Paul Little Construction Limited v Michael Byrne

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWHC 2577 (KB)

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Paul Little Construction Limited v Michael Byrne

Neutral Citation Number[2026] EWHC 2577 (KB)

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2577 (KB)
Case No: KB-2025-002557
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION

MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 12/10/2026

Before :

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE EARDLEY

Between :

PAUL LITTLE CONSTRUCTION LIMITED

Claimant

- and –

MICHAEL BYRNE

Defendant

Richard Owen-Thomas (instructed by Taylor Rose Limited) for the Claimant

Robert Sheridan (instructed by Enigma Solicitors) for the Defendant

Hearing date: 5 October 2026

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00am on 12 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

.............................

The Honourable Mr Justice Eardley:

Introduction

1.

On 5 October 2026 I heard a trial of preliminary issues (TPI) in this claim for libel, brought in respect of two reviews posted on the Google Business platform. The issues I have to decide in respect of each review are:

(a)

The natural and ordinary meaning of the statement complained of;

(b)

Whether the statement complained of was (or included) a statement of opinion;

(c)

If so, whether the statement complained of indicated, whether in general or specific terms, the basis of the opinion; and

(d)

Whether the statement complained of is defamatory at common law.

2.

In fact, the Order directing the TPI described the issues in slightly different language but, with the parties’ agreement, I have reworded them to follow more closely the language used in the Defamation Act 2013. The Order directing the TPI also omitted the third of these issues. However, it is an issue which is commonly and conveniently determined alongside the others and the parties helpfully agreed that I should determine it now.

3.

In accordance with established practice (see Tinkler v Ferguson [2019] EWCA Civ 819 at [9], Longmore LJ), I read the statements complained of for myself, once, and formed provisional views before considering the parties’ submissions. Likewise, in accordance with the practice that has developed since British Chiropractic Association v Singh [2010] EWCA Civ 350, [2011] 1 WLR 133 (see [32], Lord Judge CJ), I have considered the preliminary issues concurrently rather than sequentially, lest my resolution of one of the issues might artificially “stifle” my approach to the others.

Parties, factual background and the statements complained of

4.

The Claimant is a private limited company which undertakes the construction of domestic buildings in Devon and Cornwall. The Defendant lives with his wife in a house in Plymouth and, in April 2023, they engaged the Claimant to carry out work on the property. The Defendant was dissatisfied with what ensued. On a date sometime before 9 August 2024 he posted a review of the Claimant on the Google Business platform (the First Review) awarding one star out of five and continuing:

“STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT YOU DON’T LET THIS COMPANY ANYWHERE NEAR YOUR BUILDING PROJECT

We engaged them to carry out some building work at our house and they did a terrible job on almost every aspect – see attached a sample of the photographs of their work on our project. They worked at our property for about eight months (much longer than they originally anticipated) and when we began to question some of the frankly extortionate additional costs, the company suggested that we find another contractor to complete the project. The company then promised (in writing) to pay for another contractor to correct all of their shoddy workmanship but have so far failed to honour that promise and so it is looking increasing likely that we will have to sue them to recover those costs. So far, that has cost us thousands of pounds, but at least we are now getting a professional job done by another contractor.

Not a comment on the workmanship, but I also attach the video of one of the company’s employees urinating on our property!

Save yourself the hassle we have had; use another contractor – there are some really good ones out there.

N.B. the majority of the reviews below are given by members of staff and family members so take them with a pinch of salt.”

5.

In the printout included in the agreed hearing bundle, the First Review appears beneath the words “Paul Little Construction” and the Claimant’s address. Directly above the First Review are the words “3.9 [and 4 stars, out of 5] 11 reviews. Reviews aren’t verified”.

6.

Beneath the text of the First Review there were a number of photos and videos. In the printout included in the agreed hearing bundle there are 15 photos and videos showing building work. (I was not asked to view any of these videos; I could see only the still image at the beginning of each video; I was told that most of the videos are very short, lasting a few seconds). The Defendant says that in fact there were some 50 photos and videos, and he has appended a printout of these to his “Notice of Case” document. They too show building work. The Claimant was not prepared to admit whether all these photos and images were available to be viewed with the text of the First Review.

7.

