Desmond Campbell v Simon Craig & Anor

This is the adjourned rolled up hearing of applications for permission to appeal against two General Civil Restraint Orders (“GCRO”) made by the County Court. The first (“the Luba order”) was made by HHJ Luba KC on 24 May 2022. The second (“the Roberts order”) was made by HHJ Roberts on 19 August 2024 and followed the expiry of Luba order. Those orders restrained the applicant from issuing any claim or making any application in any County Court without permission.

I have read the papers provided by the applicant including his skeleton arguments on the two applications. He also made oral submissions to me which were articulate and well focused.

It must be noted that a further GCRO was made against the applicant in this Court by Eady J on 21 July 2025, to last for 3 years. That order states that the applicant is restrained from issuing any claim or making any application in any court without permission. On any view it applied to proceedings in the High Court or in any County Court, although the “any court” box appears to have been ticked in error. So far as the County Court was concerned, it superseded the order of HHJ Roberts which was still in force.

It follows that these two proposed appeals are academic in that the applicant is seeking to challenge two orders whose effect has already been exhausted.

In those circumstances I will set out my reasoning on the merits of the applications very concisely.

This matter has a long factual and procedural history. The immediate background is set out in the judgment of Eady J at [2025] EWHC 1899 (KB). It would be wasteful and futile for me to repeat it here. By way of brief summary, that over a period of years the applicant has made or tried to make numerous claims against defendants including the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and/or individual police officers. Eady J referred to the more recent matters although there are earlier ones. Several County Court claims and one High Court claim arose from an incident on 2 March 2019, when the applicant says that officers attended his home and restrained and arrested him and he alleges that various torts were committed against him. In at least one of his County Court claims, he also makes allegations of a similar kind about incidents occurring in 2017 and 2018. There was then a second High Court claim in which he made allegations of a similar kind about an incident on 25 June 2020.

However, as will be seen, there was more litigious history pre-dating the cases to which Eady J referred in her judgment.

The Luba order was made in what I believe was the first claim dealing with the 2 March 2019 events. The claim was issued on 28 September 2021 against a PC Craig. An application to set the Luba order aside was dismissed by HHJ Luba on 19 July 2023.

Several applications were before Judge Luba on 24 May 2022. The first was an application by the applicant to vacate the hearing for medical reasons. He did not attend court but sent in his application accompanied by 2 out of 5 pages of a discharge summary from hospital, discharging him home on 26 April 2022, 4 weeks before the hearing. He also attached two “fit notes” from a doctor saying that he was unfit for work. The reason given was a bowel obstruction but with no more particulars. The application itself stated: “sometimes I feel nearly ok and then the distension will come back causing me terrible pain”. Judge Luba noted that he sought an adjournment rather than suggesting any other solution such as a remote hearing. He was not persuaded that the evidence came close to showing that the applicant could not cope with a relatively short hearing.

Having dismissed that application, Judge Luba then adjourned applications relating to a summary judgment, striking out and substitution of parties to be dealt with a District Judge on another occasion.

He then went on to hear the defendants’ application for a GCRO, which could not be dealt with by a District Judge. He was satisfied that the applicant was on notice that that application would be dealt with and that there was no sufficient reason for his non-attendance.

In his judgment on the GCRO application the Judge referred to the applicant having brought a “wide range of litigation” and said that he would confine himself to those claims which related to the police. On a previous occasion HHJ Saggerson had struck out “a number of claims”, those being matters pre-dating those which would be identified in Eady J’s judgment. Judge Saggerson had declined to make a CRO but had given a clear warning that one might be made in future, describing the applicant as “skating on thin ice”. Permission to appeal against the striking out was refused by Fordham J. Then in December 2019, DJ Cridge made a finding that at least 6 applications in Bromley County Court were totally without merit (“TWM”) and made a Limited Civil Restraint Order. The applicant then made a new application without permission which was struck out. Then he started a new claim about the same matter which was struck out as an abuse of process. Other applications relating to the police were deemed to be TWM by DJ Cridge in September 2019 and July 2021. Counsel invited Judge Luba to consider yet further examples but he declined to do so. On the basis of the matters referred to, the Judge considered the requirements for a GCRO to be amply satisfied. The applicant had repeatedly litigated against public bodies and individual officers and was not deterred by costs orders, none of which he had paid. The Judge made the GCRO to last for 2 years and made a costs order.

The applicant applied for Judge Luba’s order to be set aside. Having granted permission for that application to be made under the GCRO, Judge Luba heard it on 19 July 2023. In his judgment he reviewed what had happened so far. He considered that he had applied the appropriate tests and made correct decisions. The applicant had not, even now, produced any further relevant information such as medical evidence. The Judge rejected an argument by the applicant that the defendants had abused the process by serving a strike-out application instead of a defence. The Judge found it “plain as a pikestaff” that the conditions for a GCRO had been satisfied. Meanwhile, there had since been two further occasions on which judges had certified applications by the applicant as TWM. Judge Luba therefore refused to set aside his order and made a further costs order.

