Guildford Borough Council v Cupids Green Limited & Ors

The Claim relates to actual and apprehended breaches of planning control at land commonly known as Wanborough Fields, off Westwood Lane, Wanborough, Guildford (hereafter referred to as “the Land”). The Land in question is an agricultural field within a designated Area of Great Landscape Value and the setting of the Surrey Hills National Landscape. It is also within 400m-5km Zone of Influence for the Thames Basin Heaths Special Protection Area. The Land has been split into many parcels of land which are registered at HM Land Registry under various title numbers. There are 8 plots recorded at the Land Registry, plots A-G, and plot A has been sub-divided into 15 sub-plots, each of which has its own Land Registry title.

Guildford Borough Council (“the Council”) is the local planning authority, and as such is empowered under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“the Act”) to restrain actual or apprehended breaches of planning control. The Council considers that there has been widespread unauthorised development on, and unauthorised use of, the Land, including its residential occupation. There has been a material change of use and operational development without planning permission. The Council also considers that there is likely to be further breaches of planning control on the Land which will include further unauthorised residential occupation.

The Council therefore seeks injunctive relief under section 187B of the Act in relation to such actual and apprehended breaches of planning control at the Land. The injunction is sought not only (a) to restrain apprehended breaches of planning control in the future (“the Restraining Elements”), but also (b) in respect of the remediation and cessation of the actual breaches of planning control which have occurred on the Land (“the Mandatory Elements”).

The present application is made against the background of other enforcement action that the Council has already taken. The Council has served 20 enforcement notices in relation to the land. Some have been satisfied; some have not; and some are subject to appeal.

An Article Four direction was made, pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Town and Country

The enforcement steps taken by the Council are addressed in the witness statements of Darren Gregory, Senior Planning Enforcement Officer, and Joanna Searle, Planning Enforcement Team Leader for the Council, which were served in support, first, of the application for interim relief made on 31 July 2025, and now in support of the application for a final injunction, the hearing of which took place on 21-22 January 2026.

These statements addressed, amongst other matters, the contemporaneous site visit notes and photographs relating to a series of site visits by the Council. In brief summary:

On 3 July 2025, the Council made an application for an interim injunction to address what it described as a recent escalation of unauthorised activity on the land.

An interim injunction was made, on notice, by Andrew Kinnier KC, sitting as a DeputyJudge of the High Court, on 31 July 2025 (“the Kinnier Order”). The learned Judge was satisfied (at paragraph 28 of his judgment in GuildfordBorough Council v Cupid Green Ltd [2025] EWHC 2220 (KB)), that “the detailed evidence contained in the three witness statements served on behalf of the council is consistent with their view that unauthorised activity on the land is escalating and that further operational development causing harm to the land (such as buildings, fencing and hardcore) will continue to be developed on the land and, pertinently, without planning permission”. Against that background, he was satisfied that the Council had demonstrated that there was a “serious question to be tried”, applying the test identified in American Cyanamid v Ethicon Limited[1975] UKHL 1; [1975] AC 396. He further found that damages were not an adequate remedy.

As to the balance of convenience (by reference to the third stage of the American Cyanamid test), the learned Judge found (at paragraphs 30-32):

“First, no or no good reason has been given by the defendants to justify not seeking planning permission for the operational development which has clearly taken place on the land over a significant period of time.

Secondly, … there have been serious, flagrant and repeated breaches of planning control which have already caused material environmental harm.

Thirdly, … the evidence suggests that there is a real and significant prospect of further significant unauthorised development and further environmental harm.

Fourthly, unless restrained by an injunction, … it is, in my judgment, likely that further breaches of planning control will be committed or unlikely to be committed. If an injunction is not granted and that risk is realised, it will, in my judgment, be difficult to undo the consequential environmental harm.

Further, as the relatively long planning enforcement history shows as does the content of the 20 enforcement notices, there is no sound basis on the material before me today upon which to conclude that alternative enforcement measures will, or are likely to, prevent further breaches of planning control. ….  I accept that a prosecution for a failure to comply with enforcement notices served under the Act, even if successful, would not provide the redress that is necessary to ensure effective enforcement of planning control to stop unauthorised activity on the land and to preserve the status quo pending the final determination of the claim. That is because the sanction would be limited to a fine. …”

The effect of this order, in summary, was to restrain the Defendants then identified (save for Defendants 4 and 9), and persons unknown, from carrying out any further works, bringing further caravans, vehicles, plant, or installing further services or infrastructure. The restraining elements of the present order replicate the terms of the Kinnier Order. At thathearing, the Deputy Judge granted the request made by Jack Brazil, Defendant 4, and Frank Green, Defendant 9, for anadjournment of the application for an interim injunction against them. In short, as explained by the learned Judge (at paragraph 2) this was because “They required time in order to seek legal advice, in order to answer the application and there were disputes of fact regarding the planning history and the way in which the alleged breaches of planning control had been articulated in the claimant’s evidence.”

A further hearing took place before Mr David Pittaway KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, on 10 October 2025. At that hearing (which Defendants 4 and 9 attended in person and at which Defendant 8 was represented by Counsel), the Deputy Judge accepted undertakings made by Defendants 4 and 9 (in identical terms to the Kinnier Order) and also allowed applications by the Claimant, inter alia, (a) to vary the names of Defendants 26 and 36, (b) to add Defendants 39 to 46 as defendants to the proceedings and (c) to extend the scope of the Land burdened by the interim injunction (“the Pittaway Order”). The Deputy Judge also allowed an application by Defendant 8 to rely on expert planning evidence and medical evidence.

At the conclusion of the hearing before me on 22 January 2026 I declared in open court that the Pittaway Order, and the undertakings of Defendants 4 and 9 to the same effect, remained in effect until the handing down of my reserved judgment and the sealing of the order giving effect to that decision.

The Defendants are those identified by the Council as having an interest in the Land, or who they have identified as being in occupation of it. The Council also seeks to restrain the activities of persons unknown. The application is resisted by a number of the named Defendants, who have either communicated their position in writing or orally during the course of this hearing. In short, their arguments are:

No resistance is offered by, and in some cases positive support is offered for the Council’s actions, by Defendants 12, 14, 23-25, 28-29, 41-42, and 44-46. At least some of these defendants have either taken action to remedy breaches of planning control in relation to their land or have expressed their willingness to do so. This raises questions as to whether these defendants should be subject to the mandatory elements of the order sought as well as the restraining aspects, and as to their position in relation to any application as to costs.

In the cases of Defendants 1, 3, 6, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 27, 39, and 40 there is an issue as to whether they are in fact the legal owners and/or occupiers of the areas of the Land attributed to them by the Council. There does seem to be a degree of uncertainty in this regard, and I will return to the implications of this below.

Similarly, I will further address the position of the remaining Defendants who have not responded in any meaningful way, or in some cases at all, to the present proceedings. This includes Defendants 16, 19, 20, 27, and 30-33.

In this regard, it is right to note that pursuant to the Part 8 of the CPR, the Defendants were required to file an Acknowledgement of Service of the Council’s Part 8 Claim. Such acknowledgement of service was filed either in advance of the hearing before me, or in at least 2 instances during the course of that hearing, from Defendants 1, 2, 3, 8, 12, 13, 14, 25, 28, 29, 36 and 44. The effect of CPR 8.4, is that where there has been a failure to file an Acknowledgement of Service, the relevant party, whilst permitted to attend the hearing, cannot participate without the Court’s permission.

In this case, Defendants 4, 5, 9, 17, 18, and 21 attended the hearing, and I permitted each to address the Court despite the lack of a filed Acknowledgement of Service. I was satisfied that given that the defendants in question are litigants in person, and that the granting of the Council’s application would or could have an impact on their use and in some cases occupation of the Land, it was in the interests of justice to do so.

Further, as part of the Pittaway Order, there was a direction that any Defendant wishing to rely on evidence should submit the same by close of play on 4 December 2025. Evidence was served, in compliance with this direction, by Defendants 1, 2, 7, 8, and 9. Again, any other Defendant required my permission to rely on evidence at the hearing. In fact, a number of the Defendants who did attend the hearing either sought to make evidential assertions or to produce evidential material, such as photographs and medical documents, at the hearing. Having given the Claimant time to consider such material, I did permit the relevant Defendants to rely on that material on the basis of the same assessment of the interests of justice. I should add that no defendant sought to give evidence on oath before me, or required the Claimant to call the witnesses on which it relied to be cross-examined. I have therefore approached this application on the basis of the material either in advance of the hearing or during the hearing by all parties, and the submissions made about it.

At the beginning of the hearing on 21 January 2026, application was made by the Council to add two further defendants, namely Ruby Boyce and Jordan Newell. The test for doing so is that set out in CPR 19.2(2), which provides that “The court may order a person to be added as a new party if – (a) it is desirable to add the new party so that the court can resolve all the matters in dispute in the proceedings; or (b) there is an issue involving the new party and an existing party which is connected to the matters in dispute in the proceedings, and it is desirable to add the new party so that the court can resolve that issue”.

Ms Boyce is the partner of Frank Green, Defendant 9, and lives with him in his caravan on the Land. She is also expecting their child. A written application to add her as a defendant had been made in advance of the hearing. She is clearly someone who would fall within the ambit of the proposed injunction, and she offered no objection to her addition. Mr Newell attended the hearing on 21 January and identified himself as someone who stored logs on the land belonging to Karen Denyer, Defendant 40. He too is someone who would be affected by the order sought, and with an interest in responding to it. Although no written application had been made in his case, Mr Newell raised no objection. Moreover, the terms of the Pittaway Order expressly required the Claimant to apply to join any person “currently encompassed within the 37^th or 38^th Defendants”, and this the Claimant sought to do. I therefore granted the application to add Ms Boyce as Defendant 47 and Mr Newell as Defendant 48. I made it clear when I did so that their position would be different as to costs to those who had been defendants for a longer period, and that I would permit each to make submissions to me despite the lack of any Acknowledgement of Service.