A lack of clarity about what falls to be considered as context for the statement complained of in a libel action can sometimes derail a TPI, at great expense to the parties: see my judgments in the Paisley v Linehan litigation ([2024] EWHC 1976 (KB), [2025] EWHC 228 (KB) and [2025] EWHC 624 (KB)). In this case though, the resolution of the issues I have to decide is not affected by how many or precisely which photos/videos readers would have seen. They are all much alike (evidently being proffered as examples of the workmanship of the Claimant’s employees).

8.

The Defendant posted another review sometime in January 2025 (the Second Review), again on the Google Business platform. The Second Review shows one star (out of five) and states:

“VERY STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT YOU DON’T LET THIS COMPANY ANYWHERE NEAR YOUR BUILDING PROJECT.

“This company attempted to build our extension and I have had numerous issues with their poor workmanship. I have had to spend thousands and thousands of pounds paying someone else to correct their work.

I also caught one of their employees urinating on our property!!!”

9.

Beneath this text there is a video, which I have watched. It lasts 30 seconds and shows a man exiting, via a patio door, from a room where building work is obviously going on, and then turning and urinating on the external wall.

Procedural history

10.

This is a somewhat unusual case in that the TPI took place after a Defence and Reply had already been filed. The Defendant originally asked for the preliminary issues to be determined without a hearing but the Claimant opposed this and, on 12 May 2026, Collins Rice J directed that there should be a hearing (without needing to resolve the question left open by Nicklin J in Hewson v Times Newspapers Ltd [2019] EWHC 650 (QB) as to whether the Court can direct a paper determination of preliminary issues in a libel claim even where the parties do not agree to that course).

11.

Even though, by the time the TPI was ordered, a Defence had been filed, responding to the Claimant’s case on meaning and asserting that the Reviews were statements of opinion in respect of which a defence of honest opinion was advanced, the Order of Collins Rice J directed the Defendant to file and serve a written notice of his case on the preliminary issues. The Defendant did so (the document seems to have been written by the Defendant himself, rather than his lawyers) and I have taken it into account insofar as its contents are relevant.

Legal principles

12.

I am required to identify the single, natural and ordinary meaning of the Article, applying the well-established principles re-stated by Nicklin J in Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB) at [12] (approved by the Court of Appeal in Millett v Corbyn [2021] EWCA Civ 567, [2021] EMLR 19):

(i)

The governing principle is reasonableness.

(ii)

The intention of the publisher is irrelevant.

(iii)

The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or non-defamatory meaning is available is not reasonable: s/he is avid for scandal. But always to adopt the less derogatory meaning would also be unreasonable: it would be naïve.

(iv)

Over-elaborate analysis should be avoided and the court should certainly not take a too literal approach to the task.

(v)

Consequently, a judge providing written reasons for conclusions on meaning should not fall into the trap of conducting too detailed an analysis of the various passages relied on by the respective parties.

(vi)

Any meaning that emerges as the produce of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation should be rejected.

(vii)

It follows that it is not enough to say that by some person or another the words might be understood in a defamatory sense.

(viii)

The publication must be read as a whole, and any 'bane and antidote' taken together. Sometimes, the context will clothe the words in a more serious defamatory meaning (for example the classic "rogues' gallery" case). In other cases, the context will weaken (even extinguish altogether) the defamatory meaning that the words would bear if they were read in isolation (e.g. bane and antidote cases).

(ix)

In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statement of which the claimant complains, it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication.

(x)

No evidence, beyond publication complained of, is admissible in determining the natural and ordinary meaning.

(xi)

The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. The court can take judicial notice of facts which are common knowledge, but should beware of reliance on impressionistic assessments of the characteristics of a publication's readership.

(xii)

Judges should have regard to the impression the article has made upon them themselves in considering what impact it would have made on the hypothetical reasonable reader.

(xiii)

In determining the single meaning, the court is free to choose the correct meaning; it is not bound by the meanings advanced by the parties (save that it cannot find a meaning that is more injurious than the claimant's pleaded meaning).

(xiv)

The ordinary reasonable reader is assumed to have read or watched the statement complained of once.

13.

Claimants can (to some extent) choose which aspects of a statement they complain about. When a claimant chooses to focus on just one aspect, "…the judge should not normally make a finding of any meaning which is not either advanced to some extent in the statement of case or submissions of one or other party, or within the same class or range as a meaning so advanced" : Yeo v Times Newspapers Ltd [2015] 1 WLR 971 at [82] (Warby J) and Swan v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2020] EWHC 1312 (QB) at [24]-[25] (Warby J) . Here, neither party has sought to rely on the allegation that one of the Claimant’s employees urinated on the Defendant’s property, so I need say nothing more about that aspect of the Reviews.