By the skeleton argument in support of his application for permission to appeal against the Luba order, the applicant repeated the abuse of process argument, contending that the defendants “cannot justify a GCRO application in the absence of a defence”. He also argued that Judge Luba was wrong to find that his fitness certificates had not shown that he could not attend court and had not scrutinised the evidence with sufficient care. He argued that the matter should not have proceeded in his absence, and the fact that the Judge required the defendants to make good their application on the basis of historic findings by courts showed that the judge was not satisfied that it was right to grant the GCRO before refusing the adjournment.

I am not persuaded that there is any real prospect of the appeal against the Luba order succeeding, or any other reason for it to proceed.

The applicant referred me to the judgment of Warby J in Decker v Hopcraft [2015] EWHC 1170 QB, which said that on an application to adjourn proceedings for medical reasons, the court must bear in mind that (1) the decision is for the court and cannot be forced on it, (2) the court must carefully scrutinise the evidence relied on in support of the adjournment, (3) the question of whether a person can participate may not have a simple yes/no answer and may be affected by possible accommodations such as sitting remotely, (4) the question also depends on the nature of the hearing and the role which the individual would have to play in it and (5) it may sometimes be apparent, and significant, that one party is bound to succeed.

I understand that the applicant feels aggrieved by Judge Luba’s decision to refuse the adjournment even though he was recovering from a bowel problem. However, it seems to me that there was a lack of sufficient information to justify him in adjourning the hearing. What Warby J explains in Decker is, in effect, that a tick in a box on a fit note is not enough. It is up to an applicant for an adjournment to explain what he can and cannot do and for the court to compare that with what will be required of him at the hearing. That is contrary to the applicant’s submission that a tick on a form stating “unfit for work” was proof that he was unfit to take part in the court hearing.

Meanwhile, there is a more fundamental point. Although Judge Luba rightly required counsel to show him the material justifying the GCRO, and would not have made the GCRO if that material had been insufficient, the fact is that there was overwhelming evidence justifying the order being made. The applicant has engaged in serial litigation, with numerous proceedings being certified to be TWM, causing the police to incur endless legal costs, none of which he ever pays despite orders for him to do so. Now the applicant argues that Judge Luba did not know that at the start of the hearing and therefore should have been much more cautious before proceeding. But it seems to me that the Judge was cautious, because he warned counsel that he would only entertain the GCRO application on the basis of historic findings by other judges – in other words he would not resolve substantive issues himself. It seems to me that the Judge was entitled to make that enquiry and to find out whether, on the basis of findings previously made, it was sufficiently clear that the GCRO should be made.

I asked the applicant what substantive answer he had, or would have had, to the GCRO application. All that he put forward was unmeritorious technical arguments.

First he said that the main basis for the GCRO was TWM findings by District Judge Cridge and argued that a District Judge had no power to make such findings. That was because they were made at a time when another party (the applicant’s former landlord) had applied for an Extended Civil Restraint Order (ECRO), and under the CPR PD 3C paragraph 3.1 an ECRO in the County Court, it can only be made by a Designated Civil Judge or their appointed deputy. That point is simply wrong. The District Judge’s power to make a TWM finding was unconnected with the question of what judge can make an ECRO.

Second, he submitted that it was abusive for the defendants to seek a GCRO when it at all times had neglected to file a Defence in the proceedings. Once again, that is a bad point. In one sense, the real value of a civil restraint order is that it relieves a party from having to take steps in vexatious litigation.

In those circumstances and in the absence of any real answer to the GCRO application, Judge Luba’s refusal of the adjournment did not make any difference. The applicant has still not identified any good argument which could have been raised against the GCRO if he had attended the hearing. Moreover, he was given the opportunity to make such arguments as he could muster in the hearing before Judge Luba on 19 July 2023.

I am fortified in that conclusion by the fact that on 17 November 2021, about 6 months before Judge Luba’s decision, another civil restraint order was made against the applicant. This was in another strand of his litigation, concerning actions of his landlord and the police in relation to a gas safety inspection. I need not set out more details here. On 17 November 2021, HHJ Coe QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, made an ECRO against the applicant, to last until 16 May 2023. That order would not have been made without proof of the requisite number of previous claims or applications certified TWM. That is further evidence of the fact that the Courts and parties needed to be protected against that sort of litigation.

On 31 May 2024, the defendant applied for a further GCRO upon the expiry of the Luba order. The accompanying evidence identified a further 5 TWM findings post-dating the Luba order.

On 19 August 2024, HHJ Roberts considered that application on paper and made a further GCRO to remain in force until 18 August 2027.

By his Notice of Appeal stamped on 4 October 2024, the applicant contends that (1) the GCRO should not have been granted because there was no live claim to which it could attach, or (2) it should have been (or should be) considered at a hearing, or (3) it should be set aside because the defendant had not filed a defence in the claim in which it was made or (4) Judge Roberts was wrong to state that his order records a further claim or application that has been certified as TWM.