At the beginning of the hearing on 21 January 2026, there was an agreed application for an adjournment in the case of Defendant 8, Billy Chapman. Mr Chapman occupies a caravan within title SY856046 together with his partner Celia Green, Defendant 7. The basis for that adjournment application was that he had made an application for planning permission for a “one pitch gypsy/traveller site” for this caravan on 23 December 2025. It is agreed by the parties that this application ought to be determined before a decision is reached as to the application of the injunction sought by the Council in his case. That takes account of the fact that there is an ongoing boundary dispute with the registered owner of title SY856046, Catherine Aikin-Sneath, who is Defendant 46, which the parties contend should be resolved before the Council’s application is determined in relation to those Defendants.

The parties’ position has also been reached in relation to Defendant 8 because it is accepted that there is no present evidence that Mr Chapman has any alternative residential option, that he is a member of the Traveller Community with protected characteristics under section 9, Equality Act 2010, and that he has significant health issues, including Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease. In short, the parties agreed that because of these particular characteristics and considerations relating to Defendant 8, his case should be adjourned until his planning application, which is at an early stage, has been determined. I acceded to that joint application for the reasons just set out.

It was recognised that the granting of this application did also have implications for other Defendants whose position was linked from that of Mr Chapman. In particular, this related to his parter, Celia Green (Defendant 7), her son, Albert Chapman (Defendant 6), and the registered owner of the land in question, Catherine Aikin-Sneath (Defendant 46). I concluded that the position of Ms Green, Defendant 7, was so inextricably connected to that of Defendant 8, given their shared occupancy of the same caravan, that in the interests of justice her case also had to be adjourned.

The position of Defendants 6 and 46 was not so closely connected to that of Defendant 8, save as to the mandatory elements of the proposed injunction. It would be inimical for either of those Defendants to make good breaches of planning control which were themselves subject to an ongoing planning application by Defendant 8 and/or the consideration of the merits of that mandatory injunctive relief against him. Their positions can, therefore, be protected by a delay to the mandatory elements of any injunction coming into effect to take account of that ongoing planning application, and I did not adjourn the proceedings in relation to Defendants 6 and 46.

At the close of the first day of the hearing, 21 January 2026, applications were made to adjourn their cases by Defendants 4, 5 and 9, because they contended that, as with Defendant 8, it was appropriate for the Council’s application to await the outcome of planning permission applications and/or appeals relating to such applications relevant to their occupation and use of the land. Similarly, on the second day of the hearing, 22 January 2026, Defendants 2, 13 and 36, applied to adjourn the proceedings in relation to them to await the outcome of their application for planning permission and/or a Certificate of Lawfulness of Existing Use and Development.

As with the application by Defendant 8 for an adjournment, it was appropriate to consider each application on its individual merits. As I have set out above, the central consideration in the case of Defendant 8 was not just that he had a very recently submitted application for planning permission relating to his caravan, but that there were wider personal considerations not least in relation to his health and the implications for him, in that context, if he were required to vacate the Land.

In the cases of Defendants 2, 9, 13 and 36, I was not satisfied that such personal considerations similarly required the adjournment of the proceedings in relation to them. Each had been directed to serve any evidence on which they sought to rely by 10 December, and in the cases of Defendants 2 and 9 they had done so. I had permitted each defendant to adduce further evidence during the hearing. I noted in the case of Defendant 9 that he had already been granted an adjournment by Andrew Kinnier KC, to give him the opportunity to provide any evidence that he wished the Court to consider. There was, therefore, no injustice to any of these defendants in the Court proceeding on the basis of the material before it as at 21-22 January 2026.

Whilst Defendants 2 and 9 were using relevant parts of the Land for residential purposes, as presently drafted, the injunction prevented the operation of the mandatory elements of the order, which would directly affect that residential use, until their extant planning permission applications or enforcement notice appeals have been resolved. The implications for their residence on the land of the order sought would in any event form an important part of my assessment of whether the order was proportionate and just. Weighed against that, I considered it important to avoid further delay to these proceedings which had been initiated in July 2025. I also considered that there was a clear public interest in the expeditious resolution of issues as to the proper enforcement of planning control for land such as that with which this case is concerned. Certainty as the position was in the interests of all parties, including these defendants. I therefore refused the applications of Defendants 2, 9, 13 and 36 for an adjournment.

So far as Jack Brazil, Defendant 4, is concerned the personal considerations were different. He gave me detailed information about his son, who has significant health issues in relation to which he provided documentation (and as to which there was evidence already available to the Council). He also informed me that his son is about to have heart surgery. Aside from the evidential implications of this, it was clear that Mr Brazil’s focus was on his son and his imminent medical treatment rather than on the present application, and that the imminent medical treatment also created issues as to the childcare of his other children which similarly were a distraction from his meaningful engagement with these proceedings.

Mr Brazil had failed to serve evidence in accordance with the requirements of the Pittaway Order. Having considered with Mr Brazil what evidence he should have served by that date, and on which he would wish to rely, it became clear that there was evidence that ought to have been served in relation to the care arrangements for his children, where they live, their access to the Land, and health concerns relating to his children and especially his son. I was satisfied that the interests of justice and the best interests of Mr Brazil’s children required that, despite his failure to comply with the Pittaway Order, Mr Brazil should have the opportunity to obtain and serve that evidence.

Additionally, Mr Brazil wished to await the outcome of his appeal against an Enforcement Notice relating to his residential use of the Land. As with Defendants 2, 9, 13 and 36, I was not prepared to adjourn solely for that reason, because in the same way as in the cases of those other defendants the terms of the order were apt to provide necessary protection of their positions, in so far as the mandatory elements of the order sought, pending the resolution of his enforcement appeal. I gave directions for the service of any evidence to be relied on by Defendant 4.

Because the basis for the adjournment in the case of Defendant 4 related to his personal circumstances rather than his planning appeal, I did not adjourn proceedings in relation to Joseph Brazil, Defendant 5. His position was different in any event. Although his position as to residency was not wholly consistent, he had told enforcement officers acting for the Council that he was not resident on the site, and had alternative accommodation. There was, therefore, no good or sufficient reason to adjourn the proceedings in so far as he was concerned.

Finally, so far as preliminaries are concerned, my attention was drawn to an application by Defendant 2 to vary the terms of the Pittaway Order. He was joined in this application during the hearing by Defendant 13. The thrust of their application was to vary the Order to permit, as part of their agricultural use of the Land, repairs to existing fencing. Agricultural use of the land, as opposed to its operational development or use for storage or residential purposes, is not prohibited by that Order, and the restraint under the Order relates to new fencing, rather than the repair of existing fencing. I did approve an amendment to the Pittaway Order to make that position clear. In my judgement any wider variation to the Pittaway Order was more appropriately considered as part of the process of whether to grant the Council’s application for a final injunction rather than as a preliminary or otherwise distinct exercise.

In addition to those various preliminary matters, consideration has been given to the position of those defendants who did not attend the hearing on 21-22 January 2026. This applies to Defendants 1, 3, 6, 10-12, 14-16, 19-20, 23-33, 39-43 and 45-46.

In addition, Defendant 37 is “persons unknown i.e. any person other than the named defendants who has already moved onto the land (as defined below) and is now living on the land and who intends to take any of the steps prohibited by paragraph 2 below (either by themselves or by asking or instructing or allowing or contracting another person), and Defendant 38 is “persons unknown i.e. any person other than the named defendants who has not already moved onto the land (as defined below) and who is not currently living on the land but who intends to move onto and live on the land (whether that be in a caravan, a mobile home or some other structure) and/or intends to take any of the steps prohibited by paragraphs 2 or 3 below (either by themselves or by asking or instructing or allowing or contracting another person)”. No one attended on behalf of those persons unknown.

The Court is permitted to proceed in the absence of a defendant pursuant to CPR 39.3, which, in so far as is relevant, states:

“(1)

The court may proceed with a trial in the absence of a party but – (c) if a defendant does not attend, it may strike out his defence or counterclaim (or both).

(2)

Where the court strikes out proceedings, or any part of them, under this rule, it may subsequently restore the proceedings, or that part.

(3)

Where a party does not attend and the court gives judgment or makes an order against him, the party who failed to attend may apply for the judgment or order to be set aside

(5)

Where an application is made under paragraph (2) or (3) by a party who failed to attend the trial, the court may grant the application only if the applicant – (a) acted promptly when he found out that the court had exercised its power to strike out or to enter judgment or make an order against him; (b) had a good reason for not attending the trial; and (c) has a reasonable prospect of success at the trial.”

Whilst there is thus power to proceed in the absence of a party, it is well recognised that this does not mean that the Court should lightly proceed to resolve the Council’s application in their absence. The decision is to be approached by reference to any information as to whether the defendants in question were aware of the hearing, if so to their reasons for not being present, and whether their interests can be properly protected in their absence.

In this regard, the statement of Joanna Searle, dated 15 December 2025, addressed the notice that the parties will have received of this hearing. By reference to that statement, and the exbibits attached thereto, I am satisfied that sufficient steps have been taken to affect service of the Pittaway Order both on the named Defendants and persons unknown. The Order identified the hearing on 21-23 January 2026 as the next and final hearing of the application. I have seen certificates of service, and photographic evidence in this regard. I have, for completeness, also seen evidence of service at earlier stages of the proceedings on those then identified as defendants and on persons unknown. In particular, the directions as to service by the alternative method specified by David Pittaway KC in his order of 10 October 2025 have been complied with.

No defendant has communicated with either the Claimant or the Court, having received such notice, to say that they could not attend, and wished the hearing adjourned. On the contrary, Ms Searle’s statement details contact a number of defendants made with her after they had received notice, and the attendance of a number of defendants at the hearing further demonstrates service to have been effective.

In relation to a number of those defendants who did not attend this hearing, I have been provided by the Claimant with material provided by those defendants in a number of forms, including acknowledgment of service paperwork, witness statements, email correspondence and notes of telephone exchanges. It follows that I have been able to consider the position of a number of the absent defendants through such means. Beyond that, the issues in the case have been thoroughly explored through the submissions of the defendants who did attend, and the careful testing of the Claimant’s application during the hearing by me. Mr O’Brien O’Reilly, acting for the Claimant, has been careful to draw my attention to any material relevant to the issues that I have had to determine, including that adverse to his own case. I am indebted to him for his assistance.

