Alex Kenneth Snowball v Chief Constable of Thames Valley & Ors

This claim seeks redress in a sum exceeding £22M, for various perceived acts and failures by 9 public bodies over more than 13 years, such acts and omissions said principally to have been instigated by the 1st Defendant, Thames Valley Police (“TVP”). It is alleged that TVP has also orchestrated campaigns of harassment and other violations against the Claimant and his business activities by other public bodies, including by way of unlawful conspiracy. The Claimant, who represents himself, describes his life before the “campaigns” began; he was Grammar School educated, studied A- level law, and went on to own/manage various businesses, notably being a director of a property development company which he set up with his brother, and an owner of a store trading in second-hand goods, as well as a private landlord. He asserts he had built up a valuable personal collection of high end watches (valued at around £200,000), jewellery, (valued at around £1.4M intended as a retirement fund), antiques and bitcoins said to be worth around £7.5million and but says that these items have now been lost after he asserts he had to leave High Wycombe in 2018, for fear of his own personal safety. He says he had promising personal relationship prospects with a named individual whom he hoped to marry. In contrast now, he asserts that following sustained periods of alleged “campaigns” against him, he continues to live in fear for his personal safety and is homeless. He has not worked for many years in a paid capacity, but has been spending a great deal of time pursuing complaints and litigation. He believes his personal and business reputation has been deliberately smeared by suggestions of criminality, within his community. It is a sad picture.

The picture is rather obscured at times by the Claimant’s use, within pleadings, of colourful generic language and personal opinions to describe the actions he regards as wrongful, for example as set out at paragraph [12] of the Particulars of Claim (“the Particulars”), “Holistically it will be averred that authorities have a proclivity to exhibit fascist mannerisms, in doing so they have viscerally pursued [the Claimant], blinded in their arrogance and infatuated with the lust of dominion in asserting its tyrannical rule through the use of its oppressive abuse of power in total disregard to the protections afforded by the equally corruptible or inept bodies which purport to govern the proper conduct of these authorities..”

The claim is further obscured by its length (almost 50 pages of close typed pleading), lack of continuous number sequencing, overlap between different elements of the various claims made and alleged breaches by the multiple Defendants, in addition to the almost text book index style list of alleged causes of action and remedies sought, which are not readily applied to the facts said to give rise to the claims. This problem is well illustrated by an extract from paragraph 15 of the “Particulars of General Special Specific Damage” (“the Damages section”) which reads, “The main part of the damages are lumped together but relate to harassment, undue influence, unreasonable duress, conspiracy, defamation, false imprisonment, (including during the search warrant in 2011), breach of fiduciary duty, trespass, misuse of personal information, intentional infliction of emotional distress, stalking, torture, malfeasance, non-feasance, misfeasance, fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligence and all other issues relevant to the case. This makes up the bulk of the claim and I do not believe £5,000,000 is unreasonable …”

Although the Claimant, at various points in his Particulars, cites wrongdoing against other family members, the Claim is issued in his name alone and for that reason I will confine my decisions to claims brought by the Claimant for his personal redress only. In reaching that decision, I am fully aware of the Claimant’s arguments, notably set out in his witness statement dated 4th April 2025 at paragraph 30, where he accepts that normally he could not claim losses suffered by his family, but in this instance he believes TVP “deliberately engineered” to target his family and those with whom he had any association, so that normal rules should not apply. He did not rely upon any authority in this regard. It is a basic rule of pleading that those who have suffered losses with a remedy in law should be named as additional claimants. I do not believe there is any sound legal basis to allow claims for losses suffered by parties other than the Claimant within my consideration. Separately, the Claimant asserts there has been a breach of his human right to private family life; I will deal with that particular aspect when considering other human rights complaints.

The Defendants who have responded deny all allegations; the 7^th Defendant served a Defence. The others, excepting the Valuation Office Agency, have merely issued strike-out /summary judgment applications. Three of the Defendants were listed in a different order on the Claim Form compared to the Particulars, so I am adopting the same approach as counsel, in using the order on the Claim Form. I should be clear that by the time of the hearing the 7th and 9th Defendants were no longer parties, claims against them having been withdrawn/dismissed, and the 4th Defendant has not responded at all. I have asked for a certificate of service of proceedings upon them.

Opposition to the claims includes assertions that the claims are incomprehensible, poorly drafted, not well-founded in law and that a number of the claims have already been complained about and litigated in other courts: it is said that the Claimant is a serial litigant; some Defendants describe his claims as vexatious. A further complaint about the alleged facts, it was submitted, is that they are, “prolix, highly discursive, vague and nonlinear in narrative” which makes them impossible to comprehend.

The Defendants also do not understand why they have all been joined into one action as they say they are not jointly and severally liable in law for any of the acts complained of. The Particulars assert that, “TVP form the primary antagonists whilst the other defendants have been involved through their compliant nature and have aligned themselves with the same style of misconduct incidentally, deliberately or otherwise” at [13]. The Claimant sought to explain that all of the actions of the Defendants are so interlinked that they are inseparable. He relied on a common law principle of “joint enterprise” although I need to be plain from the outset that that is a criminal, rather than civil law concept, and therefore is not one that can be properly pursued before this Court. There is also passing reference to unlawful means conspiracy which I will deal with later.

The matter originally came before me for a 2-day hearing in March, but due to various procedural irregularities I used that opportunity to give directions instead. The October hearing was a relisting of the original applications.

There are 6 outstanding applications by the Defendants. As set out above, the applications all seek to strike out the claims and /or summary judgment in favour of the Defendants. They seek to rely not only upon Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”) governing strike out and summary judgment, but also upon the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to strike out claims that are abusive, because they are perceived to be vexatious or seek to pursue “an ulterior purpose unrelated to the subject matter of the litigation” as per Bridge LJ in Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd [1977] 1 W.L.R. 478CA. An additional element of abuse, it was submitted arises from the Claimant’s failure to send pre-action letters of claim. The Defendants rely upon Cable v Liverpool Victoria Insurance [2020] 4 W.L.R. 110 in this regard, where the Court of Appeal confirmed that instances of abuse can relate to the pre-action period. I note that the Claimant’s skeleton argument asserts that he has attempted to “resolve issues lawfully by pursuing the relevant complaints processes”. He says he has been thwarted in those endeavours by failures to adequately investigate claims, withholding of information and active misleading of other courts, and says the wrongful activity extends to pursuing malicious prosecutions against him too. He submits that the effect of elongated complaints procedures resulted in the necessity to issue proceedings, without further embarking in pre-action correspondence under protocols to avoid being out of time.

The Claimant brought an application, following my Order dated 10^th March 2025, to amend his Particulars. In fact, the revised Particulars filed on 3^rd April 2025 were a wholesale redraft, not dissimilar in length to the existing Particulars. I dismissed that application, with reasons, at the hearing so I will say no more about it.

The Claimant’s other application, for default judgment against the 6^th Defendant, HWBIDCO, was filed after that Defendant’s Acknowledgement of Service had been filed, and a strike out application had been issued, so I had no jurisdiction to entertain it.

Pursuant to CPR 3.4 (2) the Court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the Court:

The notes to the White Book make it plain at 3.4.2 that a claim should not be struck out unless the Court is certain it is bound to fail. In such unwinnable cases the continuance of the proceedings is without any possible benefit to the respondent and would waste costs on both sides (Harris v Bolt Burdon [2000] C.P. Rep.70. Similar guidance was provided by Potter LJ in Wragg v Partco Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 594. Within the Practice Direction there are examples of cases where the Court may conclude that the Particulars disclose no reasonable grounds because they set out no facts indicating what the claim is about or they are incoherent, alternatively despite a coherent set of facts, those facts even if true do not disclose a legally recognisable claim (Price Meats Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc [2000] 2 All E. R. (Comm) 346 Ch).

As to what is an abuse of process, at 3.4.3 in the White Book the notes record that there is no clear definition, and the scope is wide, but if any abuse can be addressed by less draconian methods than a strike-out, then the other option should be taken.

When considering strike-out on grounds of abuse, a two-stage test should be applied as set out in Asturion Foundation v Alibrahim [2020] EWCA Civ 32 at [ 63]: “First the court has to determine whether the claimant’s conduct was an abuse of process. Secondly, if it was, the court has to exercise its discretion as to whether or not to strike out the claim.. It is at that second stage that the usual balancing exercise, and in particular considerations of proportionality, becomes relevant.”

Pursuant to CPR 24.2 the Court may give summary judgment on the whole of a claim or a particular issue if it considers that:

Summary judgment applications are useful where there is a short point of law or construction which can adequately be addressed in argument without a fuller investigation into the facts, because there are no reasonable grounds for believing they would add to, or alter the evidence available to a trial judge, and thereby affect the outcome of the case.

The decision in Burnford v Automobile Association Developments Ltd, BL-2021-000731 provides some assistance on the question of overlap between a summary judgment application and whether a Defendant failing to prove grounds for summary judgment must necessarily fail on its strike out application too. HHJ Paul Matthews said at [20], when comparing and contrasting the two types of application, “These two methods of summarily disposing of a claim without a trial are frequently combined in the same application, as in this case. But it is clear that an application under rule 3.4 is not one for summary judgment: see eg Dellal v Dellal [2015] EWHC 907(Fam). It is generally concerned with matters of law or practice, rather than with the strength or weakness of the evidence. So on an application to strike out, the court usually approaches the question on the assumption (but it is only an assumption, for the sake of the argument) that the respondent will be able at the trial in due course to prove its factual allegations. On the other hand, on an application for summary judgment, the court is concerned to assess the strength of the case put forward: does the respondent's case get over the (low) threshold of “real prospect of success”? If it does not, then, unless there is some other compelling reason for a trial, the court will give a summary judgment for the applicant”.

At [21] the judge continued, by reference to the judgment of Coulson LJ in Begum v Maran (UK) Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 326 at [20] “in a case like this (where the striking-out is based on the nature of the pleading, not a failure to comply with an order), there is no difference between the test to be applied by the court under the two rules”. Then continuing at [21], “accordingly, I do not agree with the judge’s observation at [4] that somehow the test under r.24.2 is “less onerous from a defendant’s perspective”. In a case of this kind, the rules should be taken together, and a common test applied. If a defendant is entitled to summary judgment because the claimant has no realistic prospect of success, then the statement of claim discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim and should be struck out: see Global Asset Capital Inc v Aabar Block SARL [2017] EWCA Civ 37…”.

Coulson LJ continued at [22] “As to the applicable test itself:

On the latter point I am also mindful of the decision in Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Company 100 Ltd [2007] FSR 63, where similarly the Court determined that it should hesitate about making a final decision without trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, but where there are reasonable grounds for believing a fuller investigation into the facts would add to, or alter, the evidence available to a trial judge and therefore affect the outcome of the case.