The first ground is based on the fact that claim H48YJ993, in which the Roberts order was made, had been struck out on 31 August 2023. In my judgment that fact does not make it arguable that the new GCRO could or should not have been made. Rules including CPR 3.3(9) and 3.4(6) show that a Court which strikes out a claim can make a civil restraint order and indeed must consider whether to do so. The rules do not set a time limit. Meanwhile Practice Direction 3C provides that a relevant judge may make a limited CRO or an ECRO where a party “has persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit” and may make a GCRO where the party “persists in issuing claims or making applications which are totally without merit” and an ECRO “would not be sufficient or appropriate”. Those provisions show that a civil restraint order is not tied to specific existing proceedings, and typically it may well be made after proceedings have been struck out. The protective measure is always available to the courts. There is therefore no merit in the first ground.

By the second ground the applicant contends that the Judge should not have decided that a hearing was not appropriate under CPR 23.8(1)(c). He also points out that where such a decision is made without giving the affected party an opportunity to make representations, rule 28.3 also gives that party a right to apply to have the order set aside, varied or stayed.

The rule 28.3 right to apply is stated in the GCRO form on which the Roberts order was made, that also demonstrating that such orders are or can be made without a hearing. The right to apply provides a safety net in such cases. It therefore seems to me that the only point which can possibly be made under ground 2 would be that, on the facts of this case, the Judge should not have proceeded without a hearing.

The problem with that point, and with both of these proposed appeals in general, is that the applicant has not identified any reason why the GCRO was not appropriate on the merits. He cannot dispute the fact that 5 applications by him were ruled TWM even after the Luba order was made.

The applicant’s merely technical arguments about the lack of a live claim did not go anywhere, as I have said. Nor did the argument, also referred to above, about DJ Cridge not having the power to certify applications as TWM.

Somewhat ironically the applicant told me that he would also have wished to tell Judge Roberts that he had outstanding applications for permission to appeal against previous orders which he had not been permitted to pursue. That ignores the fact that it is precisely because he will not desist from making applications that civil restraint orders have been made in this case.

Having heard the arguments, I am satisfied that there was no answer on the merits to the application for a new GCRO. In those circumstances, there was no good reason why the Judge was bound to convene a hearing.

The third ground is self-explanatory but has no merit. The defendant’s decision not to file a Defence because it was seeking to have the claim struck out was and is irrelevant to the decision whether or not to grant a GCRO.

By the fourth ground the applicant points out that the GCRO included a list of previous TWM findings and that the list included “Order of HHJ Richard Roberts, 19 August 2024” i.e. the occasion on which the GCRO was made, despite the fact that no claim or application by the applicant was before the Judge on that occasion.

So far as I can see, the inclusion of that item on the list does appear to have been a mistake. However, that does not make it arguable that Judge Roberts was wrong to make the new GCRO. The 5 new TWM findings amply justified the Judge in making the order, as I have said.

In the end, these proposed appeal grounds are just more unmeritorious technical arguments of the kind with which the applicant has endlessly troubled the courts, and the police and others, over a period of years.

Finally, if I were in any doubt about that conclusion, it would be dispelled by the judgment of Eady J on 24 July 2025, which records that since the Roberts order of 19 August 2024, the applicant has continued to receive TWM rulings, in orders of HHJ Bloom on 8 July 2025 and of Tipples J on 8 May 2025 and in a refusal of PTA by Peter Jackson LJ on 2 July 2025.

The applicant told me that he is now trying to appeal against the rulings of Eady J and Peter Jackson LJ, among others. He said that he has not had responses to his requests to Eady J for permission under the current GCRO, and I have made that known to the Listing department at his request. But this continuation of what has repeatedly been ruled to be vexatious litigation further demonstrates the need for the orders which have been made.

Both applications for permission to appeal will therefore be dismissed.

I will also certify both of them as being TWM. Before doing so, I was given pause for thought by the fact that both GCROs were made in the applicant’s absence – the first because he was refused an adjournment on medical grounds and the second because the Judge did not consider it necessary to have a hearing. In such circumstances the fairness of proceeding may always be open to question. However, a litigant in that position can apply to the same judge to set aside the order. The applicant did so in the case of the Luba order and was refused, but without a TWM finding. So far as I can see, he did not make that application in the case of the Roberts order. An application of that kind, in my judgment, was his appropriate remedy for the lack of a hearing or a contested hearing. That application having failed in one case, and no such application having been made in the other, the proposed grounds of appeal had no merit at all and were just further examples of the applicant’s inability to take no for an answer.

On this occasion I will not make a costs order. On the one hand the respondent to an application for permission to appeal often does not recover costs. On the other, directions were made for this rolled up hearing which plainly contemplated the defendants’ participation. However, in advance of this hearing a statement of costs was filed which sought all of the costs of the claim instead of the costs of this application. A corrected replacement appeared on CE-File on the day of the hearing. The applicant told me that he had not had time to consider it. He also pointed out that the direction for a rolled up hearing deprived him of consideration of his applications at a discrete paper stage. In my judgment the failure to file the right statement of costs at the right time means that pursuing the costs would probably necessitate a further hearing following this reserved judgment. In those circumstances I will exercise my discretion against making an award.