Fact/opinion

14.

In Koutsogiannis at [16], Nicklin J also distilled from the authorities the following principles governing the Court’s assessment of whether a statement is one of fact or opinion (the first condition for the defence of honest opinion being that “the statement is a statement of opinion” Defamation Act 2013 s, 3(2)):

(i)

The statement must be recognisable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of fact.

(ii)

Opinion is something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation, etc.

(iii)

The ultimate question is how the word would strike the ordinary reasonable reader. The subject matter and context of the words may be an important indicator of whether they are fact or opinion.

(iv)

Some statements which are, by their nature and appearance opinion, are nevertheless treated as statements of fact where, for instance, the opinion implies that a claimant has done something but does not indicate what that something is, i.e. the statement is a bare comment.

(v)

Whether an allegation that someone has acted "dishonestly" or "criminally" is an allegation of fact or expression of opinion will very much depend upon context. There is no fixed rule that a statement that someone has been dishonest must be treated as an allegation of fact.

15.

Principle (iv) concerning “bare comment” needs to be read in light of what was said about it in the later case of Millett.At [24] Warby LJ first cited with approval what Sharp LJ had said in Butt v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 933, [2019] EMLR 23 at [39]: “The ultimate determinant …is how the statement would strike the ordinary reasonable reader…- that is, whether the statement is discernibly comment (to such a reader) …In that regard the subject matter, the nature of the allegation and the context of the relevant words may well be important.” Warby LJ then continued:

“The cases on “bare comment” do not lay down a rigid rule of law that requires a court to depart from this key principle, and artificially treat a statement of opinion as if it was a statement of fact. On the contrary. The authorities show that “bare comment” is a pointer, or guideline, or rule of thumb that reflects the key principle. The question is, would the words used strike the ordinary viewer as a statement of fact or opinion? The answer does not turn on whether any given word is an adjective, noun, or verb, or some other part of speech. This is a matter of substance, not a formal, analytical matter of grammar or linguistics. In practice, when someone uses a descriptive word without giving any detail of what he is describing, that will tend to come across as an allegation of fact. That is what the cases on “bare comment” say.”

16.

So, the law does not require the Court to treat an expression of opinion as a statement of fact merely because the statement does not give a clear account of what is being commented upon. That is just one factor to be considered when assessing whether the statement would be recognised as opinion by the reasonable reader. The requirement for an indication of the basis of the opinion is a separate and distinct matter, as I explain below.

17.

As was said in Millett at [17], “The statutory test refers to the “statement complained of”, not the meaning of that statement, or the imputation it conveys”. Nevertheless, it has become commonplace in cases involving mixed statements of fact and opinion for judges to formulate a meaning and underline those parts of it which are conveyed by way of opinion rather than fact. I see nothing wrong with this, so long as the fact/opinion question is answered by reference to the actual words and images that comprise the statement complained of and not some paraphrase of it. Indeed, the practice is positively helpful because, if the third stage in the honest opinion defence is reached (s3(4) of the 2013 Act), the Court will have to determine whether “an honest person could have held the opinion on the basis of (a) any fact which existed at the time the statement complained of was published…” (emphasis added). It is useful for the court and the parties to have a brief summary of the opinion (which may be expressed at length or derived from different parts of the statement complained of) when applying that test, just as it is useful to have a pithy summary of the factual allegations in a statement so that a defendant seeking to rely on a defence of truth (s2 of the 2013 Act) knows what “imputation” they must prove to be substantially true.

Indication of the basis of the opinion

18.

Section 3(3) of the 2013 Act requires a defendant to show that the statement indicated “whether in general or specific terms, the basis of the opinion”. It replicates the position at common law, which was aimed at giving a high level of protection to expressions of opinion: Butt at [28]-[33]. It is not an exacting test. What is required is an indication in terms that are either “general or specific” and the indication must be of “the basis” of the opinion (not e.g. of the specific facts on which the opinion is based). There is no requirement that the reader should be put in a position whereby they can judge for themselves whether the defendant’s opinion is merited. The breadth of the condition is illustrated by Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345: the three-word headline “Lower than Kemsley” was held to give a sufficient indication of the matter being commented upon, namely the standards of journalism in the claimant’s newspapers.

Defamatory at common law

19.