It is helpful to record one of the other key principles to be applied on summary judgment, as set out by Lewison J, as he then was, in Easyair Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) at [15 vii)] “… it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent's case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant's case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 725”.

Finally, it is important to remember that the evidential burden is on the applicant to establish that there are grounds to believe there is no real prospect of success and no other compelling reason for trial. It is only when the applicant has produced evidence which is credible to support the application, that the respondent becomes subject to the evidential burden of proving the opposite.

For completeness sake, I will mention the submission of counsel for the Defendants, that whilst some latitude may be given to a litigant in person, they are still to be held to the same standard as a represented party, in their conduct of the litigation. Notably the Court does not usually permit a lower standard of compliance with rules or orders. I do not believe that principle is in any doubt, arising as it does from a decision of the Supreme Court in Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC12, where the Court held that a litigant in person’s failure to issue a Claim Form in accordance with the rules of Court, resulted in him being statute barred from bringing the claim at all. It is hard to imagine a more drastic outcome for a failure to comply with the CPR, therefore emphasising starkly the responsibility of an unrepresented party to comply with rules of Court, or face the ultimate sanction for his failure so to do. The decision also makes clear that the type of allowance a Court may justify, relates to case management decisions and conduct in hearings rather than court rules or orders themselves.

No precise chronology was provided but some of the key events I have managed to glean from the extensive hearing bundle are recorded in the Table below.

Counsel helpfully grouped the various claims brought against TVP into broad categories and I will deal with each of them in turn.

The Claimant asserts that on occasions when he has sought the assistance of TVP to investigate goods brought to his store which he believes are stolen, TVP has instead chosen to accuse him of dealing in stolen goods and on occasion has issued personal threats or sought to prosecute him. I refer to specific incidents contained in the Chronology above but also to specific incidents in the Particulars involving the Claimant:

The First Defendant aside from relying upon the vagueness of the facts relied upon, their historic nature beyond usual limitation periods, the lack of compliant pre-action protocol correspondence, even more importantly to my mind, relies upon the lack of an identifiable legal basis to pursue a claim for breach of duty to investigate.

The First Defendant cites 2 Supreme Court cases where it has been determined that (i) there is no private law duty on the police to either exercise reasonable care to safeguard victims or potential victims of crime or criminal activity by a third party (Michael v the Chief Constable of South Wales Police and another [2015] UKSC 2 (“Michael”)) and (ii) there is no private law claim against the police for a failure to act (Robinson v the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2018] AC 736 (“Robinson”)). The First Defendant also identified that those determinations have even more recently been upheld by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal in Tindall v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2024] UKSC 33 and Woodcock v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police [2025] EWCA Civ 13.

The Claimant in his witness statement dated 4th of April 2025, issued in response to the application, accepts at paragraph 27 that “normally” there is no duty to investigate crime, but he says the chain of events involving unlawful conduct by TVP means he is unable to separate out losses relating solely to such a failure, from other losses caused by wrongful acts or omissions of TVP.

In response to TVP’s submission that the pre-action protocol should have been followed, I have already set out at paragraph 9 above that the Claimant references various complaints measures which he has been following for several years and, at paragraph 14 of his witness statement, says that the delays caused in the processing of the complaints meant he could not pursue the pre-action protocol as well, otherwise he would have fallen foul of various time limits for issuing the civil claim in court. His position is that the First Defendant is not taken by surprise by the allegations, and has therefore not been prejudiced and has had every opportunity to deal with matters outside the court process. I am aware from the hearing bundle that the final investigation report from TVP was received by the Claimant on 18^th March 2024 (page 541) and there were other complaints raised going back several years in the bundle. The Claim Form was received at this Court for issue on 13^th March 2024.

I agree with the First Defendant that as it is well established that there is no general duty at common law giving rise to a private law claim against the police for a failure to act, those paragraphs of the Particulars of Claim relying upon any such alleged failures must be struck, out as they are unrecognisable in English law as valid causes of action. There is no need to consider further the other grounds relied upon by the First Defendant for a strike out of such claims, as I am bound by the authorities produced to me. The Claimant may wish the law was otherwise, but it is a futile exercise to continue to argue that point of view when the law is certain. Where he seeks to rely upon some of the facts alleged as examples of alleged harassment by TVP, that cause of action will be considered below.

The Particulars cite an undated incident when PC Voight “threw” the Claimant “to the floor” and “violently detained” him, apparently for attempting to evade him, although it is pleaded that initially PC Voight stated he believed the Claimant had “just broken into cars or houses”, which later was changed to a “history of handling stolen goods”. The Claimant asserts in his pleading that the incident was investigated but that the quality of the investigation was very poor indeed, and did not even include a conversation with the officer concerned, and there was subsequent destruction of evidence such as the body worn footage.

The Claimant attempted to explain the pleading further during the course of oral submissions, and said he was would be relying upon a mobile telephone recording of the incident at the time of the assault. He offered to play the recording during the course of the hearing, but as the Court was concerned with the pleading of relevant facts, and the identification of relevant causes of action, rather than assessing evidence that could be made available at a later time, the recording was not played.

The Claimant included various documents in the hearing bundle providing further detail surrounding the alleged incident, including his online complaint form at pages 709-715 of the hearing bundle which provides the incident date as 6^th May 2021, explains that the injuries sustained were “a worsening of my previous condition of a sprained ankle” and “mental health issues which have been heightened as a result of the assault”. The incident is fairly succinctly summarised as one where a police car drove past the Claimant in the early hours of the morning and attempted to gain the Claimant’s attention; when it did so the Claimant perceived that the officer was aggressive, so he proceeded to dial 999 and continue walking down the road and explained to the call handler what was happening whereupon he states he was “thrown about by the police. During these events I am thrown into a bush and then Judo thrown onto the floor.” He goes on to say he did not attempt to resist officers at any time, but says “When I am on the floor I have the officer violently twist my arms and apply handcuffs”. He says after that the officer tried to justify his actions with varying reasons, and then the officer took the personal laptop which he has been carrying, on the basis it was evidence of a stolen laptop. During a later officer search he says he was unable to stand up by himself “due to the injuries that he caused which I now know to be a high ankle sprain on my right foot.”

In a witness statement dated 4th April 2025 the Claimant says at page 244 of the hearing bundle, “TVP state that PC Voight battered me because I attempted to run, hide and evade him. This is a lie, I think victim blaming like this should be illegal yet I knew before I made a complaint that the outcome was pre-ordained because the level of corruption is so entrenched it's impossible to unravel.” Earlier in the statement the Claimant says he has been unable to obtain a medical report due to lack of legal representation and funds but he does not consider it would be fair to strike out the claim due to that omission.

Within the bundle there are some documents pertaining to the Claimant’s complaint to the Professional Standards Department of TVP, and the outcome dated 4th of August 2021, which briefly indicates that the Investigating Officer considered the Claimant was being elusive, whereupon PC Voight and his colleague decided to exercise their powers under Section 1 PACE, Stop and Search, and that during the process of detaining and handcuffing the Claimant he “ dropped to the floor and called 999 claiming that he was being attacked by police”. The call recording was reviewed, during which the Claimant was heard to be calm at first and then to scream and shout claiming he was being restrained for no reason. Unusually perhaps, it was recorded “There was no other person or noise in the background ” which is hard to comprehend if the police were communicating in any way verbally to the Claimant, especially as the call was reported to have lasted for two minutes and 12 seconds. The Investigating Officer said the amount of force used was reasonable and proportionate, and that there were lawful grounds for stop and search to have been deployed.

Additional documents in the bundle at pages 642 –673 include correspondence from the Claimant’s father stating he had full authority to represent his son who had poor mental health at the time, and requesting a review of the outcome of the Professional Standards Department investigation. This contains further detail as to the events surrounding the alleged assault. The documents are dated as sent 9th October 2021 and were submitted to the OPCC complaint reviews team, but apparently could not be processed by them as there had been no supporting evidence to indicate a criminal offence. It appears that the Claimant was thereafter advised that there was no other option available than to seek legal advice about a judicial review.

In oral submissions the Claimant indicated he considered that the use of force against him was unlawful and provided reasons, but that level of detail is not contained within the current version of the Particulars, although it seems implicit from his choice of wording, set out above . No further detail was provided about the false imprisonment claim, following the alleged assault, in submissions.

The First Defendant sought a strike out of the serious allegation of assault on a number of bases, including the failure to plead why the actions amounted to an assault, the lack of detail (such as incident date), explanation or generally coherent history as to why the Defendant should be liable for the individual officer’s alleged actions. The First Defendant submitted that the Claimant should have made it plain whether the alleged unlawfulness of the actions complained of related to the fact of the arrest itself, or whether it was an allegation of use of unreasonable force. It was suggested that the claim may be time barred if it is one for personal injury, although if it was such a claim, it was pointed out that there is no medical report on condition and prognosis for any alleged injuries sustained, as required by the CPR.

Similar to the Claimant’s submissions on this incident generally, there were also no additional submissions from the Defendant around the false imprisonment claim.

Assault is defined in Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 24^th edition published 2023 (“ Clerk and Lindsell”) at 14-12 as ““An act which causes another person to apprehend the infliction of immediate, unlawful, force on his person.” The defendant’s act must also be coupled with the capacity of carrying the intention to commit a battery into effect…Threats and vile abuse per se do not constitute a tortious assault …Accordingly, the claim for harassment created by the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 may in many cases, offer the claimant a more favourable remedy than that of assault.”

I do not need to repeat some of the possible defences to a claim for assault, which were set out in submissions, but the First Defendant has not yet served a Defence backed by a statement of truth. Once a Claimant establishes a prima facie assault, the burden shifts to the Defendant to establish the defence. Similarly, limitation is a defence.

False imprisonment is defined as the unlawful imposition of constraint on another's freedom of movement from a particular place, as derived from Collins v Wilcock 1984 1 W.L.R. 1172 at paragraph 1178. Therefore to satisfy this particular tort, there needs to be not only physical restriction of movement, but also an intention (or reckless disregard) to detain the Claimant i.e. without an honest and reasonable belief that they had the authority so to do.

I agree with the First Defendant that the pleading lacks clarity in its current form concerning the alleged assault, but I cannot conclude either that it is bound to fail, nor find that it is an abuse of process to allow the claim to proceed. There are documents in the bundle which have been in TVP’s possession for some years now, indicating the precise nature and date of the allegations concerning the incident with PC Voight on 6^th May 2021, and it is plain that the claim was not time barred (under any 3-year time limit for personal injury as submitted or otherwise) when the claim was issued on 2nd April 2024, the Claim Form having been received by the Court on 13th March 2024.