I am therefore satisfied that it was in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing in the absence of those defendants who did not attend.

Pursuant to section 57 of the Act, planning permission is required for “the carrying out of any development of land”. Development is defined by section 55(1) as “the carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under the land or the making of any material change in the use of any buildings or other land”.

Section 55(2) of the Act identifies operations which shall not be taken as involving such development, and this includes, at section 55(2)(e) “the use of any land for purposes of agriculture or forestry (including afforestation) and the use for any of those purposes of any building occupied together with land so used”. Section 336(i) makes clear that “agriculture includes horticulture, fruit growing, seed growing, dairy farming, the breeding and keeping of livestock (including any creature kept for the production of food, wool, skins or fur, or for the purpose of its use in the farming of land), the use of land as grazing land, meadow land, osier land, market gardens and nursery grounds, and the use of land for woodlands where that use is ancillary to the farming of land for other agricultural purposes.”

Section 171A(1) of the Act makes clear that carrying out development without the required planning permission is a breach of planning control. That said, Chamberlain J made clear in Durham County Council v Secretary of State for Levelling up, Housing and Communities [2023] EWHC 1394 (Admin) (at para.34) that it was for the Court, when determining a claim for a section 187B injunction, to determine “whether the development was an actual or apprehended breach of planning control, if there was a dispute about that”.

A planning authority may issue an enforcement notice, pursuant to section 172 of the Act, where it appears to them that there has been a breach of planning control, and where it is expedient to issue the notice having regard to the provisions of the development plan and to any other material considerations. A failure to comply with an enforcement notice renders the recipient liable to criminal proceedings, pursuant to section 179(1) of the Act. The recipient can appeal against the notice under section 174 of the Act, and the grounds for such an appeal, as set out at section 174(2), include (in so far as is relevant in these proceedings) “…(a) that, in respect of any breach of planning control which may be constituted by the matters stated in the notice, planning permission ought to be granted or, as the case may be, the condition or limitation concerned ought to be discharged; (b)  that those matters have not occurred; (c)  that those matters (if they occurred) do not constitute a breach of planning control..”.

In relation to such an appeal, the Court made clear in Chelmsford City Council v Lee [2019] EWHC 756 (QB) (at para.46) that the Court is not required to evaluate the prospects of success for any such appeal in considering enforcement action taken by the local planning authority under section 187B of the Act. HHJ Dight (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) observed that “it would be sensible for the court not to shut its mind to the possibility of an appeal being successful, but it is not… for me to evaluate the real chances of success”.

Section 187B(1) of the Act provides that “where a local planning authority considers it necessary or expedient for any actual or apprehended breach of planning control to be restrained by an injunction, they may apply to the court for an injunction, whether or not they have exercised or are proposing to exercise, and if there are other powers under this Part”. Section 187B(3) makes clear that this includes an application for injunctive relief against persons unknown.

The principles which govern the exercise of the court’s power under section 187B of the Act were considered by the House of Lords in the case of South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter [2004] UKHL 33 (referred to hereafter as “South Buckinghamshire”) and more recently by Holgate J in Ipswich Borough Council v Fairview Hotels (Ipswich) Ltd [2022] EWHC 2868 (KB) (referred to hereafter as “Ipswich”).

The relevant principles identifiable from those authorities can be summarised as follows:

Those principles underline that this Court may adopt a different approach to the different elements of the order now sought by the Council depending on the circumstances that apply to a particular defendant. Where, on the balance of probabilities, the Claimant can show that there are proper grounds to anticipate a breach of planning controls on land for which a particular defendant is responsible, it may be appropriate to restrain such a breach by that defendant and/or to require that defendant to prevent such a breach on that land. However, where there has either been no breach of planning controls on that land, or that defendant has not been responsible for any such a breach, it may not be appropriate additionally to impose mandatory requirements on them to make good a breach for which they are not responsible, and which they could not reasonably have prevented. Where, however, a breach has occurred for which they can be held responsible, or which they could reasonably have prevented, the position would be otherwise, and mandatory requirements in their case may be appropriate.

It is therefore necessary to consider what, if any, breaches of planning control the Claimant can demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, against any particular defendant. Mr O’Brien O’Reilly helpfully took me through the evidence relied on by, and/or available to, the Council defendant by defendant, and those defendants who had attended the hearing were given the opportunity to make submissions in this regard. It is also convenient to address those defendants in relation to whom there is issue as to ownership of the land as part of this review.

Defendant One: Cupids Green Ltd.

According to Land Registry information, Cupids Green Ltd, Defendant 1, is the owner of the freehold title SY864326. This is the area also identified as Lot A1, which has been subdivided into a series of subplots that can be linked to Defendants 2, 3, and 6, and potentially Defendants 7 and 8. In addition, Cupids Green Ltd. told the Council that this title of land had been sold as sub-plots to Defendants 9-12. Defendant 1 asserts that there has been delay in the registration of its sale of the land by the Land Registry.

Lot A1, according to the first statement of Darren Gregory, is “where a significant proportion of the breaches are happening”. It is the lot adjacent to the site access to the Land. As a comparison of aerial photographs from April 2021 to April 2025, show in that period there has been “occupation of the Land for residential purposes using caravans, mobile homes or similar” and “unauthorised use of the land for the storage of vehicles”. There have also been a number of structures and amounts of fencing erected. The evidence shows that none of these developments had been undertaken with planning permission.

The Council does not suggest that Defendant 1 was responsible for these breaches of planning control. However, it is submitted that on the balance of probabilities the Court can proceed on the basis that the defendant is still responsible for Lot A1, because it has not proved that it has devolved that responsibility.

In that regard, I have seen a statement from Gabor Varga, a Director of Cupids Green Ltd, which asserts that the company sold the land in August 2024, that “during our ownership we did not develop or alter or bring material onto any part of the land and we disposed of it precisely as we acquired it…we have no ability to influence present owners and prior to purchase we made clear the Green Belt status of the land”. There is evidential support for Defendant 1’s position as to this from a number of other defendants. In summary:

There is, therefore, a degree of uncertainty as to whether Defendant 1 remains properly a party to these proceedings, and the Defendant emailed the Council on 5 January 2026 to that effect. The Claimant submits that where certainty has not been established through Land Registry records, it would be inappropriate for a party with arguable responsibility for the land to be absolved of responsibility for making good demonstrated breaches of planning control. The result otherwise could be that no one could be compelled to make such breaches good.

Defendants 2, 13 and 36: Alfie Day, Jamie Wooton and Hogs Back Farm Ltd.

It is convenient to deal with these defendants together because Defendants 2 and 13 accept that they have used relevant parts of the Land for the operation of their company, Defendant 36. Defendant 2, in response to a welfare questionnaire from the Council, stated “the land under my control is used solely for agricultural purposes, including livestock keeping and breeding (pigs, poultry, ducks), cultivation, land care and daily farm operations”. He also accepted that he was in residential occupation of the Land. Defendant 13 agreed as to this categorisation of the use of the land, save that he denied that he was in residential occupation. Through Defendants 2 and 13, Defendant 36’s position is that the Land is being used for agricultural, and thus permitted, purposes.

The Council asserts that there is mixed use of the Land both for agricultural purposes, which are permitted, and residential purposes, which are not. There has also, it is asserted, been a material change of use in that a number of structures have been located on the land, such as livestock enclosures. An enforcement notice was served in December 2025 which came into effect on 15 January 2026, which required the removal of three buildings from Defendant 2’s land. He has sought to appeal that enforcement notice, but has not sought planning permission for the structures on his land. He submits this is not necessary because the structures are related to his agricultural use of the land. The Defendant has undertaken further work to the site since becoming aware of the Council’s objections, such as the erection of further fencing.

Further enforcement action had been taken that applies to the land controlled by Defendant 13, namely a stop notice, dated 24 September 2020, relating to the laying of hardcore and the erection of fences, and a noticed relating to similar activity, date 21 May 2024. The Council contends that there have been operational developments to the land, such as the erection of fencing and livestock enclosures, which involve a mixed use of the land. Similarly, the Council point to Defendant 13’s use of the land for the storage of vehicles and the use of containers, a caravan and a horsebox for storage and, potentially, for residential purposes. Defendant 13 denies living on site, and asserts that a horsebox with heating was an office. The Defendant has continued development of the site despite awareness of the enforcement notice of which they represent a breach.

Each Defendant at the hearing asserted that they had taken steps to remove items and structures from the site to comply with the Council’s requirements.

Defendant 2, in his appeal statement in opposition to the Council’s injunction, argued that his operation on the Land fell within the definition of agriculture in section 336 of the Act, and therefore did not require planning permission. Defendant 13 made the same assertion in his late arriving Acknowledgment of Service. In that document, Defendant 13 also asserted that their farm operated under a valid CPH number, and complied with agricultural regulations.

The Council’s response to this is that it is not the agriculture use of the land that requires permission, but the erection of structures on site, and its use both for non-agricultural purposes such as storage and for residential purposes. The Council also rely on the Article 4 Direction which since 27^th July 2018 has mandated that the erection of fences and other animal enclosures required planning permission. In relation to the residential use of the land, it is right to note that Defendant 2’s position has changed with time. His position, for example in response to the Welfare Questionnaire from the Council, was that 24/7 occupancy of the site was necessary to monitor and feed the animals. At the hearing, he indicated that he planned, when his resources permitted, to move off site and visit it as required for animal care, and that it was his lack of means at present to acquire such off-site premises that required him to reside on site.

In an email to the Council on 7 January 2026, Defendant 2 took issue with the scope of the order as to the area of land that he would be required to make good under the injunction, if granted. It went beyond the land that he owned and occupied.

