Hamza Lakhany v Danyaal Hasan

I have provided my judgment in this matter (Lakhany v Hasan [2025] EWHC 3369 (KB)) and there are now arguments with respect to costs. I have seen written submissions from the defendant dated 23 January 2026 and the claimant’s response dated 31 January 2026. The claimant does not seek to suggest that he ought not pay the costs of the defendant in light of the contents of my judgment in this matter. The claimant’s concern is that the combination of seeking a costs order on the indemnity basis, combined with the size of the costs set out in the defendant’s costs schedule, means that the costs order will be very high. Even if I do grant costs on an indemnity basis, the claimant contends that should be on the basis that the costs are assessed if not agreed.

Of course the costs will need to be assessed, the issue is whether those costs are to be assessed on the indemnity or standard basis. As the hearing took less than a day then any assessment should take place summarily (44SC.2(b)).

The defendant seeks its costs on the indemnity basis and that those costs be assessed to the full amount claimant, namely £40,581.00. Even if assessed on the standard basis, the defendant seeks the full sum of costs claimed in the sum of £40,581.00, which are the costs of the entire discharge application – the hearing which took place before me on 28 November 2025 being the adjourned hearing from HHJ Bever on 8 October 2025.

In order for costs to be awarded on the indemnity basis, there must be some circumstance or conduct which take the case “out of the norm” (Excelsior Commercial and Industrial Holdings Limited v Salisbury Hamer Aspden & Johnson [2002] EWCA Civ 879).

It is clear to me that the circumstances of this application and the conduct of the claimant were “out of the norm” so that the appropriate assessment of costs should be on the indemnity rather than the standard basis.

As I set out in my judgment on the application to discharge the injunction it is worth remembering the words of Mann J. in JSC Mezhdunarodniv Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2014] EWHC 4336 (Ch), where he said the following:

“What one has to do is to acknowledge the seriousness of the consequences of a freezing order; and the invasion of liberty that it involves (especially bearing in mind it is usually sought in a without notice application) and to reflect that in requiring proof to an appropriately high standard. Orders are not to be lightly sought and will not be granted on flimsy evidence. The requirement to demonstrate a risk of dissipation is a lot more than formal.”

In this case the height of the claimant’s case is that there was some activity about the sale of a property at 124 Old Park Ridings in May 2025 (leading to an application being made more than 4 weeks after that activity and not coming before the court until approximately 8 weeks later). There was therefore considerable delay (which concerned Calver J. who had the initial application listed before him), the property was not in the control of the defendant in any way, and the defendant had notified the claimant of his address was in Pakistan in December 2024.

While the claimant now seeks to suggest that he did not know that the claimant had moved to Pakistan in December 2024 the email stating that his “new address” was an address in Pakistan could not really be read other than he had moved there. Representations were made to the Judge on behalf of the claimant which suggested that there should be a concern that the defendant had left for Pakistan in or around March 2025 and that this had been “discovered”. That is not the same as informing the court that it was uncertain whether he had moved to Pakistan in December 2024 when he had said his new address was in Pakistan. Not only could this easily have created a false impression or suspicion that the defendant was in some way seeking to avoid the consequences of any adverse judgment by removing himself from the jurisdiction, it being suggested in the skeleton argument presented to Calver J for the hearing on 27 June 2025, it does appear that the claimant deliberately failed to mention the December 2024 email or that the defendant had been transparent in informing the claimant of his move.

With respect to the dealings with 124 Old Park Ridings, the information with respect to the property at 124 Old Park Ridings not being in the control of the defendant – either in his own name or as majority shareholder of OPR – was available publicly at Companies House. That was not brought to the Judge’s attention by the claimant. The defendant was not able to dissipate assets as LPA receivers had been appointed and the property itself was not owned by the defendant.

The claimant has acknowledged that in the circumstances of this application being made without notice and then adjourned, there is an obligation for full and frank disclosure. That duty was not complied with.

It was unreasonable for the claimant to bring an application before Calver J without notice to the defendant. There was a failure to comply with the duty of full and frank disclosure. Both of these matters are serious faults which interfere with the administration of justice and there are numerous authorities to support a costs order being made on the indemnity basis in these circumstances. Each are on their own facts but fundamentally are concerned as to whether the behaviour takes the case “out of the norm”. In Frances v Al Assad [2007] EWHC 2422 (Ch), Henderson J (as he then was) set out that he found the application had been made without notice, that it suffered from severe procedural flaws and that the duty of full and frank disclosure was breached in two respects. In PHLO Technologies Limited v Tallaght Financial Limited (T/a Cubefunder) [2025] EWHC 1405 (Ch), indemnity costs were ordered to be paid where there had been material non-disclosure: “the right way to express the court’s disapproval of the failure to give short notice and what I have held to be material, albeit not deliberate non-disclosure, is through an order for indemnity costs in favour of [the Defendant] in relation to the first two hearings.” In Mex Group Worldwide Limited v Ford & Ors [2023] EWHC 3394 (KB), the order for indemnity costs was made because of the “fundamental matter” of the claimant’s breach of its duty of full and frank disclosure.

In this matter, the breaches which make the application “out of the norm” are numerous and are set out in the main judgment:

In all the circumstances, and for the reasons set out in the judgment, the appropriate order is for costs to be awarded on the indemnity basis. The consequence of such an assessment is that the court will resolve any doubt which it may have as to whether costs were reasonably incurred or were reasonable in amount in favour of the receiving party (CPR 44.3(3)).

Having considered the statement of costs, I resolve doubts in favour of the defendant. However, I do consider that overall the fee charged for Counsel attending the two hearings is not reasonable. I appreciate that there was considerable work in supporting the application to discharge the injunction and, in the circumstances, I award £18,000 over the two hearings.

There is no claim for VAT and in those circumstances the appropriate figure is £35,581.00 to be paid within 14 days of the date of the order.