The concept of “defamatory at common law” was definitively summarised by Warby LJ in Millett at [9]:

“At common law, a meaning is defamatory and therefore actionable if it satisfies two requirements. The first, known as “the consensus requirement”, is that the meaning must be one that “tends to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally.” The judge has to determine “whether the behaviour or views that the offending statement attributes to a claimant are contrary to common, shared values of our society”: Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB); [2017] 4 WLR 68 at [51]. The second requirement is known as the “threshold of seriousness”. To be defamatory, the imputation must be one that would tend to have a “substantially adverse effect” on the way that people would treat the claimant: Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB);[2011] 1 WLR 1985 at [98] (Tugendhat J).”

The overall approach to a TPI in libel

20.

The Court of Appeal has recently reminded judges about the nature of our task when determining meaning in a libel action and the associated preliminary issues that typically arise:

“[…] any determination must be clear, unequivocal, and firmly tied to the purposes of rulings of this kind. These are to identify and spell out with precision one or more meanings or imputations about the claimant that meet the common law tests for what is defamatory and, where appropriate, to categorise the statement as factual or as an expression of opinion. Anything that falls short of meeting these criteria risks generating further disagreement and dispute.”

Hemming v Poulton [2025] EWCA Civ 1494 at [10] (Warby LJ)

The parties’ submissions

Claimant

21.

In his skeleton argument for the Claimant, Mr Owen-Thomas puts forward the following meaning for the First Review:

“The Claimant was a seriously poor and unreliable building contractor which had carried out very poor workmanship across almost every aspect of the Defendant’s project, had sought grossly excessive additional charges and, after promising in writing to correct its defective work, failed to do so, leaving the Defendant to spend thousands of pounds employing another contractor; it was therefore a company which prospective customers should not entrust with their building projects.”

22.

This formulation is significantly different from the meaning pleaded in the Particulars of Claim (not settled by Mr Owen-Thomas). However, I allowed him to advance it because no prejudice was caused to the Defendant. The position may well have been different if Mr Owen-Thomas’s formulation contained more serious allegations that the pleaded case but, in fact, the opposite is true: the pleaded meaning contained allegations of dishonesty which Mr Owen-Thomas (rightly in my view) has not included.

23.

Mr Owen-Thomas submits that his meaning arises naturally from the headline, the body of the review and the pictures. He says that the pictures in fact show work in progress, not completed work, but accepts that whether that is the case or not is for another day. He says the pictures are clearly being held out to the reader as illustrations of the poor workmanship referred to in the review. He says that the headline in particular broadens out the allegation against the Claimant to make a general critique of its competence and trustworthiness, not just a criticism of how it handled the specific project at the Defendant’s home.

24.

Mr Owen-Thomas accepts that there are elements of opinion, in particular the descriptions of the work as “terrible” and “shoddy” and the additional costs as “extortionate”, but he submits that there are also defamatory assertions of fact, in particular the allegation that the Claimant failed to honour the promise to pay for remedial work, causing the Defendant to incur thousands of pounds of costs. He accepts that the First Review sufficiently indicates the basis for the opinions it expresses and he submits that the First Review, in the meaning he ascribes to it, is clearly defamatory at common law, having a tendency to form a negative view of the Claimant’s competence and reliability and to avoid contracting with it.

25.

As for the Second Review, Mr Owen-Thomas again set out a meaning in his skeleton argument which is different from the Claimant’s pleaded case. Again, I permitted him to do so, for the same reasons. He submits that the Second Review bore the following meaning:

“The Claimant’s workmanship on the Defendant’s extension was seriously defective, requiring the Defendant to spend many thousands of pounds employing another contractor to put it right, and the Claimant was therefore a builder which prospective customers should not entrust with their building projects.”

26.

Again, he says this flows naturally from the headline and body of the Second Review. He submits that the headline – warning prospective customers off the Claimant, expands the criticism beyond the work done at the Defendant’s property to call into question the Claimant’s standards generally. He accepts that the words “poor workmanship” are a statement of opinion but contends that the statement “I have had to spend thousands of pounds maying someone else to correct their work” is a factual assertion that the work needed correcting and caused the Defendant to incur thousands of pounds of costs. Mr Owen-Thomas submits that Second Review does not sufficiently indicate the basis of the Defendant’s opinion that the Claimant’s workmanship was poor (because, in contradistinction to the First Review, no images are appended, other than the video of the man urinating). He again submits that the threshold for “defamatory at common law” is comfortably passed, given the tendency of such a review to deter readers from dealing with the Claimant.

Defendant

27.