It is appropriate that I resolve these Defendants’ contention that their development of the land has all related to its permitted agricultural use and is itself therefore permitted. That is not, in my judgment, a correct reading of the relevant statutory provisions. The “use of the land for agriculture” is not an operation that involved the development of the land, pursuant to section 55(2)(e) of the Act, and that includes “the breeding and keeping of livestock” by reference to section 336. But that means exactly what it says, namely the “use” of the land in relation to the keeping of livestock. It does not mean the erecting of barns or other buildings to house that livestock, the erection of structures to store materials relating to the raising or breeding of livestock, or the provision of accommodation for those caring for the livestock. Those are all developments of the land because they are “the carrying out of building… or other operations”, by reference to section 55(1), which require planning permission, pursuant to section 57 of the Act. The underlying agricultural purpose of such development may well be an important consideration to a decision as to planning permission, but it does not represent an exemption from the requirement to seek such permission.

Defendant 3: Jack Mikol

According to his Acknowledgement of Service, Defendant 3 accepted that he owned plot A1 and had been using a storage container on the land. He asserted he had not done so for 6 months by July 2025, and that he was storing a trailer there. According to Joanna Searle’s third statement, the container had been removed by the time of the Council’s last visit on 27 November 2025, but a quantity of logs had appeared which the Council understood to belong to Defendant 2. That defendant confirmed this at the hearing. It follows that there is still unauthorised storage taking place on the land, but less clear that this is the responsibility of Defendant 3, as opposed to something that he had not prevented from occurring. The use of the land for storage was the subject of an enforcement notice, which was unsuccessfully appealed. It follows that Defendant 3 has accepted action in breach of planning control on land for which he is responsible.

Defendants 4 and 5: Jack and Joseph Brazil

I address Defendant 4, Jack Brazil, only to provide context for the consideration of Defendant 5, given that I have adjourned his case. An enforcement notice, dated 10 June 2025, identified that four buildings had been erected on the land which Defendant 4 accepts to be his, with a raised platform and hard standing also installed. It was alleged that the Land was being used for mixed agricultural and residential purposes. This mixed use was accepted at the hearing on 21 January 2026 by Defendant 4, although he has sought to appeal the enforcement notice and has also applied for planning permission by way of a ground (a) appeal, belatedly, for the structures.

In his enforcement appeal form, signed by Defendant 5, it states “Jack Brazil and Joseph Brazil live in the Mobil (sic) home for the animals.. the children visit their father and stay at weekends”. It was accepted by Defendant 4 that his children do have alternative accommodation with their mother. On 29 July 2025, Joseph Brazil’s representative told the Council that Joseph Brazil “has nothing to do with the land”, and that he was no longer connected to the mobile home on the land. In a witness statement from Defendant 5, he stated that he had stayed with Defendant 4 on site following his separation from his wife, and that his plan was to reside there in the future. It follows that Defendant 5 accepts that he has been and wishes to use the land for residential purposes, contrary to the terms of the enforcement notice, and in breach of planning control.

Defendant 6: Albert Chapman

Defendant 6 was understood by the Council to have occupied a caravan on land with title SY856046, and to have been responsible for the hard standing on which that caravan was located. That information was provided by his mother, Defendant 7. However, on 30 July 2025, Defendant 6 informed the Council that he was “no longer the owner of the land”. Defendants 7 and 8 now reside in the caravan, and Defendant 8 has applied for planning permission. There is therefore uncertainty as to ownership by Defendant 6 of the land, and continued responsibility for it. The Council argues that that uncertainty should be resolved in its favour, in the absence of any engagement by Defendant 6 with these proceedings since July 2025, lest otherwise no one be held liable to make good the breaches of planning control to the land. However, the only evidence that Defendant 6 is responsible is the hearsay provided by his mother, whereas his direct assertion is to the contrary.

Defendants 9 and 47: Frank Green and Ruby Boyce

Defendant 9 is named in Land Registry documents as owned of Title SY892315. In his response to the Welfare Questionnaire from the Council, he identified himself as the owner of plots 20a-c, whereas Defendant 1 had told the Council that it had sold plots 20a and c to Defendant 9, which fall within SY864326 which is still recorded as the property of Defendant 1, rather than title SY892315, and had sold plot 20b to Defendant 10. Defendant 9’s position is that he and his partner, Defendant 47, occupy the land and that he has done so for 5 years. He is visited on site by his children, although they otherwise reside with his ex-partner elsewhere. He describes his use of the land as a mixture of residential and agricultural. He accepts that he had not obtained planning permission for the structures erected on the land, or for its residential occupation.

At the hearing before Andrew Kinnier KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, on 31 July 2025, Defendant 9 was not made subject to the injunction because his case was adjourned. Between that date, and the further hearing before David Pittaway KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, on 10 October 2025, it is accepted that there was further occupational development of the site, in that a structure was erected next to Defendant 9’s caravan, including a swing and secured to the ground by concrete foundations, and a dog kennel was installed. The Council contends that these structures represent a further development of the site after Defendant 9 had become aware of its concerns as to such development. I am satisfied that Defendants 9 and 47 are responsible for a series of breaches of planning control before and after the Kinnier order was made. Defendant 9 has made an application for planning permission, and this may therefore be remedied.

Defendants 10 and 11: William Keat and Nick Chapman

Defendant 1 informed the Council that Defendants 10 and 11 had acquired sub-plots that had been part of Plot A1 from them, although such ownership is not reflected in Land Registry records. Neither defendant has engaged with these proceedings, although Defendant 11 did speak to the Council on 28 July 2025 to say that he was the owner of a plot of land that was, as far as he was concerned, empty. That description appears to be accepted by Joanna Searle in her third statement. So far as Defendant 10 is concerned, the breach of planning control appears to be the erection of the structures occupied by Defendant 9 on land that Defendant 1 says belongs to Defendant 10, but which Defendant 9 says belongs to him. There is, therefore, no evidence that either Defendant is responsible themselves for any breach of planning control, and there is some uncertainty as to Defendant 10’s ownership or control of the land.

Defendant 12: Jadwiga Szczecinek

Defendant 1 identified Defendant 12 to the Council as the purchaser in 2020 of plot 6A, which appears to be part of title SY864326, a small plot to the rear of plot A1. According to Joanna Searle’s third statement, Defendant 12 responded to the welfare questionnaire sent to her by the Council to say that she had purchased the plot of land but had not visited it since her purchase. Ms Searle records that on the Council’s last visit in November 2025, there was a metal structure and various other items stored on the land, and there was thus a breach of planning controls. On 7 December 2025, Defendant 12 asked the Council to remove her from the ambit of the injunction because her plot was clear. That is a description accepted by the Council, as at 11 January 2026. It follows that the Council seeks only the restraining elements of the injunction in the case of Defendant 12, who does not dispute her ownership of the relevant part of the Land.

Defendant 14: Show Site Services Ltd.

Defendant 14 is the registered owner of land within title SY877109. As at the last Council visit to the land, there were piles of material dumped on site. In their Acknowledgement of Service, Defendant 14 states “we agree this needs to stop. We need a resolution on how to remove the people, cars, skips and any other material that has been illegally left on the site”. In their welfare questionnaire response Defendant 14 states that the land was bought as an investment and is not used by them. They add that the state of the land would prevent its onward sale. They do not argue that they are not responsible for clearing the site of that which others have dumped there.

Defendant 15: Noah Green

Defendant 15 is the registered owner of title SY884043, although in his reply to the welfare questionnaire he said that Defendant 8 had acquired the land and he was awaiting the revision of the Land Registry to reflect this. There is evidence of development of the land without necessary permission in relation to the creation of an area of hard surfacing and fencing. I am satisfied that there has been a breach of planning control in relation to land for which this Defendant is responsible.

Defendant 16: Martin Chatfield

On 11 December 2024, Council personnel attended the land to serve an enforcement notice, in part in relation to a caravan on land within title SY884043. Defendant 16 was present, threw the enforcement notice at the personnel and told them to “get off my caravan”. He had also been seen by Council personnel on the land on other occasions. He has not otherwise engaged with the Council. The caravan of which he claimed ownership represents a development of the site without permission, and a breach of planning control.

Defendants 17, 18 and 21: Russell Ede, Dean Early and James Ede

Defendant 17 is the registered owner of land within Title SY885406. Defendant 18 is the registered owner of land within Title SY885405. Defendant 21 is the registered owner of land within Title SY899796. I deal with them together because they appeared at the hearing to make the same representation, namely that they were no longer the legal owner of the land in question. Defendants 17 and 21 stated that they had sold their land to Defendant 4, and he confirmed this at the hearing. They also produced documentation to confirm the sale of part of their land to Defendant 20. Defendant 18 stated that he had sold his land to Defendant 13, who confirmed this at the hearing. It is of note that Joanna Searle in her third statement records that it appeared that Defendant 18’s land was being occupied by Defendant 19, who owned the neighbouring plot.

In short, therefore, each defendant asserted that they were no longer responsible for the land attributed to them by the Council, but could not produce evidence from the Land Registry to confirm this. In each case, there was another identified defendant to whom responsibility for actual breaches of planning control could be attributed.

Defendant 19: Adam Bahou

Defendant 19 is the registered owner of Title SY904704 according to Land Registry records. As already referenced, he is also identified by the Council as the occupier of land registered to Defendant 18 on the adjacent plot, Title SY904705. The land occupied by Defendant 19, according to the Council’s evidence, is being used for storage, and hard standing and fencing have been installed for this purpose in contravention both of planning control and served enforcement notices. There is also evidence of bonfires being used on site. There is no evidence that Defendant 19 is in residential occupation of the land under his control. He has not engaged with the Council, and there is no evidence from him before the Court to disassociate him from responsibility for making good unauthorised development of land for which he has responsibility.