As I indicated at paragraph 21b) above, it is not my responsibility at this stage to conduct a mini-trial; however there is sufficient material before me to conclude that any defects in the pleading should not be sanctioned by the draconian measure of a strike-out, although the pleading should be amended, in a tight timescale, so that it is confined to relevant matters to which the First Defendant can sensibly respond in a way which does not require a disproportionate amount of work.

I also note that by way of clarification, in oral submissions, the Claimant stated his claim was for assault, not personal injury per se, and confirmed his injuries are contained in various medical records. Strictly speaking, the Practice Direction upon which the Defendant relied (CPR PD16.4) requires a medical report to be provided with the Particulars, ifit is intended to be relied upon, so it does not preclude injury claims progressing without a medical report, even though the quality of the evidence to be placed before the Court may not be as good.

If the Claimant wishes to continue with his claim for false imprisonment arising from the detention following the alleged assault of PC Voight, a matter on which I was not directly addressed by either party, but which forms the substance of the pleading at paragraph 4 on page 33, and paragraph 12 on page 43, of the Particulars, and which is clearly interlinked with the assault complained of, that claim needs to be more clearly set out in an amended pleading, within a strict final timetable which I will set out in a directions order, before TVP can be sensibly asked to respond to it in their Defence. This is because that claim is not, at this stage, sufficiently incomprehensible to justify being struck out. Strike out is a sanction of last resort; I cannot say that part of the case is bound to fail, but equally it should not be construed that this claim will necessarily continue the full path to trial; it is simply too early to say, as the defects in the current pleading may be capable of correction.

The claim for damages and an injunction for protection from alleged harassment is scattered through many paragraphs of the Particulars. The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (“the Act”) is set out in some detail towards the end of the Particulars but it is not specifically applied to earlier sections by definitively linking the requirements under the Act to perceived factual examples of conduct said to amount to harassment.

In answer to challenges about the application of the Act during oral submissions the Claimant responded that he is claiming remedies at common law for harassment also. He has not set out the components for such a tort.

An overview of the various allegations can be taken from paragraph 4 of the Particulars. At [4] it is stated that, “TVP started this conduct around 2007 with TVP officers accusing [the Claimant, his brother and father] or a combination of them with dealing in stolen items. This belief has continued through the years with the police deploying a variety of methods in order to deter the perceived unlawful conduct. The conduct each year has become increasingly aggressive”. I have listed some of those alleged “methods” such as threats of prosecution in the Chronology above.

Within the Damages section on page 49 of the hearing bundle (also page 40 of the Particulars), a broad overview of the economic losses of Snowies, said to be caused by the alleged harassment is set out, “The unlawful conduct of defendants was sufficient to intimidate and unsettle staff, customers and other stakeholders. This led to competent staff leaving, customers going elsewhere, unrest with suppliers, contractors, and other stakeholders”.

Personal losses of the Claimant relating to his physical and mental health said to arise due to the harassment, includes amongst other claims lumped together within the Damages section, injury to feelings by reference to the Vento Guidelines (at paragraph 4), stress said to result in hair loss (at paragraph 5), a “further serious” decline in physical health (at paragraph 6) which the Claimant acknowledges will need to be determined by experts but the resulting issues are listed as “being unable to walk without pain and unable to perform simple tasks such as make a cup of tea due to the pains, frequent heart palpitations, dizziness, vertigo, muscle spasms, constant fevers and more”. At a number of points in the Particulars the Claimant expresses his fear for his own personal safety and that of his family (for example, see paragraph 2 on page 5 of the Particulars). He also asserts the harassment has made him feel “suicidal”, (paragraph 9 on page 7 of the Particulars).

Whilst a number of the causes of action set out in the Particulars tend to overlap, the main allegations of harassment appear to relate principally to the following pleaded events:

In his witness statement dated 4th April 2025 in response to the application, the Claimant asserts at paragraph 20 that three serving TVP officers have admitted to harassing the Claimant, and these are identified as an Inspector, a PC and a Sergeant. He goes on to assert at paragraph 54 that TVP is the body holding all the information on the campaigns of harassment, (the information he held on his laptop allegedly having been deleted by police, after its seizure), although he says that the 2018 campaign has been well documented by him also. The Claimant believes he can establish that TVP has engaged in a continuing course of conduct over many years which amounts to harassment with multiple events.

At page 671 of the hearing bundle there's a copy letter dated 7th September 2021, written to the Professional Standards Department of TVP, by the Claimant's father, but countersigned by the Claimant, in which he states “During the 18 months he was away, the police did not have occasion to enter the store on a single occasion, yet before he left it could be and often was, anything up to 20 times a day…. within three weeks of his return the police again entered his property and seized the business’s computer….”

The Claimant’s documents within the hearing bundle include at pages 722 and 723, notes relating to a Neighbourhood Action Group meeting between the police, local councillors and others on 8^th November 2018 at which the Claimant was not present, but according to the transcript the police admitted to “ruffling” the Claimant and a “tactic” of “harassing” him. Additionally there are references to Snowies “taking stolen goods” and the owner “financing their lifestyle through selling stolen property”.

The First Defendant argues that the Act has strict requirements as to the elements of the statutory duty which must be clearly set out and satisfied within Particulars, failing which it cannot be entertained by the Court. They further maintain that those elements are not sufficiently addressed, thus satisfying the threshold for a strike out. They argue, for example, that the issue of vicarious liability has not been dealt with, and if it is maintained that the officers allegedly concerned were acting in the course of their duties or not. Furthermore that many of the acts complained of appeared to be against the customers of Snowies, rather than the Claimant himself.

TVP also advanced their application on the basis that the conduct complained of, in relation to the harassment claim, even if the Particulars were amended to include the matters submitted orally by the Claimant at the hearing, is nowhere serious enough to meet the required threshold set out, obiter, by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in the House of Lords in Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34 and then advanced as ratio, by the Court of Appeal in Conn v The Council of the City of Sunderland [2007] EWCA Civ 1492 (“Conn”). That threshold requires untoward conduct of such gravity as to require sanction in criminal law, albeit that the claim can be made in civil proceedings. At [12] in the Conn judgment, it was held that conduct which “crosses the boundary between unattractive and even unreasonable conduct and conduct which is oppressive and unacceptable, may well depend on the context in which the conduct occurs. What might not be harassment on the factory floor or in the barrack room might well be harassment in the hospital ward and vice versa. In my judgment the touchstone for recognising what is not harassment for the purposes of Sections 1 and 3 will be whether the conduct is of such gravity as to justify the sanctions of the criminal law”.

It was also argued for TVP that section 1(3) of the Act provides a defence to a harassment claim where the course of conduct complained of is for the prevention or detection of crime, such that the Shop Watch programme complained of in 2018 would clearly fall within that territory.

It was also submitted for TVP that there is no good reason for dates not to have been supplied for all the acts complained of. However, as alluded to above, the Claimant has stated that his personal laptop seized by PC Voight during his arrest in 2021 (see paragraph 55 above) contained all his records, and that when it was finally returned to him, his data had been erased. The Claimant also asserts that the search warrant executed on 27^th May 2021 resulted in loss of further records from Snowies. The Claimant not only made oral submissions about this before me, but he also signed a statement of truth on his Particulars, where this is referenced at paragraph 14 on page 7, and at paragraph 24 on page 9. The Claimant has given this account previously to the police in complaints correspondence exhibited at page 545 in the hearing bundle. It is not my function today to make findings of fact on that evidence, but I do take the explanation provided into account when reaching my conclusions.

The Act does not define what harassment is although it will include alarming the person, or causing the person distress. In Thomas v News Group Newspapers [2001] EWCA Civ 1233 (“Thomas”) at paragraph 30, harassment was described as “a persistent and deliberate course of unreasonable and oppressive conduct, targeted at another person, which is calculated to and does cause that person alarm, fear or distress”. That case also highlighted that it is the course of conduct which is to be considered by a Court to see if it has the quality of harassment rather than each individual act. The standard applied by the Act is objective and a Defendant will be taken to have known his conduct amounts to or involves harassment “if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to or involved harassment of the other” (section 1(2)). As the author in Clerk and Lindsell points out at paragraph14-20, “ the relationship between the gravity of the crime and its tortious equivalent is not a precise one since a tort action may lie even though the facts would not persuade a prosecuting authority to pursue the case criminally”, such sentiment being sourced from a judgment of the Court of Appeal in 2009.

A Court will look at conduct as a whole to assess whether it crosses the boundary from a heavy-handed response to one which is oppressive and unacceptable, as for example in Worthington v Metropolitan Housing Trust Limited [2018] EWCA Civ 1125. In 2010 a helpful summary of what must be proved, in order for a claim in harassment to succeed, was set out in by Simon J in Dowson v Chief Constable of Northumbria [2010] EWHC 2612 (QB) (“Dowson”) at paragraph 142:

“ (1) There must be conduct which occurs on at least two occasions,

(2)

which is targeted at the claimant,

(3)

which is calculated in an objective sense to cause alarm or distress, and

(4)

which is objectively judged to be oppressive and unacceptable.

(5)

What is oppressive and unacceptable may depend on the social or working context in which the conduct occurs.

(6)

A line is to be drawn between conduct which is unattractive and unreasonable, and conduct which has been described in various ways: “torment” of the victim, “of an order which would sustain criminal liability”.”

As to a tort of harassment at common law, the Court of Appeal in Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721 effectively ruled out the prospect of the development of such a tort following the Act, such a tort not having been recognised prior to the Act (see Clerk and Lindsell at 14-18).

I agree as a statement of principle, with the First Defendant’s submission that it is not enough for the Claimant to simply list facts and say to the Defendant that they should work out what the express wrongs are said to be in accordance with the law, so that they can then respond adequately to the allegations in their Defence. The current structure of the Particulars is unhelpful and difficult to navigate, as it provides some factual assertions in the earlier pages, and then in the final pages provides legal definitions without applying them in detail to all the earlier stated facts. This needs to be remedied, but I do not find the current content concerning alleged harassment to be totally incoherent or incomprehensible; it is clear that there is an alleged course of conduct of a threatening and intimidating nature, which, on the face of it, aligns with the description set out in Thomas; it begs a response. Some of the matters complained of may seem more like a mere annoyance on an individual level, but when taken into account as a part of a series of acts, their complexion may be altered to one of a more sinister nature. Reflection on that point needs to take place in the context of a detailed evaluation by the Court, at the very least when in possession of a Defence, rather than on a strike-out or summary judgment application before a Statement of Case has even been provided by TVP.