The Defendant did not put forward a rival meaning for either of the Reviews. Rather, in both his Defence and his Notice of Case, he critiqued the Claimant’s pleaded meanings, admitting some aspects of them but denying others.

28.

In oral submissions (which were the first opportunity the Defendant had to address the Claimant’s new formulations in Mr Owen-Thomas’s skeleton) Mr Sheridan agreed with the new formulations to some extent but he took issue with the suggestion that the Reviews impugned the Claimant’s competence and reliability generally, submitting that the Defendant was confining his criticisms to what he observed in his own dealings with the Claimant. He also submitted that the warnings given to prospective customers in the headline for each Review were less stark than the Claimant submits, suggesting only that they should think twice before entrusting work to the Claimant.

29.

Mr Sheridan forcefully submitted that, insofar as the Reviews contained anything even arguably defamatory, those were entirely statements of the Defendant’s personal opinion and clearly indicated the basis for those opinions. He accepted that the assertions that the Defendant had spent thousands of pounds on corrective works were factual but submitted that these passages were not capable of being defamatory – simply flowing from the (possibly defamatory) statements of opinion about the quality of the Claimant’s work. He rather glossed over the allegation, in the First Review, about an unfulfilled promise.

30.

Mr Sheridan further submitted that Reviews did not pass the threshold to qualify as defamatory at common law. He submitted that, so far as material. they were recognisably opinion and that readers would be well aware that practically every business with an online presence will attract reviews from their customers which run the whole gamut from absolutely satisfied to completely dissatisfied. He asked, rhetorically what “behaviour or views” the Reviews were attributing to the Claimant which are “contrary to common, shared values of our society” (see the quote from Millett above) and he submitted that given the prevalence and range of online reviews, the statements complained of would not tend to have a “substantially adverse effect” on the way that people would treat the Claimant.

Decision and reasons

The First Review

31.

In my judgement, the answers to the questions posed to me in respect of the First Review are as follows:

(a)

The single natural and ordinary meaning of the First Review is:

“The Claimant did building work on the reviewer’s house, almost every aspect of which was of extremely poor quality, and charged additional costs which were grossly excessive. At the time of the review, the Claimant had failed to honour a written promise to pay for another contractor to carry out corrective work such that it was increasingly likely that the reviewer would need to take legal action to recover that sum from the Claimant. The Claimant should not be trusted to take on building projects for other customers.”;

(b)

The First Review contained statements of opinion, the opinions being those underlined above. In all other respects it was factual in nature;

(c)

The First Review indicated, at least in general terms, the basis of the opinions it conveyed, namely the work done by the Claimant at the Defendant’s home, the fact that the Claimant charged additional costs, and the fact that the Claimant had not yet honoured its promise to pay for corrective work;

(d)

The underlined words in the first sentence of the meaning set out above, and the entirety of the words in the second and third sentences are defamatory at common law.

32.

As can be seen, I agree with the Claimant that the review goes beyond criticising the specific work done for the Defendant and alleges incompetence and unreliability more generally. That comes from the headline. On the other hand, I agree with the Defendant that that wider attack on the Claimant’s qualities is presented as an opinion firmly rooted in the Defendant’s own experiences. There is no suggestion that it is based, e.g. on the experience of other customers. The headline is emphatic. It goes beyond merely inviting readers to “think twice” about engaging the Claimant.

33.

I do not agree with the Defendant that all the (arguably) defamatory imputations in the First Review are to be derived from those parts that are statements of opinion. The body of the Review starts with an expression of opinion that the work done was “terrible” and the additional costs “extortionate”, but it moves into the factual realm when stating that corrective work was undertaken at great cost and that the Claimant has failed to honour a promise to pay for it. These parts add substantially to the sting of the review. I do find, however, that the allegation of the unhonoured promise is less strong that the Claimant submits. Readers would understand that the Review was addressing a developing situation, with the possibility that the Claimant would eventually come good on its promise to pay for the corrective works. The suggestion that the Claimant would not do so without the intervention of a court was presented as the Defendant’s own personal assessment of the situation.

34.