Defendants 20 and 27: Joseph Faam and Mohammed Faam

Defendant 20 is the registered landowner of Title SY904216. His brother, Defendant 27, is the registered landowner of Title SY853140, on which there are a number of caravans located. The Council understands Defendant 20 to have occupied one of these at one stage. On a site inspection on 19 June 2025, there was evidence that this caravan was being lived in, and Defendant 27, who was on site, told the Council personnel to speak to Defendant 20 about this. Defendant 27’s land has also been used for storage purposes. On 23 July 2019 an enforcement notice had been issued in relation to this plot, requiring the removal of that which was stored there, including a horse box, a JCB excavator, trailers, vehicles and building materials. Defendants 20 and 27 both appealed against this enforcement notice, but their appeal was refused on the basis that the Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State rejected the defendants’ assertions as to their agricultural use of the land, and the agricultural connection of the various items stored there.

In his fourth witness statement, Darren Gregory addresses various attempts to effect service by post on Defendant 27 at two addresses connected to him. In each case, he was recorded as “addressee gone away”. However, service was also affected on the land itself. That it not itself a bar to making Defendant 27 responsible for addressing unauthorised development of the land, along with his brother.

Defendants 23-24, 26, and 32-33: Asaf and Haleema Hosein, Olga Ustinova, Angelica Ceccarelli and Sean Ridgewell

Defendants 23 and 24 are the joint owners of Title SY867489. The Council’s evidence is that this plot of land appeared to be clear, and that there was nothing on which the mandatory elements of the order would bite. Defendant 26 is the registered owner of Title SY863533, also referred to as lot C1. The Council’s evidence is that no unauthorised development of this plot has been noted. Similarly, Defendants 32 and 33 ae the joint owners of title SY851173, also referred to as lot G. As with the land of Defendant 26, the Council’s evidence is that no unauthorised development of this plot has been noted. In the case of each of these defendants, accordingly, the Council seeks only the restraining elements of the injunction, to prevent future unauthorised development of the land.

Defendants 25 and 280-29: Lixiang Guo, Junbo Ding and Caili Zhu

Defendant 25 is the owner of Title SY863832, also referred to as lot B1. According to the third statement of Joanna Searle, at the time of the last Council site visit on 27 November 2025, this plot was being used for the grazing of pigs. This use in itself does not give rise to issues. However, fencing had been erected to confine the animals and there was evidence of other unauthorised development, in terms of piles of hardcore and other materials which Joanna Searle suggests in her third statement could have crossed onto plot B1 from the adjacent plot A1. Defendant 25, in her Acknowledgement of Service, stated that “since the land of lot B1 was purchased, I haven’t done anything to this land. I was not aware of what other people did to the land”. In her response to the Council’s welfare questionnaire, Defendant 25 added that they were not living on the land and had not encouraged anyone else to do so.

Defendants 28-29 are recorded by the Land Registry as the owners of Titles SY861901 and SY861900. Joanna Searle, in her third statement, described the difficulties in understanding the exact bounds of these plots. She also detailed the evidence of unauthorised development of the land, in that within SY861901, there was evidence of hardcore under foot, an earth bund and a sunken water butt. There is also evidence of a concrete base and fencing. In their response to the welfare questionnaire, the Defendants accepted that they were the legal owners of the titles in question, albeit that they were seeking to sell them to buyers they did not identify. As Ms Searle puts it “they present themselves as landowners still and indicate they have not used the land at all”. They welcomed the Council’s efforts to clear the Land.

On the evidence, therefore, whilst Defendants 25, 28 and 29 are not themselves responsible for any breach of planning control, others have breached this in relation to land for which they are responsible, and these breaches need to be rectified.

Defendants 30-31: Bridget Cash and Joseph Mitchell

Defendants 30-31 are the joint legal owners of title SY849867. There is uncertainty as to the precise boundaries of the plot, however, on the Council’s site visit of 27 November 2025, there was fencing and the remains of previous unauthorised building. This was despite an enforcement notice which had required the removal from the land of “all buildings, works and paraphernalia brought onto the land to facilitate the unauthorised equestrian use…” Although it is accepted that Defendants 30 and 31 were not the owners of the land at the time of that enforcement notice, it runs with the land, and they therefore acquired an obligation to address that notice when they acquired the land. The Defendants have not engaged with the Council in relation to this notice, or the present proceedings. There is therefore no basis advanced by them to dissociate them from the requirement to make good unauthorised development of this land.

Defendant 39: Thomas Chapman

On 1 August 2025, as detailed in his fourth witness statement, Darren Gregory undertook service of the injunction granted on 31July on the land. On 4 August, a male giving his name as Thomas Chapman telephoned Joanna Searle. He told her that he owned land adjacent to the left side of the track just beyond the caravan, and that he had two dogs and their kennel on the land. The land thus identified by Defendant 39 appeared to be that owned by Defendant 46, title SY856046, which includes the caravan occupied by Defendants 7 and 8. Whilst there may, therefore, be issue as to the legal ownership of the land being used by Defendant 39, he has accepted that he had undertaken unauthorised development of it. He did maintain that his use of the land was agricultural, but the relevant land not only included a caravan being used for residential occupation but also had levelled land, and areas of hardcore and fencing erected, each undertaken in breach of planning controls.

Defendants 40 and 48: Karen Denyer and Jordan Newell

Defendant 40 is the registered owner of Title SY883086. When visited by the Council on 16 September and 27 November 2025, wood was being stored on this land, which represents a breach of planning control. At the hearing on 21 January 2026 Defendant 48, as he has become, identified himself as responsible for this storage of wood, which he said was incidental to his agricultural activities at a different location (not a part of the Land with which this case is concerned). It was not possible to elicit further information from Defendant 48 about the more precise use of the wood, and whether it related to commercial activity or not, because he did not return for the second day of the hearing on 22 January 2026. In that regard, it is of note that Defendant 40, in her welfare questionnaire response, states that she had bought the land for her “tree surgeon son”, who “wanted it to prepare and store logs”. It is not clear whether this referred to Defendant 48, or a further person using this plot of land for similar, and similarly unauthorised, purposes.

Defendants 41-42 and 44-45: Simon and Jacqueline Blanchflower, and Barry and Sheila Doyle

Defendants 41 and 42 are the joint owners of title SY874604. On 27 November 2025, on the Council’s site inspection, there was evidence of engineering operations on this land, by reference to the levelling of the ground, introduction of hardcore material and fencing. Defendant 41 had contacted the Council on 8 October 2025 to advise that they had not undertaken any work to their land, and that any work there had been undertaken without their knowledge or permission. They did not oppose the injunction. In their welfare questionnaire response, they undertook to make good any unauthorised development of their land, and I was advised at the hearing that they had done so. The Council therefore only seeks that Defendants 41 and 42 be made subject to the restraining elements of the injunction.

There are, in my view, strong parallels between Defendants 41 and 42 on the one hand, and Defendants 44 and 45 on the other. Defendants 44 and 45 are the joint owners of title SY864163. On 27 November 2025, on the Council’s site inspection, there was evidence of engineering operations on this land, by reference to fencing. In their response to the welfare questionnaire, Defendants 44 and 45 advised that they were not using their land, and that any use thereof was without their consent. Defendant 45 spoke to Joanna Searle on 6 October 2025, and it was explained that her land was covered by the ambit of the injunction, and she and Defendant 44 would be added as defendants. She raised no objection to this course, and said that she and Defendant 44 had been unaware of the works undertaken on their land.

Defendant 44 attended at the hearing on 21 January, and explained that he had been unable to attend the previous hearing on 10 October 2025 because of ill health. He applied for permission to serve a late Acknowledgement of Service, for which I granted permission. In this document, Defendant 44 states that he and Defendant 45 had applied for planning permission to use their land for equestrian purposes and that, knowing that Article 4 prevented them erecting fencing, they had sought to grow a hedge, but that this had been buried under hard standing material imported by others onto their land to create a road across the top of the field.

Defendant 44 said that when Defendant 45 spoke to Joanna Searle on 6 October 2025, she offered to make good the unauthorised development of the land, and was advised that they should not visit the site without police protection. The Council disputes this and points to the note Ms Searle made of the conversation on 6 October. However, that note reads, in this regard, “Sheila (Defendant 45) asked me what her rights were and whether she could clear her land now if she wanted to. I said I thought she could if her land but I advised her to seek legal advice” and “She said she may visit the site to gain a proper update and asked about safety on the site. I explained that our risk assessment is to attend with the police and suggested she may be able to view enough from the land she owns to the south without entering the land to the north.” In my view, it would be reasonable for someone in Defendant 45’s position to understand what was there recorded as a warning not to go onto the land where remedial work was required without police support.

Defendant 44, in his Acknowledgement of Service, submits that he and Defendant 45 should not be placed in a different category to Defendants 41 and 42. Like them, he was willing to make good the unauthorised development of his land voluntarily and in advance of the hearing on 21^st January, but, unlike them, he understood that he had been advised not to do so. He reiterated at the hearing that he was willing to make good, and had made arrangements with Defendants 4 and 9 to do so with their help.

I therefore agree with Defendant 44 that Defendants 44 and 45 are to be treated like Defendants 41 and 42, so that they should only be made subject to the restraining elements of the injunction. I further consider that all four defendants should be treated in the same way in relation to any application for costs, namely that they should not be held liable to contribute to the costs.

Defendant 43: Virdzhiniya Ilieva

Defendant 43 is the registered owner of title SY864553. Joanna Searle’s third statement described Defendant 43 as “using the land for growing fruit and vegetables”. However, she noted that Defendant 43 had erected fencing on the land without permission. On 7 October, Defendant 43 confirmed this when she spoke to Ms Searle. She explained that she had erected the fencing to protect her crops and stop animals damaging them. She did not live on the land, and was seeking to use it for agricultural purposes. Such use is permitted under the Act, but because of Article 4 the erection of fencing requires planning permission. There has, therefore, been unauthorised development of this land by Defendant 43.

Defendant 46: Catherine Aikin-Sneath

Defendant 46, as already alluded to, is the registered owner of title SY856046. This is the plot on which the caravan occupied by Defendants 7 and 8 is located. There have also been other unauthorised developments of this land, by reference to the creation of hardstanding, fencing, a toilet block, a dog kennel and a swing seat. The Council accepts that Defendant 46 was not responsible for these breaches of planning control herself, but there have nevertheless been a series of such breaches on land for which she is responsible. In her response to the welfare questionnaire, Defendant 46 acknowledges this, and supports the Council’s action to prevent such unauthorised activity.