I note in passing that the Claimant has provided a number of documents recording his mental and physical ill health vulnerability which, if established, is unlikely to have assisted his record keeping or recollections, such that the loss of his personal records during police seizures, if proven, will certainly not have assisted him in drafting the Particulars. It is not a situation where it is fanciful to believe, as the Claimant does, that the police hold further and better records for at least some of the incidents complained of, which will no doubt assist in drafting a Defence. Given the unusual alleged circumstances of destruction of some of the Claimant’s data by that Defendant, which has so far not been denied, I consider it only just, and in accordance with the overriding objective, that a fully pleaded response should be provided to those aspects of the claim which remain after consequential orders on amendments, and strike out of superfluous matters in accordance with this judgment.

Furthermore, although some of the alleged acts of harassment are very old indeed, as the Claimant has submitted, limitation is a defence, rather than a bar. That topic may require further articulation at the hearing when consequential orders will be made, flowing from this judgment. The pleading also requires greater clarity about when the Claimant stopped being a sole trader of Snowies, and the business became a corporate entity, something that was not ventilated in submissions, but which has become plain in the preparation of this judgment. This is a topic to which I will return, as it impacts what is permissible for an individual to sue on, rather than the company itself (see paragraph 152).

At paragraphs 3 and 59 of the Particulars the Claimant complains about a conviction he received for drinking carrot juice from a can in a public place during a Public Spaces Protection Order (“PSPO”) operation introduced by the local authority (Second Defendant) and executed by TVP on 20^th December 2018.

The Defendant has a number of objections including:

The textbook Police Misconduct published by the Legal Action Group in 2022 summarises at paragraph 8.8, the essential elements of this tort (taken from Martin v Watson [1996] AC 74 at paragraph 80) as the Claimant being required to show they have suffered damage as a result of the following:

I conclude that as the prosecution complained of has not terminated in the Claimant's favour, this cause of action cannot continue and should be struck out. As I set out at the start of the judgment, I can only consider the prosecution of the Claimant rather than those directed at his brother, father or a company with which he was involved, as he is the only named Claimant on the Claim Form. At times the Claimant has referred to “prosecutions” in the plural, since 2019 (paragraph 3 of the Particulars), but I cannot identify another prosecution against him personally. If I am wrong on that, it can be raised at the consequential directions hearing.

The Claimant has included these causes of action within his Particulars on page 33, with only bullet point summaries as to how they might be relevant, although no such summary is provided for non-feasance and that particular reference should be struck out as this is not a recognisable legal concept within the jurisdiction of England and Wales. I raised this point at the hearing. The claims sit alongside similar ones for damages in negligence, although they are mutually exclusive.

The Claimant defines misfeasance as arising when a public officer intentionally abuses their power causing harm to an individual. He pleads at paragraph d) on page 33 of the Particulars that , “if the council or other defendants were involved in assisting the police in their unlawful conduct they have engaged in misfeasance”

Counsel for the Defendant helpfully provided a copy of the authority in Young v Chief Constable of Warwickshire & DPP [2020] EWHC 308(QB), and specifically drew my attention to paragraphs 24-26 which set out the necessary ingredients of the tort, as follows: “

At paragraph 26 the Judge pointed out that the requirements at (c) & (d) above are onerous and went on to explain “the claimant must specifically plead and properly particularise the bad faith or reckless indifference relied upon. It may be possible to infer malice but if what is pleaded as giving rise to an inference is equally consistent with mistake or negligence, then such a pleading will be insufficient and will be liable to be struck out. The claimant must also specifically plead and properly particularise both the damage and why the public officer must have foreseen it. A pleading that fails to do so is similarly liable to be struck out”. The Judge went on to cite previous authorities establishing these principles from the Court of Appeal and the High Court. He went on to say that “these remarks would apply with equal or greater force to a claim of misfeasance in public office”.

Counsel also included, within the authorities bundle, a helpful summary of the law set out by Tugendhat J in Carter v Chief Constable of Cumbria Police[2008] EWHC 1072 (QB) paragraphs 66 to 69. At 66, “ It is essential that before this action for misfeasance is allowed to be pursued through the courts, anxious scrutiny should be made of it to ensure that the Defendant’s immunity against actions for negligence is not circumvented by the pleading device of converting what is in reality no more than allegations of negligence into claims for misfeasance in public office”. The judge went on to note that allegations of misfeasance are amongst the most serious, short of conscious dishonesty, that can be made against any public official, hence the need for great care in permitting them to proceed beyond a strike out application.

The Defendant asserts that the very bald nature of the Claimant’s pleading demonstrates that there is no basis for the allegation made against this Defendant or any other.

The Claimant does not define malfeasance and the Defendant did not expressly refer to it in submissions.

There is not a great deal that needs to be added beyond the submissions on misfeasance. The limitation period for commencing such claims is 6 years from the date of the alleged misconduct. The difference to negligence which reflects carelessness, is that misfeasance requires an intention or recklessness. There is no need therefore to show that a duty of care arose, and the tort offers the opportunity to recover aggravated and exemplary damages. If the inference of malice is equally consistent with a mistake or negligence the pleading will be liable to be struck out.

Although I was not taken to the case, I am mindful of the decision in R Cruickshank Limited v Chief Constable of Kent [2002] CA Civ 1840 (“Cruikshank”) where the Court accepted, on a summary judgment application, that a claim for damages for misfeasance was arguable concerning the wrongful identification of Claimants as distributors of stolen goods publicised by officers to customers of the business. The case was more factually complicated than the one before me, as it related to international law aspects of vehicle title, but the basis of allowing the misfeasance claim to proceed to trial, was the fact there was a critical issue to determine the police officers’ state of mind as to whether they had acted recklessly or unlawfully in exercising their powers. The Court also took account of the fact that disclosure had not taken place (the police were in breach of an order to disclose documents) such that the evidence needed to be more fully explored as to the police officers’ knowledge and intentions. It was held that a police officer’s state of mind is a factual issue unsuitable for summary judgment.

As to malfeasance, it is not referred to in the main legal texts such as Clerk and Lindsell, or those concerning civil actions against the police. Some commentators (possibly referring to claims in the USA), argue that it is an unlawful intentional act of misconduct, which is a more serious matter than misfeasance. I have been unable to locate any English case authority on this cause of action; there are some for overseas jurisdictions which are plainly irrelevant.

I am mindful of the need for “anxious scrutiny” of the Particulars before allowing the misfeasance aspect of the claim to proceed further. The Particulars are untidy and disorganised; various threads assert on a number of occasions that the police acted with malice towards the Claimant and were intent on destroying his business/personal livelihood, such as in the operations detailed in 2018. The standard of pleading required for such serious allegations has not been met at this juncture. Part of the issue is the overlap with the harassment claim where the same facts are cited which affects structure of the pleading. Each cause of action needs a separate clear section, setting out how the perceived facts are said to fulfil the various elements of the tort. I cannot say that the claims are bound to fail at this juncture based on the Cruikshank decision, if the Particulars were corrected, although I have considerable doubts, but strike out is a sanction of last resort. However, there is a further difficulty in that the much complained of police operations of 2018 occurred at a time when the Claimant asserted to a bailiff that the business was then owned by Hellfire (see Chronology). This was not drawn to my attention in any of the submissions, similar to the omission regarding Cruikshank, so this cause of action should be addressed further at the consequential directions hearing. I will refer to the implications of a change of business ownership at paragraph 152 following.

The claim for malfeasance is not particularised at all and it must be struck out both on that basis and given its general lack of recognition under English law.

Although the Claimant sought to pursue a tort headed “abuse of process”, the only particulars provided on page 34 refer to harassment and malicious prosecution, for example in relation to the PSPO, abusing provisions in search warrants, as well as negligently causing emotional distress, all of which are dealt with elsewhere in this judgment. The cause of action as a separate tort was not specifically argued before me, and with the scant reference in the Particulars, which merely seems to replicate the other causes of action, it seems susceptible to strike-out on the basis of incoherence.

Furthermore the PSPO has already been the subject of an unsuccessful appeal, and an appeal has been filed in the County Court claim KOOHD611, whilst the actions of legal representatives in respect of the alleged bailiff assault appear to be the subject of new proceedings recently launched in the High Court (see Chronology at paragraph 25, loosely referred to by the Claimant in oral submissions). It would be inappropriate for there to be concurrent proceedings, or re-opening of issues already litigated to a final conclusion ( see paragraph 113 and subsequently). During oral submissions the Claimant acknowledged it was not his intention to mount a collateral attack on decisions reached in other Courts where the same issue has been raised.

In respect of the search warrants, the Claimant would need to have demonstrated, there was a predominant purpose “outside the ambit of the legal claim which the court is asked to adjudicate”(Clerk and Lindsell at paragraph 15-69), and that the warrants were issued against him personally not the Company. The complaints about the earlier search warrants would appear to be out of time as well, whilst the latter ones were issued after the Claimant stopped trading as a sole trader, so would appear to relate to the Company.If I have not covered all instances where “abuse of process” is referenced in the Particulars, the parties will need to address me further at the directions hearing for consequential orders.

The reference to “torture” is to be found in the Particulars at paragraphs 65, 68 and 85 and the definition is contained in the Damages section, paraphrasing Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The events complained of relate to an alleged assault by a bailiff in February 2018 allegedly under the direction of the Second Defendant, but with TVP standing by and doing nothing to assist. That assault is said to have resulted in the Claimant’s pre-existing injuries having got significantly worse and needing to sleep 12-18 hours a day to recover.

The Defendant said they could not understand the pleading, that it was an allegation of the utmost severity, lacking the necessary detail as to what particular act was said to amount to torture, and that the allegation was “baseless and not supported by the facts alleged in the preceding paragraphs”. Thus the Defendant maintained this Article was inapplicable to the events described, and that the threshold for applicability to conduct which is said to be “torture” is nowhere near as low as the events described in this claim. There are clear rules for pleading such an allegation, which have not been followed, and any such claim is also grossly out of time, being well beyond the usual 1 year limitation period.

I agree with the Defendant that the Particulars do not plead the type of “torture” that is envisaged by the Convention and are woefully lacking in detail. Furthermore, the claim is well out of time. For all those reasons that claim must be struck out.

Equality Act claims were included in the Particulars on pages 36 and 37, and Human Rights Act violations were set out on page 38. TVP was the only Defendant expressly referred to in relation to the Equality Act, whilst both TVP and the Second Defendant were identified in respect of the Human Rights Act breaches. No specific facts were identified linked to the causes of action.

The Defendant submitted that the Equality Act has a limitation period of six months and the Human Rights Act has a limitation period of one year, and all such claims are therefore time barred, and so far out of time as to exceed any possible discretion that the Court may, in some limited circumstances, exercise to extend time.

Furthermore it was submitted that the pleading is totally opaque as to what disability the Claimant alleges he has suffered, for it to be caught by the provisions of the Equality Act.

During the course of all submissions the Claimant did not choose to pursue the Equality Act claims, and submitted that he would rely upon general breaches of duty of care by the Defendants in respect of issues which he had sought to include in the Particulars under the heading of Human Rights Act breaches.