I cannot accept the Defendant’s submissions that the First Review is not defamatory at common law. I can take judicial notice of the fact that domestic building work is often intrusive, disruptive, expensive, and a cause of great stress for the household concerned. Alleging that a contractor for such work has been incompetent and untrustworthy on one job to the extent that other potential customers should not engage them is clearly attributing to them “behaviour [which is] contrary to common, shared values of society” and would tend to have a “substantially adverse effect” on the way that potential customers would treat the Claimant. Likewise, the allegation of a (so far) dishonoured promise to pay for necessary corrective works. The facts that some elements of the First Review are recognisably opinion and that online reviews commonly express a range of views about a business do not negate its tendency to do substantial reputational harm. These are points that may have greater significance when the Court comes to consider the requirements of serious harm and serious financial loss at trial (Defamation Act 2013, s1).

The Second Review

35.

In my judgement, the answers to the questions posed to me in respect of the Second Review are as follows:

(a)

The single natural and ordinary meaning of the Second Review is:

“The Claimant attempted to build an extension at the reviewer’s home but its workmanship was poor in numerous respects. As a result the reviewer was obliged to spend thousands of pounds on corrective work. The Claimant should not be trusted to take on building projects for other customers”;

(b)

The Second Review contained statements of opinion, the opinions being those underlined above. In all other respects it was factual in nature;

(c)

The Second Review indicated, at least in general terms, the basis of the opinions it conveyed, namely the work done by the Claimant at the Defendant’s home;

(d)

The underlined words in the first sentence of the meaning set out above and the entirety of the second and third sentences were defamatory at common law.

36.

My reasons are similar to those in respect of the First Review. The body of the Second Review concerns the Claimant’s conduct in the Defendant’s own case but the headline broadens out the allegation to suggest general incompetence, albeit presented as a subjective inference from the Defendant’s experience in his own case.

37.

Whether the allegation of poor workmanship is one of fact or opinion is closer to the line in this instance, given that the Second Review does not set out images of the Claimant’s work which are being held up as the workmanship that is being commented upon. Nevertheless, given the context (a review by someone who has engaged the Claiamnt to do a specified job) I am satisfied that the poor workmanship allegation would be understood by a reasonable reader to be the writer’s own subjective evaluation of the Claimant’s work on his home rather than (e.g.) the reporting of an objective finding or established fact about the Claimant’s standards. I also consider that the words “this company attempted to build our extension” are sufficient to indicate the basis of that opinion for the purposes of s3(3) of the 2013 Act.

38.

As with the First Review, the initial expression of opinion about the quality of the work gives way to a factual assertion that it led to the Defendant incurring thousands of pounds to pay for corrective work. I therefore cannot agree with the Defendant that all the defamatory elements of the Second Review would strike the reasonable reader as expressions of opinion. The asserted fact that the Claimant’s work needed to be corrected at great cost emphasises the seriousness of the Claimant’s alleged shortcomings in a way that significantly intensifies the review’s harmful tendency. This factual element may well complicate the defence of this claim, but that cannot be a reason for me to depart from my task of determining how the review would strike the reasonable reader.

39.

As with the First Review, allegations of this sort cross the line into “defamatory at common law” notwithstanding that they are, in part, recognisably opinion and that businesses attract all manner of positive and negative reviews. Right-thinking people expect building contractors to be able to demonstrate competent workmanship and trust them to complete a job without the need to incur expensive corrective work. The “strong” recommendation, based on first-hand knowledge, that other customers should not engage the Claimant because of its poor workmanship, clearly has a tendency to have a substantially adverse effect on the way that reasonable people would treat the Claimant.

Conclusion

40.

I shall invite the parties to agree an Order recording my determinations and dealing with costs and other consequential matters. On costs, I draw the parties’ attention to Sharif v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2021] EWHC 343 (QB) at [41]-[47] where Nicklin J indicated that the usual order after a TPI of this nature should be costs in the case. Any party contending for a different costs order will need to explain why a departure from the usual course is justified. As to other consequential matters, the statements of case will need to be amended to reflect my rulings. Unless significant disputes arise about the terms of the necessary amendments, the case can then be returned to the assigned master for future case management.

41.

I would strongly encourage the parties to engage in mediation or other alternative dispute resolution. This Court sees a steady trickle of libel claims such as this but they can only represent the smallest minority of instances where customers post negative reviews about businesses online. That suggests that most businesses feel able to mitigate the effects of reviews they perceive to be unfair or inaccurate without resorting to litigation, for example by posting responses which rebut the criticisms or put them in context. The Claimant has every right to bring this claim (no one has suggested it is abusive in any way) and to seek to prove its case at trial. Nevertheless, it is somewhat dispiriting to see litigation of this sort in the High Court, which will doubtless generate significant legal costs that someone will have to pay.

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