As was made clear in Durham County Council v Secretary of State for Levelling up, it is for the Court to determine whether there have been actual or anticipated breaches of planning control on the land in relation to which injunctive relief is sought. I agree with the assessment of Andrew Kinnier KC, that “…there have been serious, … and repeated breaches of planning control …” and that “… the evidence suggests that there is a real and significant prospect of further significant unauthorised development …” Direct responsibility for these breaches varies between the named Defendants, but there is a proper basis for finding that those with either ownership or occupation of the land should be restrained from future breaches in relation to further mixed or residential use of the land, and that those with a responsibility, direct or otherwise, for existing breaches should be required to make them good.

Having identified that there have been extensive breaches of planning control on the Land, in accordance with the approach identified, for example, in Chelmsford City Council v Mixture, it is appropriate to consider the degree to which a breach can be said to be wilful or flagrant in determining whether to impose mandative injunctive relief to prevent its continuance or recurrence. Put shortly, the more flagrant the breach, the more ready this Court should be to grant such injunctive relief. As I have just observed, direct responsibility for these breaches varies between the named Defendants, and therefore the degree to which the breaches identified above can be said to be flagrant will itself vary.

Holgate J provided assistance as to the meaning of “flagrant” for these purposes in Ipswich, when he said (at paragraph 117): “This is not a case where the breach of planning control is clear, such as, for example, the carrying out of significant operational development. Nor is any breach flagrant in the sense of being carried out in an area of environmental sensitivity or in an area subject to strong development control policies, such as the green belt.”

Here, the evidence relied on by the Council shows the land to be of environmental sensitivity, by reference to its designation as within Area of Great Landscape Value and the setting of the Surrey Hills National Landscape. It is also within 400m-5km Zone of Influence for the Thames Basin Heaths Special Protection Area. In the skeleton argument served on behalf of Defendant 8, before his case was adjourned, submissions were made as to whether the land was correctly regarded as being characterised as green belt, and thus protected from development, or whether it should be regarded as grey belt, and thus more amenable to such development. The third statement of Joanna Searle, served on behalf of the Council, explains why the Council takes issue with that submission.

However, for present purposes it does not seem to me that this is an issue that I have to resolve. That is because it is well established that it is not the function of the Court in determining an application for a section 187B injunction to assess the planning merits, rather it is for the Court to decide the proportionality of any final injunction. The House of Lords was clear in South Buckingham (at paragraph 67), that “What uses should or should not be allowed of lands within the area of the authority, what development should or should not be permitted to take place upon lands, are questions for the planning authorities and not for courts of law to resolve” and that matters of “planning judgment” are “forbidden ground” for the Court.

This is because the Council is the “local body democratically-elected and accountable” for the determination of “planning applications” (by reference to paragraph 11 of South Buckinghamshire), that “issues as to whether or not planning permission should be granted are exclusively a matter for” local planning authorities, like the Council, and “respect should be accorded to the decisions” of such authorities (see paragraph 18 of South Buckinghamshire). It follows that I can, and should, approach the breaches I find there to have been of planning control to have occurred in the context of unauthorised development of green belt land which, by reason of its designation, calls for particular protection.

In this regard, I should briefly deal with a matter raised by Defendant 9 relating to what he characterised as a development for which the Council had given permission “just across the road” from the land with which this case is concerned. Further enquiry has shown that this is fact a reference to a planning application, which was made on 22 December 2025 and is yet to be decided, to build 420 dwellings outside Tongham, and thus approximately 3.2km away from the land. Although this planning application relates to unallocated land, it is adjoining allocated land (that is land allocated for development by the Council), and it is not within the green belt. I am satisfied that there is no comparison between that application and the present proceedings, and that any decision to be taken by the Council there would not undermine its stance here.

Beyond this, there are a number of instances of intrusive and abusive behaviour that have been demonstrated by a number of defendants that render their breaches flagrant. In this regard, my attention has been drawn to:

In addition, there have been a number of breaches that have taken place despite, and in the face of, enforcement notices and/or this Court’s interim injunction, which again make such subsequent breaches more serious. In this regard, my attention has been drawn to the following:

These developments have to be balanced, to an extent, against efforts described by Defendants 2, 9 and 13 to address unauthorised activities by others, such as fly tipping, which they have sought to remedy. There is evidence that they did assist Defendants 41 and 42 to clear their land, and they made clear their willingness similarly to assist Defendants 44 and 45. I have also been provided, during the hearing, with photographic evidence by both Defendant 9 and Defendant 13 as to the fly tipping with which they have had to contend.

Nevertheless, in my judgement the Council is correct overall to characterise the breaches of planning control they identify as flagrant. That is particularly because of where the breaches took place, and the nature of the land. It is also because of the continuing nature of the breaches despite orders, including the interim injunction, which should have precluded them.

The approach taken in in Ipswich indicates that the Court should have regard to the planning harm caused and the nature and extent of that harm in determining whether to grant injunctive relief. The rationale for that is clear. If, as the Council contend, there has been significant planning harm to date, this would provide strong support for the case for the mandatory elements of an injunction so that such harm can be remedied, and, if there is a risk that there will be significant planning harm if further development and occupation takes place on the Land, then the case for the restraining elements of the injunction would similarly be strengthened.

The evidence as to this, relied on by the Council, was not the subject of serious challenge at the hearing. Indeed, given that it included a large number of photographs taken on a number of site visits undertaken by the Council, which are graphic illustrations on the harm caused by the unauthorised breaches of planning control, it would have been difficult to do so. In summary, the evidence provided by Darren Gregory, the Council’s Senior Planning Enforcement Officer, in his first statement, dated 3 July 2025, was to the effect that:

“the breaches of planning control on the Land which have occurred previously have already made a deleterious transformation of the land from an attractive open green field site to a subdivided unsightly field with haphazard unauthorised development … It is considered that the impact of this unauthorised development within the Green Belt will harm the character and appearance of the immediate and surrounding area, including the intrinsic value of the Area of Great Landscape Value. Further, there is a serious risk that further unauthorised development will likely have an adverse ecological impact on the land. Any new unauthorised residential development would also cause harm to the Thames Basin Special Protection Area as increased residential occupation is deemed to cause harm to the habitats of the wild birds that are protected at this European Site.”

The same considerations are reflected in the Authorisation for Enforcement Action report, dated 26 June 2025 and prepared by Joanna Searle, the Council Planning Enforcement Team Leader, which was the foundation for the Council’s decision to seek injunctive relief. This included the assessment of Surrey County Council’s Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (‘AONB’) Officer, which was summarised as follows:

“the landscape of this field where relatively small plots have bene sold has significantly been spoiled by the unauthorised developments that have taken place. They are clearly visible to the public passing along the adjacent main road. In my long experience it is one of the worst examples I have seen of harmful unauthorised developments… The field is within the setting of the Surrey Hills National Landscape just tot eh south. Natural England’s proposal to extend the Surrey Hills National Landscape are fairly advanced and include this field. Natural England’s landscape consultants whop have extensive experience in defining National Park and National Landscape/AONB boundaries, and whether they possess sufficient natural beauty for designation, assed this site before such extensive unauthorised development took place. Following the public consultation the proposed extension across this field still remains and will be included in their submission to the Secretary of State for designation toward the end of this year or early 2026. It is reasonable to conclude that the underlying landscape value and setting of this field still remain and such harmful development will be removed in time following planning enforcement and the sites will be restored”.

The Authorisation of Enforcement Action report also addressed the national and local policies in relation to development occurring on Green Belt land. For example, the National Planning Policy Framework (‘NPPF’) states that inappropriate development is, by definition, harmful to the Green Belt and should only be approved in very exceptional circumstances. These will only arise where the harm is outweighed by other considerations, and where development does not undermine the fundamental purposes of the Green Belt. Defendant 8, before his case was adjourned, was seeking to submit that the land was not properly designated as Green Belt, but as Grey Belt. This is defined as “land in the green belt comprising previously developed land and/or any other land that… does not strongly contribute to any of the purposes” of Green belt designation “(a) to check the unrestricted sprawl of large built-up areas, (b) to prevent neighbouring towns merging into one another” or (d) to preserve the setting and special character of historic towns”. Moreover, Grey Belt designation does not apply to land falling within, amongst other things, National Landscape.

In support of his contentions as to Grey Belt designation, Defendant 8 relied on an expert report from Brian Woods, on behalf of WS Planning & Architecture. His report has been addressed by Joanna Searle in her third statement, and by Clive Smith, Surrey Hill National Landscape Planning Advisor. They provide a detailed analysis as to why this land falls within Green Belt rather than Grey Belt. As I have already observed, that determination is a planning one, which this Court should not second guess. In any event, in the absence of Defendant 8, there is no other challenge to the Council’s determination in this regard, and I have proceeded on the basis of it. Had I been required to reach a determination on this issue, on the material that I have seen I would in any event have reached the conclusion for which the Council contends.

In terms of the contention that there are here other considerations which outweigh the protection of the Green Belt, the focus has been on the provision of accommodation for members of the Traveller community. In this regard, it is contended that consideration needs to be given to whether what has been established on the Land is accommodation for members of the Traveller community, and whether there is an unmet need for such accommodation, which itself will be established if there will be a lack of a 5 year supply of such accommodation. It is accepted by the Council that it is not meeting this 5 year supply. In this regard, consideration is necessary of paragraph 13 of the Planning Policy for Traveller Sites (‘PPTS’). However, for reasons explained by Joanna Seale in her third statement, this consideration is to take place alongside consideration of the NPPF, rather than instead of it. It follows that the Council is required to consider the sustainability benefits of a site for travellers, together with consideration of its location, and shortfalls in terms of transport sustainability.