The claims under the Equality Act and the Human Rights Act should be struck out. They are incoherent and have not been pleaded to anything like a satisfactory level. That is adequate reason enough for them to be struck out, irrespective of limitation, which would also be another good reason not to allow them to continue.

This claim is referred to at paragraph 5 of the Damages section of the Particulars, and was not expanded upon in written or oral submissions. The Claimant asserts that the tort applies to each Defendant “in the overall oppressive actions against[the Claimant] and his family. TVP’s officers behaviour was extreme and outrageous which has resulted in severe emotional harm and the defendants actions holistically has caused severe emotional distress, this will need to be explored on the merits of each defendant".

I can deal with this cause of action fairly briefly. The law concerning this cause of action was not articulated during the hearing, but this is a rarely used tort arising from the 1897 case of Wilkinson v Downton, recently considered by the High Court in GKE v Gunning [2023] EWHC 332 (KB), where the essential elements were identified, which importantly for this case included a ruling that causing “distress” is not enough and “psychiatric injury” is required. For the sake of brevity I will not set out the other essential components. A subsequent decision of the House of Lords has confirmed that “emotional distress” is insufficient ( Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53). Even severe distress falling short of a recognised psychiatric illness is insufficient (O (a child) v Rhodes [2015] UKSC 32 at paragraph 87 where it was held that, “a person who actually intends to cause another to suffer severe mental or emotional distress (which should not be understated) bears the risk of legal liability if the deliberately inflicted severe distress causes the other to suffer a recognised psychiatric illness”.

The claim as pleaded must fail as the Claimant does not anywhere in his extensive Particulars identify that he has suffered a recognisable psychiatric injury.

Negligent infliction of emotional distress

This claim as pleaded appears to be a “mop up” allegation for any emotional harm said to arise as a result of a negligent action, not covered elsewhere in the pleadings (at paragraph 7 on page 34 of the Particulars). The wording is vague, does not include even the basic elements for pleading a breach of duty and was not argued out before me. Emotional distress is not generally recognised as sufficient damage, to give rise to compensation in a negligence claim; the courts look for diagnosable psychological injuries. In cases of physical or sexual abuse there may be additional awards for injury to feelings but this case is not about, and not pleaded as, physical or sexual abuse. The Vento guidelines which are referred to in the Damages section of the Particulars, relate to compensation in the Employment Tribunal, particularly in discrimination claims under the Equality Act 2010, and are therefore not relevant. The Protection from Harassment Act at section 3(2) allows recovery of damages for anxiety but that is a statutory remedy, not a tortious one.

This claim must be struck out. It does not have a legally recognisable basis.

The Claimant defines civil conspiracy as conduct involving 2 or more parties who agree to commit an unlawful act that results in harm to another at paragraph 9 on page 34 of the Particulars. He went on to elaborate “This is likely related to any communication with other persons not included in the principle action”. He had already set out elsewhere within the Particulars that he believed TVP was orchestrating actions against him with other public bodies, but he appeared to recognise that the allegation has been flimsily set out, as in oral submissions he said he just wished to retain it until disclosure had occurred. The purpose of the allegation was therefore to bring in additional Defendants in due course. On this basis the paragraph cannot survive a strike out as the Court does not permit claims to persist where the Defendant is unidentified, in the hope that something might turn up, and where there are no pleaded facts underlying the cause of action.

I have previously set out in the Chronology, various assertions by the Claimant concerning unlawful detention of property belonging to him by TVP. These assertions have been made in the context of the claim for harassment. The specific pleading as to conversion/interference with goods as a separate tort is very bare (on page 35 of the Particulars) and is not grounded or linked to any specific facts, and was not the subject of further submissions in Court. The claims would appear to have been brought out of time and are not pleaded to the requisite standard, are incoherent so this cause of action must be struck out. However, further consideration will need to be given at the consequential directions hearing as to the precise correct Order in respect of those parts of the Particulars referred to as property torts, as there is the overlap with the harassment claim.

Also, there must be close scrutiny of the nature of the property losses claimed as it has transpired that Snowies was the trading name of a limited company from January 2017 at the latest (see the Chronology at paragraph 25, especially the entries dated January 2017 and 5^th February 2018) but possibly from July 2015, such that the Claimant cannot maintain an action for property losses relating to goods owned by the Company (see paragraph 152 ). This will have a further impact on the paragraphs that should be struck out in the Damages section of the Particulars.

Breach of fiduciary duty

This claim was not set out in any detail in the Particulars, and the Claimant agreed that it could be removed during the course of oral submissions.

Data Protection Act breaches

The Claimant asserted that the Defendants (TVP, the 2nd and 3^rd Defendants) had shared private information about him causing harm and loss, but it was unclear following discontinuance of proceedings against the Information Commissioner's Office, whether any element of those claims is still pursued. The claim, if it is said to continue separately, was not understood. The alleged claim that there has been data sharing as part of a campaign of harassment, falls to be considered with the other allegations concerning harassment. The appropriate order will need to be the subject of submissions at the directions hearing dealing with consequential orders.

The Particulars from paragraphs 54, 59, 65 through to 98, set out the claims, which include 38 causes of action, as follows:

Additional claims are made in bullet points at the back of the Particulars such as intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, civil conspiracy, contempt of court, fraud and data protection breaches.

I am aware that the correct title of this Defendant has changed over time following various local government reorganisations, but that does not have a material impact on my decisions and I will say no more about it, simply referring to BC or the local authority interchangeably throughout.

The Defendant objects to the claim and seeks strike-out/summary judgment for all the generic reasons set out at paragraphs 6 and 7 above, and specifically on the following basis:

Within the hearing bundle I was given a copy of the Claim Form issued jointly by the Claimant in the High Court under case number QB-2021-001041and Hellfire Entertainment Ltd (“Hellfire”) against Newlyn PLC and Buckinghamshire Council on 5th March 2021. The Particulars of Claim are 24 pages long and include a litany of complaints in respect of bailiff enforcement action undertaken by Newlyn PLC as contractors of the local authority, engaged to recoup unpaid levies for D6, BIDCO, and unpaid council tax bills for which the local authority had obtained liability orders from the Magistrates Court.

Also within the bundle was a copy of Deputy Master Grimshaw’s Order, following a hearing and submissions from counsel instructed by the Claimant, on a strike out application brought by the local authority who denied they were vicariously liable for the actions of the sub-contracted Bailiff. The Deputy Master struck out the claim by Order dated 9th of February 2022 pursuant to CPR 3.4 (2) (a).

The Claimant asserts at paragraph 88 of the Particulars that the strike out application was “based on fraudulent pleadings and failure to disclose pertinent and relevant information”. He goes on to allege that the Council owes a duty both in contract and tort which they have breached by their pleadings. The Defendant maintains that this amounts to a collateral attack on an earlier Court decision which was never appealed. They rely upon the decision of the House of Lords in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] A.C. 529 which defined collateral attack as an abuse of process; “ .. the initiation of proceedings in a court of justice for the purpose of mounting a collateral attack upon a final decision against the intending plaintiff which had been made by another court of competent jurisdiction in previous proceedings in which the intending plaintiff had full opportunity of contesting the decision in the court in which it was made.” In oral submissions the Claimant mentioned that he had “appealed” and launched a contempt application and claim for fraudulent misrepresentation against the bailiff company. There were no documents concerning this in the hearing bundle.

Within the hearing bundle, at page 648, there is a copy of the judgment of the Administrative Court relating to the Claimant’s conviction for the PSPO offence.

The law concerning re-litigation of issues or causes of action in a new claim, when another Court has already dealt with them, is generally articulated using a succinct umbrella Latin term, “res judicata” loosely meaning a judgment by a Court of competent jurisdiction is final, and the matters determined cannot be relitigated. The twin objectives of the doctrine of res judicata are the public interest in the finality of litigation and the avoidance of oppressing a Defendant by subjecting them unnecessarily to successive actions. Lord Sumption eloquently summarised 5 principles or doctrines loosely co-existing under that umbrella term, in Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited v Zodiac Seats UK Limited [2013] UKSC 46 (“the Virgin case”) as follows:

More recently, Pepperal J has provided further guidance on how to approach matters when considering if there has been an abusive process, in Mansing Moorjani v Durban Estates Limited [2019] EWHC 1229(TCC) at paragraph 17.4:

“ Even if the cause of action is different, the second action may nevertheless be struck out as an abuse under the rule in Henderson v Henderson where the claim in the second action should have been raised in the earlier proceedings if it was to be raised at all. In considering such an application:

a)The onus is upon the applicant to establish abuse.

b)The mere fact that the claimant could with reasonable diligence have taken the new point in the first action does not necessarily mean that the second action is abusive

c)The court is required to undertake a broad, merits-based assessment taking account of the public and private interests involved and all of the facts of the case.

d)The court’s focus must be on whether, in all the circumstances, the claimant is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before.

e)The court will rarely find abuse unless the second action involves “unjust harassment of the defendant”.

I have already set out the law in respect of the other causes of action when dealing with the claims brought against the First Defendant above.

Any claim in negligence against this Defendant is too vague to survive, and all references should be struck out. It is not clear what personal duty is said to be owed to the Claimant, nor how and when any breach occurred. Insofar as it may relate to the perceived failure to change the registered use of the property occupied by Snowies, to residential for the upper floors, I note pages 602/603 in the hearing bundle. They contain correspondence from BC in response to a complaint by the Claimant in September 2020. He was advised to contact the Valuation Office (4^th Defendant) as the relevant body to seek reassessment if that was to be pursued. Nothing is pleaded as to why that was incorrect advice. The complaint in relation to the lack of a bin was also explained in the same correspondence chain, as due to lack of residential status of the premises. The Claimant is pursuing the Valuation Office in these proceedings. There is no information in the Particulars as to why BC is also being sued with regard to these matters, so those claims should be struck out in respect of BC.

The claim for misfeasance in public office is not understood, simply being pleaded at page 33 of the Particulars as, “ if the council or other defendants were involved in assisting the police in their unlawful conduct they have engaged in misfeasance”. This is a very serious allegation to make and the pleading is woefully inadequate, incoherent and must be struck out.

As regards BC’s participation in the alleged assault by the bailiff, I have read the Particulars of Claim filed in QB-2021-001041. At paragraph 1, the allegation against BC was that they had a duty to manage their agents and protect the public. The issue of responsibility for the bailiff’s actions has already been litigated at a hearing with legal representation and there are no copies of appeal papers in the hearing bundle, although the Claimant said in oral submissions that he has appealed the decision. He also said that he has launched a contempt application and one based on fraudulent misrepresentation against the bailiff company which is currently stayed. This is a plain example where the doctrine of res judicata protects the 2nd Defendant from further litigation on the subject determined, either by way of cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel. It should be struck out.

The reference to “fraudulent pleadings” in respect of the bailiff assault matter as a separate cause of action is also duplicative of other Court proceedings of which I have become aware, against the legal representatives conducting the litigation for BC, in action number KB-2025-000799, which is another reason not to allow this aspect of the Particulars to survive within this claim.

This claim is not clearly articulated, as demonstrated by the pleading at paragraph 69 of the Particulars stating that the council “have been involved in the harassment against [the Claimant] but it is not clear to what extent.” No further details are provided expressly referencing harassment until paragraph 92, where the Claimant asserts that BC knew he was being harassed during the PSPO operation. This allegation seeks to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the PSPO process which has already being subject to review in the Administrative Court. The Claimant accepts at paragraph 59 of the Particulars that he could have appealed the previous Court’s decision, but instead is choosing to pursue the matter as a case of malicious prosecution. This pleading appears to be another attempt to mount a collateral attack on a decision of another Court. It cannot be allowed to stand and must be struck out.

The next reference to harassment is at paragraph 95 of the Particulars concerning the Claimant being unable to use his living space “due to harassment and threats from TVP” . Although the Claimant has quoted extracts from the Protection from Harassment Act at the end of his pleadings, these are not cross referenced to any individual acts by BC. I refer again to the decision in Dowson, and the basic tenets of the statutory duty to protect from harassment referred to at paragraph 63 above, namely, “There must be conduct which occurs on at least two occasions,….which is calculated in an objective sense to cause alarm or distress, and.. which is objectively judged to be oppressive and unacceptable”. The Particulars do not address these requirements; the specific occasions where harassment is referenced relate to TVP, and one of them has already been the subject of a judgment from the Administrative Court. The harassment allegations against BC must be struck out, as they are not related to specific relevant facts and it is not possible to leave open the claim, just in case something might turn up on disclosure. Although the Claimant submitted that disclosure failings by the Defendants left him in a position where he could not properly plead the cause of action generally, he has not applied to the Court for pre-action disclosure. I have taken a different approach towards the harassment allegations against TVP because they are more substantially pleaded, despite the Claimant saying he does not have a full set of records, and my decision has also been influenced by the fact that the Claimant asserts the police have wiped some of his date from his laptop and seized other items.

The claim for trespass and fraudulent misrepresentation in relation to an agent of BC attending Snowies property in 2018 to assist with changing use of upper floors to residential, as set out at paragraph 76 of the Particulars, is incoherent and should be struck out on that basis. The correspondence in the hearing bundle referred to at paragraph 116 above, provides some background information and records that the Claimant had been requesting BC for a change of use; this process was said by BC to require a visit to the property by both BC and a representative of the Valuation Office. The reason why re-registration did not subsequently occur was set out in correspondence of September 2020, at page 602 of the hearing bundle, as due to the Valuation Office noting the lack of a fire escape from the upper part of the property. The Claimant has not pleaded why, given those documented facts, the causes of action are made out. It is impermissible to simply name a cause of action in Particulars without pleading supporting facts relied upon.

Although the Claimant relies on this tort in connection with acts of BC on page 34 of the Particulars, it is unclear which prosecutions the cause of action is said to relate to, apart from the PSPO dealt with above. If it also relates to the Claimant’s complaints about council tax being wrongly levied, and pursued through liability orders, as the liability orders are issued by Magistrates Courts, for which this Court is not an appeal route, this Court has no jurisdiction over the matter. Those complaints therefore should be struck out; to allow those claims to continue would be a collateral attack on the decisions in those other Courts.

Additionally, claims in respect of the liability orders relating to Hellfire should be struck out in any event, because the Claimant has no personal right to bring legal actions to recover a Company debt. I will be setting out the relevant law below (see paragraph 152). In oral submissions the Claimant amplified his Particulars concerning the conduct of the Council’s representative, which he found malicious when he appeared on behalf of the Company, particularly in relation to his stated residential address at Snowies. This has been strongly refuted in complaints correspondence dated 20^th January 2022 in the hearing bundle, and would appear to be a professional conduct matter, if proven, rather than containing the necessary “ingredients” to substantiate the tort (see also paragraph 70 above).

The claim for losses for removal of property said to belong to the Claimant by BC in 2013 is woefully out of time, and the cause of action is named in a passing reference in the lengthy Particulars, rather than correctly pleaded. It must be struck out as it is an incoherent claim, leaving aside the limitation point.

The assertion that BC produced fraudulent pleadings to the Court at paragraphs 87-89 of the Particulars, relates to the proceedings which were struck out by Deputy Master Grimshaw in 2022, relating to the bailiff assault allegation. I have already noted that despite having legal representation at the hearing, the Claimant did not appeal the decision at the time; that would have been the correct course if the Claimant disagreed with the manner in which evidence was brought before the Court. Although he mentioned an appeal in oral submissions, I cannot find any trace of one on the High Court file and have checked and found nothing live in the Court of Appeal either. I cannot allow the cause of action to persist in this litigation; it must be struck out. It appears that there are also proceedings afoot against the bailiff company mounting similar allegations; that does nothing to alter my decision regarding the current claim against the local authority.

The failure to arrange housing for the Claimant pleaded at paragraph 98 is not understood. It is pleaded as, “[The Claimant] has had his personal security and safety at constant risk. [The Claimant] has been targeted in every residential property he has resided in and has been forced to be unable to live in his residential property due to the incompetence of [the Second and Sixth Defendants]. As a result [the Claimant] was put into contact with [the second Defendant] to arrange housing. [The Claimant] had to provide evidence of him being homeless before [the 2nd Defendant] would assist,[ the Claimant] was hesitant in provided this information as he feared it would lead to harassment. When [the Claimant] did provide this information to[ the Second Defendant], a visit to the property took place and [the Second Defendant] confirmed where [the Claimant] was staying. [The Second Defendant] stated that [the Claimant] could not have been living in the caravan and the caravan went missing shortly afterwards. Around the same time [the Second Defendant] issued a legal notice threatening prosecution to [Hellfire] regarding not having planning applications for the land.”

It appears that the claim is based on a cause of action of harassment. The process of supplying evidence of homelessness before a housing application can be made is a standard one. The subsequent loss of the caravan is not linked factually with the housing application; it is pure speculation on the basis of the information provided to the Court. The documents in the hearing bundle include items provided by the Claimant, notably at page 638, which is a response to a complaint to the original Ninth Defendant, the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman, about the local authority not providing proper help and support to address the Claimant’s homelessness, such that he was now sofa surfing. It is dated 21st April 2021. The Ombudsman states in summary, “There is no fault in how the Council dealt with [the Claimant’s] request for homeless assistance”. The detail of the report went on to explain the requirement for information on whether the Claimant was indeed homeless or threatened with homelessness and at paragraph 24 stated that “Despite not having received the information it needed,… the Council decided to accept a duty to [the Claimant]to prevent his homelessness. It completed a personalised housing plan.” It then recited in addition the local authority referred the Claimant to local hostels. One of those contacted the Claimant, but he told them he had accommodation so the referral was closed. The report concluded, “the Council could have closed [the Claimant’s] case when he refused to provide all the necessary information it needed to confirm that he was eligible and homeless. Instead, it accepted a prevention duty so it could help him”. The report went on to explain that hearing no more the file was closed after the statutory period of 56 days expired, but not before a letter had been sent to the Claimant explaining he could ask for a review of the decision if he disagreed with it. I conclude on the basis of the incoherence of the pleaded case and the factual findings in the Ombudsman report, which have not been challenged through the statutory channels, and following notification that the Claimant has agreed to dismiss the claim against the Ninth Defendant, that his claim for homelessness against BC, including any harassment relating thereto, is bound to fail and must be struck out. The reference to the threat to Hellfire in the Particulars is something of a red herring, given the Claimant's lack of standing to bring an action on behalf of the Company.

The complaint about failing to register the Claimant to vote cannot remain within these pleadings. It is linked to the one concerning homelessness, and inability to change the registered use of the premises occupied by Snowies, which I have already struck out above. In passing I note that the Electoral Commission does require a qualifying address, where an individual is entitled to be registered to vote.

The allegations concerning refusal to provide operational agreements relating to BIDCO, and the consequences thereof, have already been extensively litigated in Huddersfield County Court, and indeed a hearing on the 5th February 2024 was adjourned so that disclosure could take place. I therefore fail to understand why the same complaints about disclosure is raised in these proceedings and I cannot find any sound basis for those to remain in this action. The doctrine of res judicata applies. Furthermore, it appears that there are other proceedings afoot in connection with the previous litigation in Huddersfield (see the Chronology at paragraph 25).

The assertion that this Defendant forced the Claimant to pay his father's council tax debt in 2015-2016, is another allegation that cannot survive the strike out application. For a start it relates to an underlying liability order from a Magistrates Court, which would have been the appropriate forum to challenge it in, or by way of judicial review. Further, the complaint is very stale and out of time. Those are reasons enough to strike it out. In passing I note that the Particulars at paragraph 80, assert fault by the bailiffs acting on behalf of the Council in enforcing the debt, similar to the cause of action pleaded in this Court, and struck out in QB- QB-2021-001041 in respect of BIDCO levies enforced in 2018. Once again there seems to be an underlying assumption that the local authority is vicariously liable for the acts of the bailiffs, although that is not explained. In any event, I do not need to explore that line of enquiry further because I have already identified other sound reasons to strike that claim out.

The causes of action in respect of BFRS are set out at paragraphs 99-117 of the Particulars of Claim. In essence the claim seeks redress for Prohibition Orders issued against the Claimant, and consequential losses as follows:

The Damages section of the Particulars includes claims referencing losses associated with aspects of the complaints against BFRS, even though they are not expressly linked to that claim, such as loss of the Claimant’s home at Lawsone Rise valued at £558,000, loss of items from the property valued at £200,000, loss of bitcoins from the property valued at £7,513,150, loss of rental income on the property valued at £280,000 to December 2023, loss of money linked to an Amazon account linked to the property of £40,000, and so the list continues, but the Claimant appears to be saying that the losses arose from the combined impact of several Defendants working together and sharing allegedly false or unlawfully disclosed information about him.