The Council has undertaken that assessment, on the material I have seen. By way of example, in her third statement, Ms Searle said “Whilst recognising the Council is not meeting traveller accommodation needs at this time, and noting the absence of alternative sites …given the identified harm to the Green Belt, landscape character of the area, including the area of great landscape value and setting of the National Landscape, and due to the other concerns articulated in the enforcement report pertaining to the Thams Basin Special Protection Area and ecological concerns, I am of the view that very special circumstances have not been found in this particular case and the development would not be supported if a planning application was submitted. I consider this to be the case in relation to both a temporary and permanent permission, as the harm to the Green Belt and the National Landscape is considered to be significant and something which cannot be tolerated even on a temporary basis”.

Further, I accept the Council’s submission that, as set out in South Buckinghamshire and in Ipswich, the need to enforce planning control in the public interest is a relevant consideration. There is a need to uphold the integrity of the planning enforcement system and there is a public interest in ensuring effective enforcement, particularly such as in cases like here where intentional unauthorised development has continued notwithstanding efforts by the LPA to take enforcement action.

As was made clear, for example, by Holgate J at paragraph 88 of Ipswich, I am required to consider whether the injunction sought is “necessary or expedient”, and whether granting it would be proportionate in all the circumstances.

This involves consideration of whether any lesser measure would have been sufficient to address breaches of planning control, and in particular whether enforcement notices (pursuant to section 172 of the Act), the undertaking of remedial steps directly by the Council (pursuant to section 178), or prosecution for non-compliance with enforcement notices (pursuant to section 179) would have presented suitable remedies for such breaches.

In that regard, I am referred to the approach the Court adopted in East Hertfordshire District Council v Flynn [2025] EWHC 1458, where Alison Morgan KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, accepted that Council’s submission that such lesser steps would have been insufficient. The learned Deputy High Court Judge said (at paragraph 75): “I note that the Claimant did not seek to remedy the position itself by removal of the site. Nor did it seek to prosecute any or all of the Defendants for non-compliance of the Enforcement Notice. Whilst these are steps that could have been taken by the Claimant as alternatives to seeking an injunction, I accept the submission of the Claimant that neither route would have led to an appropriate or proportionate remedy in the circumstances of the case. The former would have involved considerable public expenditure. The latter would have involved a criminal sanction and would not have achieved the objective of removing the materials from the site which amounted to breaches of planning control. I consider that there was good and sufficient reason for the Claimant to conclude that neither remedy was an appropriate way of dealing with the breaches.”

This issue is addressed by Darren Gregory in his first statement as follows: “The Council believed that trying to rely solely on less invasive statutory redresses, such as the enforcement notices which have already been served at the Land would be insufficient to address the apprehended material harm. A prosecution will, if successful, only result in a fine and will not remedy the material harm and will not offer an urgent solution. Direct action under section 178…could remedy the existing harm however the complex nature of the ownership and regular sub-division and sale of the Land is such that it is limited to the identified harm subject to an Enforcement Notice and would to prevent further harm. The Council believes only an injunction will provide adequate protection against the material harm to the Land and its special character.”

As Mr Gregory identifies, the Council has issued a series of enforcement notices in relation to a succession of unauthorised breaches of planning control. These notices have in some cases been challenged on appeal, but more often they have been ignored, and been succeed by further breaches rather than compliance. The Council, to a similar end, obtained an Article 4 direction in July 2018, and issued a Community Protection Notice, in March 2025, as against Defendant 14 . These too have not prevented the very kind of unauthorised development at which each was aimed. I am satisfied on this basis that as in the East Hertfordshire case, and for similar reasons, Mr Gregory’s assessment is correct and lesser measures that injunctive relief will not be sufficient.

The Authorisation for Enforcement report prepared by Joanna Searle in June 2025 shows that the Council considered lesser measures before it applied for the interim injunction, and concluded that they would be insufficient for the reasons also set out by Mr Gregory in his statement.

It is against that background that I turn, finally, to consider the extent to which the Council has taken account of the personal circumstances of the defendants, and any hardship that they will be occasioned. This also involves, necessarily, my consideration of the application of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’) to these defendants, and the extent to which the Injunction will infringe these rights.

Prime amongst these is consideration of the extent to which proper regard has been had by the Council to the defendants right to private and family life, as protected by Article 8, ECHR. This states:

“1  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

The interaction of that right to issues of planning control was considered by the European Court of Human Rights in Chapman v UK (2001) 33 EHRR 399, in which the Court said (at paragraphs 102-104):

“102  Where a dwelling has been established without the planning permission which is needed under the national law, there is a conflict of interest between the right of the individual under Article 8 of the Convention to respect for his or her home and the right of others in the community to environmental protection. When considering whether a requirement that the individual leave his or her home is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, it is highly relevant whether or not the home was established unlawfully. If the home was lawfully established, this factor would self-evidently be something which would weigh against the legitimacy of requiring the individual to move. Conversely, if the establishment of a home in a particular place was unlawful, the position of the individual objecting to an order to move is less strong. The Court will be slow to grant protection to those who, in conscious defiance of the prohibitions of the law, establish a home on an environmentally protected site. For the Court to do otherwise would be to encourage illegal action to the detriment of the protection of the environmental rights of other people in the community.

103  A further relevant consideration, to be taken into account in the first place by the national authorities, is that if no alternative accommodation is available, the interference is more serious than where such accommodation is available. The more suitable the alternative accommodation is, the less serious is the interference constituted by moving the applicant from his or her existing accommodation.

104  The evaluation of the suitability of alternative accommodation will involve a consideration of, on the one hand, the particular needs of the person concerned— his or her family requirements and financial resources— and, on the other hand, the rights of the local community to environmental protection. This is a task in respect of which it is appropriate to give a wide margin of appreciation to national authorities, who are evidently better placed to make the requisite assessment.”

The application of Article 8 in the context of breaches of planning control was considered both by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in South Buckinghamshire. Lord Hutton, at paragraph 88, approved the analysis in this regard of Simon Brown LJ in the court below, which included the following:

“Questions of the family's health and education will inevitably be of relevance. But so too, of course, will countervailing considerations such as the need to enforce planning control in the general interest and, importantly therefore, the planning history of the site. The degree and flagrancy of the postulated breach of planning control may well prove critical. If conventional enforcement measures have failed over a prolonged period of time to remedy the breach, then the court would obviously be the readier to use its own, more coercive powers” (p.1377D)

“Relevant too will be the local authority's decision under section 187B(1) to seek injunctive relief. They, after all, are the democratically elected and accountable body principally responsible for planning control in their area. Again, however, the relevance and weight of their decision will depend above all on the extent to which they can be shown to have had regard to all the material considerations and to have properly posed and approached the article 8(2) questions as to necessity and proportionality.” (p 1377G)

It is also necessary to have regard to the First Protocol to the ECHR, Article 1 which address the protection of property. It states: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

In relation to those making residential use of the site, the lack of alternative sites for members of the traveller community to go to if ejected from the Land is an important factor in the assessment of proportionality. These, and other instances of personal hardship occasioned by the injunction sought are relevant to that determination. This was underlined, by way of example, by Karen Ridge, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, in Waverley Borough Council v Gray and others [2023] EWHC 2161 KB (hereafter ‘Waverley’), when (at paragraph 112) she observed: “I remain conscious of the duty to uphold lawful decisions made by planning authorities. I must also bear in mind the consequences of a final injunction when there are no alternative sites available, and the defendants are likely to resort to unauthorised roadside camping which would lead to further environmental harm and hardship for the families and children in terms of their welfare needs not being met. These are significant factors militating against the grant of a final injunction on the facts of this case.”

The learned Deputy High Court Judge in that case (at paragraph 55) cited with approval the approach of the Supreme Court in Zoumbas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKSC 74 to the protection of the welfare of children, when it identified that the relevant principles included the following:

“• The best interests of a child are an integral part of the proportionality assessment under article 8 ECHR;

• In making that assessment, the best interests of a child must be a primary consideration, although not always the only primary consideration; and the child's best interests do not of themselves have the status of the paramount consideration;

• Although the best interests of a child can be outweighed by the cumulative effect of other considerations, no other consideration can be treated as inherently more significant;

• While different judges might approach the question of the best interests of a child in different ways, it is important to ask oneself the right questions in an orderly manner in order to avoid the risk that the best interests of a child might be undervalued when other important considerations were in play;

• It is important to have a clear idea of a child's circumstances and of what is in a child's best interests before one asks oneself whether those interests are outweighed by the force of other considerations;

• To that end there is no substitute for a careful examination of all relevant factors when the interests of a child are involved in an article 8 assessment; and

• A child must not be blamed for matters for which he or she is not responsible, such as the conduct of a parent.”

The Council submits that their approach can be distinguished from that of the claimant in the Waverley case on the basis that the evidence shows that they did review their assessment of the balance of competing factors, and the implications of Article 8 and the First Protocol, Schedule 1 to the ECHR, as new information came to light, and they have continued to do so up to and including at the hearing on 21-22 January 2026. In that regard, the Council points to:

It follows that the present application by Council does follow a careful reassessment of the balance of factors relevant to an application for injunctive relief in the present circumstances, by reference to all the information now available to them. This is not a case where the Council is “pursuing it to a final injunction without pausing to re-evaluate the appropriateness of the use of coercive measures on becoming aware as to personal circumstances of the individuals they were concerned with”, as was assessed to be the case by the learned Deputy High Court Judge in Waverley Borough Council (see paragraph 113). Indeed, comparison between the present case and the assessment there provides support for the Council’s application, rather than weighing against it.

I have had regard, in this context, to the evidence provided by the defendants, including the submissions made to me at the hearing by those who attended.

Defendants 2, 13 and 36:

These Defendants identify themselves as working farmers. Defendant 2 wishes to reside on site to provide 24-hour care to their livestock. They need fencing to prevent their livestock escaping, and need structures on site to accommodate those animals, and to store equipment and other items “necessary for lawful farming operation”. The order would (to quote Defendant 2’s application for an adjournment) place them “at risk of being unable to lawfully carry out essential livestock care and ordinary agricultural activities, which may result in irreparable harm to animals and disruption to the functioning of the farm”. Defendant 13 pointed to the fact that the structures on the site for storage were necessary, for example to store hay and feed for the animals, and that they were all movable or temporary.

The Defendants point to the impact on animal welfare of the injunction, because of the impact it would have on their ability properly to care for those animals, and to house and feed them.

Defendant 13 has not made residential use of the land, and any order would not impact his accommodation position as it would that of Defendant 2. If he were required to move, in contrast, Defendant 2 says that he cannot afford other accommodation. He denied that the postal address he had provided for service related to an address at which he could live. His justification for residential occupation did become more focussed on his ability to find other accommodation rather than a focus on animal care as his submissions at the hearing developed. He also described, by reference to the period when he was a child in care of the local authority, that he had no confidence in their ability to house him. He also described the need for onsite accommodation by reference to hygiene issues after working with the animals, and he pointed, in his welfare questionnaire response, to the impact being required to move would have on his mental health.

In his submissions at the hearing, Defendant 2 also described further development of the site that he was contemplating, for example as to installing solar panels. Given his awareness of the objections to any such development, this was not encouraging. In this regard, it is also relevant to note that these Defendants have not made an application for planning permission for much of their development of the land. They have applied for a Lawful Development Certificate. Paragraph 11 of the proposed order makes clear that the mandatory terms of the order will only come into effect against Defendant 2 if his enforcement notice appeal is unsuccessful, but this does not include this certificate application.

Defendant 5

Joseph Brazil has identified, for example through the statement he provided in September 2025, that he is 71 years of age and suffers from a number of health issues. He identified that he wished to live on the land with his son, Defendant 4, but that he was not doing so at present. It follows that his position is not akin to that of defendants already using the land for residential purposes. Moreover, the terms of the injunction, in relation to its mandatory elements, would only operate against Defendant 5 if ongoing planning permissions applications/appeal are unsuccessful, as paragraph 11 of the proposed order makes clear.

Defendants 9 and 47

Defendant 9 has lived on this plot of land for 5 years. The structures he has placed on site are all removable, but necessary for his occupation of the land and his agricultural operations there. He pointed, for example, to the fact that he had erected the structure next to his caravan so that his children were protected from the summer sun. Defendant 47 lives there with him, and they are expecting a child, whose interests also fall to be considered. Although Defendant 9 has a postal address for a bricks and mortar property, he explained that this is occupied by his elderly father. His other 4 children come to stay on site with him, including one with autism. The children do have alternative accommodation, and there would, as Defendant 9 accepted, be other locations at which he could see them.

Defendant 9 is concerned that, if ejected from the site, he would have nowhere to go, other than car parks and laybys. This would restrict his access to his children, and leave his land vulnerable to fly tipping. These considerations are important, and a balance has to be struck between the considerations of the proper enforcement of planning control and the protection of ecology and environment on the one hand, and the rights of these Defendants to their family life on the other. Defendant 9 has an ongoing planning permission application. Paragraph 11 of the proposed order makes clear that the mandatory terms of the order will only come into effect against Defendant 9 if those other applications are unsuccessful. It follows that his Article 8 rights would be affected if it was determined that his residential use of the land was unlawful, and had been so when it commenced 5 years ago. That is highly relevant to the necessary balancing exercise, as was acknowledged in Chapman.

Other Defendants

A number of defendants have raised issues as to the proposed order restricting their business activities on the site. I have already addressed Defendants 2, 13 and 36 in this regard. Defendant 40, in her welfare response, asserted that “If my son can’t use it to store logs it would be useful to him and frankly worthless”. Defendant 43 explained that she had erected fencing to protect her crops.

A number of the other defendants have also raised concerns as to the financial implications of the proposed order on them. These are legal owners of the land who have not themselves been responsible for breaches of planning control, but whose land has been subject to unauthorised development. For example, Defendant 14 in its response to the welfare questionnaire said “the hardship we would incur would be financial and personal, should we be held liable…it makes it virtually impossible to sell the land with an order against it. Our company situation is very fragile at the moment and we can’t afford to not be able to sell this land.”. Similarly, Defendants 28 and 29 stated in their response “we are not in a position to undertake or fund ay such works as doing so would place significant financial strain on us”.

Such concerns do engage consideration of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR, and the peaceful enjoyment of property. However, that right is not unqualified. It may be limited by lawful and proportionate action in the public interest, such as the proper enforcement of planning control and the protection of the environment. The measures that any particular defendant needs to take to make good unauthorised development will depend on measures others responsible for those developments can be compelled to take, and any such measures will if anything enhance the value of the land in question and make it easier rather than harder to resell. Any restriction on commercial use of the land has to be set against proportionate and necessary measures to protect the integrity of planning control and the protection of land from existing and further planning harm.

Having undertaken this lengthy analysis by reference to the criteria that I am enjoined to consider, my conclusions are as follows:

I have considered with care the extent to which, if at all, the order should be made against the named defendants. I am persuaded that given the uncertainty in relation to a number of defendants as to their ownership of relevant parts of the land, there is a need to restrain future breaches of planning control by any person who can be shown to have, or potentially still to have, an interest in the Land. I therefore make each of the named defendants subject to the restraining elements of the Order, set out at paragraph 6. The exception to this is Defendant 1. On my analysis above, I am not satisfied that they are properly a party now to these proceedings, and I exclude them from its ambit.

However, I have concluded that it is not appropriate to impose the mandatory elements where there is sufficient uncertainty that the defendant in question has any control over the land so as to be able to comply with those elements, has not been responsible for that which they would be required to make good, and/or where either there is nothing to make good on their land or they have already done so. I therefore exclude the following Defendants 6, 10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 21, 23-24, 26, 32-33, 41-42, and 44-45 from the mandatory elements of the order. So that it is clear, the mandatory elements will apply to the remaining defendants.

The Council makes an application in relation to its costs. In relation to those whose cases I have adjourned (defendants 4, 7, 8), costs will be reserved. In general, those made subject to this order should be jointly and severally liable for the Claimants’ costs. However, I do not consider that this should apply to those defendants who have never opposed the order and who have either taken steps to put right any unauthorised development, or who never had anything to make good on their land. I therefore exclude the following from the ambit of the order that I make as to costs Defendants 11, 12, 23-24, 26, 32-33, 41-42, and 44-45.

Further, in relation to those defendants joined to the case at later stages, I make clear that they should not be made liable for costs incurred at earlier stages. In particular, Defendants 47 and 48 should only be liable for a proportion of the costs incurred in relation to the final hearing on 21-22 January 2026.

I turn, finally, to the position of Defendants 37 and 38, persons unknown. The evidence from the Council has amply demonstrated that, despite their best endeavours there has been and remains uncertainty as to the legal owners of the land, and thus for it so be effective the injunction needs also to address others who have or may take up occupation of the land who are at present unknown.

In Wolverhampton City Council and others London Gypsies and Travellers and others [2023] UKSC 47; [2024] 2 WLR (hereafter ‘Wolverhampton’), the Supreme Court considered whether and, if so. the circumstances in which ‘newcomer’ injunctions may be imposed. After a detailed and careful consideration of the competing arguments, potential issues and justifications for such orders, the Court concluded (at paragraph 167) that “ …there is no immoveable obstacle in the way of granting injunctions against newcomer Travellers, on an essentially without notice basis, regardless of whether in form interim or final, either in terms of jurisdiction or principle. But this by no means leads straight to the conclusion that they ought to be granted, either generally or on the facts of any particular case.” The Court also made clear (at paragraph 170) that such newcomer injunctions were not “constitutionally improper” and ‘so far as the local authorities are seeking to prevent the commission of civil wrongs such as trespass, they are entitled to apply to the civil courts for any relief allowed by law.’

In terms of alternative remedies, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the alternatives of possession orders against squatters (at paragraph 166), and the use of byelaws (at paragraph 172). In relation to the former, the Court observed that “…the possession order works once and for all by a form of execution which puts the owner of the land back in possession, but it has no ongoing effect in prohibiting entry by newcomers wishing to camp upon it after the order has been executed. Its shortcomings in the Traveller context are one of the reasons prayed in aid by local authorities seeking injunctions against newcomers as the only practicable solution to their difficulties.” In relation to the latter, the Court said “In our view the theoretical availability of byelaws or other measures or powers available to local authorities as a potential alternative remedy is not shown to be a reason why newcomer injunctions should never be granted against Travellers. Rather, the question whether byelaws or other such measures or powers represent a workable alternative is one which should be addressed on a case by case basis”.

The Court set out (at paragraph 167) that the granting of a newcomer injunction was “only likely to be justified as a novel exercise of an equitable discretionary power” in the following circumstances:

Here, the evidence shows that there is a sufficiently real and imminent risk of further reaches of planning control in light of (a) the works undertaken to date as described above, (b) the intensification of the unauthorised development that the Council’s site visits have highlighted and (c) the breaches of the Pittaway Order. In that last regard, I am satisfied that the Council has carried out notification of that Order in compliance with its terms. Beyond the evidence from the Council in this regard, I have heard submissions from Defendants 2, 4, 9 and 13 as to the activities of unknown persons fly tipping on the site both before and after the Pittaway Order was made, which fortifies me in the conclusion that an order that addresses the activities of persons as yet unknown is imperative.

The first statement of Darren Gregory addresses evidence from a number of sources, including Defendants 5 and 8, of contemplated development of the Land as a transit site for members of the Traveller Community. There is a compelling justification for the remedy notwithstanding the fact that the Claimant cannot demonstrate a five year supply of gypsy/traveller pitches. With respect to other statutory powers and/or byelaws, this would take time, whereas an injunction offers immediate restraint against further unlawful development and further occupation. Further, the development, both with respect to the actual and apprehended breaches of planning control, is contrary to the relevant planning policies such that an application for an injunction pursuant to section 187B of the Act is the most effective tool.

By reference to the procedural matters addressed in Wolverhampton (from paragraph 187), I am satisfied:

I am therefore satisfied that it is necessary, expedient and proportionate to make the order sought against persons unknown in the terms set out. Such an order is the only and most effective means of enforcement to control and manage actual and apprehended breaches of planning control, in combination with the order that I make in relation to the named defendants.