A copy of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety ) Order 2005 (“the Fire Safety Order”) was included in the authorities bundle although the interpretation of it was contested. Within the Fire Safety Order the following duties are set out:

The Defendant’s application seeks a strike out on the basis:

In his first witness statement dated 26^th February 2025, the Claimant sets out further information about this claim at paragraphs 153-200. I am fully alive to the fact that this evidence is not part of the pleaded case, but it helps me to understand the claim which is not set out in any great detail in the Particulars. The Claimant maintains that BFRS powers only applied to commercial, not residential, parts of a property, and he therefore believes the Prohibition Orders were never intended to protect customers and staff as stated, because they had no access to the upper floors of the building which were personal family spaces. He also believes that the Prohibition Orders were not served correctly and that the legislation protecting the Defendant in the course of their statutory duties does not extend to protect them from other offences, “such as fraudulent misrepresentation or harassment nor does it account for when an order is issued outside of their legislative powers” (paragraph 162). The reference to fraudulent misrepresentation appears to rely on statements that the Defendant’s officers had a warrant, when they did not, and as a consequence he believed they committed trespass. He says he was threatened with prosecution for obstructing an officer if he did not provide access to the property; he considers that harassment as they did not have a warrant. He also says he pursued a complaints process but the Prohibition Orders were upheld, so he became homeless and his property was broken into several times. He believes his data was wrongly shared with third parties in order to target his family at the Colosseum in Huddersfield, who were visited by the local fire service thereafter. The Claimant says he was bullied into signing Prohibition Orders when he was mentally and physically and vulnerable and makes reference, at paragraph 175, to not being an employee of Snowies Procurement. I note from Companies House data that this company was incorporated on 26^th March 2018, his brother was the only Director and a petition was issued for winding up on 24^th April 2023 and the company is now in liquidation. The witness statement refers to claims in addition for malfeasance and misfeasance.

In oral submissions the Claimant also relied on a transcript in the hearing bundle at page 578, of a member of the fire service attending Snowies’ premises saying he has a warrant (in respect of the 4^th Prohibition order), and the Claimant explaining that upstairs is in process of being changed “from commercial to residential”. He also says the transcript confirms he corrected himself from saying he was the manager of the business, to the manager of the property, but I am unable to locate that reference (or a date) on the document.

The Claimant contended that he could not pursue a complaint in the Magistrates’ court because he did not receive a warrant within the 28 day appeal period in which to make the complaint. He further submitted that the premises where the Orders were issued did not satisfy the legislative definitions as they related exclusively to residential spaces and that as he was not the responsible person he could not appeal the Orders made.

I consider that this action against the Third Defendant is hopelessly flawed and must be struck out. There are no reasonable grounds for bringing it. On a plain reading of the Fire Safety Order, it does apply to the premises in question, as it was not a single private dwelling house (See Part 4, Section 35(10) above in the Fire Safety Order extract). Incidentally, although it is not material to my decision, whilst the Claimant asserts the first and second floor premises above Snowies were non-commercial, at paragraph 8 of the Particulars he states clearly that the first floor was partly used for offices when he acquired the lease, and much of his complaint against the Second Defendant is that the registered use of the premises has never been changed to residential for the upper 2 floors.

It is also plain that the Claimant was a responsible person within the meaning of the Fire Safety Order, such that he could be served with notice; he admits at paragraph 8 of the Particulars that he was responsible for running the business, and did not contest that in his lengthy second witness statement. At paragraph 66 of the Particulars he references a receipt being written at the premises for monies paid by Alex Snowball trading as Snowies (although he complains that the payment was unconnected with that business/premises entirely, he does not complain about his trading status recorded on the receipt) and at paragraph 71 he makes clear he signed up the lease of all the premises. In his first statement at paragraph 175 he says he refused to sign the first Prohibition Order as he was not an employee of Snowies; that clearly is a mistaken interpretation of the Fire Safety Order at Part 1 Section 5 (4); he was a responsible person because he had obligations under the lease of the premises.

It is also crystal clear from the Fire Safety Order that any perceived irregularity or complaint about the issue of Prohibition Orders should be made first to the Magistrates Court and then by appeal to the Crown Court if there was any difficulty with it (see Part 4 Section 35(7) above in the Fire Safety Order); in this regard I consider it irrelevant that the Claimant says he had not been served with the warrant and therefore could not start an in time process. That is precisely the sort of matter that could have been brought to the Magistrates’ attention. At paragraph 125 of his second witness statement the Claimant says he was aware of the route to appeal but decided to take the Prohibition Notices “on the chin” which is a different reason to that given in oral submissions.

The claim for trespass is not understood on the facts, nor is it pleaded correctly, even if such a claim existed; again this is a matter that should have been brought to the Magistrates’ attention, rather than making a civil claim circumventing the statutory process. These are not instances of searches by the Defendant resulting in no action, but ones where Prohibition Orders were issued, in pursuance of statutory powers, and again if the Claimant had any complaint it should have been made in the Magistrates’ Court.

The suggestion that TVP harassed the Claimant by encouraging BRFS to search the Claimant’s property cannot survive; there is no factual basis set out for this, and the visits whether encouraged or otherwise were undertaken pursuant to a statutory regime, and resulted in safety risks being identified. Thus the claims against this Defendant must be struck out; they are bound to fail for the reasons set out above.

This claim against Kirklees Council is jointly pleaded with the action against the Health & Safety Executive at paragraphs 150-169 of the Particulars. The local authority cited is the one responsible for the area where the Claimant’s business interests through Hellfire Entertainment (“the Company”) at the Coliseum in Huddersfield were located. The dispute, according to the Particulars, relates to a threatened prosecution of the Company, if they did not remove parts of the redevelopment work that the Company had undertaken. The threat was followed by an actual prosecution via the Health and Safety Executive. It is alleged at paragraph 159 that the resultant legal action led to lengthy delays and financial outlay fighting the prosecution, together with financial losses connected with the redevelopment project.

The Claimant asserts that the 5th Defendant’s actions resulted from information passed to them by TVP, and that the Council failed to perform its duties to a satisfactory standard, and similar to the claims against the other Defendants in this action, there is a list at paragraph 163 of numerous causes of action without specific details relating to each such claim, save that alleged details of foul play in the conduct of the prosecution process are set out more fully. A claim for damages in respect of malicious prosecution is a cornerstone of the claim against this Defendant generally.

The Claimant says he resigned as a Director of the Company on 26^th June 2018 with a view to protecting the Company, as he considered the actions had been instigated as part of the harassment campaign against him by TVP, so he believed his investment in the Company could be saved that way. In the Damages section he seeks recovery of £500,000 invested by him into the Company and recovery of Company losses and Company income of £200,000, plus legal costs in fighting the prosecution in the region of £100,000.

The Defendant has a number of objections to the claim against them which can be briefly summarised as:

The Claimant’s first witness statement dated 26^th February 2025 adds nothing of substance, save that it appears to add complaint that this Defendant has failed in its responsibility to rehouse him, but that is not reflected in the Particulars in the section relating to this Defendant.

In his more lengthy witness statement dated 4^th April 2025, in response to the general strike out application, the Claimant added at paragraphs 351- 389 further information not in the Particulars, about his complaints in respect of this Defendant and some of these were repeated in oral submissions. It seems there was more than one prosecution (paragraph 370 of the witness statement). At paragraph 358, the Claimant says, “KC would at all times be passive aggressive, arrogant, obnoxious, hostile, threatening and disrespectful of IWS, the venue and AES. I mostly kept out of the way and just observed what was going on..”. At paragraphs 388/389 the Claimant says, “ ..KC did not make any threats towards me. It was clear to me that KC were attempting to close HEL down or to cause significant financial loss”.

In oral submissions the Claimant referred to his desire to recoup funding he had supplied to the Company. At one point he appeared to concede it was the Company that should bring any claim and not him personally.

I am in no doubt whatsoever that this particular claim is hopeless and bound to fail as presented to the Court. It should be struck out. Leaving aside the incorrect title of the Defendant which could be amended,no personal harassment of the Claimant has been pleaded and the other acts complained of were against the Company not the Claimant; he has no right to sue on behalf of the Company.

As to loss of funds that the Claimant may have suffered by investing in the Company, the pleading totally ignores the long established principle of company law known as “reflective loss”, which is one of the rare “bright line rules” of law which cannot be readily adapted to meet a particular situation within the Court’s discretion. Although not argued before me, the boundaries of this rule have been explored in a number of decisions, but most importantly by the Supreme Court in Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd [2020] UKSC 31 (“Marex”), which reined in some previous attempts to soften restrictions on recouping losses flowing from investment in a company other than by the Company itself. This Court has previously examined the resultant state of the law for directors/shareholders in Andrew Breeze and Dominic Wilson v The Chief Constable of Norfolk Constabulary[2022] EWHC 942 (QB). An earlier authority permitting recovery of some shareholder losses, by way of narrow exemption from the reflective loss principle, established in Giles v Rhind [2002] EWCA Civ 1428, was held to be "dead for all intents and purposes" following Marex. Those aspects of the Damages section which contravene the reflective loss principle must be struck out.

This claim against HWBIDCO LTD (“BIDC)”) is set out at paragraphs 128-149 of the Particulars. The Particulars describe this body as a successor to the High Wycombe Town Partnership, originally set up between Wycombe District Council (2^nd Defendant) and local businesses, but now a separate company with around 1500 members paying a bid levy. It has a business plan and the purpose of BIDCO is to promote local business but the Claimant believes (paragraph 138) that it is run for the benefit of its board members which “includes WDC and by extension TVP”. The Claimant further asserts at paragraph 139 that he has been excluded from the activities of BIDCO, or they have been performed to his detriment and examples are given of removing him from Stopwatch, failing to include him in the list of independent local stores, soiling Snowies’ windows with mud and water, spreading false information amongst other members about the Claimant handling stolen goods and organising the events outside Snowies store with barriers so close to the store that its customers did not have access.

In the Damages section of the Particulars the only specific financial losses claimed are £1600 for a refund of payments to this Defendant (paragraph 40 on page 46), together with interest, although no doubt some other generic losses claimed against an amalgam of Defendants is also attributable to the 6^th Defendant.

I have a document from the Claimant dated 18^th October 2018 at page 547 of the hearing bundle evidencing a unanimous vote of the Stop Watch not to include Snowies in the Stop Watch scheme, with a right of appeal in 6 months. A supplemental note dated 22^nd November 2018 states the decision was that of Stop watch not TVP or BIDCO.

I have also been referred to additional papers not contained in the original hearing bundle, including a copy of the Claim Form dated 10^th October 2023, issued against this Defendant by the Claimant in Huddersfield County Court and the Claimant’s extremely lengthy skeleton argument for a hearing subsequently in that action. The Claim Form states the Claimant “is unhappy with the services received” and “Defendant when providing these services has done so in a manner with the express view to cause the Claimant loss”.. The pleading continues that the Defendant has “vilified claimant without lawful, contractual or reasonable excuse. Defendant's actions have been deliberate and malicious in nature and have resulted in claimant fearing for his safety and having to move out of the area, losing his job and house.” The claim was argued both in contract and tort for breach of a duty of care. It referenced alleged misconduct by Board members causing loss of the Claimant’s personal reputation amongst other matters and there are said to have been breaches of data sharing arrangements between this Defendant and the local authority. The sum of £100,00 was sought by way of damages plus interest for breaches since 5^th March 2015 on the Claim Form. I also have a copy of the separate Particulars and aspects are recited in the witness statement filed in support of the strike out application by this Defendant’s solicitor, Samanatha Zaozimy. I note at paragraph 23 the following words, “The damages section of the particulars of claim comprises 48 separate items of alleged loss ranging from repair of a laptop(£1000) 256 stolen bitcoins (£7.5m). The alleged loss exceeds £22m” , which is a remarkably similar amount to what is sought by way of damages in this claim.

The Claimant has updated his valuation of this claim in his request for Default Judgment against this Defendant at page 462 in the hearing bundle where he seeks £468,000 and itemises the breakdown against various numbered heads of loss in the Damages section of his Particulars.

In an Appendix to the main hearing bundle, there is a copy of the Court order dismissing the Huddersfield County Court claim dated 4^th July 2024 , and also without a page number in the same Appendix, but at Tab 6, I have a copy of the Claimant’s Appellant Notice dated 31^st December 2024, contesting the dismissal of his County Court claim, apparently issued in the Leeds Combined Court. He stated in oral submissions that the appeal was in a queue awaiting determination and so far no permission to appeal has been granted. I have also noted elsewhere that an action has been brought against the legal representatives involved in defending the original claim.

The Defendant maintains that the action against them should be struck out on various grounds, and that the resulting order should clearly states that the claim was totally without merit. Furthermore this Defendant seeks indemnity costs. Various grounds for a strikeout are cited including:

The Defendant has supplied a copy of the Claimant’s pre-action protocol letter sent to them dated 13^th April 2023 for breach of contract, together with various complaints letters and responses dating back to 2016.

In his witness statement of 26^th February 2025 the Claimant deals at paragraphs 214-233 with criticisms of his claim set out in the strike out application, but this covers the same ground as dealt with in the County Court claim. In his second witness statement dated 4^th April 2025 at paragraphs 291-297 the main topic is the malicious spread of information about him in very vague terms.

In oral submissions it was confirmed that the appeal was still pending, which is surprising as it was lodged in December 2024. The Claimant accepted there was “a little bit of overlap” between the claims, and that his original pleadings prior to amendment, mirrored much of this claim, but maintained that the County Court action was entirely contractual, later amended to fraudulent misrepresentation, and did not include a harassment element, which he identified as the provision of services in a deliberate way to cause loss.

As far as the assertion that the previous claim did not include harassment, I find that hard to square with the written submissions which the Claimant prepared for the adjournment hearing, which cite many of the specific examples argued elsewhere in this claim as facts to support a harassment claim. At paragraph 12 of the written submissions under the heading “services performed to the detriment of claimant” the submission reads “defendant did not investigate the harassment or other misconduct when informed about it”. In the section headed “The Fraud Act” at paragraph 109 of the written submissions, it describes the Defendant as providing services such as harassing the homeless, and these submissions are followed by complaints that the Claimant has been rendered homeless by the Defendant’s actions (at paragraph 168 under the later heading “Central issues of damages and costs” for which specific damages are sought in paragraph 173. Also, that paragraph expressly states which claims are not included within the action namely, personal injury, data protection breaches and misuse of personal data.

The Defendant has explained in its skeleton argument that to allow the proceedings to continue would be tantamount to allowing a collateral attack on the decision of the County Court. I note that action was not struck out in a cursory or summary fashion, but only after three hearings.

I agree with the Defendant that this claim must be struck out as an abuse of process. The Court must be mindful of allowing a claiming party to put its case in various different ways within one action so as to effectively begin the process all over again from another claim. As Coulson J (as he then was) remarked, “The Civil Procedure rules are designed to avoid the litigation equivalent of death by 1000 cuts” in Seele Austria GMBH Co KG v Tokio Marine Europe Insurance Limited [2009] EWHC 255 (TCC).

This claim against the Health and Safety Executive (“HSE”) is set out at paragraphs 150-169 of the Particulars, intertwined with the case against the 5^th Defendant and specific causes of action are described on pages 34 and 38 of Particulars as malicious prosecution and contempt of court. Somewhat concerningly at paragraph 69, despite the length of the pleading, the Claimant acknowledges, “the specific misconduct of HSC in this case is less known by [the Claimant] , but it is clear that they have worked under the instructions of KC and indirectly by TVP. [The Claimant] has been informed of the various wrongs however has not documented them, due to in part to resigning as a director”. The latter reference relates to his former directorship of Hellfire Entertainment Ltd, previously described as “the Company” .

I specifically note the Claimant’s pleading at paragraph 157, where he states that in order to comply with the requests of the HSE “would result in having to undo the work that had just been done to rectify the issues, slowing down the project or to fight the council on a point that should not have to be fought. Inevitably it would result in spending time and or money on a non-issue.”

I have already set out the insuperable difficulties for the Claimant suing for redress on this factual matrix, as a matter of law, by way of action in a personal capacity, at paragraph 152.

The claim is defended on the basis that:

The first witness statement filed in support of the Defendant’s application clearly set out at paragraph 15, that the first dealings of the HSE with the Company related to an appeal against the Prohibition Notice and an Improvement Notice issued on 17th August 2018, following a visit by the HSE Inspector earlier that day, such date being more than three weeks after the Claimant had resigned as a director of the Company. The Defendant believes there was never any contact between the Claimant and anyone from the agency throughout the proceedings, which concerned demolition works at the property without any evidence that statutory precautions had been taken to deal with the possible presence of asbestos, and general management concerns about the project.

The Defendant’s first witness statement also clearly sets out that at no time did the HSE prosecute anyone, in connection with the matters uncovered by their Inspector. It is acknowledged that the initial concern which led to the visit had come from Kirklees Council, but the only other contact with that body was to update them following the conclusion of proceedings so they could continue with any regulatory steps they thought appropriate.

Within the hearing bundle I have copies of the previous judgment of the Employment Tribunal and the Order of the Administrative Court striking out the appeal. Furthermore, there is a supplemental witness statement from the Defendant’s in-house solicitor who has had conduct of all the previous proceedings brought by the Company against the HSE, and clarifying the process as regarding the evidence served on the Company previously in response to queries raised by the Claimant.

In oral submissions the Claimant stated that he had only resigned as a director of the Company due to the threat of prosecution and harassment that he foresaw. This was also set out at paragraph 162 of his Particulars. He also conceded that he understood his personal remoteness from the Company legally, but explained that the matters complained of needed to be seen within the overall framework of evidence, because TVP had started the actions by contacting the Borough Council stating if the Council/5th Defendant had been “more honourable”, they would not have pursued the matter further.

There is no doubt that this claim must be struck out. The reasons are various; I have already set out a strict application of the law relating to failures of service connected with a Claim Form, and the lack of latitude for discretion when dealing with breaches of Court rules, with regard thereto, even when the Claimant is legally unrepresented (paragraph 24).

Most importantly the Claimant’s lack of legal standing to bring a claim in his name for Company or shareholder losses is well established ( see paragraph 152).

The Claimant’s chronology appears unsound in respect of his purported personal harassment claim against this Defendant, leaving aside the lack of factual evidence to support any elements of such a cause of action, as the HSE investigation did not commence until after he had resigned as a Director of the Company, as confirmed in witness evidence from both the Defendant’s in-house lawyer and separately the HSE Inspector who conducted the investigation. At paragraph 62, I have set out a definition from the Court of Appeal as to what amounts to harassment, “a persistent and deliberate course of unreasonable and oppressive conduct, targeted at another person, which is calculated to and does cause that person alarm, fear or distress”. There is no detail in this claim against the HSE as to how the Claimant personally was said to have been harassed. The Claimant, by his own written admission is hazy on the events surrounding the HSE investigation. The detail which is provided, relates to purported actions by TVP which are based on speculation rather than fact, or effects of actions on the Claimant’s father or the Company. None are adequate to found this cause of action.

Further in respect of harassment, it is also self-evident from the summary of the claim above, that the Claimant’s complaint was about statutory regulations which he considers might cause him personal inconvenience (see paragraph 147) even where one of the issues is the potential deadly presence of asbestos, and has chosen instead to characterise those who seek to enforce the law as harassing him. Such a stance cannot be accommodated by the Court; it is bound to fail as it discloses no legally recognisable claim. I have already set out at paragraph 60 that there are defences to any harassment claim set out in the statute. Section 1(3) (b) of the Act specifies that harassment cannot be said to apply to a course of conduct “pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any enactment”. That section undermines the continuance of the cause of action by itself.

To add to all these reasons, there is also the grave problem, that the issues in question have already been considered by two other Courts, and to allow further litigation of them would be a collateral attack on those prior Court decisions, and thus contrary to the doctrine of res judicata.

I consider it important to emphasise that the Court’s task on a strike out application is to identify issues which are bound to fail and to eliminate them. In Dow Jones & Co Inc v Jameel, [2005] EWCA Civ 75 the Court of Appeal, when considering abuse of process, held at paragraph 54, “… It is no longer the role of the court simply to provide a level playing-field and to referee whatever game the parties choose to play upon it. The court is concerned to ensure that judicial and court resources are appropriately and proportionately used in accordance with the requirements of justice”.

It is not the function of the Court at this stage to conduct a mini-trial; some of the remaining elements of the claim may not be very strong, it is too early to say or further evaluate the merits; they have simply escaped the draconian sanction of a strike out at this very early stage, before a Defence has even been provided.

The Particulars will be very much shorter and more focussed as a result of the items struck out by this judgment. As Leggatt J said in Tchenguiz and others v Grant Thornton and others [2015] EWHC 405 (Comm) at paragraph 1, “Statements of case must be concise. They must plead only material facts meaning those necessary for the purpose of formulating a cause of action or defence, and not background facts or evidence. Still less should they contain arguments, reasons or rhetoric. These basic rules were developed long ago and have stood the test of time because they serve the vital purpose of identifying the matters which each party will need to prove by evidence at trial”.

However, when a Claimant raises so many causes of action against multiple Defendants in one claim form, and in a manner which is not chronological, does not have sequential paragraph numbering throughout, and where many claims overlap, and some issues been previously litigated, the task of identifying which parts of the claim may proceed, following a partially successful strike-out applications, is not wholly straightforward. The Court will be greatly assisted if the parties can liaise to produce a combined draft amended Particulars of Claim, clearly marking those paragraphs which must be struck out as a result of this judgment. If there is disagreement between the parties on any particular paragraphs, those should be marked in track changes rather than a separate document. A further hearing has been listed in this matter imminently to determine consequential directions arising from this judgment.

Finally, the Court has been concerned to note the multiplicity of actions in various Courts, which the issues in this case touch upon. For clarity for all concerned, those other cases which have now been identified, are set out in the Table below.